The message of this Haftorah is in my opinion, one of the best Mussar talks ever given- from the נבואה of Yeshayahu himself.
It consists of the end of פרק נז and פרק נח
ישעיהו פרק נז
(יד) וְאָמַ֥ר סֹֽלּוּ־סֹ֖לּוּ פַּנּוּ־דָ֑רֶךְ הָרִ֥ימוּ מִכְשׁ֖וֹל מִדֶּ֥רֶךְ עַמִּֽי: ס
Hashem gives instructions to prepare the way for people to repent by removing things that cause people to stumble.
The metaphor of a road that needs to be paved and cleared is used.
Think of the slave laborers who used to clear jungles to make and pave roads for people to travel safely on.
Similarly, Hashem instructs us to make well-paved, obstacle free roads through the jungles of temptations to help people do Teshuva.
This is not just about getting people on the right “Derech”- its about paving and clearing the Derech!
We have seen the word מכשול used in the Chumash in the context of the Mitzva of “ולפני עור לא תתן “מכשול – “do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind.” (Vayikra 19/14)
In that context, this is understood by Chazal to refer to giving people bad advice in businesss (ספרא קדושים פרשה ב) , and also to causing people to sin. (עבודה זרה 6:)
The second interpretation fits in particularly well in our context- Here we are told not only to avoid doing things that will cause people to sin, but to actively try and remove things from the “derech” that could cause people to do so.
Obviously this must be done wisely, peacefully, and non-coercively in a way that will truly help people do the right thing, and not get their backs up and ultimately throw them “off the derech” or make them hate Torah, chas vesholom – We are not the Taliban!
However, warning one’s kids, friends, or students, of the need to avoid immodest, violent, or other harmful movies, venues, websites, beaches, etc, in the correct way, could certainly qualify as a fulfillment of this possuk!.
(טו) כִּי֩ כֹ֨ה אָמַ֜ר רָ֣ם וְנִשָּׂ֗א שֹׁכֵ֥ן עַד֙ וְקָד֣וֹשׁ שְׁמ֔וֹ מָר֥וֹם וְקָד֖וֹשׁ אֶשְׁכּ֑וֹן וְאֶת־דַּכָּא֙ וּשְׁפַל־ר֔וּחַ לְהַחֲיוֹת֙ ר֣וּחַ שְׁפָלִ֔ים וּֽלְהַחֲי֖וֹת לֵ֥ב נִדְכָּאִֽים:
Hashem stressed that although he dwells in the highest of places, he also dwells with the most poor and “lowly” of people. This sets the scene for much of what could well be the central theme of the Haftorah and the next perek.
(טז) כִּ֣י לֹ֤א לְעוֹלָם֙ אָרִ֔יב וְלֹ֥א לָנֶ֖צַח אֶקְּצ֑וֹף כִּי־ר֙וּחַ֙ מִלְּפָנַ֣י יַֽעֲט֔וֹף וּנְשָׁמ֖וֹת אֲנִ֥י עָשִֽׂיתִי: (יז) בַּעֲוֹ֥ן בִּצְע֪וֹ קָצַ֥פְתִּי וְאַכֵּ֖הוּ הַסְתֵּ֣ר וְאֶקְצֹ֑ף וַיֵּ֥לֶךְ שׁוֹבָ֖ב בְּדֶ֥רֶךְ לִבּֽוֹ: (יח) דְּרָכָ֥יו רָאִ֖יתִי וְאֶרְפָּאֵ֑הוּ וְאַנְחֵ֕הוּ וַאֲשַׁלֵּ֧ם נִֽחֻמִ֪ים ל֖וֹ וְלַאֲבֵלָֽיו:
Hashem points out that at the end of the day, we are all his creatures- HIS children, and that despite our failings, he will not remain angry with us forever.
In these Pessukim,the Novi returns again to the theme of Teshuva in general , the focus of this perek and the first section of the Haftorah.
(יט) בּוֹרֵ֖א נוב נִ֣יב שְׂפָתָ֑יִם שָׁל֨וֹם׀ שָׁל֜וֹם לָרָח֧וֹק וְלַקָּר֪וֹב אָמַ֥ר יְקֹוָ֖ק וּרְפָאתִֽיו:
Hashem in the present tense is constantly recreating the “speach of people’s lips” – those that used to speak of war, will now speak of peace.
Hashem speaks of peace “to the far and to the near”- This can be interpreted both literally and figuratively.
On a literal level, it is a description of the ends of days, the war of Gog and Magog against Yerushalayim- Hashem will bring an era of peace for those who are near and far to Yerushalayim, the centre of the conflict.
On a figurative level, near is taken to mean those who are near to Hashem, ie. Those who have been on the right path, and far are those who have been far from Hashem, ie. On the wrong path, and are now repenting, ie. בעלי תשובה.
You can see both interpretations in the various Rishonim on this perek, and the Talmud (ברכות לד:) in fact debates who is greater: someone who has always been righteous, or a בעל תשובה ; based on this very possuk!
(כ) וְהָרְשָׁעִ֖ים כַּיָּ֣ם נִגְרָ֑שׁ כִּ֤י הַשְׁקֵט֙ לֹ֣א יוּכָ֔ל וַיִּגְרְשׁ֥וּ מֵימָ֖יו רֶ֥פֶשׁ וָטִֽיט:
In this incredible metaphor, the wicked are compared to the wave motion of the sea.
In the Rishonim, a number of explanations are found: The sea is always restless, moving up and down, never really at peace-So too, are the wicked!
Rashi goes further and explains that when a wave is about to break, it is at its height and peak
It then breaks and is pulled backward, dragging dirt and sand with it. The next wave sees what happens to its friends, but learns nothing, and rises again arrogantly to conquer the shore.
So too, the wicked, are at their most arrogant at the peak of their power- yet that is often the sign that they are about to break.
They break, and are pulled back full of discomfort.
Their friends see what happens to them, but fail to learn from them and repent- rather, the next tyrant comes along and does the same thing-Think פרעה, נבוחדנצר, המן, אנתיוחס, טיטוס, היטלר …
It occurred to me to add that when a large wave comes,it seems that it will cover everything and remain on shore forever.
Yet despite the terrible damage it does, even the greatest tsunami retreats eventually, and dry land is once again exposed.
So too, at the height of the wicked’s power, as they swallow everything around them, they might seem immortal and invincible. Yet, they too are mere mortals, and their time too will come, after which the righteous will be left once again in peace!
(כא) אֵ֣ין שָׁל֔וֹם אָמַ֥ר אֱלֹהַ֖י לָרְשָׁעִֽים: ס
The promise of eternal peace extends to the righteous and those who repent, but not to those who remain wicked despite all the opportunities thrown at them to change their ways.
(א) קְרָ֤א בְגָרוֹן֙ אַל־תַּחְשֹׂ֔ךְ כַּשּׁוֹפָ֖ר הָרֵ֣ם קוֹלֶ֑ךָ וְהַגֵּ֤ד לְעַמִּי֙ פִּשְׁעָ֔ם וּלְבֵ֥ית יַעֲקֹ֖ב חַטֹּאתָֽם:
A leader cannot be silent about the wrongs committed in his community.
He is directed by Hashem to inform them of their failings in order to enable them to do Teshuva.
(ב) וְאוֹתִ֗י י֥וֹם יוֹם֙ יִדְרֹשׁ֔וּן וְדַ֥עַת דְּרָכַ֖י יֶחְפָּצ֑וּן כְּג֫וֹי אֲשֶׁר־צְדָקָ֣ה עָשָׂ֗ה וּמִשְׁפַּ֤ט אֱלֹהָיו֙ לֹ֣א עָזָ֔ב יִשְׁאָל֙וּנִי֙ מִשְׁפְּטֵי־צֶ֔דֶק קִרְבַ֥ת אֱלֹהִ֖ים יֶחְפָּצֽוּן:
Hashem complains about people who pretend to want to be close to him and to want to know what he wants from them, when they really don’t care.
One gets people who give the impression that they are so frum and are always asking sheilos about every little thing, yet they don’t really want to hear the correct answer, and are just doing it so that the Rabbi or other people will think they are SO amazing.
Hashem has major issues with such people.
(ג) לָ֤מָּה צַּ֙מְנוּ֙ וְלֹ֣א רָאִ֔יתָ עִנִּ֥ינוּ נַפְשֵׁ֖נוּ וְלֹ֣א תֵדָ֑ע הֵ֣ן בְּי֤וֹם צֹֽמְכֶם֙ תִּמְצְאוּ־חֵ֔פֶץ וְכָל־עַצְּבֵיכֶ֖ם תִּנְגֹּֽשׂוּ:
People want to know why they fast but Hashem doesn’t accept their fast-
(ד) הֵ֣ן לְרִ֤יב וּמַצָּה֙ תָּצ֔וּמוּ וּלְהַכּ֖וֹת בְּאֶגְרֹ֣ף רֶ֑שַׁע לֹא־תָצ֣וּמוּ כַיּ֔וֹם לְהַשְׁמִ֥יעַ בַּמָּר֖וֹם קוֹלְכֶֽם:
Hashem replies that its because people fast in order to create arguments and to hurt each other, not for sincere purposes.
Many people go through the motions of fasting and other Mitzvos, but don’t allow them to penetrate into their being and make them into better people the way they are supposed to.
Chazal taught us that Mitzvos were given only in order to refine people- to make us into better, purer people.
they explain that Hashem doesn’t really care from his point of view where we slaughter an animal from (whether we eat kosher or not kosher), but gave us the laws of kashrus in order to make US better.
בראשית רבה (וילנא) פרשת לך לך פרשה מד )
רב אמר לא נתנו המצות אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות, וכי מה איכפת ליה להקב”ה למי ששוחט מן הצואר, או מי ששוחט מן העורף, הוי לא נתנו המצות אלא לצרף בהם את הבריות
This doesn’t mean Chas vesholom that Mitzvos are voluntary and that we can choose other ways to “refine ourselves.”
Hashem knows the precise formula needed for us to attain the level of refinement we need, and we have to follow his formula, not our own!
HOWEVER, we have to always bare the end result in mind and not get sidetracked by our ego along the way, otherwise the Yetzer horoh can actually use frumkeit as a means of making us arrogant and even hurt others who we perceive as less frum.
The Gemoro tells a frightening story about how two Kohanim were so eager to perform the Avoda that in the rush to ascend the מזבח first; one of them landed up stabbing the other, and the people were more concerned about whether the knife was still pure than about whether he was still alive. (Yoma 23a)
Its possible to become so involved in the fight to become or to be seen to be frumer than everyone else, than one turns Torah into a “Jihadist style” warship, rather than what its meant to be,namely the “ways of pleasantness.”
(ה) הֲכָזֶ֗ה יִֽהְיֶה֙ צ֣וֹם אֶבְחָרֵ֔הוּ י֪וֹם עַנּ֥וֹת אָדָ֖ם נַפְשׁ֑וֹ הֲלָכֹ֨ף כְּאַגְמֹ֜ן רֹאשׁ֗וֹ וְשַׂ֤ק וָאֵ֙פֶר֙ יַצִּ֔יעַ הֲלָזֶה֙ תִּקְרָא־צ֔וֹם וְי֥וֹם רָצ֖וֹן לַיקֹוָֽק:
Do people really think that this is the kind of fast that Hashem wants?
People going through the motions of fasting but fighting each other and not getting the message of the day?
“bowing their heads like a bulrush” and “ putting on sackcloth and ashes”- even if someone shokkels tills his neck hurts, if he doesn’t internalize the message of the fast and undergo internal change, its all a waste of time.
(ו) הֲל֣וֹא זֶה֘ צ֣וֹם אֶבְחָרֵהוּ֒ פַּתֵּ֙חַ֙ חַרְצֻבּ֣וֹת רֶ֔שַׁע הַתֵּ֖ר אֲגֻדּ֣וֹת מוֹטָ֑ה וְשַׁלַּ֤ח רְצוּצִים֙ חָפְשִׁ֔ים וְכָל־מוֹטָ֖ה תְּנַתֵּֽקוּ:
This is kind of fast Hashem wants: One that makes people reconsider their selfish and corrupt lifestyles and start thinking about justice and charity (its fascinating to note that the Hebrew words for justice (צדק) and charity (צדקה) have the same root!)
Corruption needs to be stamped out and the poor have to become one’s priority.
(ז) הֲל֨וֹא פָרֹ֤ס לָֽרָעֵב֙ לַחְמֶ֔ךָ וַעֲנִיִּ֥ים מְרוּדִ֖ים תָּ֣בִיא בָ֑יִת כִּֽי־תִרְאֶ֤ה עָרֹם֙ וְכִסִּית֔וֹ וּמִבְּשָׂרְךָ֖ לֹ֥א תִתְעַלָּֽם:
Much of the Sugyos on צדקה are based on these Pessukim. (בבא בתרא ט)
We learn from here that when it comes to a poor person who asks for food, one should first feed him and then check to see if he is genuinely needy.
With clothing, one should first check to see if he is really needy and then clothe him.
(Although there is an opposite opinion in the Talmud, the halocho follows this view, and both views are based on how we interpret these Pessukim- you will need to learn the sugya to see how! )
On a fast day, one needs to realize that Hashem has given some people surplus food and clothing and expects them to share it with those who don’t have.
“Divide your bread with the hungry and bring the rejected poor into your house. When you see a naked person, cover him, and do not neglect your own flesh and blood.”
It is not good enough to give a nice donation to the Chevra Kadisha and be snobby when it comes to one’s social arrangements. One is required to bring the poor “into one’s own house.”
Chazal strengthen this message in Pirkei Avos when Yosi ben Yochanan Ish Yerushalayim tells us (Avos 1/5] that the poor should be like members of our family.
Sometimes people are so consumed with the poor that they neglect their own family’s needs.
The possuk ends with the dramatic warning: ומבשרך לא תתעלם – don’t ever neglect your own family!
(ח) אָ֣ז יִבָּקַ֤ע כַּשַּׁ֙חַר֙ אוֹרֶ֔ךָ וַאֲרֻכָתְךָ֖ מְהֵרָ֣ה תִצְמָ֑ח וְהָלַ֤ךְ לְפָנֶ֙יךָ֙ צִדְקֶ֔ךָ כְּב֥וֹד יְקֹוָ֖ק יַאַסְפֶֽךָ:
(ט) אָ֤ז תִּקְרָא֙ וַיקֹוָ֣ק יַעֲנֶ֔ה תְּשַׁוַּ֖ע וְיֹאמַ֣ר הִנֵּ֑נִי אִם־תָּסִ֤יר מִתּֽוֹכְךָ֙ מוֹטָ֔ה שְׁלַ֥ח אֶצְבַּ֖ע וְדַבֶּר־אָֽוֶן:
(י) וְתָפֵ֤ק לָֽרָעֵב֙ נַפְשֶׁ֔ךָ וְנֶ֥פֶשׁ נַעֲנָ֖ה תַּשְׂבִּ֑יעַ וְזָרַ֤ח בַּחֹ֙שֶׁךְ֙ אוֹרֶ֔ךָ וַאֲפֵלָתְךָ֖ כַּֽצָּהֳרָֽיִם:
(יא) וְנָחֲךָ֣ יְקֹוָק֘ תָּמִיד֒ וְהִשְׂבִּ֤יעַ בְּצַחְצָחוֹת֙ נַפְשֶׁ֔ךָ וְעַצְמֹתֶ֖יךָ יַחֲלִ֑יץ וְהָיִ֙יתָ֙ כְּגַ֣ן רָוֶ֔ה וּכְמוֹצָ֣א מַ֔יִם אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־יְכַזְּב֖וּ מֵימָֽיו:
(יב) וּבָנ֤וּ מִמְּךָ֙ חָרְב֣וֹת עוֹלָ֔ם מוֹסְדֵ֥י דוֹר־וָד֖וֹר תְּקוֹמֵ֑ם וְקֹרָ֤א לְךָ֙ גֹּדֵ֣ר פֶּ֔רֶץ מְשֹׁבֵ֥ב נְתִיב֖וֹת לָשָֽׁבֶת:
These Pessukim describe the incredible Brocho that comes from the fast if it indeed has the refining effect intended: inspiring one to forsake corruption and focus on those less fortunate.
(יג) אִם־תָּשִׁ֤יב מִשַּׁבָּת֙ רַגְלֶ֔ךָ עֲשׂ֥וֹת חֲפָצֶ֖יךָ בְּי֣וֹם קָדְשִׁ֑י וְקָרָ֨אתָ לַשַּׁבָּ֜ת עֹ֗נֶג לִקְד֤וֹשׁ יְקֹוָק֙ מְכֻבָּ֔ד וְכִבַּדְתּוֹ֙ מֵעֲשׂ֣וֹת דְּרָכֶ֔יךָ מִמְּצ֥וֹא חֶפְצְךָ֖ וְדַבֵּ֥ר דָּבָֽר:
(יד) אָ֗ז תִּתְעַנַּג֙ עַל־יְקֹוָ֔ק וְהִרְכַּבְתִּ֖יךָ עַל־במותי בָּ֣מֳתֵי אָ֑רֶץ וְהַאֲכַלְתִּ֗יךָ נַחֲלַת֙ יַעֲקֹ֣ב אָבִ֔יךָ כִּ֪י פִּ֥י יְקֹוָ֖ק דִּבֵּֽר: ס
At face value, the previous Pessukim might seem to imply that the main Avoda of Yom Kippur is focusing on issues of social justice, not on Mitzvos between man and Hashem.
In fact, many non traditional movements have used this as a “proof text” that being frum is not so important, chas vesholom, so long as one is an ethical and good person who cares about other people.
However, the Novi ends off this dramatic prophecy by putting the nail in the coffin of any such theories.
The grand finale of the perek focusses on Shabbos, the Mitzva that perhaps more than anything symbolizes our faith in and relationship with Hashem, and shows that keeping the Mitzvos between man and Hashem are an equally important prerequisite to the great inheritance promised again to us in the closing פסוק.
Many laws of Shabbos are derived from these Pesukim.
“IF you hold back your feet because of Shabbos”- is the source for the prohibition of walking outside the techum of Shabbos.
The source for the Mitzva of Oneg Shabbos and Kovod Shabbos is here in these pesukkim, including the prohibitions to avoid weekday activities and even discussions ׁ(.שבת קיג)
There are some otherwise religious kids who are so addicted to their phone and the internet that some people have been trying to come up with “creative” ways to justify their sending text messages on their phones on Shabbos, ר”ל .
Even if ways could be found to get around the melocho problems, which itself is dodgy, allowing such things on Shabbos could mean the very end of the spiritual day of rest as we know it. The one day when no matter who bothers you constantly on the phone, one’s only focus is on the Kavod and Oneg of Shabbos, would be destroyed chas vesholom. If I were on a Sanhedrin , even if it wasn’t ossur, it might be one of the first things I would ban!
From these words of Yeshayahu. Just like the true spirit of fasting is detailed, treating Shabbos appropriately becomes not just a chumra for those who wish to act “in the spirit of Shabbos” , but an actual commandment to act in that spirit.
We have come full circle and the closing message of the chapter is clear: Ethics and ritual, our relationship with man and Hashem, the two sides of the tablets are inseperable
(Written with pain, tears, and trepidation and davening for a refuah shleima for all the injured and nechama for all those who lost relatives, teachers, students, and friends)
The second chapter of Yoma opens with a discussion regarding the תרומות הדשן( removal of ashes from the altar), which was the first task given to the כהנים (priests) before dawn in preparation for the morning service.
It tells us that initially, any kohain could choose to perform this service on a first come, first served basis.
If more than one kohain wished to perform it, they would literally race along the ramp to the altar and whoever got within 4 amos of it first would receive the honor.
It once happened that while two kohanim competed for the honor, one of them pushed his friend who fell and broke his leg.
Once the בית דין (court) saw that this ”competition” brought them to danger, they abolished this custom and replaced it with a lottery system.
On reading this shocking account, one is faced with some obvious questions, among them:
- Why did it take such a disaster for the בית דין to abolish this custom- was it not clear from the beginning that it was disaster waiting to happen?
- How can one explain the behaviour of the one כהן who in his zeal to perform the מצוה, would push his friend- was it not clear to him that a מצוה which one can only perform by pushing his friend might not be a מצוה at all, but rather a מצוה הבאה בעבירה (a mitzva that comes from a sin?)
As if this episode is not shocking enough, on the next daf (Yoma 23b), a ברייתא is brought which tells how another time, two kohanim were racing towards the altar, and one of them got within 4 amos first, thus becoming entitled to the honor.
The other then took out a knife and mortally stabbed his friend.
Rabbi Tzadok stood on the stairs of the entrance hall and referenced the obligation for the inhabitants of the closest town to bring an עגלה ערופה (special calf offering) to atone for a murder that took place.
He questioned whether an atonement offering for this murder should come from the people of the city or from the Kohanim who were in the courtyard of the Temple at the time.
Meanwhile, while the victim was lying dying on the ground, his father came and announced that the victim himself would be the atonement.
If this were not astounding enough, he then told everyone to quickly remove the knife from the body of his dead son so that it would not become impure when he died.
The Gemara notes that the purity of vessels was taken more seriously by that generation than murder, and points to the period of the wicked king Menashe where murder was so common that the streets of Yerushalayim were filled with blood.
Putting the historical discrepancy between the time of Rabbi Tzadok and King Menashe aside, the depths to which a generation of the Jewish people could sink to the point at which a father seemed more concerned about the purity of a knife than the murder of his son is thankfully unfathomable to us.
Yet unfortunately, the slippery slope towards such an abomination is less difficult to imagine.
We live in a time where many presumably observant Jews certainly seem to prioritize certain mitzvot and customs over human life, if not consciously , then at least at some level.
During the Corona period, we have seen how people have insisted on attending indoor minyanim in shul, as well as mass celebrations and funerals, often without masks, in completed disregard for medical advice and legislation, and how many people have likely died as result.
We have just seen how an unthinkable, but unfortunately not unpredictable tragedy occurred because the need to allow unlimited numbers of people to attend a religious event (the significance of which is clearly subject to debate, but which is clearly significant to most who innocently went to great pains to attend it) was allowed to override the most obvious concerns for human safety and the basics of crowd control.
Chalila to believe that anyone would literally stab their neighbor in order to get into a religious event instead of him- there is no indication that anyone at this event was even pushing anyone else consciously- but many people have clearly lost perspective to the point that they don’t even realize how their obsessive observance of certain customs is actually endangering other people physically.
We can spend years analyzing what went wrong on a metaphysical level and assigning blame, but the most obvious reaction is to follow in the footsteps of Chazal and take corrective practical action to try ensuring that such a terrible event ever occurs again, – if that means limiting participation in mass events or even redesigning or abolishing them, which hopefully will not be necessary, then so be it- saving lives takes priority .
The Gemara questions which of the two events took place first.
If the murder took place first, and despite the severity of the event, the custom was not abolished, then why would it be abolished after a later less severe event were someone only broke his leg.
On the other hand, if the event in the Mishna took place first, then once the race was replaced with the lottery, how did the second event occur as described?
It answers that the murder indeed took place first.
However, the court felt that this might have been a freak event unlikely to repeat itself and refrained from abolishing the race.
Once the second tragedy took place, even though it was not as severe, it became clear that this was in fact a dangerous custom, and it was abolished.
Some might claim based on this that limiting such a popular custom on the basis of one freak incident is going too far.
However, such a claim seems both disingenuous and reckless.
It is not unfair to believe that a kohain intentionally stabbing a rival kohain in order to get his mitzva is a rather freak event which even in such a murderous period was not expected to repeat itself.
However, the tragedy in Meron was neither a freak event nor one that was not predictable.
It is something that happens all around the world where crowds become too dense, and some trigger event causes that crowd to collapse like a wave of water.
It was also the second mass casualty event in recent history to take place at the site, after over-crowding caused a balcony to collapse and kill many people at the same sight just over 100 years ago.
It is damning enough that various other considerations stopped the responsible parties, of whom it appears there are many, from taking the correct action in advance to prevent this tragedy- a certain member of parliament reportedly even pushed aside safety concerns raised by professionals by saying that the merit of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai would protect everyone- it would be unforgivable if measures are not taken to at least attempt to prevent a similar or even worse tragedy happening there or anywhere else again.
הכל בידי שמיים חוץ מצינים ופחים – all is in the hands of heaven except for colds and fever.
We have discussed before the two different approaches to miracles associated with the Rambam and Ramban respectively.
Whereas Rambam sees supernatural miracles as a rare event Hashem performs occasionally in order to show that he controls nature , and tends to explain seemingly supernatural events discussed outside Tanach in natural ways , Ramban believes that such miracles are a regular part of life .
The truth is that both views seem to be well represented in Chazal.
On our daf, a story is told of a certain pious man who used to dig well and pits for travellors to drink from.
His daughter was swept away by a flood and noone , not even the famed Rabbi Pinchas Ben Yair could comfort him.
When told about the pious acts he had done , Rabbi Pinchas Ben Yair declared thats it is impossible that someone who served Hashem with water would be harmed like that by water .
Soon, an announcement was made that the man’s daughter has been found .
Two versions of the story are given:
One is that she was able to hold onto a branch and survive.
The other is that an angel appeared in the form of Rabbi Pinchas Ben Yair and saved her.
We see in this story representation of both approaches- the natural miracle , and the supernatural. A similar example can be found in the Bavli ( Brachos ) where 400 barrels of Rav Huna’s wine turned into vinegar.
Rav Ada bar Ahava and the Rabbis came to visit him and suggested that he look into his affairs to examine what he had done to deserve this.
Rav Huna was offended that they had suspected him of wrong-doing and they countered by asking him if he suspected Hashem of punishing him for no reason .
Rav Huna then asked them if they had heard any rumours about him .
They replied that they had heard that he never paid his sharecropper.
Rav Huna replied that the man was a thief and had stolen more than the value of his work but nevertheless took the “mussar” and paid him in any case.
Two versions of the conclusion are then brought !
One is that a miracle happened and the vinegar turned back into wine.
The other is that the price of vinegar went up to the price of wine !
Again, we see one view that explains the miracle in a natural way and another that explains it supernaturally!
the Mishna on daf 8a forbids the person who takes money out from the contribution boxes for use in the divine service to wear a garment with a folded hem or even to wear shoes or tefillin while doing so !
This is in case people suspect that he might have taken some money for himself and placed them in the fold, in his shoes, or even untied the tefillin boxes and hidden some money inside.
If he becomes poor , people might think that it is due to such wicked actions, and if he becomes rich, they might think that it is from the money he stole.
The possibility that the person entrusted with such holy work could abuse his power in such a way or even abuse holy items such as Tefillin to aid his crime might be shocking , but unfortunately is as applicable today than ever.
Two sources are brought for the requirement to be completely above suspicion:”והייתם נקיים מה’ ומישראל “( and you shall be clean (of suspicion) from Hashem and Yisrael)- just like a person has to be clean in deeds in front of Hashem ( who knows all thoughts and actions), he also needs to be clean of suspicion from others who do not know his thoughts and actions .
It is thus not enough to be honest in reality, but one also has to be above any suspicion of dishonesty.
This passuk is found in the Chumash itself ( Bamidbar 32/22) in the context of the promise made by the tribes of Reuvain, Gad, and half of Menashe to help the other tribes conquer Eretz Yisroel proper in exchange for being allowed to settle on the other side of the Jordan.
An alternative source is brought from Nach (Mishlei 3/4)
“ומצא חן בשכל טוב בעיני אלוקים ואדם “( and he found grace and good intellect in the eyes of G-d and man.)
The passuk is describing the result of one’s following the Torah properly , and a version of it in prayer form is found in the additions we say in the benstching .
The Gemara on daf 9a brings further examples , among them :
A קווץ ( person with long hair ) should not be given this task , presumably because he might be suspected of hiding money in his hair.
They would keep talking with him all the time he is in the room so he would not be suspected of hiding money in his mouth !
It also brings a third source for the requirement to be above above suspicion from the Navi and concludes that the first source brought from the Chumash is the clearest of all !
We have already seen this passuk being brought as a source for this requirement in the Bavli in our post on Pesachim 12-13 where we discussed this topic in more detail and together with other sources and examples , referenced our Mishna here in Shekalim.
As with everything in the Torah , and particularly in ethical matters , it cannot be highlighted enough!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
The Gemara on 107b concludes that the reason for the prohibition against eating from סמוך למנחה on ערב פסח is in order not to become full and land up eating the מצה in a way that is considered אכילה גסה (gluttonous eating.)
Rashi (see Pesachim 99b “לא יאכל”) seems to take this further than face value and explain this as a form of הדור מצוה (performing the mitzva in a more beautiful way.)
Rather than literally avoiding אכילה גסה , which as Tosfos (קז. ד”ה “דילמא) notes is generally not considered eating at all, Rashi explained that one actually needs to build up an תאיבון [appetite] for the matza, an idea he seconds here on our daf using the even stronger phrase תאוה[lust.]
This seems to make this law a rather unusual case of a גזירה דרבנן (rabbinical decree) made to protect a הדור מצוה , something requiring its own analysis.
In contrast, the above-mentioned Tosfos on our daf understands that the concern is literally that one will be so full by the time he comes to eating his מצה that it will not qualify as eating at all, the fully-fledged kind of אכילה גסה for which one is exempt on Yom-Kippur!
This makes this a more usual גזירה דרבנן designed to prevent one from entirely missing an עשה דאורייתא , similar to that requiring one to say שמע before midnight to avoid missing it entirely (Brachos 2a.)
A possible נפקא מינה (practical difference) between these two views could be what types of snacks one is permitted to eat even after this time and/or the quantity of snacks that one is permitted to eat.
We have already seen from Tosfos at the beginning of the פרק (see post on Pesachim 99 and 100) that this prohibition is referring to something very specific, not to all forms of eating, namely מצה עשירה.
In contrast, מצה is forbidden all day, and מיני תרגימא (certain snacks) are permitted all day.
We have also seen that the Rambam distinguishes between eating a lot of anything which is prohibited, and eating a small amount of snacks, which is permitted.
The source for the היתר (permission) to eat מיני תרגימא lies on our daf and is stated expressly by ר’ אסי and illustrated by ר’יצחק’s practise of “dipping” them.
This practise seems to be further illustrated by a ברייתא which states that the שמש(servant) may dip (and eat) the בני מעיים (innards) of the animals and also place them in front of the guests.
