Tag Archives: הלכה כדברי המקיל בעירוב

Eruvin 93-95  When the Eruv comes down, שבת הואיל דהותרא הותרא , and הלכה   כדברי המיקל בערוב revisited

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When it comes to Eruv Techumim, we have seen that the golden rule regarding whether the eruv is valid is that if it is valid during the period of בין השמשות at the beginning of shabbos, it is valid the whole shabbos, even if the eruv food is later lost,eaten, or destroyed .

When it comes to ערוב חצירות and the מחיצות required for them, the situation is less simple.

At the bottom of Eruvin 93a, רב הושיעא asks what happens if new inhabitants enter a courtyard on shabbos?

Do we say that seeing as they were not there for the beginning of shabbos and their lack of participation in the eruv thus never invalidated everyone else’s eruv, the eruv remains valid for the whole shabbos despite their lack of participation therein, or do we say that seeing as they cannot join the eruv on shabbos, their presence now invalidates the eruv for the rest of the shabbos ?

Rashi gives the example of two courtyards separated by a common wall, who both make their own eruvin.

The wall then falls down, and each courtyard suddenly has a whole lot of new “inhabitants” that could render their eruv invalid.

Rav Chisda suggests a proof from the Mishna which says that if a large courtyard’s boundary wall with a smaller one is breached, the inhabitants of the large courtyard invalidate the eruv of the smaller courtyard.

He assumes that this is referring to if it was breached on shabbos, and we see from this that even if an eruv was valid for part of shabbos, it can be invalidated on shabbos through “new inhabitants.”

Rabbah, however, says that this Mishna might be referring to when the breach occurred before shabbos, and Abaya notes that according to Rabbah, it MUST be referring to such a case, as Rabbah himself had told Abaya that he has asked Rav Huna who in turn asked Rav Yehuda about a related case:

This was about two courtyards that made a joint eruv by means of an opening in their shared boundary wall which became sealed during the course of the Shabbos, possibly invalidating the eruv.

Rav Yehuda answered with the principle that שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה – Once Shabbos has been permitted (at its onset), it remins permitted (even if the entrance the eruv is based on becomes closed up.)

Similary in our case, once the smaller courtyard made its own eruv and the wall separating it from the neighboring larger courtyard was standing at the onset of shabbos, the eruv remains valid even if the wall falls down, introducing “new inhabitants.”

It follows that according to Abaya, Rabbah, and Rav Yehuda, we follow the rule of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה  , and at least according to Abaya and probably Rabbah, this is a broad principle that applies both  in cases where a wall falls down (destroying a partition) and where a gap in the wall is filled (recreating the partition.)

The Gemara then records a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding a similar case where the boundary wall between two courtyards that both made their own עירוב חצירות  falls down on Shabbos.

Rav holds that the inhabitants of each courtyard invalid the eruv of those of the other and carrying more than 4 amos within in the area is forbidden.

Shmuel, on contrast, holds that each courtyard’s inhabitants may carry up to where the boundary wall was, based on the rule of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה .

Although we usually follow Rav against Shmuel, seeing as the later Amoraim like Abaya and Rabbah seem to hold like Shmuel, there is a strong argument at this point that we would do so too.

However, the discussion is far from over- In the Mishna at the bottom of Eruvin 94a, there is a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi regarding what seems like related cases.

There, a house or courtyard collapses on two sides bordering the public domain on shabbos , or the pole or beam of a מבוי  collapse on shabbos.

Rabbi Yehuda holds that even though the מחיצות  that separate them from the public domain have collapsed, we apply the rule of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה  and carrying within them remains permitted for the duration of that Shabbos.

In contrast, Rabbi Yossi holds that the duration of Shabbos is no different to the next shabbos, and the Gemara on Eruvin 95a understands this to mean that just like carrying within them will be forbidden the next shabbos, it is also forbidden for the duration of this shabbos and we do not apply the rule of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה .

Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef rules like Rabbi Yosi, whereas Rav Yehuda quotes Shmuel as ruling leniently like Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara questions whether Shmuel could really have ruled leniently in this case.

