The Mishna on daf 64a describes how the Kohanim were divided into 3 different shifts for offering up the קרבן פסח in order to prevent overcrowding.
When the first group was full, נעלו דלתות העזרה (they locked the doors of the courtyard.)
On daf 64b, Aba opines that the correct גירסא (wording) of the Mishna is “ננעלו” (“were locked”-or that is at least what was meant by the Mishna.)
This implies that the doors were miraculous locked when occupancy was full.
Rava, in contrast, upholds the reading of the Mishna in front of us, and insists that people locked the doors.
The Gemara understands this as a debate between Abaya and Rava regarding whether we rely on miracles.
According to Abaya, people kept entering until the doors locked by themselves, relying on the expected miracle to keep them from the dangers of overcrowding.
In contrast, Rava holds that we do not rely on such miracles, and that people actively locked the doors.
Although it might seem from here that Abaya believes that it is permitted to rely on miracles, it is possible that this was only in the בית המקדש where miracles were the norm.
In fact, the Gemara on our daf later quotes a Beraisa that says that there was only one case in history when a person was harmed by the crowding in the Beis haMikdash!
Further, The Mishna (Avos 5/5) lists no less than 10 miracles that regularly took place in the בית המקדש , which I have attempted to translate as follows:
No woman miscarried from the smell of the sanctified meat.
The sanctified meat never became rotten.
A fly was never seen in the slaughterhouse.
The Kohain Gadol never had a seminal emission on Yom-Kippur.
The rain never extinguished the fire on the altar.
The wind never prevailed over the pillar of smoke.
A disqualifying property was never found in the Omer, two loaves, or show bread.
People stood crowded but had plenty space to bow.
A snake or scorpion never caused damage in Jerusalem.
No one ever said that he felt claustrophobic in Jerusalem .
Whereas most or perhaps all of this miracles could be considered natural miracles that though unlikely, do not involve that which is impossible according to the laws of nature, it is certainly clear from here that the בית המקדש was not comparable to anywhere else when it comes to the frequency of miracles, and even if a supernatural miracle such as doors automatically closing occurred there regularly enough that it could be relied upon, one can certainly not conclude from there that Abaya would condone relying on miracles anywhere else.
Although there is a concept that Torah and Mitzvos offer a degree of protection (see Sotah 21a and post on Pesachim 8) it is clear that where the danger is common or definitely present, one may not rely on that protection even while fulfilling a mitzva (Pesachim 8.)
Although Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi took the rather extreme step of learning next to people who were afflicted with רעתן (a terrible contagious disease) relying on this protective power (Kesubos 77b), most Amoraim were particular to keep their distance, and if that was the case with some of the greatest Amoraim, it follows that this is certainly the case for all of us, whose stature does not compare to theirs.
Returning to our daf, we should note that Rava appears to hold that relying on miracles is not acceptable where a common danger is present, even in the בית המקדש where miracles were so common, AND even though it was during the fulfillment of one of the greatest mitzvos!
We should also note that with only 6 exceptions (see Bava Metzia 22b ) the halacha usually follows Rava in his disputes with Abaya.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Without prejudging this issue, I would like to daven that in the zechus of this and all the other learning we do, My dear father שליט”א , and teacher of so much Torah to so many, should have a refuah shleimah.
One of the most emotionally, politically, and religiously charged topics in Israel during the Corona outbreak has been the closure of shuls, Torah schools, and Yeshivos in order to prevent the spread of the disease.
On the one hand, preservation of life is one of the most sacred principles in Judaism, and one is not only permitted, but required, to transgress all commandments, except for murder, idolatry, and sexual immorality, in order to save lives (Yoma 85b,Sanhedrin 74a.)
On the other hand, not only is Torah study and prayer considered to be pillars of our and the entire world’s existence (Mishna Avos 1/2,) there is even some evidence that at least some Chazal considered both Torah and the commandments to have protective, or even healing power (see Sotah 21a.)