According to Rashi, the proof from the ברייתא is somewhat difficult, given that he defines מיני תרגימא as פירות (fruits) but does not seem to permit meats, like Rashbam does, let alone Mezonos snacks (as permitted by Tosfos, at least according to his first answer in ד”ה “מיני”.
Rashi’s limitation of the leniency to fruit appears to fit in well with his requirement for הדור מצוה which presumably requires a greater degree of caution than simply avoiding אכילה גסה and Tosfos’s generous extension of this permission even to Mezonos snacks which are certainly more filling seems to match his lower bar of simply avoiding אכילה גסה.
Yet how would Rashi explain the proof in the Beraisa, which seems to permit eating meat snacks as well, at least the way he himself explains it (see Rashbam for alternative explanation.)
As Rashbam himself seems to note Rashi understands this in several steps:
- It is normal for the שמש to eat while preparing food, and not doing so causes him צער. (distress)
- Seeing that he is eating while he works to prevent צער and not for pleasure, meat snacks are also less likely to fill him up, and have the status of מיני תרגימא specifically for him
- From the fact that the בני מעיים get the more lenient status of מיני תרגימא for him and this permits them to him, it follows that fully fledged מיני תרגימא, namely fruits, are permitted for all people.
Be that as it may, we have seen that Rashi limits the היתר of מיני תרגימא to fruit , Rashbam expands it to meat snacks, and Tosfos permits even “Mezonos” snacks like non chametz cake, cookies, kneidlach etc, and this can be directly linked to how Rashi and Tosfos see the basis for the prohibition.
Once we have seen that the ban on eating is not total but linked to the risk of being satiated by the type of quantity of snacks eaten, which in turn is linked to how we understand the prohibition, it is possible to investigate another possible נ”מ of this debate.
Is it permitted to eat after dark, after Kiddush, during the Seder itself, but before eating the matza?
On the one hand, we have not seen a specific prohibition against doing so, and the Mishna specifically seems to limit the prohibition עד שתחשך (until it gets dark.)
On the other hand, if we are concerned about being too full for matza for the entire later half of the afternoon, surely we should be more concerned during the Seder itself, closer to the time we need to eat the matza?
The second law in the Beraisa brought as a support for permitting מיני תרגימא states that the שמש places the בני מעיים in front of the visitors.
As it is normal for the visitors to arrive after dark for the seder, the simple reading of this statement seems to imply that the visitors are permitted to eat them after dark during the Hagada. (though note that what is normal for us might have been normal in the times of Chazal, and the discussion on 100a about interrupting eating or drinking when Shabbos or Yom-Tov starts does seem to indicate that serving visitors (probably sleep-over visitors from out of town which was the main form of הכנסת אורחים practiced) was done for pre -Yom-Tov snacks as well.)
Though Rashbam understands that the visitors are fed these snacks during the afternoon before dark as appetizers for later, Rashi specifically limited the היתר to eat בני מעיים in the late afternoon to the שמש, so it is also more consistent for him to view the placing in front of the visitors after dark when the official prohibition is over, if it indeed is.
Tosfos (צט.. ד”ה “סמוך למנחה” ) seems to have offered explicit proof that eating after dark is permitted from an earlier sugya (Pesachim 40a) which permits one to eat בציקות של נכרים (matza baked by non-Jews but essentially non shmura-matza) during the seder so long as one eats at least a kezayis of fully fledged (shmura) matza afterwards to fulfil one’s mitzva.
Whereas the main lesson of the Gemara there is that it is permitted to eat non Shmura matza on pesach, even during the seder, but cannot use it to fulfil the mitzva of eating matza, it appears from it that eating בציקות של נכרים is permitted before one fulfills the mitzva of matza!
As these taste like מצה, are just as filling as מצה, and far more filling than מיני תרגימא (certainly Rashi’s “fruit” מיני תרגימא ), this seems to fly completely in the face of the prohibition of eating on ערב פסח and even defeat the purpose.
Whereas there are other ways of learning the earlier sugya and Rashi seems to understand that the מצה באחרונה referred to there is the afikomen, which is meant to be eaten while satisfied anyway, it seems clear from their question and answer that Tosfos understands it to refer to the מוציא מצה!
In a logical curveball, the Tosfos answer that eating during the seder before the מצה is actually less risky than eating during the late afternoon!- once one has started the meal (presumably with קדוש and כרפס) one is aware of the risk of filling oneself up and is more careful not to do so.
As such, one would be permitted to eat even בציקות של נכרים and certainly מיני תרגימא during the meal even before eating מצה.
Whereas this logic might be arguable, and it is hard to believe that eating בציקות של נכרים will not ruin one’s appetite for the מצה, Tosfos seems to be happy with it, and this might well be consistent with his limiting the prohibition of eating to that which risks real אכילה גסה.
It is unlikely that Rashi, who requires one to have a “lust” for the מצה, would permit eating בציקות של נכרים before the first מצה has been eaten, and by explaining this היתר as referring to during the meal proper before the afikomen, he avoids the need to do so.
Yet it is quite possible that he accepts Tosfos’ basic logic that eating non-filling things like fruit, which in smaller quantities actually stimulate the appetite, is even less problematic than during the afternoon, and remains permitted during the entire seder, even before מצה is eaten- This would be consistent with how he seems to understand the permission for the visitors to eat the בני מעיים as being specifically after dark, during the seder, but before the מצה!