In a different context, Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying that we always follow Rabbi Yehuda’s (lenient) rulings when in comes to eruvin, which at first glance appears to be consistent with the ruling quoted here.

However, Rav Chanan of Baghdad had asked Rav Yehuda to clarify whether Shmuel would even be lenient when it comes to the post or beam of a מבוי  being removed on shabbos, and Shmuel said that the lenient rule he had mentioned applied only to Rabbi Yehuda’s lenient views regarding the eruv itself, but not regarding the מחיצות  that are required for it.

As such, when it comes to disputes regarding whether מחיצות  are valid or not, the rule of   כדברי המיקל בערוב   הלכה does not apply- in our case, Shmuel would accordingly be stringent like Rabbi Yosi and not say שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה !

Rav Anan reconciles that apparent contradiction in Shmuel’s words by distinguishing between a private domain that opens to a רשות הרבים  and one that opens to a כרמלית .

In the former case, any dispute regarding the validity of the מחיצות  is effectively a dispute regarding a biblical prohibition, and being stringent is consistent with the general rule of ספק דאורייתא לחומרא.

In contrast, if only a רשות היחיד  and a כרמלית  are involved, the dispute only involves rabbinical matters, and the rule of ספק דרבנן לקולא  and its stronger “extension” of הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב  should logically apply.

It could follow that according the conclusion of the sugya, if certain components of the מחיצות  that validate the eruv, such as a boundary wall, or the pole or beam of a מבוי, fall down on shabbos, the eruv remains valid for the duration of that shabbos, so long as  the previously enclosed area is not open to a biblically defined public domain.

This could be an extremely useful tool for many of our city eruvin which are based on the assumption that the public areas are not busy or large enough to be considered a biblically defined public domain ((רשות הרבים דאורייתא

Another huge נפקא מינה (practical ramification) could be when it comes to debates regarding the precise length of halachik measurements such as a טפח  and an אמה  which are used to measure the validity of מחיצות.

Assuming that the rule of הלכה כדברי המקיל בעירוב  applies to disputes amongst later authorities as well (which of course needs its own discussion,) then according to Rav Anan’s distinction, so long as no biblically defined public domain is involved, one might be permitted to rely on the more lenient opinions  (for example measure a לבוד  taking a טפח  as closer to 10cm rather than closer to 8cm when measuring the maximum gap between the wires of a fence.)

However, while Rav Anan has succeeded in reconciling the contradiction in Shmuel’s words, and he does seem to have the final word in this sugya, it is not a foregone conclusion that we follow Shmuel either in this particular case of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה   or in his general rule (as understood by Rav Anan) that הלכה כדברי המיקל בערוב  applies even regarding מחיצות  when no רשות הרבים  is involved.

There are other sugyas that discuss this issue (see for example Eruvin 17a, Eruvin 70b,Eruvin 81b) which need to be put together with the various pieces on our three daf before a clearer idea of  the halacha can be seen, but we shall suffice for now to point out that Tosfos rules against Shmuel even when the previously enclosed area opens to a כרמלית  seeing as Rav rules like Rabbi Yosi. This seems to be the general consensus of other Rishonim as well, though a thorough study of their views is obviously required still, and as such, it seems that when a problem occurs on shabbos with the מחיצות , the rule of הואיל דהותרה הותרה  cannot be applied.

When the problem is created by the closure of a gap in the מחיצה  and not the lack of a מחיצה , however, Tosfos points out that even Rabbi Yosi agrees with the rule of שבת הואיל והותרה הותרה.

Whether Rav Anan’s extension of כלכה כדברי המיקל בערוב  to rabbinically required מחיצות  in other disputes where Rav does not rule against Shmuel requires further analysis, and could impact our second question regarding disputes over the sizes of the טפח  and אמה!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Eruvin 89-90 The dispute over roofs and הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב revisited

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The new chapter opens with a fascinating dispute about various unusual private domains that are not primarily used for living in, but have some other, if not limited, use.

The opening Mishna starts with the view of Rabbi Meir who considers all roofs within a certain proximity to each other to be considered as if they are one large private domain, even if they are owned by different people.

