In the previous post, we mentioned the three opinions regarding how unusual types of private domains such as roofs, courtyards, and קרפפים are treated when it comes to transferring from one to the other in the absence of an eruv. I refer to them as “unusual” seeing as their main purpose is not for dwelling in-see first Rashi 91a )
According to Rav Yehuda, the opinions are as follows:
1. Rabbi Meir allows free direct transfer from roof to roof, courtyard to courtyard , and קרפף to קרפף so long as the one private domain is within 10 amos height of the other , even if each domain has different owners.
2. The Chachamim consider each roof to be under the same domain as the house below and thus forbid transferring from one to the other .
3. Rabbi Shimon allows free transfer between all 3 of these special private domain types so long as the object was in one of them before Shabbos and not in one of the houses. He also does not have the 10-amah height limitation between domains that Rabbi Meir has.
We have discussed how Rav and Shmuel debated whether two roofs not separated by a partition can be considered separate as far as carrying on one of them according to Chachamim, or bringing things from the house onto them according to Rabbi Shimon.
We discussed how Samuel’s lenient ruling might not carry weight against Rav despite the rule of הלכה כדברי המיקל בערוב because Shmuel himself holds that this rule only applies to requirements of the eruv itself and not disputes about the status of the מחיצות needed for the eruv, something we shall hopefully follow up on soon.
In this post, we discuss whether Rabbi Shimon’s lenient ruling is accepted in halacha.
On the one hold, we would not normally follow Rabbi Shimon against the majority view in a Mishna.
On the other hand, the rule of הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב might apply here, seeing as the debate is not about what is considered a valid מחיצה but rather about whether an eruv itself is required between different types of irregular private domains ( as opposed to houses which are specifically meant to live in)
Rabbi Yochanan indeed rules leniently like Rabbi Shimon.
There is another principle of psak, often quoted by Rabbi Yochanan himself, however, which the Gemara uses to question whether Rabbi Yochanan could indeed have ruled that way.
This is the rule of הלכה כסתם משנה ( the halacha follows an anonymous Mishna .)
Wherever a view of a Tana is recorded in the Mishna without his name being mentioned , the law follows that view.
The reason for this is because when writing down the Mishna, Rebbe chose to use this method to record a view which he considered to be authoritative and not subject to dispute
Seeing as there is such a סתם משנה which forbids moving things from one courtyard onto the top ( roof) of the wall between it and its neighboring courtyard, against Rabbi Shimons permission to transfer things from one private domain to another so long as a house is not one of the domains involved, it should follow that we do not accept his lenient opinion.
From the question itself, it seems to follow that the Gemara assumes that this principle of הלכה כסתם משנה should override the rule of הלכה כדברי המיקל בערוב- this makes sense given the fact that Rebbe chose to record the stringent view anonymously despite the later rule, clearly holding that the former rule does not apply .
The Gemara answers that the Mishna does not contradict Rabbi Shimon, as it could be referring to transferring things from the house VIA the courtyard to the top of the wall, which even Rabbi Shimon forbids.
As Tosfos points out, the very question of the Gemara is difficult , seeing as the rule of הלכה כסתם משנה has its limits.
If such a Mishna is followed by one which contains dissenting opinions on the subject, the rule no longer applies, as we assume that Rebbe specifically recorded the later Mishna as a dispute in order to show that he no longer regards the anonymous Mishna as authoritative.
This is referred to as סתם ואחר כך מחלוקת .
Seeing as the dispute between Rabbi Meir, Chachamim , and Rabbi Shimon is recorded later in the same Masechta than the סתם משנה against Rabbi Shimon, the סתם משנה should not be authoritative anymore .
The Rashba and Ritva suggest that the Gemara could indeed have answered that but preferred to answer the way it did .
Given that the answer given both went against the simple meaning of the Mishna and Rabbi Chiya’s apparent interpretation thereof, this seems like a rather extreme approach, but perhaps making our principle of הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב fit in with the סתם משנה was more important to the Gemara than interpreting it in the simplest way?
Tosfos in contrast suggests that the Gemara is not questioning Rabbi Yochanan’s support for Rabbi Shimon’s ruling regarding treating the three types of unusual private domains as one, as that is indeed סתם ואחר כך מחלוקת.
Rather the Gemara is questioning his support for Rabbi Shimon’s leniency regarding not being concerned about a 10 tefachim difference in height between the relevant private domains as Rabbi Meir is , Something which is not explicitly permitted in our Mishna but rather deduced.
He suggests that the debate regarding this can be found in an earlier Mishna whereas the Mishna that discussed the wall between the courtyards and seems to be stringent like Rabbi Meir is both later and anonymous, making it סתם ואחר כך מחלוקות .
Whether the earlier Mishna is indeed connected to this issue or not depends on how the case under concern is interpreted, and the Ritva indeed views the two cases as completely different.
In any case, it is seems to be concluded that we follow both leniencies of Rabbi Shimon without compromising the rule of הלכה כסתם משנה, something which can be very useful under the correct circumstances, though the correct alignment of roofs, courtyards, and קרפפים that Rebbe used to carry his towel to the spring is unlikely to be replicated in modern cities.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha