the Mishna on daf 8a forbids the person who takes money out from the contribution boxes for use in the divine service to wear a garment with a folded hem or even to wear shoes or tefillin while doing so ! This is in case people suspect that he might have taken some money for himself and placed them in the fold, in his shoes, or even untied the tefillin boxes and hidden some money inside.
If he becomes poor , people might think that it is due to such wicked actions, and if he becomes rich, they might think that it is from the money he stole. The possibility that the person entrusted with such holy work could abuse his power in such a way or even abuse holy items such as Tefillin to aid his crime might be shocking , but unfortunately is as applicable today than ever.
Two sources are brought for the requirement to be completely above suspicion:”והייתם נקיים מה’ ומישראל “( and you shall be clean (of suspicion) from Hashem and Yisrael)- just like a person has to be clean in deeds in front of Hashem ( who knows all thoughts and actions), he also needs to be clean of suspicion from others who do not know his thoughts and actions . It is thus not enough to be honest in reality, but one also has to be above any suspicion of dishonesty. This passuk is found in the Chumash itself ( Bamidbar 32/22) in the context of the promise made by the tribes of Reuvain, Gad, and half of Menashe to help the other tribes conquer Eretz Yisroel proper in exchange for being allowed to settle on the other side of the Jordan. An alternative source is brought from Nach (Mishlei 3/4) “ומצא חן בשכל טוב בעיני אלוקים ואדם “( and he found grace and good intellect in the eyes of G-d and man.) The passuk is describing the result of one’s following the Torah properly , and a version of it in prayer form is found in the additions we say in the benstching . The Gemara on daf 9a brings further examples , among them : A קווץ ( person with long hair ) should not be given this task , presumably because he might be suspected of hiding money in his hair. They would keep talking with him all the time he is in the room so he would not be suspected of hiding money in his mouth ! It also brings a third source for the requirement to be above above suspicion from the Navi and concludes that the first source brought from the Chumash is the clearest of all ! We have already seen this passuk being brought as a source for this requirement in the Bavli in our post on Pesachim 12-13 where we discussed this topic in more detail and together with other sources and examples , referenced our Mishna here in Shekalim. As with everything in the Torah , and particularly in ethical matters , it cannot be highlighted enough!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Given that the prohibition of chametz on pesach is included in the list of איסורי הנאה (prohibitions that one is not allowed to derive any benefit from,) our perek spends considerable time discussing the scope of such prohibitions.
Whereas when it comes to most forbidden foods, the prohibition is limited to the act of eating and when it comes to shabbos and forbidden relationships, specific actions are forbidden, when it comes to this category of prohibitions, benefit itself is prohibited, and this might apply even to benefits that do not involve a specific action (לאו שאין בו נעשה) such as just smelling the fragrant aroma of incense offered for idolatrous purposes.
The central topic of the end of daf 25 and most of daf 26 is the status of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה, benefit which comes to a person “by force.”
Although the Gemara itself does not initially give an example of this, Rashi cites the case mentioned above of a person who walks past a place where incense is being offered for idolatrous purposes and cannot help smelling the fragrant aroma.
Abaya holds that this is permitted, whereas Rava holds that it is forbidden.
Seeing as we are dealing with benefit which is unavoidable, debating whether it is permitted or forbidden seems rather spurious, and it is thus obvious that the debate does not center around someone already in the situation, but whether one is permitted to willingly enter into a situation where one knows that this will or might happen.
Alternatively, the debate could center upon whether a person is required to immediately move away from such a situation the moment he encounters it, even if it means retracing his steps and taking an alternative or possibly longer route to avoid further benefit, or whether one may carry on and pass the area, seeing as the benefit he gets from the smell is forced upon him.
Either way, the Gemara divides the discussion up into 4 different scenarios, which depend on whether it is אפשר (possible) to avoid the benefit or not, and whether one is מתכוין (intends) to derive benefit or not.
The 4 permutations are as follows:
When it is both impossible to avoid the prohibition and one has no intention to derive benefit from it (2 factors in one’s favor)
When it is impossible to avoid the prohibition, but one has intention to derive benefit from it. (1 factor in one’s favor and 1 against)
When it is possible to avoid the prohibition, but one has no intention to derive benefit from it. (1 factor against and one fact in favor)
When it is possible to avoid the prohibition and one has intention to benefit from it. (2 factors against)
The Gemara first claims that everyone would be lenient in the first case, and stringent in the second and fourth cases- in other words, if one has intention to benefit, it is forbidden, whether it is possible to avoid the situation or not, and if one has no intention to benefit AND it is impossible to avoid the situation, they both agree that it is permitted.
The debate is solely focussed on the third case, where it is possible to avoid the situation but one does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibition, and centers around the famous view of Rabbi Shimon (see our various posts on this back in Shabbos) who holds that דבר שאין מתכוין מותר (one is permitted to perform a permitted action even if there is a significant concern that it will be accompanied by a secondary forbidden action.)
The classic example of this principle is his permission for a person to drag a bed, chair, or bench along the ground even though he might dig a ditch while doing so, as long as this is not his intention.
However, as we have seen, it is clear from various sources ( see post on Shabbos 133) that this leniency of Rabbi Shimon’s applies not only to the laws of shabbos but to all areas of halacha.
As such, Abaya argues that seeing as the act of walking to wherever one is going is a permitted action, it remains permitted even though one might transgress the prohibition of benefitting from עבודה זרה (idol-worship) along the way.
Rava, on the other hand, claims that the leniency of Rabbi Shimon is limited to cases where it is impossible to achieve one’s goal without taking the risk, for example if the above-mentioned furniture is too large or heavy to lift.
However, if it is possible to avoid the risk, such as in the case of smaller/less heavy furniture which one can lift, one is required to avoid the risk altogether.
It should be noted that this limitation to Rabbi Shimon’s leniency was suggested elsewhere (Shabbos 29b) and rejected, as it will be later in this sugya, but it is of course important to understand this הוה אמינא (initial thought) as well.
The Gemara immediately brings an איכא דאמרי (alternative version) whereby everyone (in this case both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda [who normally forbids דבר שאין מתכוין ] ) agrees that in the first case, where the situation is unavoidable and one has no intention to benefit, it is permitted, and that in the fourth situation where the situation is avoidable and one has intention to benefit, it is forbidden.
The third scenario where it is possible to avoid the situation, but one has no intention to benefit, is the classic dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda.
According to this version, It is the second scenario, where it is impossible to avoid the situation but one DOES intend to benefit once one is in the situation, which is subject to debate between Abaya and Rava.
According to this version, the debate between Abaya and Rava centers not on the view of Rabbi Shimon, for whom intention is the critical factor and for whom it would thus be clearly forbidden (see Rashi) but on the view of Rabbi Yehuda who seems less concerned with intention and more concerned with whether it is possible to avoid the situation or not.
Abaya claims that just like Rabbi Yehuda makes no distinction in a case where it is possible to avoid the situation between a case when one intends to benefit and a case when one does not, forbidding דבר שאין מתכוין regardless, so also in a case where it is impossible to avoid the situation, he does not care whether one intends to derive an otherwise forbidden side benefit from it, or not, and permits it either way. If this is correct, it would follow that once a person is in an unavoidable situation in which he is forced to derive a forbidden benefit, having conscious intent to enjoy the situation might be permitted, something which seems like a tremendous novelty.
Rava, in contrast, counters that Rabbi Yehuda’s lack of concern for whether one has intention for the forbidden action or benefit or not only applies לחומרה (stringently) to forbid an otherwise permitted act if it could involve a forbidden secondary action or benefit.
However, he certainly does not disregard intention in order to be lenient and permit one to have specific intention to perform a forbidden action or derive a forbidden benefit if one is already in a situation where some benefit is “forced on him.” Although one might not be required to leave the situation, one is certainly not permitted to have intention to derive benefit from it.
After bringing various proof texts for the views of Abaya and Rava (with it being important for us to take note of which version of the debate the proofs seem to assume to be correct,) the Gemara brings a Mishna (Kil’ayim 9/5 ) which permits one to “wear” כלאים (forbidden garments which contain a mixture of wool and linen, also known as שעטנז ) in order to display it to would be non-Jewish buyers, so long as one does not intend to derive warmth or protection from it.
This is despite the fact that one could rather display it from behind, as the צנועים (more “modest” or careful people) would do.
This proves without a doubt that the view that permits דבר שאין מתכוין, namely Rabbi Shimon, permits it even when it is possible to avoid the situation and achieve one’s objective without risking the secondary forbidden action, thus disproving the first version of Rava’s opinion.
Although this case and the proof from it requires its own analysis, it follows that we would either rule like Abaya in the first version, despite the rule that we follow Rava in all but 6 disputes against him (Bava Metzia 22b) or more likely, in order to keep with this rule, that we follow the second version of Rava’s opinion.