We recall that even though on a biblical level, there is no problem with transferring something directly from one private domain to another, Chazal forbade transferring items between adjacent private domains owned by different people or from a private domain owned by one person to  a shared courtyard or vice versa, in the absence of an eruv chatzeiros.

This is in order that one should not become confused and think that transferring from any domain to another is permitted, thus coming to transfer things between a private and public domain and vice versa.

Rabbi Meir is of the view that this prohibition is limited to transferring from one house to that of another or one type of private domain to a different type of private domain, but that roofs (and we shall see soon, also courtyards and קרפפים  ) have limited use, are not affected by the dwellers below and do not share this concern( see Rashi ).  As such, one may transfer items  directly from one roof to another, so long as the one roof is not more than 10 tefachim below or above the other, a limitation the Gemara explains later.

The Chachamim on the other hand, do not agree with this leniency, and hold that the roofs have the same divided status as the houses underneath and one may not transfer things from one roof to another.

The third and most lenient view is that of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that so long as an item was on a roof, in a courtyard, or a קרפף on erev shabbos and not in a house, one is permitted to transfer it directly from anyone of these three types of private domain to another!  the Gemara brings the case where Rebbe said that they used to “carry” their towels and annointing oil through these kind of domains to the spring in which they would wash and back on shabbos!

Whereas I hope to focus on this view of Rabbi Shimon and whether it is authoritative in a later post, I would like to focus today on a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding the opinion of Chachamim, which might also be relevant to the view of Rabbi Shimon.

This debate is regarding an important principle regarding partitions, known as גוד אסיק מחיצתא  (the partition carries on upwards), the more widely applied cousin of the principle we discussed in the previous post, namely גוד אחית מחיצה  (the partition carries on downwards) and its sibling rule of  פי תקרה יורד וסותם (the edge of the ceiling continues downwards and seals.)

This rule might be what allows us to view a raised area such as a roof, higher than 10 tefachim vertically, or in a horizontal displacement of 4 amot, to be viewed as a private domain, seeing as the vertical rise below is considered to continue upwards enclosing the raised area.

The dispute centers around the status of a roof that is open to the neighbor’s roof.

According to Chachamim, it is forbidden to carry from the one roof to the other.

The Question is whether one may carry things around within the limits of the one roof itself?

This is because  being open to the neighboring roof means that it is open to a place to which items may not be transferred from it, and the rule is that any domain that is open to another domain to which items may not be transferred is itself considered similar to a כרמלית  in that one may only transfer within 4 amos even inside it.

Although each roof is viewed to be surrounded by the “rising” walls below, the area between the roofs might be viewed as open.

Whereas Shmuel holds that the boundary wall between the houses below is also consider to “rise upwards” and close the gap between the roofs, Rav is of the view that the rule of גוד אסיק  only applies where the partition below is noticeable from the top. In a case where there is no gap between the roofs, the roofs effectively hide the boundary wall below from the view of those on the roof, and the boundary wall cannot be said to rise and close the gap.

This would make a major difference as to how one can carry things on a roof according to Chachamim, and even according to Rabbi Shimon, it will also be relevant when it comes to items brought from the house to the roof on shabbos, to which his leniency does not apply.

When it comes to how to rule in this debate, we are faced by contradictory rules.

On the one hand, the halacha generally follows רב  against שמואל  except in 3 cases (see for example Shabbos 22a.) On the other hand, we also hold that הלכה כדברי המקיל בעירוב (the halacha is like the lenient opinion when it comes to eruvin,) even against a majority and against existing rules of psak (see Eruvin 46a.)

The Ritva rules that the halacha is like Rav as usual, because the rule of הלכה כדברי המקיל בעירוב  does not apply in our case.

He proves this from an earlier sugya (Eruvin 81b) which states that even though the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda regarding Eruvin, this is only regarding the laws of the eruv itself, but when it comes to the laws of the מחיצות , the partitions required to define the status of the domains that the eruv is made for, this is not the case- it is in fact Shmuel who restricts this rule in that way.

The Ritva seems to understand that the rule that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehuda refers to his many leniencies and is an application of this rule of הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב, and that its limitation to the laws of eruv proper and not those of the partitions, proves that its parent rule, namely הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב  is similarly limited. This appears to be the understanding of the Yerushalmi too, which I hope to discuss in a later post.