Despite this possibility, however, there is also a clear prohibition against intentionally using the words of Torah to heal (see Shvuos 16b,Sanhedrin 90a/101a) opening the door to a third approach whereby learning Torah and performing mitzvot for their own sake might be permitted despite the existence of dangers in doing so, due to this protective power.
The subject is complex, and there are many sugyos that need to be studied to even get a superficial view of the issues involved. In the context of a daf post like this, I wish to study the topic as it appears in this daf, what seems מוכרח (indisputable) from it, and what possibilities are left open.
Near the bottom of Pesachim 8a, the Gemara brings a Beraisa which states that we do not require a person to put his hand into holes and cracks in order to find chametz (rather a visual inspection with the candle is sufficient.)
The reason given for this is due to the danger involved.
The Gemara, in questioning what this danger is, rejects the possibility that it is the danger that a scorpion might be hiding in one of the holes and cracks, because it was normal to use these holes and cracks (in the walls) for storage (otherwise one would not be required to search there anyway, as only places where chametz is kept need to be searched.)
The rejection of this concern can be explained in two ways:
One would not use holes and cracks for storage if scorpions were found in them due to the danger, so the danger almost certainly does not exist.
There is indeed some danger of scorpions in the holes and cracks, but as it clearly did not stop one from using them for storage, it is clearly not enough of a concern to exempt one from the mitzva.
An important נפקא מינה (practical ramification) would be whether one is liable to take reasonable every-day risks for the sake of a mitzva.
If the reason that the danger factor is rejected is because we are referring even to places where scorpions are not find in holes in the wall used for storage, it could follow that in places where people used holes in the wall for storage despite the risk of scorpions (whether this is permitted or not,) there might still be no obligation to take this risk in order to perform the mitzva of בדיקת חמץ.
On the other hand, if the danger factor is rejected because we are dealing with places where despite the danger of scorpions, people still take the risk and use the holes, it would follow that in the case of a reasonable every day risk that people take, such a risk might indeed be obligatory for the sake of a mitzva like בדיקת חמץ .
It should be noted that given that, at least when בטול is performed, בדיקת חמץ is only דרבנן (a rabbinical requirement,) extending the exemption due to this level of danger to biblical obligations, though possible, should not be taken for granted based on this sugya alone.
After rejecting the possibility that the Beraisa is exempting one from searching holes or cracks in the walls for chametz, it concludes that we are dealing with searching in the holes formed in the heap of a collapsed wall.
Though it does not state precisely what the danger is, Rashi takes for granted that this concern is indeed due to scorpions, seeing as scorpions are far more common in garbage dumps and heaps.
Despite the more significant danger involved in this case, the Gemara is still troubled by the Beraisa’s exemption, due to the principle stated by Rabbi Elazer that שלוחי מצוה אינם ניזוקין (those on a mission to perform a mitzva are not harmed.)
This principle seems to indicate that a person merits protection while performing a mitzva, and that even if there is a real danger of scorpions in the pile, the mitzva of בדיקת חמץ will protect him.
It is important to stress that we see from here that this principle, whatever it means, applies even to a rabbinical mitzva!
After some give and take, the Gemara seems to accept the fact that although a real concern normally, the danger of scorpions is not sufficient to exempt one from the search, due to this rule.
It concludes that the danger mentioned is that once the mitzva is over and the protection it affords is no longer active, he might continue feeling for a lost item and get stung by a scorpion while doing so.
We see from here that whatever protective power a mitzva has, it ceases to function once the mitzva is complete, even if one does a voluntary action that one would not have done had he not performed the mitzva.
Alternatively, Rav Nachman bar Yitchak suggests that the danger referred to is not that of scorpions but of his non-Jewish neighbor, who might find his actions suspicious and suspect him of practicing witchcraft against him.
The Gemara once again attempts to refute this with Rabbi Elazer’s principle that שלוחי מצוה אינם ניזוקין and concludes that “היכא דשכיח הזיקא שאני” (where danger is “שכיח” , it is different.)
The word שכיח is the Aramaic equivalent of the Hebrew “מצוי”, literally translated as “found or present” but most often refers to “common.” (note that in a similar discussion in Yoma 11a, the phrase (fixed)קביע הזיקא is used, and as the same prooftext is brought, it seems that the two are equivalent at least to some degree.)
