In the fifth Perek (Pesachim 59a,) the Mishna teaches that even once it has been set aside to be a קרבן פסח, if the lamb or goat was slaughtered with intent to use it for another קרבן, or other invalid purposes, it is פסול.
In our chapter, we have focussed a lot on the fact that the קרבן פסח pushes aside the prohibition of מלאכה on Shabbos, and is thus offered even on Shabbos, unlike the חגיגה which does not push this prohibition aside and is thus not offered on shabbos.
The Mishna on 71b puts these two rules together and teaches that if someone slaughtered a קרבן פסח for an invalid purpose on shabbos, seeing as the קרבן is invalid and the מצוה has not been fulfilled, he has also unknowingly desecrated שבת and needs to bring a קרבן חטאת (sin offering) to atone for this.
The Gemara on 72b notes that seeing as the קרבן is invalid, the slaughter was actually an act of מקלקל (a destructive action) and the general rule is that מקלקל בשבת פטור (one is not liable for a melacha whose result is only destructive- See post on Shabbos 105-106)
There is a view,however, namely that of Rabbi Shimon (Shabbos 106a ) that holds that כל המקלקלין פטורים חוץ ממבעיר וחובל – one is not liable for any destructive act other than lighting a fire and injury (the later falling under the מלאכה of שוחט.
According to this view, these two melachot are exemptions to the exemption of מקלקל and it thus makes sense that slaughtering an animal in a way that renders it unfit is still a punishable act on shabbos.
However, according to the view that מקלקל בחבורה (making a wound in a destructive way) is also פטור, why should one who slaughters an animal on shabbos in a way that disqualifies it be liable- his act was purely destructive!
The Gemara first asks this question in relation to someone who slaughtered the קרבן פסח with the intention for people other than those assigned to it to eat it.
It responds that seeing as such a קרבן is not taken down from the מזבח if it was already put up, there is still some benefit to the slaughter, and it is not considered מקלקל.
It then asks the same question regarding the case where the animal is found to be a בעל מום (blemished) after slaughter. In this case, even if the animal has been put on the מזבח already, it must be taken down.
The Gemara answers that the mishna is only referring to certain blemishes that Rabbi Akiva holds do not require it to be taken down once it has already been put up.
The Gemara proceeds to query the case where it was slaughtered and then found to be a טריפה (terminally wounded animal) in a place which could not have been seen before slaughter, and answers that there is still some benefit in that the animal can no longer become טמא like a נבילה (an animal that died without halachik slaughter.)
We see from this sugya that even according to the opinion that the exemption of מקלקל applies to the מלאכה of שוחט\חובל , the slightest benefit achieved from the animal itself because of the slaughter prevents the action from being defined as מקלקל , even if the action is clearly more destructive than constructive.
Whether this limitation applies only to these two exceptional מלאכות or to all cases of מקלקל requires further analysis.
Tosfos notes that in addition to מקלקל, there is another reason for exemption that should apply in these cases, namely the exemption of מתעסק, which usually applies when one intends to perform an action on a permitted item and lands up performing it on a forbidden one.
One who slaughters a קרבן פסח for another purpose presumably does so because he thought that it was set aside for another purpose (though see the discussion regarding the precise case on daf 72a where this might not be so straightforward an assumption.)
Similarly, one who thinks that he is slaughtering an animal without a blemish or that is not a טריפה and later finds out that it was indeed blemished or טריפה, has also performed an action on a forbidden item thinking it was a permitted item.
He notes that although there is admittedly a view (Kerisot 19b), in connection with the case of the two babies discussed on daf 72, that just like מקלקל is not an exemption when it comes to חובל, neither is מתעסק, a view which of course needs its own explanation, it is clear from the same sugya that according to the view that the exemption of מקלקל does apply to חובל, it applies to מתעסק too.
As such, it is difficult why the Gemara does not question the liability of such a person based on the exemption of מתעסק, even if it is not considered מקלקל.
We should note that this question fits the way תוספות understands מתעסק (see post on Shabbos 72.)
However, Rashi holds that the exemption of מתעסק only applies where the action was applied to a DIFFERENT item than the one which he intended to apply it to, for example if his hand slips, and in a case where he intended it to be applied to the same item but merely thought that it was a permitted item, he would be liable as שוגג seeing as נעשתה מחשבתו (his intended action was carried out on its intended recipient.)
According to this view, the question does not even begin!
Another difficulty is the assumption that even a small benefit stops an action from being considered מקלקל even according to the opinion (Rabbi Yehuda) that exempts מקלקל בחבורה .
Virtually every destructive action could be viewed as beneficial in some far-fetched way, rendering the often-used exemption rather mute.
Yet Rabbi Yochanan (Shabbos 106a) denied that Rabbi Shimon held that מקלקל is liable when it comes to חובל ומבעיר and said that if he did indeed hold that way, it is only when there is some small benefit.
It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds that מקלקל is exempt even when it comes to these 2 מלאכות , he must mean that this is EVEN if there is some small benefit!
The Tosfos therefore suggest that when our sugya refers to the view that exemptsמקלקל בחבורה , it is not referring to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather to Rabbi Shimon according to Rabbi Yochanan’s interpretation by which Rabbi Shimon only holds one liable for מקלקל בחבורה if there is some small benefit.
It is possible that Rabbi Yochanan would still agree that Rabbi Shimon holds that מתעסק בחבורה is liable just like מקלקל בחבורה is under his more limited circumstances, and that our sugya is not bothered by the מתעסק issue.
This also allows us to conclude that Rabbi Yehuda exempts מקלקל בחבורה even where there is some small benefit and that this certainly applies to מלאכות other than it and הבערה!
There is much more to discuss on this issue, some of which we have done in earlier posts, and some of which I hope to revisit in later posts.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.
One of the guiding principles of these posts, as taught to me by my Rebbeim, is that while it is both impossible and disingenuous to resolve complex questions based on isolated sugyas without considering all sugyos in the shas that pertain to the relevant question (obviously the domain of senior Talmidei-Chachamim) , passing through daf of Gemara superficially without taking note of things that could impact these questions is a waste of an incredible opportunity to build one’s database, and likely a form of בטול תורה.
I would like to touch briefly one how some topics we have discussed before in our posts are enriched by these daf:
סיכה כשתיה and deodorants on Pesach:
In our post on Shabbos 86a (please refer there for background,) we discussed using non-edible substances containing chametz (such as deoderant containing wheat-based alcohol) on one’s body on Pesach.
This was based on the Mishna (Shabbos 86a) which says that regarding Yom-Kippur, the rule is that סיכה כשתיה (annointing is like drinking( and not only drinking chametz liquids but annointing with them is also forbidden (albeit as noted there, not treated as stringently.)
We discussed whether this rule applies in other areas of halacha as well, specifically chametz on Pesach, in which case although the prohibition of deriving any benefit from chametz on Pesach only applies to chametz that is fit for a dog to eat, something that is fit for annointing such as deodorant might be considered as if it is fit for drinking and thus also forbidden (please refer to that post for a more detailed analysis of this and other factors involved.)
At the bottom of Pesachim 31b, the Gemara quotes a Mishna which forms much of the discussion on Daf 32a.
This Mishna (Trumos 6/a) tells us that a זר (non kohain) who eats תרומה (the portion separated for the kohain) בשוגג (unintentionally) must compensate the kohain with the קרן (same amount of fruit) plus חומש (a fifth penalty [actually a quarter of principle, making the penalty a fifth of the total paid]) and that this applies also to one who drinks תרומה or anoints oneself with it.
Rashi (as well as the Bartenura on the Mishna) explains that although the Torah only requires this penalty of one who ate תרומה, and not one who damaged it (as the Gemara derives later on the daf,) we know from elsewhere (Yoma 76b) that סיכה כשתיה (annointing is like drinking) and for this reason, one who anoints himself unknowingly with תרומה is also liable to this penalty.
As such, we have seen at least one other area of halacha, namely the prohibition of eating תרומה, that the principle of סיכה כשתיה applies, at least according to Rashi, and also according to this Mishna itself (see ר”ש who points out that this is based on a ת”כ ), in the absence of some other explanation.
While we can still not conclude that this is the case regarding chametz on Pesach, from this Mishna, things are starting to look more that way, though we have still not shown that the principle extends so far as to make something that is ראוי לסיכה (fit for annointing) as if it is ראוי לשתיה (fit for drinking.)
All the above is based on this Mishna and daf, but a thorough study of the sugya in Yoma and elsewhere will show that many Rishonim say that Yom-Kippur and תרומה are indeed exceptions, and discuss whether even there, the prohibition is only דרבנן, just another illustrating of the guiding principle we opened this post with.
קים ליה בדרבה מינה – the greatest of two punishments.
One of the essential principles when it comes to punishments is that if a person performs an action which involves more than one prohibition, and thus more than one punishment, he receives the more severe punishment and is exempt from the lighter one.
There are two main sources for this principle, one regarding liability to payment for damages caused by a capital transgression (אין אדם מת ומשלם – see Kesubos 36b), and one regarding liability to payment for damages caused by corporal transgressions (אין אדם לוקה ומשלם- see Makkos 13b)
There is a debate as to whether the former principle replies only to transgressions subject to death by the courts, or whether it also applies to transgressions subject to כרת , with רבי נחוניה בן הקנה holding that כרת treated like a death penalty in this respect (as recalled from daf 29a.)
The Mishna at the bottom of Pesachim 31b says that if a person eats chametz תרומה on pesach unknowingly, he pays both the principle and the fine, but if he does so intentionally, he is exempt not only from the penalty (which only applies for unknowing transgression), but also for the principle.
After much discussion regarding why this is so, the Gemara on daf 32a seems to conclude that the mishna reflects the view of רבי נחוניא בן הקנה, who holds that the rule that one who is liable to death for an action is exempt from monetary obligations that come from the same action applies also to someone liable to כרת.
Seeing as one who eats chametz on Pesach intentionally is liable to כרת, he cannot also be liable to compensate the kohain.
While certainly not the last word in the debate, a סתם משנה (anonymous Mishna with no debate) that supports this view certainly could add to its weight, unless there is a later Mishna which debates the matter (סתם ואחר כך מחלוקת), something we shall have to keep our eyes open for!
In various posts on the subject (see post on Shabbos 72 for background), we have discussed the rule pertaining to someone who intends to perform an action on a permitted item and lands up performing it on a forbidden one.
For example, one who intends to cut something detached from the ground on shabbos and lands up cutting something attached, or one who intends to eat permitted fats and lands up eating forbidden fats.
We saw the general rule that when it comes to shabbos, one is exempt for such actions due to requirement for מלאכת מחשבת (significant and calculated melacha), and when it comes to actions one derives pleasure for, such as forbidden fats (or forbidden sexual relations), one is liable.
There is a degree of unclarity as to what happens with prohibitions that one does not derive pleasure from but are not shabbos related, though Chazal did seem to derive a general exemption for מתעסק from the words “וחטא בה” (Kerisos 19a.)
We also saw a dispute between Rashi and Tosfos regarding what type of מתעסק one is exempt from on shabbos.
Rashi understood the exemption to pertain only to one who intends to cut one item that he knows to be detached but whose hand slips and lands up cutting a different item which was attached.
However, if he intends to cut a certain item thinking it is detached, and after successfully doing so, realized that the same item had been attached, he could be liable.
In contrast, Tosfos holds that the main discussion centers around the later case, and that in the former case, one would be exempt even if he had intended to cut an attached item but landed up cutting a different attached item!
On daf 32-33, there is much discussion about the prohibition of מעילה, deriving benefit from הקדש ( sanctified things), something we also touched on earlier (post on Pesachim 25-26) in discussing הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה .
One of the things discussed is the source brought in a Beraisa for exempting one who performed מעילה intentionally from the required sacrifice, namely the words in the verse “וחטאה בשגגה”
The Beraisa immediately asks why a special source is required regarding מעילה, where more serious intentional transgressions for which one is liable to כרת also do not require a קרבן.
It responds that from a different perspective, מעילה is actually more serious than the other prohibitions, and there are various versions in the Gemara as to what precisely the Beraisa says and means.
Two views, those of מר בריה דרבנא and רב נחמן בר יצחק relate directly to the sugya of מתעסק and indeed portray it from a different angle.
The former claims that מעילה is stricter than other prohibitions in that one is liable even בלא מתכוין (without intention.)
For example, whereas if one intends to tear a detached item on shabbos and lands up cutting an attached item, he is exempt, if one intended to warm oneself with regular wool and landed up warming himself with wool from an animal set aside for a burnt offering, he is liable.
We note that:
As expected, both Rashi and Tosfos explain the case of מתעסק in shabbos and with מעילה consistently with their explanations elsewhere
The Gemara seems to take it as given that shabbos is only an example of the exemption but that it applies to all other prohibitions as well, other than מעילה, and Rashi actually brings both the source of מלאכת מחשבת regarding Shabbos and “וחטא בה” regarding other mitzvos, noting that there is no such מעוט (exclusion) regarding מעילה.
No mention is made here of the fact that we have seen in other sugyot on the subject that prohibitions that one derives pleasure from (presumably most prohibitions) also produce liability even for מתעסק.
Although this indeed seems to be the classic definition of מתעסק in the sugyas we have studied (at least according to Rava), The phrase מתעסק is not used by מר בריה דרבנא but rather the phrase אין מתכוין .
In contrast, רב נחמן בר יצחק explains that מעילה is stricter than other mitzvos in that one is liable for מתעסק in the case of מעילה unlike in other mitzvos where one is exempt.
He gives the example of one who intends to lift a detached item on shabbos and lands up tearing an attached item, who is exempt, as opposed to one who puts his hand into a vessel containing oil of הקדש (consecrated oil) intending simply to remove an item from it but lands up annointing his finger in the oil, who is liable.
We note that:
Unlike מר בריה דרבנא, רב נחמן בר יצחק does refer to the phrase מתעסק as opposed to אין מתכוין.
רב נחמן בר יצחק gives examples of מתעסק according to Abaya in the other sugyas we have studied, as Rashi explains, where one intends to do a permitted act (lifting) and lands up performing a forbidden act (tearing), seemingly agreeing with Abaya that in the case referred to by מר בריה דרבנא, this would be considered like regular שוגג even on shabbos and one would be liable.
The above observations could be invaluable in understanding the different views regarding howמתעסק works and how it relates to דבר שאין מתכוין and הנאה הבאה לאדם בע”כ.
Hopefully we shall have a chance to return to them soon!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Given that the prohibition of chametz on pesach is included in the list of איסורי הנאה (prohibitions that one is not allowed to derive any benefit from,) our perek spends considerable time discussing the scope of such prohibitions.
Whereas when it comes to most forbidden foods, the prohibition is limited to the act of eating and when it comes to shabbos and forbidden relationships, specific actions are forbidden, when it comes to this category of prohibitions, benefit itself is prohibited, and this might apply even to benefits that do not involve a specific action (לאו שאין בו נעשה) such as just smelling the fragrant aroma of incense offered for idolatrous purposes.
The central topic of the end of daf 25 and most of daf 26 is the status of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה, benefit which comes to a person “by force.”
Although the Gemara itself does not initially give an example of this, Rashi cites the case mentioned above of a person who walks past a place where incense is being offered for idolatrous purposes and cannot help smelling the fragrant aroma.
Abaya holds that this is permitted, whereas Rava holds that it is forbidden.
Seeing as we are dealing with benefit which is unavoidable, debating whether it is permitted or forbidden seems rather spurious, and it is thus obvious that the debate does not center around someone already in the situation, but whether one is permitted to willingly enter into a situation where one knows that this will or might happen.
Alternatively, the debate could center upon whether a person is required to immediately move away from such a situation the moment he encounters it, even if it means retracing his steps and taking an alternative or possibly longer route to avoid further benefit, or whether one may carry on and pass the area, seeing as the benefit he gets from the smell is forced upon him.
Either way, the Gemara divides the discussion up into 4 different scenarios, which depend on whether it is אפשר (possible) to avoid the benefit or not, and whether one is מתכוין (intends) to derive benefit or not.
The 4 permutations are as follows:
When it is both impossible to avoid the prohibition and one has no intention to derive benefit from it (2 factors in one’s favor)
When it is impossible to avoid the prohibition, but one has intention to derive benefit from it. (1 factor in one’s favor and 1 against)
When it is possible to avoid the prohibition, but one has no intention to derive benefit from it. (1 factor against and one fact in favor)
When it is possible to avoid the prohibition and one has intention to benefit from it. (2 factors against)
The Gemara first claims that everyone would be lenient in the first case, and stringent in the second and fourth cases- in other words, if one has intention to benefit, it is forbidden, whether it is possible to avoid the situation or not, and if one has no intention to benefit AND it is impossible to avoid the situation, they both agree that it is permitted.
The debate is solely focussed on the third case, where it is possible to avoid the situation but one does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibition, and centers around the famous view of Rabbi Shimon (see our various posts on this back in Shabbos) who holds that דבר שאין מתכוין מותר (one is permitted to perform a permitted action even if there is a significant concern that it will be accompanied by a secondary forbidden action.)
The classic example of this principle is his permission for a person to drag a bed, chair, or bench along the ground even though he might dig a ditch while doing so, as long as this is not his intention.
However, as we have seen, it is clear from various sources ( see post on Shabbos 133) that this leniency of Rabbi Shimon’s applies not only to the laws of shabbos but to all areas of halacha.
As such, Abaya argues that seeing as the act of walking to wherever one is going is a permitted action, it remains permitted even though one might transgress the prohibition of benefitting from עבודה זרה (idol-worship) along the way.
Rava, on the other hand, claims that the leniency of Rabbi Shimon is limited to cases where it is impossible to achieve one’s goal without taking the risk, for example if the above-mentioned furniture is too large or heavy to lift.
However, if it is possible to avoid the risk, such as in the case of smaller/less heavy furniture which one can lift, one is required to avoid the risk altogether.
It should be noted that this limitation to Rabbi Shimon’s leniency was suggested elsewhere (Shabbos 29b) and rejected, as it will be later in this sugya, but it is of course important to understand this הוה אמינא (initial thought) as well.
The Gemara immediately brings an איכא דאמרי (alternative version) whereby everyone (in this case both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda [who normally forbids דבר שאין מתכוין ] ) agrees that in the first case, where the situation is unavoidable and one has no intention to benefit, it is permitted, and that in the fourth situation where the situation is avoidable and one has intention to benefit, it is forbidden.
The third scenario where it is possible to avoid the situation, but one has no intention to benefit, is the classic dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda.
According to this version, It is the second scenario, where it is impossible to avoid the situation but one DOES intend to benefit once one is in the situation, which is subject to debate between Abaya and Rava.
According to this version, the debate between Abaya and Rava centers not on the view of Rabbi Shimon, for whom intention is the critical factor and for whom it would thus be clearly forbidden (see Rashi) but on the view of Rabbi Yehuda who seems less concerned with intention and more concerned with whether it is possible to avoid the situation or not.
Abaya claims that just like Rabbi Yehuda makes no distinction in a case where it is possible to avoid the situation between a case when one intends to benefit and a case when one does not, forbidding דבר שאין מתכוין regardless, so also in a case where it is impossible to avoid the situation, he does not care whether one intends to derive an otherwise forbidden side benefit from it, or not, and permits it either way. If this is correct, it would follow that once a person is in an unavoidable situation in which he is forced to derive a forbidden benefit, having conscious intent to enjoy the situation might be permitted, something which seems like a tremendous novelty.
Rava, in contrast, counters that Rabbi Yehuda’s lack of concern for whether one has intention for the forbidden action or benefit or not only applies לחומרה (stringently) to forbid an otherwise permitted act if it could involve a forbidden secondary action or benefit.
However, he certainly does not disregard intention in order to be lenient and permit one to have specific intention to perform a forbidden action or derive a forbidden benefit if one is already in a situation where some benefit is “forced on him.” Although one might not be required to leave the situation, one is certainly not permitted to have intention to derive benefit from it.
After bringing various proof texts for the views of Abaya and Rava (with it being important for us to take note of which version of the debate the proofs seem to assume to be correct,) the Gemara brings a Mishna (Kil’ayim 9/5 ) which permits one to “wear” כלאים (forbidden garments which contain a mixture of wool and linen, also known as שעטנז ) in order to display it to would be non-Jewish buyers, so long as one does not intend to derive warmth or protection from it.
This is despite the fact that one could rather display it from behind, as the צנועים (more “modest” or careful people) would do.
This proves without a doubt that the view that permits דבר שאין מתכוין, namely Rabbi Shimon, permits it even when it is possible to avoid the situation and achieve one’s objective without risking the secondary forbidden action, thus disproving the first version of Rava’s opinion.
Although this case and the proof from it requires its own analysis, it follows that we would either rule like Abaya in the first version, despite the rule that we follow Rava in all but 6 disputes against him (Bava Metzia 22b) or more likely, in order to keep with this rule, that we follow the second version of Rava’s opinion.
Either way, as following the second version of Abaya’s view would unnecessarily go against this rule, this seems like an unlikely possibility.
As such, it seems to be the conclusion of the sugya that scenarios 1 and 3 are clearly permitted (at least according to Rabbi Shimon whom later Amoraim have clearly deemed authoritative )- so long as one has no intention to derive forbidden benefit, even if the situation is avoidable, there is no obligation to avoid it.
On the other hand, in cases 2 and 4, where one has intention to derive forbidden benefit, entering the situation is forbidden, irrespective of whether it is avoidable or not.
Now that we have summarized the flow of the sugya, according to Rashi and the consensus of most Rishonim, it is time to focus on some of the difficulties raised by this sugya.
As we have seen, the case of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה (benefit which is forced upon a person) has been divided into 4 scenarios, based on 2 critical factors, namely whether is it possible to avoid the situation and whether one intends to derive the forbidden benefit.
However, the very term בעל כרחיה (by force) seems to exclude a situation where it is possible to avoid the situation, as well as a case where one has intention to derive forbidden benefit.
If one is able to avoid the situation, how can any subsequent benefit be considered “by force?”
Similarly, if when faced with the situation, one consciously has intention to enjoy it, how can that be considered “by force?”
It seems that Rashi and most Rishonim understand that
when referring to אפשר ( the possibility to avoid the situation,) the Gemara means that it is possible to achieve the intended permitted goal (such as reaching one’s destination) by taking an alternative route
ii. לא אפשר refers to a situation where it is impossible to achieve one’s otherwise permitted goal without taking the problematic route.
Tosfos and other Rishonim (see for example Ritva in the name of the רא”ה) add that it is also considered לא אפשר (impossible to avoid) if the alternative route or method is longer or requires more effort, time, or money.
“אפשר” , in contrast, is understand to refer to a situation where it is possible to perform one’s intended otherwise permitted task in an equally convenient way that avoids the risk.
Yet even such a case, while forbidden according to the first version of Rava’s view, seems to still be referred to by the Gemara as “by force,” seeing as if he goes on his chosen route, he is forced into encountering the forbidden benefit, an extremely broad definition of “by force” to say the least.
Furthermore, it seems according to Rashi and most other Rishonim (see for example Meiri, though see Ritva for a different view) that קא מכוין refers to one who consciously intends to enjoy the forbidden benefit, and it requires some serious analysis to understand how this could ever be considered “by force.”
One could possibly explain that once a person is forced into a situation where he cannot avoid enjoying a forbidden pleasure, then “giving in” and consciously enjoying it, while probably not permitted, is to a certain extent, still considered to be “forced.”
This could perhaps be compared to a person who is raped but at a certain point, once feeling the pleasure of physical stimulation, gives in and “enjoys it.” (obviously, the plausibility of this depends on the individual and precise circumstances, but such cases certainly seem to exist -a thorough analysis if the sugya in Yevamos 53b of אין אונס לערוה is recommended at this point.)
Whereas the victim might be obligated to try his best to mentally detach himself and avoid deriving pleasure from the physical sensation, it might be harder to condemn him for succumbing and doing so, given that the combination of being forced into the situation and biology make it close to impossible to avoid- even if he is punished for this, as in the case of אונס לערוה (Yevamos 53b,) it might still be called “by force.”- he was simply required to resist the force.
The Ran, however, simply explains that even though one intends to derive benefit, if the benefit is not intended for him (or brought about by him) but comes automatically, it is still called in this context “by force.”
As mentioned above, the Ritva goes to the opposite extreme and says that whenever a person benefits, it is considered intentional, and that לא קא מכוין refers to when the person himself does not (or perhaps believes he will not ) derive pleasure from the forbidden entity, even if many or most people would (why the phrase הנאה is used to describe someone who does not have הנאה requires explanation according to this view.)
These various explanations could have major practical ramifications, but more on that at a later stage hopefully.
פסיק רישיה and הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה
One of the issues that bothers the Rishonim is the fact that in our sugya, it seems clear that according to Rabbi Shimon who permits דבר שאין מתכוין, there is no problem walking past a place where there is a pleasant forbidden fragrance.
Likewise, examples are given of sitting in the shade of the Temple’s walls for a derasha and lowering workers into the קדש הקדשים for maintenance even though they will derive forbidden benefit from seeing the inside.
Yet it is made clear in many places that even Rabbi Shimon forbids פסיק רישיה , a situation where the secondary forbidden action (in this case benefit) is inevitable, and it seems pretty much inevitable that a person in these situations will derive some benefit from them.
Whereas the Tosfos choose to assume that all these cases do not involve inevitable benefit (perhaps as different people react differently to certain scents and sights etc) the מהר”ם חאלאוה distinguishes between a forbidden action such as a melacha on shabbos whose completion is not affected by one’s lack of intention, and benefit, which is not considered complete when one lacks intention to benefit.
The latter’s חידוש (novel idea) seems to be that unintended pleasure is not considered complete pleasure at all, and even if such pleasure is inevitable, the stringency of פסיק רישיה does not apply to it, something which of course requires further explanation.
Of course, according to the view of the Ritva in the name of the רא”ה quoted above, the leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין only applies where a person does not derive pleasure from the problematic situation, but if he does derive pleasure, it is considered intentional, and the question does not begin.
הנאה as a stringency
We have seen in our sugya that Rabbi Shimon’s leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין מותר is extended to forbidden benefits occurred during otherwise permitted actions.
However, we have dealt before with another related leniency, namely מתעסק, where one intends to perform a permitted action and lands up doing something that is forbidden (see posts on shabbos 72 and 92 for background.)
Regarding מתעסק, we have seen that when benefit is derived from the unintended forbidden action (such as eating forbidden fats thinking that it is permitted fat or sleeping with a woman who is forbidden to him, thinking she is permitted to him,) one is still liable to bring a korban (sacrifice) for one’s actions.
We see a similar idea regarding נזיקין (damages- B.K. 19b) that although an ox is sometimes exempt from damages it does with its mouth in public property, the owner is liable up to the value of the benefit that it derived from doing so (such as the cost of the food it ate.)
It seems from the above that whenever a person (or his animal) derives pleasure from something, his lack of intent or warning is irrelevant to his liability for any transgression derived thereby.
It seems, at least on the face of it, that there must be a strong distinction between מתעסק and דבר שאין מתכוין when it comes to benefit and that the latter is conceptually so different that הנאה does not affect it at all.
Perhaps this because whereas in מתעסק, the primary action one lands up doing, albeit unintentionally, is forbidden, in the case of דבר שאין מתכוין, the primary action remains permitted and the forbidden action is merely a secondary by-product of that action- secondary benefit that is only a by-product of a permitted action might not be enough to create liability or even to forbid the permitted action in the first place.
OF course, once again, if we were to adopt the approach of the Ritva quoted above, then any benefit is treated as intentional (even though possibly still called “by force”) and there is no need for any such distinction.
Entering situations of sexual temptation for the sake of permitted activities
It follows from the conclusion of our sugya, at least according to most Rishonim, that it is permitted to enter a situation where one might derive forbidden but unintended benefit, if one needs to for some otherwise permitted purpose, even if there is an equally convenient alternative route or way of achieving that objective (אפשר ולא קא מכוין)
Yet we are told (Bava Basra 57b) that a man who intentionally walks past a place where women are washing clothes (and thus not fully covered) where another path exists to where he is going, is called a רשע (wicked person.)- Only if there is no alternative path, may he walk past and turn his eyes away.
It is not immediately clear from that sugya whether the alternative path needs to be as convenient as the problematic one or not, but If intentionally walking past a place where he will derive pleasure from the forbidden fragrance of idolatrous incense is permitted, even if there is an equally convenient alternative route, why should walking past this immodest situation even if an EQUALLY convenient alternative route exists, be not only forbidden but bad enough to be called a רשע ? (see though Rashbam on the sugya, as opposed to Rabbeinu Gershom, regarding what exactly this means.)
Once again, if we accept the Ritva’s explanation above, the question might not even begin.
Although it is indeed possible for a person to know in advance (or at least think) that he does not derive pleasure from incense, the principle of אין אפוטרופוס לעריות might teach us that it is impossible for any man to know or assume in advance that he will not derive pleasure from immodestly dressed women.
Similarly, according to the Tosfos who say that הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה is only permitted in cases where דבר שאין מתכוין itself is permitted, namely when the benefit is not inevitable, perhaps the strength of the sexual urge is such that such benefit is inevitable.
However, according to the מהר”ם חאלאוה quoted above, who explains that benefit one is “forced into” is not subject to the stringency of פסיק רישיה, neither of these explanations hold water.
Pinning an explanation on the severe status of forbidden relations in things related to them is also not sufficient, seeing as idolatry and things related to it are treated equally strictly.
Perhaps a combination of the severity of the transgression and likelihood thereof due to its overpowering attraction sets entering a situation of sexual temptation apart and even the מהרם חאלואה would agree that the leniency of הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה does not apply to it.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
I had the zechus recently to listen to a video-shiur by Rabbeinu haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א, on the subject of דבר שאין מתכוין and פסיק רישיה (forms of unintended melacha we have discussed before in various posts.)
He discussed a question which I have often been bothered by, that seems so obvious, yet doesn’t seem to be dealt with by the Rishonim (early commentaries) at all.
The question centers on what the source for the leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין is- after-all, seeing as it applies not only on shabbos but in other areas of halacha too (see earlier entries,) it can not simply be based on the requirement of מלאכת מחשבת.
He gave an explanation very similar to what I have myself suggested, obviously with better proofs, but started out by saying that whenever we encounter an obvious question that is not dealt with by the Rishonim at all, we should generally assume that the answer was so obvious to them that the question didn’t even begin.
It then becomes our task not simply to answer the question, but to explain why the answer is actually SO obvious.
Of course, before jumping to this approach, one needs to go through the entire shas with all the major Rishonim and be sure that the question was in fact not asked, at a minimum going through all related sugyas.
As I am not Rav Osher Weiss and do not have close to that level of knowledge, this is simply not possible for me, even with the help of the Masores hashas (cross-reference printed in most editions of the Talmud) and even with the Bar-Ilan search tool. As such, although I try to check for parallel sugyas and do my homework, I often simply miss something.
Here is an example of this happening to me:
We have established in this chapter that one is permitted to perform all essential actions that form part of the circumcision process on the eighth day from birth, even if it falls on shabbos.
In contrast, if the bris is delayed for whatever reason and not performed on the eighth day, one is not permitted to perform it on shabbos, and waits till the next day.
The Mishna discusses a case where a mohel had 2 different babies to bris, one whose eighth day fell on shabbos, and one whose eighth day fell on the next day.
Somehow, he made an error and circumcised the younger baby when he was only 7 days old on shabbos, and the older one the next day when he was 9 days old.
The Mishna rules that this is an example of desecrating shabbos בשוגג (in error) and he is required to bring a קרבן חטאת (sin-offering.)
However, we have seen earlier in our study of Shabbos (Shabbos 72), that there is a way of performing a melacha unintentionally, known as Misaseik, for which one is exempt.
Although this exemption could possibly apply with other transgressions that do not involve הנאה (pleasure), this exemption is particular applicable on shabbos due to the requirement for מלאכת מחשבת.
We have discussed a substantial debate between the Amoraim Abaya and Rava, as well as Rashi and the Tosfos, regarding under which precise circumstances a melacha is considered מתעסק and thus exempt from a korban.
To sum up, according to Abaya, the classic example is one who intends to lift up an item that is detached from the ground and lands up cutting (detaching) an item connecting to the ground.
He intended to perform a permitted action, namely lifting, and landed up mistakenly performing
1. a different action, namely cutting
2. on a forbidden object, namely something attached to the ground
This is very far from his original permitted intention, both in terms of the מעשה (action) and the חפצא (object the action is applied to) and he is thus exempt.
Rava is more lenient and holds that the classic example is one where one’s actual action is only different to one’s intended action in terms of the object it is applied to, not the action itself.
The classic case, according to Rava, is thus as follows: One intended to apply an action (namely cutting) to a permitted item (namely something detached from the ground, and landed up applying that SAME intended action, to a different object (something attached to the ground) that it is forbidden to apply that action to.
We also showed that Rashi (Kerisos 19b) interpreted the case Rava is referring to as one where he knew which item was permitted and which was forbidden, intended to cut the permitted detached item, but his hand slipped and he landed up cutting the forbidden attached item instead.
Seeing as his intended action was not applied to the intended object of his action, it is clear that לא נעשתה מחשבתו (his thoughts were not fulfilled,) and he is thus exempt.
However, if he intended to pick up a certain item thinking it was detached, and later discovered that it was really attached, it is considered as if his intentions were fulfilled, and is not considered מתעסק but rather שוגג ( a transgression action performed intentionally but unknowingly,) for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
The Tosfos, in contrast, understood that it is precisely this later case that Rava is referring to, pointing out that in a case where his action was not performed on the desired object, he would be exempt even if his intended object was also forbidden!
According to Tosfos’ explanation of מתעסק, the classic case is thus precisely when one intends to apply an action to an object which he believes is permitted, but after doing so, it becomes clear that it was in fact a forbidden object.
Surely the case of our mishna is a precise example of such a case, and should thus be exempt completely, rather than liable to a sin-offering as per the Mishna?
A person intends to perform an action (circumcision) on what he thinks is a permitted “object” (the 8 day old child) and later finds out that it was a forbidden “object” (the 7 day old child.)-
According to Abaya, seeing as he intended to do the action of circumcision, he would be liable.
According to the way Rashi understood Rava’s view, one could argue that the Mishna is not referring to a case where his hand slipped and circumcised the wrong baby (something rather disturbing and hopefully very unlikely,), but to a case where he thought the baby he was circumcising was the 8 day old when he was really the 7 year old .
Such a case would understandably result in liability.
Yet if we follow the generally accepted view of Rava according to Tosfos, the case of our mishna should be classic מתעסק and result in zero liability (at least as far as shabbos laws are concerned.)
I searched zealously through the various Rishonim on the daf, and although it is always possible that I missed something, I failed to find anyone who asks this seemingly obvious question.