The reason for this distinction could be that whether an eruv is valid or not affects only rabbinical laws, the validity of a partition can also determine whether an area is biblically defined as a private or public domain (or neither) and this rule can therefore not be universally applied as an extension and further leniency in the general rule of ספק דרבנן לקולא  (assuming this is indeed what it is, ואכמ”ל)

Even though the affected halacha is not always biblically, to avoid confusion, the extended leniency of eruvin is inapplicable in all cases regarding מחיצות .

Seeing as many Rishonim and poskim apply the later rule to many undecided disputes regarding eruvin, this distinction would have a massive impact when it comes to any undecided disputes regarding partitions. 

There is much to write regarding the scope of  the rule of הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב and whether it also applies to partitions, and this is indeed the subject of much discussion and dispute amongst the Rishonim.

Before getting to the Rishonim and Poskim, there are many sugyas relevant to the discussion, and I hope to revisit this in a few days again the next time it comes up!  

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Eruvin 46 and 47 Rules of psak: הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב, דעת יחיד בשעת הדחק, ספק דאורייתא לחומרא ,ספק דרבנן לקולא

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This daf is heavily concentrated with some of the most important principles of psak halacha that it is even harder than usual to do it justice.

We shall suffice with a brief explanation of some of them and some notes based on an initial analysis of how they are applied on this daf, hoping to build on what we have already done and continue to do based on their application in other sugyas.

The Mishna on Eruvin 45b recorded a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri and the Chachamim whether a person can acquire his shabbos techum during twilight of erev shabbos if he is asleep.

Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri rules that he can, whereas chachamim hold that seeing as he was not awake at the time, he did not acquire his 2000 amos from the place where he was, and is limited to the 4 amos in which he was.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is quote by Rav Yaakov bar Idi as ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri’s lenient opinion.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Yaakov ben Idi whether he heard this from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi as a specific ruling relating to this case, or deduced it based on a general rule of his, which the Gemara identifies as “הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב” -the law follows the lenient opinion regarding Eruvin.

Rav Yaakov bar Idi replied that he heard it as a specific ruling, and the Gemara explains that this specific ruling was needed in addition to the rule to teach us that this rule applies even when the lenient opinion is a דעת יחיד (single opinion) against the majority opinion, such as in the case of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri versus the Chachamim.

It is not clear at this point whether this leniency is meant to apply only to this case, or whether this case now serves as a precedent for all the laws of Eruvin, or perhaps even all rabbinical disputes

If the former is correct, we need to explain why this dispute in different to all other disputes regarding Eruvin. If the middle option is correct, we need to explain why the laws of Eruvin are treated more leniently than other rabbinical laws, where we are only lenient when there are as many lenient views than stringent ones.

If the latter is correct, we need to explain why we are so lenient with all rabbinical disputes to the point of pushing aside the general rule of אחרי רבים להטות – following the majority, and defend this statement against any other statements of Chazal that imply the opposite.

We also need to investigate whether Rabbi Yehoshua’s rule of הלכה כדברי המקיל בערוב is merely an application of the general rule of ספק דרבנן לקולא (as in the third option above), with the assumption that an unresolved dispute has the status of a doubt, and whose lenient applications are thus shared with all unresolved rabbinical disputes, or whether it is an independent rule that has its own unique leniencies not shared with other rabbinical disputes (as in the middle option above.)

We have touched on a similar question in an earlier post (Eruvin 35-36) where we discussed ספק עירוב לקולא – the rule that in matters of doubt regarding the validity of an eruv, we are lenient, and there is appeared that the Gemara understood this as simply an extension of the general rule of ספק דרבנן לקולא.

Assuming that a ספיקא דדינא ( a doubt as to which authority the halacha follows) is an extension of the concept of ספק דרבנן, this would imply that a dispute regarding Eruvin should also simply be an extension of the rule of leniency in the case of a dispute regarding any rabbinical law.

However, from a question asked by Rava on the Gemara’s understanding of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s statement, it seems that he understands that disputes regarding Eruvin have their own unique leniences.