Either way, as following the second version of Abaya’s view would unnecessarily go against this rule, this seems like an unlikely possibility.
As such, it seems to be the conclusion of the sugya that scenarios 1 and 3 are clearly permitted (at least according to Rabbi Shimon whom later Amoraim have clearly deemed authoritative )- so long as one has no intention to derive forbidden benefit, even if the situation is avoidable, there is no obligation to avoid it.
On the other hand, in cases 2 and 4, where one has intention to derive forbidden benefit, entering the situation is forbidden, irrespective of whether it is avoidable or not.
Now that we have summarized the flow of the sugya, according to Rashi and the consensus of most Rishonim, it is time to focus on some of the difficulties raised by this sugya.
Semantic Matters
As we have seen, the case of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה (benefit which is forced upon a person) has been divided into 4 scenarios, based on 2 critical factors, namely whether is it possible to avoid the situation and whether one intends to derive the forbidden benefit.
However, the very term בעל כרחיה (by force) seems to exclude a situation where it is possible to avoid the situation, as well as a case where one has intention to derive forbidden benefit.
If one is able to avoid the situation, how can any subsequent benefit be considered “by force?”
Similarly, if when faced with the situation, one consciously has intention to enjoy it, how can that be considered “by force?”
It seems that Rashi and most Rishonim understand that
when referring to אפשר ( the possibility to avoid the situation,) the Gemara means that it is possible to achieve the intended permitted goal (such as reaching one’s destination) by taking an alternative route
Whereas
ii. לא אפשר refers to a situation where it is impossible to achieve one’s otherwise permitted goal without taking the problematic route.
Tosfos and other Rishonim (see for example Ritva in the name of the רא”ה) add that it is also considered לא אפשר (impossible to avoid) if the alternative route or method is longer or requires more effort, time, or money.
“אפשר” , in contrast, is understand to refer to a situation where it is possible to perform one’s intended otherwise permitted task in an equally convenient way that avoids the risk.
Yet even such a case, while forbidden according to the first version of Rava’s view, seems to still be referred to by the Gemara as “by force,” seeing as if he goes on his chosen route, he is forced into encountering the forbidden benefit, an extremely broad definition of “by force” to say the least.
Furthermore, it seems according to Rashi and most other Rishonim (see for example Meiri, though see Ritva for a different view) that קא מכוין refers to one who consciously intends to enjoy the forbidden benefit, and it requires some serious analysis to understand how this could ever be considered “by force.”
One could possibly explain that once a person is forced into a situation where he cannot avoid enjoying a forbidden pleasure, then “giving in” and consciously enjoying it, while probably not permitted, is to a certain extent, still considered to be “forced.”
This could perhaps be compared to a person who is raped but at a certain point, once feeling the pleasure of physical stimulation, gives in and “enjoys it.” (obviously, the plausibility of this depends on the individual and precise circumstances, but such cases certainly seem to exist -a thorough analysis if the sugya in Yevamos 53b of אין אונס לערוה is recommended at this point.)
Whereas the victim might be obligated to try his best to mentally detach himself and avoid deriving pleasure from the physical sensation, it might be harder to condemn him for succumbing and doing so, given that the combination of being forced into the situation and biology make it close to impossible to avoid- even if he is punished for this, as in the case of אונס לערוה (Yevamos 53b,) it might still be called “by force.”- he was simply required to resist the force.
The Ran, however, simply explains that even though one intends to derive benefit, if the benefit is not intended for him (or brought about by him) but comes automatically, it is still called in this context “by force.”
As mentioned above, the Ritva goes to the opposite extreme and says that whenever a person benefits, it is considered intentional, and that לא קא מכוין refers to when the person himself does not (or perhaps believes he will not ) derive pleasure from the forbidden entity, even if many or most people would (why the phrase הנאה is used to describe someone who does not have הנאה requires explanation according to this view.)
These various explanations could have major practical ramifications, but more on that at a later stage hopefully.
פסיק רישיה and הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה
One of the issues that bothers the Rishonim is the fact that in our sugya, it seems clear that according to Rabbi Shimon who permits דבר שאין מתכוין, there is no problem walking past a place where there is a pleasant forbidden fragrance.
Likewise, examples are given of sitting in the shade of the Temple’s walls for a derasha and lowering workers into the קדש הקדשים for maintenance even though they will derive forbidden benefit from seeing the inside.
Yet it is made clear in many places that even Rabbi Shimon forbids פסיק רישיה , a situation where the secondary forbidden action (in this case benefit) is inevitable, and it seems pretty much inevitable that a person in these situations will derive some benefit from them.