I reached the point of frustration where I wondered whether this was an example of the type of question Rav Osher had referred to, whose answer is SO obvious to the Rishonim that the question doesn’t even beg asking , but I couldn’t figure out why- what was I missing.
In desperation, I started looked through the Achronim(later commentaries,)something I always prefer to do only once I have come up with my own approach to an issue (a very Maharal style approach I have learnt from my Rebbe, Rabbeinu haRav Blachman שליט”א )
I felt like such a fool when I saw that Rabbi Akiva Eiger, often considered as the king of the Achronim, points that that the Gemara itself asks this question in the main sugya of Misaseik (Kerisos 19b) and answers that this case is different, seeing as circumcision involves the prohibition of )עושה חבורה making a wound(, which falls under the melacha of שוחט ( slaughtering or taking a life, the blood spilled being considered a partial taking of life.)
Although a melacha performed with only a destructive purpose (מקלקל, see earlier post) usually does not result in liability, there is a view that there are 2 melachot to which this exemption does not apply, seeing as they are by definition destructive- wounding, and burning.
The Gemara in Kerisos says that seeing as מקלקל is not an exemption for these melachot, NEITHER is מתעסק.
There we go- I forget a Gemara I had learnt- question asked, question answered.
Yet this answer needs some serious explaining- after all, these melachot might not be subject to the exemption of מקלקל, but that is because they are by definition mainly destructive acts.
Yet the other exemptions based on מלאכת מחשבת do apply to them, so why shouldn’t מתעסק?
Furthermore, if we accept that answer of the Gemara in Kerisos as final and authoritative, we will be faced with a סתם משנה (anonymous Mishna) that supports the view that מתעסק בחבורה חייב (one is liable for an act of Misaseik that involved wounding,) which has major implications for this melacha as well as the other melacha singled out, namely making a fire.
Even more problematic is the fact that in the main sugya of מקלקל בחבורה (Bava Kama 34b,) Rabbi Yochanan rejects the view that one is liable for such a purely destructive act even for these melachot and applies the obligation to situations where there is a need for the result of the action.
Making our Mishna reliant on this view thus places Rabbi Yochanan in direct opposition to a סתם משנה, whereas he is the one who always stressed the fact that we always rule like a סתם משנה.
There is much more to discuss before we can answer these questions, but that’s it for now….
This Daf is packed with examples of some of the most important principles of Melocho on Shabbos, mainly based on the idea that in order to be biblically forbidden and punishable, an act has to be considered מלאכת מחשבת (a significant, important, or calculated act of work.)
Among them, are the idea that a melacha done in a significantly unusual way (שנוי) is exempt from punishment, as is the rule of two people performing a melacha that could be done by one person ( more on that tomorrow , Hashem willing .)
We have discussed before the concept of מתעסק, where someone who does not have full intention to perform the forbidden act might be exempt .
This, unlike many of the exemptions of מלאכת מחשבת, is derived ( כריתות יט.) from a specific מעוט ( exclusion) in the verse that obligates one to bring a קרבן חטאת for performing a serious transgression unknowingly – “וחטא בה פרט למתעסק” . ( interestingly enough, so is שנים שעשו, right here on the daf)
Yet , despite having its own source, the Gemara in numerous places also states that המסעסק בשבת פטור מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה המתעסק בחלבים ועריות חיב שכן נהנה – one who performs a melacha on shabbos without intention is exempt, as the Torah only forbade calculated melacha, but if one eats forbidden fats or sleeps with someone forbidden to him unintentionally, he is liable , as he has derived pleasure from it .
This seems to imply that מתעסק is yet another exemption of מלאכת מחשבת , and not an independent exemption based on its own source .
One can ask further that if the only reason מסעסק is liable by forbidden fats and עריות is because of the pleasure he gets ( a subject for analysis in its own right), then it should apply in ALL areas of halacha where pleasure is not a factor, not only on shabbos , so what is the relevance to מלאכת מחשבת , which is only an exemption on shabbos? ( see Rashi there who asks the question and takes a different approach to what I suggest below, which is more constant perhaps with other Rishonim here , for reasons outside the scope of this post, but that need to be fully studied to get an understanding of this concept.)
It stands to reason that there probably two different kinds of מתעסק or intentional melacha , one category that is exempt in all areas of halacha other than where הנאה ( pleasure) is involved , and one that is only exempt on shabbos .
For example , the classical case of מתעסק where one intends to pick up something detached from the ground and landed up picking up something connected to the ground ( see earlier post on perek 7) , is similar to intending to eating permitted fat and landing up eating forbidden fat, which would be exempt if not for the fact that he derived benefit.
It follows that there is no need for the concept of מלאכת מחשבת to exempt this, as it is covered under the blanket exemption learnt from its own source, which applies in theory to all areas of halacha.
But there is another kind of מתעסק , which we see in the main sugya in כריתות, as well as on our daf today !
This involves a case where one intends to do something that is forbidden, but lands up performing the same forbidden action on a different חפצא ( object ) than intended , or in a different manner (צורה) than intended .
One example subject to debate in the sugya in כריתות is when one intends to light or extinguish a certain candle and lands up lighting or extinguishing a different one .
In other areas of halocho, if one would intend to , for example, bow down to one idol. , and landed up bowing down to another , it is very possible that one would still be liable, seeing as one intended to do the same forbidden action, and there is no exclusion from וחטא בה .
However, on shabbos, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is so strong, that it requires a complete fulfillment of נתקים מחשבתו, (his intentions were fully fulfilled .)
Any deviation from this could be a reason for exemption, due to this broader form of מתעסק.
A far -reaching application on this rule is found in a Mishna on our daf!
If one intends to carry something in front of him, and lands up carrying it behind him, even though there is no lack of intent ( מתעסק) in the מעשה ( action), or even in the חפצא ( object of the action), but merely in the צורה ( manner or form of the action), one is exempt!
Rashi explains that this is a form of לא נתקיימה מחשבתו ( his intentions were not fully fulfilled ) which in turn is a form of מתעסק!