It follows that where the danger is common (such as a non-Jewish neighboring accusing a Jew of witchcraft,) as opposed to danger that is real but less common (such as a scorpion being present in the hole at the time or stinging one when he puts his hands in) the principle may not be relied upon.
We can now attempt to list a hierarchy of dangers, regarding the applicability of the principle of שלוחי מצוה אינם נזוקין .
A situation with no significant danger (such as holes in the wall in a place where scorpions are hardly ever found.)- There is no need for this principle, and it is obvious that the mitzva must be fulfilled.
A situation where there is some risk of danger, but it is a normal risk accepted in every day life (Equivalent or similar to what Chazal call “דשו בו רבים” in other contexts such as Shabbos 129b and Yevamos 12b- It is possible that here too there is no need for this principle, and the mitzva must be fulfilled even without it, but it is also possible that in the absence of this principle, there would be no obligation to take the risk, even if its permitted to do so voluntarily.
A situation where the danger is significant enough that one would normally avoid it in every-day life, but not in the category of “common.”
The principle would require one to take the risk for the sake of a mitzva.
A situation where the danger is common ,the principle is not relevant, and one is exempt from the mitzva.
The above analysis, though already complex, deals solely with the question of whether one is obligated to take risks to perform mitzvot and not whether one is permitted to do so voluntarily, a topic for another discussion.
It also fails to tackle the actual meaning and mechanism behind the principle, and the fact that we see In front of us many cases where people have been harmed, even by freak occurrences, in the performance of a mitzva (see Kiddushin 39b for example re שלוח הקן)
We have to bare in mind the possibility that the principle is less a statement of fact, and more of a halachik principle (as well as a kind of hope, blessing or prayer), which defines certain types of risk that one would normally avoid as obligatory when it comes to performing mitzvot.
The sugya ends with Rav being asked whether his students who live far away in the valleys should risk harm in order to go early and come back late from the study-house.
His response was that he took the responsibility for any harm that comes to them on himself.
Once again, there are two possibilities for understanding what he meant:
Rav admitted that some risk was involved, but was prepared to take responsibility for the risk, given the enormity of the mitzva of Torah study. Such a willingness to risk other people’s lives would certainly require further discussion.
Rav believed that due to Rabbi Elazar’s principle, there was no risk at all, and they would not be harmed (see Rashi who seems to understand it this way!)
Whereas this explanation appears easier to understand ethically, it is harder to understand on a factual basis.
Although the Gemara does not elaborate on the level of danger that was involved in making this daily journey before dawn and after dark, it seems clear that it was great enough that people would normally be hesitant to risk it for non-mitzva related purposes, and despite that fact, Rav still encouraged them to come for the sake of Torah study and took the risk on himself.
It is also necessary to point out that the above analysis applies to an individual taking certain levels of danger on himself for the sake of a mitzva- none of these examples directly deal with endangering other people or the public in general for the sake of one’s own personal mitzva or Torah-study, or endangering the public for the sake of a public mitzva or public Torah study, though the above case of Rav and his students might come closest to this.
I do not intend to come to practical conclusions regarding the current situation from this analysis- there are far too many other sugyot to analyze (see for example Yoma 11a which seems to include monetary risk in the exemption, Kiddushin 39b regarding שילוח הקן, Kesubos 77b regarding חולי ראתן, Sotah 21a regarding the מים המאררים ,as well as what might be a completely different approach to the entire idea of שלוחי מצוה אינם ניזוקין in the Rambam and the Meiri) and I leave this to senior Talmidei-Chachamim, but what seems certain from this sugya is that
A certain level of significant risks that people normally try to avoid in their everyday lives wherever possible not only may, but MUST, be taken for the sake of mitzvot, even rabbinic mitzvot, and even more so for Torah study.
There is a level of risk which may not be taken even for the sake of mitzvot.
Finding the balance between the above two levels of risk, is not simple, but is essential to make practical decisions in this and other situations.