Whereas the Tosfos choose to assume that all these cases do not involve inevitable benefit (perhaps as different people react differently to certain scents and sights etc) the מהר”ם חאלאוה distinguishes between a forbidden action such as a melacha on shabbos whose completion is not affected by one’s lack of intention, and benefit, which is not considered complete when one lacks intention to benefit.
The latter’s חידוש (novel idea) seems to be that unintended pleasure is not considered complete pleasure at all, and even if such pleasure is inevitable, the stringency of פסיק רישיה does not apply to it, something which of course requires further explanation.
Of course, according to the view of the Ritva in the name of the רא”ה quoted above, the leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין only applies where a person does not derive pleasure from the problematic situation, but if he does derive pleasure, it is considered intentional, and the question does not begin.
הנאה as a stringency
We have seen in our sugya that Rabbi Shimon’s leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין מותר is extended to forbidden benefits occurred during otherwise permitted actions.
However, we have dealt before with another related leniency, namely מתעסק, where one intends to perform a permitted action and lands up doing something that is forbidden (see posts on shabbos 72 and 92 for background.)
Regarding מתעסק, we have seen that when benefit is derived from the unintended forbidden action (such as eating forbidden fats thinking that it is permitted fat or sleeping with a woman who is forbidden to him, thinking she is permitted to him,) one is still liable to bring a korban (sacrifice) for one’s actions.
We see a similar idea regarding נזיקין (damages- B.K. 19b) that although an ox is sometimes exempt from damages it does with its mouth in public property, the owner is liable up to the value of the benefit that it derived from doing so (such as the cost of the food it ate.)
It seems from the above that whenever a person (or his animal) derives pleasure from something, his lack of intent or warning is irrelevant to his liability for any transgression derived thereby.
It seems, at least on the face of it, that there must be a strong distinction between מתעסק and דבר שאין מתכוין when it comes to benefit and that the latter is conceptually so different that הנאה does not affect it at all.
Perhaps this because whereas in מתעסק, the primary action one lands up doing, albeit unintentionally, is forbidden, in the case of דבר שאין מתכוין, the primary action remains permitted and the forbidden action is merely a secondary by-product of that action- secondary benefit that is only a by-product of a permitted action might not be enough to create liability or even to forbid the permitted action in the first place.
OF course, once again, if we were to adopt the approach of the Ritva quoted above, then any benefit is treated as intentional (even though possibly still called “by force”) and there is no need for any such distinction.
Entering situations of sexual temptation for the sake of permitted activities
It follows from the conclusion of our sugya, at least according to most Rishonim, that it is permitted to enter a situation where one might derive forbidden but unintended benefit, if one needs to for some otherwise permitted purpose, even if there is an equally convenient alternative route or way of achieving that objective (אפשר ולא קא מכוין)
Yet we are told (Bava Basra 57b) that a man who intentionally walks past a place where women are washing clothes (and thus not fully covered) where another path exists to where he is going, is called a רשע (wicked person.)- Only if there is no alternative path, may he walk past and turn his eyes away.
It is not immediately clear from that sugya whether the alternative path needs to be as convenient as the problematic one or not, but If intentionally walking past a place where he will derive pleasure from the forbidden fragrance of idolatrous incense is permitted, even if there is an equally convenient alternative route, why should walking past this immodest situation even if an EQUALLY convenient alternative route exists, be not only forbidden but bad enough to be called a רשע ? (see though Rashbam on the sugya, as opposed to Rabbeinu Gershom, regarding what exactly this means.)
Once again, if we accept the Ritva’s explanation above, the question might not even begin.
Although it is indeed possible for a person to know in advance (or at least think) that he does not derive pleasure from incense, the principle of אין אפוטרופוס לעריות might teach us that it is impossible for any man to know or assume in advance that he will not derive pleasure from immodestly dressed women.
Similarly, according to the Tosfos who say that הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה is only permitted in cases where דבר שאין מתכוין itself is permitted, namely when the benefit is not inevitable, perhaps the strength of the sexual urge is such that such benefit is inevitable.
However, according to the מהר”ם חאלאוה quoted above, who explains that benefit one is “forced into” is not subject to the stringency of פסיק רישיה, neither of these explanations hold water.
Pinning an explanation on the severe status of forbidden relations in things related to them is also not sufficient, seeing as idolatry and things related to it are treated equally strictly.