[ These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha ]
If one eats a fruit and accidently lands up swallowing a bug , should one worry that he has transgressed up to 5 prohibitions, or so long as he checked them first according to halachik requirements , may one be relatively relaxed?
Our perek has spent significant time dealing with the requirement to bring a korban afte00r breaking shabbos beshogeig – when one intends to do the forbidden action but has forgotten that it was shabbos or that the action was forbidden on shabbos .
Today, we are introduced to a different principle, namely that of Misaseik.
Although the difference may seem subtle, classic Misaseik is usually understood as a form of unintentional transgression where one intended to do something permitted and landed up doing something forbidden.
At least regarding the laws of shabbos , Misaseik is treated more leniently than shogeig, and no korban is required – at worst, it is an unpunishable transgression, at best, it isn’t viewed as a transgression at all, similar to oneis ( an action completely beyond someone’s control and totally unavoidable).
An example given on our daf is if a person intended to lift up something from the ground that is not attached to the ground, like a knife which he dropped (an example given by Rashi.)
Instead, he lands up lifting and detaching something attached to the ground, thus inadvertently performing the forbidden melacha of kotzeir (reaping.)
As he never intended to perform an act of cutting at all, everyone agrees that he is exempt, and this is derived in Maseches Kerisos, probably the main sugya on the subject, from the phrase in Vayikra וחטא בה- he needs to sin with the intended action in order to be liable to bring a korban .
In a possible extension of this concept, the Gemara brings a debate between Abaya and Rava regarding what happens if he intended to cut something detached from the ground and landed up cutting something attached.
The subtle difference here is that he intended to perform the action of cutting, not just lifting, and he did indeed perform such an action- the lack of intention here does not relate to the מעשה ( the action) but to the חפצא ( the item the action is performed on.)
In such a case, Abaya maintains that one is liable, as in a regular case of shogeig, whereas Rava holds that one is still exempt, as a form of מתעסק.
There is a further debate between Rashi and Tosfos as to what precise case Abaya and Rava are arguing about.
Rashi seems to maintain that we are dealing with a case when he intended to cut an item that is not attached, but his hand slipped and landed up cutting a different item, which was attached ( see his commentary on the parallel sugyos in Sanhedrin and Kerisos.)
However if he merely was unaware that the item he intended to cut was attached, and later found out that it was attached after tearing it, he could be liable to bring a korban הואיל ונעשית מחשבתו ( seeing as his intended action was performed on its intended object.)
Tosfos, on the other hand, seems to maintains that everyone agrees than in the former case, he will be exempt, and holds that the argument is specifically in a case where he succeeded in tearing the precise item he thought was detached, and then realised that it actually was attached .
The halacha, as usual, is like Rava, and even if one intended to cut, so long as one intended to cut something permitted, he is exempt.
Whether we follow Rashi or Tosfos might be dependent on how we interpret a rather cryptic Rambam and later sources, but that’s for another time.
Our Gemara makes it clear that shabbos is more lenient than other prohibitions when it comes to מתעסק, and in the sugya in Kerisos, Shmuel says explicitly that misaseik is exempt on Shabbos, because of the general requirement of מלאכת מחשבת – a melocho must be significant in order to be subject to punishment on shabbos – any lack in the intention is enough thus to exempt someone .
On the other hand, if one intends to eat permitted fats (שומן) and lands up eating forbidden fats (חלב), one is liable, seeing as one derived benefit from it.
What is unclear from the sugya is what happens with other sins performed unintentionally, but without benefit.
On the one hand, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת does not apply, but on the other hand, the benefit factor is missing to make him liable.
Tosfos on our daf seems to understand that the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is only needed to exempt a third form of מתעסק – if one intends to detach something that is attached and lands up detaching a different attached item.
In this case, he had full intention to sin, but because his action was applied to an object other than the intended one, his thoughts were not fully carried out, and he is exempt due to the lack of מלאכת מחשבת .
On the other hand, if he intended to apply an action to a permitted item and applied it to a forbidden item, the regular exemption of וחטא בה פרט למתעסק applies ( an unintentional sin is excluded from the obligation to bring a korban)
The only time when one would then be liable would be if one derived benefit from the sin, like eating forbidden fats.
It follows that the exemption of מתעסק when there was no intention to sin at all applies not only to shabbos but to other prohibitions as well, so long as one does not benefit from them.
Now for the crunch- if one intends to eat a fruit that is not normally infested , or that one has done one’s reasonable best to check and appears clean, and lands up eating a bug which he isn’t aware of –
It seems to follow that so long as one never got benefit from eating the bug ( as most of us would clearly not), then this is no worse than misaseik and one would be exempt even from a korban ( or the equivalent prayer and repentance.)
Indeed, as Rav Eitam Henkin הי”ד pointed out in his work לכם יהיה לאוכלה, there are various poskim including the Rogotchover Gaon and Rav Shlomo Zalman who suggest or even rule that this might indeed be a case of מתעסק.
Others take issue with it, and in a more analytical Hebrew analysis on the subject , I have discussed the pros and and cons of applying the exemption of מתעסק to unintentionally eating bugs in insects, and point out that it could be tied to the argument between Abaya and Rava as well as that of Rashi and Tosfos.
I also argue there that according to some Rishonim, it could actually fall under the even more lenient category of דבר שאין מתכוין.
Suffice to say that without minimizing the requirement as coded in Shulchan Aruch to check vegetables that are commonly infested before eating them, the common fear-based argument that not doing so is worse than eating non-kosher, given that some bugs involve 5 different prohibitions, could clearly be exaggerated given that one’s intention is not to eat any bugs.
If one saw a bug, he clearly would remove it , all he intends is to eat the very kosher fruit , and he clearly does not benefit from the bugs either – on the contrary he finds them disgusting ( at least in our culture…)
Of course, the usual disclaimer is that we are simply learning and exploring the concepts together – I do not rule very much, so before deciding on your policy in this matter, discuss with a serious Torah scholar who is well versed in these issues as well as the actual facts on the ground.