Rava asks why there was even a הוא אמינא (initial thought) that we would not follow a lenient single opinion against a stringent majority opinion when it comes to Eruvin?!

He points out that this should be obvious, seeing Eruvin is a rabbinical requirement, and in rabbinical disputes, we always follow the lenient opinion, even if it is an individual against the majority!

Various proofs are brought to dispute this assumption of Rava, and this issue is far from resolved at this point, but from his question, it certainly seems that he understood that his colleagues saw Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s lenient view regarding Eruvin to be unique to Eruvin.

Though Rava’s assumption seems to be rejected, the Gemara clearly seems to understand than in another unique area of rabbinical law, namely the laws of mourning, the rule of הלכה כדברי המקיל באבל applies even when the lenient opinion is a single authority versus the majority!

More than that, Tosfos seems to understand that this rule that we follow the lenient opinion in the laws of mourning applies even on the first day of mourning which is דאורייתא (biblical) in nature, suggesting that this might be the case regarding biblical laws of Eruvin too (such as the larger techum of 4 parsah (about 16 km) which some view as deorayso, or when enclosing a real public domain), certainly a huge חדוש (novelty!)

Given that the usually undisputed rule regarding biblical laws is ספק דאורייתא לחומרא – in disputes we follow the stringent opinion, this is nothing short of remarkable, and we cannot escape the need to distinguish between the laws of mourning and possibly also Eruvin, from other rabbinical, and even biblical laws.

There is a fairly well- known dispute amongst the Rishonim regarding the status of the rule of ספק דאורייתא לחומרא .

The Rambam (see Issurei Biah 18/17, for example) opines that this rule is itself only rabbinical in nature, and that on a biblical level, one is not required to be stringent in the case of a doubt- the Torah by default forbids things that we know are forbidden and not things whose forbidden status is subject to doubt.

In contrast, when it comes to the status of rabbinical laws, he is of the view that all rabbinical laws start out with biblical status by default, based on the commandment of לא תסור (do not go against their words…see for example intro to M.T)

Although the various leniencies Chazal applied to their own laws can still be explained based on the fact that the Torah gave them the power to both make and define their own laws, in the case of a doubt, this is not necessary, given that the Rambam considers all doubts to only be subject to rabbinical law, and the Rabbis chose to be stringent with biblical doubts and lenient with their own.

This means that theoretically, in cases of doubt, Chazal have the authority to apply any leniencies they choose, even if the doubt is biblical in nature- they simply chose to be stringent most of the time.

In the case of mourning laws and possibly Eruvin, it is thus quite legal for Chazal to choose to be lenient even in cases of biblical level doubt, and perhaps out of sensitivity to a mourner already in such a sad state, and a person stuck outside his techum on shabbos, they chose to be lenient.

Whether this can be extended to following a single lenient opinion against the majority in a biblical matter is less straight-forward, as it is possible that even the Rambam admits that when there is clear majority on the side of stringency in a biblical dispute, it is a biblical requirement to follow the majority, based on אחרי רבים להטות .

It could be possible, however, that the Rambam holds that אחרי רבים להטות only applies when the dispute has come to the great Sanhedrin, but that a dispute that has not come before the great Sanhedrin had no such law, and remains a bona fide ספק , over which Chazal have total control.

However, some other Rishonim )see for example Rashba, Kiddushin 73a regarding Mamzer) are of the view that the requirement to follow the stringent opinion in case of doubt is a biblical requirement, and according to them, it seems impossible for Chazal to be able to push this rule aside in biblical aspects of Eruvin and the laws of mourning.

The mere fact that Tosfos suggests that the laws follows the lenient opinion even in biblical disputes when it comes to mourning and Eruvin, as well as the proofs he brings for it, seem to offer support for the Rambam’s view!

When it comes to most of the laws of Eruvin and mourning which are clearly rabbinical, Chazal clearly have total authority over their own laws, and if for the reasons suggested above, or other reasons, they chose to treat Eruvin and mourning even more leniently than their other laws and follow even a single lenient opinion against the majority, the were certainly within their mandate.

For further analysis, particularly regarding whether we follow this leniency even against the majority, the Ramban’s long treatment on the daf is essential reading.