Perhaps a combination of the severity of the transgression and likelihood thereof due to its overpowering attraction sets entering a situation of sexual temptation apart and even the מהרם חאלואה would agree that the leniency of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה does not apply to it.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
On Daf 12b, the Gemara quotes a Mishna which records a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the last time one is permitted to eat chametz on erev Pesach.
Rabbi Meir holds that one may eat chametz until the end of the fifth hour of the day and must burn in at the beginning of the sixth hour.
Rabbi Yehuda, however, holds that one may only eat chametz until the end of the fourth hour, may keep it in one’s possession till the end of the fifth hour, and burns it in the beginning of the sixth hour.
It should be noted that the prohibition of eating and owning chametz on a biblical level only applies from midday, and that these are rabbinical “fences” designed to avoid missing the biblical deadline.
The Gemara in 13b notes that Rav Nachman ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, and later claims that Rebbe’s own ruling supported his conclusion.
It tells how someone had deposited a leather sack (see Rashi) filled with chametz with יוחנן חקוקאה and it was bitten open by a mouse.
It was erev pesach, and the chametz was leaking out and getting lost, and he wanted to sell it to recover whatever money he could for the owner while doing so was still allowed.
Rebbe kept telling him to wait, in case the owner came and wanted to eat it, until the beginning of the fifth hour when he told him to go to the market and sell it on his behalf.
The Gemara assumes that Rebbe meant for him to sell it to non-Jews, thus implying that he agreed with Rabbi Yehuda that eating chametz during this time is already forbidden for Jews.
After all, if he meant for him to sell it to Jews and agreed with Rabbi Meir that Jews were still permitted to eat chametz during this time, he should have rather given Yochanan the option to buy it himself first and eat it during this time, rather than requiring him to make the effort to go to the market to sell it!
The Gemara refutes this suggestion, explaining that Rebbe might indeed agree with Rabbi Meir and have intended for Yochanan to sell it to Jews on behalf of the owner.
However, Rebbe did not want him to buy it himself, due to concerns for חשד (arousing suspicion.)
As Yochanan had a vested interest in fixing the price lower than the going rate in order to buy it himself, Rebbe held that it was wrong to buy it, even for the same price as others would agree to, in order not to arouse suspicion that he had indeed done so.
To back this reasoning up, it brings a Beraisa that discussed someone who collects copper coins for charity and currently has no poor people to give them to. Due to the concern that they might go rusty, he needs to exchange them for silver coins with someone else, but he may NOT exchange them for his own silver coins, in order not to arouse suspicion that he gave himself a favorable rate.
This would be going against the apparently biblical directive of “והייתם נקיים מה’ ומישראל ” – “you shall be clean from Hashem and the Jewish people (Bamidbar 32/22.)
The same applies to someone who works in a soup kitchen and has excess food: He needs to sell it to someone else, but may not buy it himself from the charity, to avoid suspicion that he might give himself a better price!
This idea can be found in an explicit Mishna (Shekalim 3/2,) which tells us that the person who puts donations given to the Temple in the 3 boxes used for storing them may not wear a garment that is folded over, shoes, an amulet, or even Tefillin, in order not to arouse suspicion that he stole from them and hid the money in one of the above items (see Rambam there.)
The idea that someone would be so brazen as to un-sow Tefillin and hide stolen money in them might seem extreme , but there have indeed been cases in modern times where “religious” Jews have been caught smuggling diamonds and other things in their Tefillin, making this Mishna even more chilling (Rav Mordechai Kamenetzky (https://torah.org/torah-portion/drasha-5757-shoftim/) tells how when consulted about this phenomena, his saintly grandfather Rav Yaakov Kamenetzky זצ”ל compared such behavior to someone who approaches enemy lines with a white flag as if to surrender, and throws a grenade, violating a sacred symbol of peaceful intent so that others no longer trust it.)
We saw earlier in the daf cycle (Shabbos 23a) that a person is required to leave פאה (the corner of the field left for the poor) at the end of his field, for 4 different reasons, one of them being to avoid חשד (suspicion) that he might not have left anything at all.
Similarly, The Gemara (Bava Basra 8b) rules that it is forbidden for someone who is collecting money for charity to put money that he finds in the street, or that someone gives him in repayment of a loan, in his own wallet, so that people should not think that it is charity money that he is taking for himself.
Rather, he should put it in the charity box, and transfer it to his own wallet once home. The people collecting money are also supposed to go in pairs for the same reason (Bava Basra 8b.)