We have seen above that although regarding the laws of mourning, and possibly also Eruvin, we may follow a single lenient opinion against a stringent majority, this is not necessarily the case in other rabbinic laws.

Whereas we are usually lenient in cases of doubts and disputes regarding rabbinic laws, where the stringent opinion is the majority, the majority might still prevail.

Yet there is a time where it seems to be permitted to follow a lenient single opinion against a majority stringent opinion, under certain circumstances, and that is the case of שעת הדחק – an emergency.

There is a debate (Niddah 2a) between Rabbi Eliezer and Chachamim regarding whether a woman who has not had a period in 3 months and then has a period may assume that until that moment, she was still pure- this would affect the purity status of whatever she was in contact with before.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, everything she was in contact with until now is treated as pure, whereas the Chachamim rule that anything susceptible to becoming impure from contact with a Niddah that she was in contact with over the 24 hours prior to her period is considered impure.

This is a rabbinical rule due a concern that she was already a niddah earlier, even though on a biblical level, we would be lenient.

Rebbe commented that he once mistakenly thought that the law is like Rabbi Eliezer and declared the items in question to be pure.

When he later discovered that the law was like the Chachamim, he did not rule them to be impure, saying that כדאי הוא רבי אליעזר לסמוך עליו בשעת הדחק – in an emergency, one may rely on Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara understands this to mean that unlike Rava’s suggestion, we normally follow the stringent majority against a lenient single opinion even in rabbinical disputes, and only in a שעת הדחק, the minority view may be followed.

It follows from this that even according to Rava’s antagonists, a דעת יחיד may be followed in an urgent situation, at least in a rabbinical matter.

What is not clear yet is the scope of this rule:

  1. Does it apply even to a biblical level dispute? According to Rambam’s above quoted view, it is certainly possible, but according to the stringent views that hold a biblical doubt is subject to biblical level stringency, it seems less likely that שעת הדחק would override that rule.
  2. Does it apply to any dispute, even one already resolved, or only to an unresolved dispute- The Gemara seems to take it for granted that this is limited this to an unresolved dispute (possibly similar to that between Rabbi Yehuda and Chachamim regarding the times for Mincha and Maariv- Brachos,) and that in a dispute that has already been resolved, שעת הדחק would not be a factor. It is still unclear, however, what the Gemara means by a resolved dispute- is this only one that has been resolved by Sanhedrin, do even the Amoraim count, or even post Talmud Geonim and Rishonim?
  3. What is the definition of שעת הדחק as far as this leniency is concerned- Tosfos seems to identify two different levels of שעת הדחק !

The above questions can have immense ramifications in many areas of contemporary halacha, and as we move through the daf cycle, we hope to collect more evidence to help us answer them!

Later on Eruvin 46 and moving onto 47, we move to a different set of rules of psak halacha.

Here we deal with the weight given to various Tannaim against one another when a dispute is given.

Various rules of thumb are given, amongst them:

  1. The halacha follows Rabbi Akiva against a single colleague of his
  2. The halacha follows Rabbi Yossi even against a majority
  3. The halacha follows Rebbe against a single colleague of his

Various other now well-known such rules are also stated, after which רב משרשיה claims that none of these rules actually apply, meaning that each case is in fact to be treated on its own merits- bases this on various ruling of Rav which seem to negate these rules.

After various examples brought to back this claim up, it becomes clear that even those who accept these rules must accept that there are some exceptions. היכא דאיתמר איתמר – in a place where a definitive ruling was made against the general rule, that ruling overrides the general rule. Only in a place where no definitive ruling has been made, do we apply these rules of thumb.

Incredibly, Rav does not except the existence of these rules at all, and even in undecided cases, leaves it up to the individual current authority to rule according to which argument makes most sense to him.

As Rabbi Yochanan does except these rules, the irony is that by the rule of thumb that we follow Rabbi Yochanan against Rav, it should follow that these rules are indeed authoritative, and Rashi on the daf says so explicitly, but what is to force those who choose to follow Rav to accept a ruling based on a rule they do not accept in the first place? Seems Kind of like what came first, the chicken or the egg, but in truth has a lot to do with the power of מעשה בית-דין which still applied to an extent in the time of Rabbi Yochanan!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.