We should note that unlike the practise in many corrupt areas of making traffic police work in pairs to make it more risky to accept bribes, the concern here is not even that they would steal the money but simply that they might be suspected of doing so- such is the ethical standard expected of a Jew.
The directive to “be clean” does not only apply to monetary matters, but also to arousing suspicion of other types of improper behavior.
For example, one of the reasons that it is forbidden to enter a חורבה (ruin ) is to avoid suspicion that one might be meeting a prostitute there (Brachos 3a and Rashi there.)
A Jew is required to not avoid corruption, but to avoid any suspicion of corrupt behave, and to always be AND appear squeaky clean.
There is a related concept called מראית עיין, where Chazal forbade or required certain actions to avoid “looking bad.”
Whether this is an extension of the concern of חשד or an independent concept requires some analysis, which I hope to be able to do at a later opportunity.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
On our daf, we continue dealing with the question of whether a loan document ( שטר חוב) that has already been paid back has any residual use to the lender or not.
This will of course impact on liability for transferring it on Shabbos .
Typically, a person who borrows money will sign a document together with witnesses which the lender will then keep as proof of the loan.
When the borrower pays back the loan, the document could be returned to him, or destroyed , or a שובר ( type of receipt ) could be signed and given to the borrower.
Given that documents were written on animal hides and involved a degree of expense (paper was not cheap and readily available as it is today,) it stands to reason that the lender might wish to keep the document to use to cover a container with, or for some other use.
Yet we see an opinion that this is forbidden, presumably even if the borrower trusts him and agrees.
One opinion goes further and says that it is forbidden even if a שובר is written !
Rashi brings a passuk in Iyov as a source for this prohibition , which says “Corruption should not dwell in your tent .”
Without discussing the propriety of using verses in the Navi or Kesubim as basis for laws, and whether this is a דרשה גמורה or a kind of אסמכתא, It is clear that Rashi understands that even though someone is honest, and even trusted by the other side, it is forbidden to bring oneself into financial temptation.
Financial temptation is one of the things that no-one is immune from – ” as bribery blinds the eyes of the wise and corrupts the words of the righteous ” ( Devarim 16/19,) and although this is far from actual bribery, the temptation to claim back a repaid loan a second time, coupled with the chances that the borrower might lose his receipt , is enough reason to forbid the lender from retaining the loan document , even though it has some permitted financial utility to him.
It could be noted that according to Rashi at least, this is not a concern of חשד, or that people will suspect him of corrupt intent, as there is already an accepted source in the Chumash itself for the need to avoid any suspicion, namely ” and you shall be clean with regards to Hashem and Israel ” ( Bamidbar 32/22).
Rather, the passuk in Iyov is revealing to us that even if a person would not be suspected of wrong doing , he is not allowed to bring himself to any temptation to be corrupt .
It can be illustrated from various sugyas that the need to stay away from any financial temptation, or even the slightest financial suspicion, applies to the greatest of people- in fact, the greater one is, the more squeaky clean one is expected to be.
In Brachos 5b , we are told how Rav Huna had 400 barrels of wine turn to vinegar.
When his colleagues came to visit him, they told him to look into his affairs to see what he might have done to deserve it (important to note that this is not the way one should normally talk to people who are suffering and it might be a transgression of the prohibition of אונאת דברים – see Bava Metzia 58b)
After some give and take , he asked them if they heard anything negative about him, and they replied that they had heard that he did not pay his sharecropper his share in the yield.
Rav Huna replied that the sharecropper stole more than the value of his share already, so he had no claim .
They replied that despite this, when one steals from a thief, one tastes the taste of theft ( see Rashi there.)
He then agreed to pay the sharecropper and the vinegar became wine again ( or was sold for the price of wine.)
The message seems to be that even though Rav Huna was within his legal rights , after all , the law is that one is permitted to take back what is his himself without going to court ( see Bava Kama 27b re עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה ), someone of his level certainly has to be completely above any chance of suspicion – the mere fact that people suspected him of wrong doing was reason for him to lose a fortune of money .
There is another law which prohibits lending money without witnesses, as one could be causing the borrower to sin by defaulting on the loan ( Bava Metzia 75b.)
The Gemara tells a story where Ravina asked if that even applies to someone who lends him money, given that he is honest and would never default.
He was told that it applies even more so to him, as he is extra busy and could “forget.”
Although some of these cases refer to suspicion and some to temptation or even forgetfulness, all of them show that no matter how great one is, one cannot rely on his greatness to take even the smallest chance of financial impropriety or suspicion.
If only we could live up to even part of these high expectations!
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