This thesis of Tosfos is put to the test, however, by a discussion at the end of daf 107b, moving onto 108a.
We are told how Rava used to drink wine throughout erev Pesach in order to stimulate his appetite for the מצה later.
In order to prove that wine stimulates the, he draws on the Mishna which states that one is permitted to drink additional cups of wine between the first and second cups, and between the second and third cups.
If wine is filling, argues Rava, it would not be permitted to drink so much before eating the מצה!
Tosfos acknowledges that if his thesis is correct that eating during the seder is less problematic than during the afternoon, Rava’s entire proof falls away.
His first answer, once again consistent with his view of the prohibition, is that although one is careful during the seder not to eat too much, it is much harder to be careful not to drink too much wine, due to its intoxicating effect.
As such, whereas eating even בציקות של נכרים and certainly מיני תרגימא during this time is permitted, drinking additional wine is not.
The second answer, however, is more problematic in terms of permitting eating snacks during the מגיד.
Tosfos suggests that there is a distinction between the long period of the מגיד between the first and second cups which is similar in practise to a different meal, and the short period between drinking the second cup and making המוציא .
According to this answer, the היתר to eat בציקות של נכרים is limited to the short period between the מגיד and מוציא מצה when was is super conscious of the impending mitzva and can be very careful not to fill oneself.
There is no such permission during the long period of the מגיד between the first and second cup, and it is from the permission to drink wine during this period despite it being like a different meal, that Rava derives his proof that wine, unlike בציקות של נכרים , are not filling.
It follows that according to this answer, eating בציקות של נכרי during the מגיד is certainly forbidden and it remains unclear whether מיני תרגימא are still permitted like they are during the later afternoon.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
These daf focus on the laws of Havdala and the precise wording to be used in the main bracha ,other than the bracha on the wine, spices, candle, Shehecheyanu etc as appropriate.
Although the longer bracha we are accustomed to say is also sourced in this daf, the Gemara also records the shorter version of Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, which includes just one mention of havdala, namely ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול.
A number of Amoraim, including Rabbi Yaakov Bar Aba [see Rashbam Pesachim 103b ד”ה “א”ל” ], רבי מנחם בר סימאי , and Chananya [see 104a) seem to follow this view, and the Gemara brings a case where Rav Yehuda told his son, Rabbi Yitchak, to take a basket of fruit to meet Ullah and observe what version of the Havdala he said.
Rather than going himself, he sent Abaya, who reported back to him that Ullah had said only ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול.
Rav Yitchak then reported this to his father, who rebuked him for not going himself, saying that his arrogance deprived him of the ability to hear this directly from Ullah himself.
In contrast, Rava would say the full version we have today, citing רבי אלעזר and רבי אושעיא for support [see Rashbam 103b ד”ה “כי מטא], רב שמואל בר אידי ruled against his brother חנניא, and רבי יהושע בן לוי also rules that a concluding bracha is needed as well [104a.]
There are several possible differences between the longer version we say and that of רבי יהודה הנשיא .
- The longer version mentions four different types of הבדלות (distinctions) that Hashem makes, whereas the shorter one only mentions one.
- The longer version both begins and ends withאתה ה’ ברוך, whereas the shorter version contains this phrase only once, if at all
- The longer version mentions Hashem’s name and is a fully fledged bracha, where it is not immediately clear from the Gemara whether the shorter version does so and has the status of a fully fledged ברכה. Whereas the wording quoted by the Gemara does not include the phrase ברוך אתה ה’, it could be that it is taken for granted as כל ברכה שאין בה שם ומלכות לאו שמיה ברכה (any blessing that does not contain Hashem’s name and the word “king” is not a bracha-Brachos 12a.) It is also possible though, that the shorter version is only valid for one who made Havdala in his Amida already, and that a second fully-fledged bracha is not required but rather a symbolic declaration is sufficient.
On the one hand, as a later authority, it sees that Rava’s view should be accepted, yet on the other hand, Ullah’s view seems to get the last word in our Gemara.
Some support could possibly be brought from a different sugya (Shabbos 150b) for those who follow רבי יהודה הנשיא and say the shorter version.
The Mishna (Shabbos 150a ) rules that it is permitted to wait at the border of the shabbos techum in order to do work in the field outside the techum as soon as Shabbos is over.
The Gemara asks how this is permitted, seeing as it is forbidden to work before Havdala, and two answers are given:
- רבי נתן בר אמי in front of רבא -The Mishna is referring to בין הגיתות (the wine-pressing season) where there is plenty wine in the field on which to make havdala.
- רבי אבא to רב אשי -The Mishna is referring to someone who says the phrase ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול after which working is permitted.
The later answer seems to have been accepted by רב אשי (who reports this as having been their custom in the house of רב כהנא ), which indicates that we are likely to rule accordingly, hence validating the shorter version.
However, whereas the later answer seems very similar in wording to the view of רבי יהודה הנשיא in our sugya, there are some major differences:
- In our sugya, we are talking about the ideal version of the havdala, whereas the case in Shabbos might simply be referring to a second-best solution when making havdala properly is not possible before work.
- In our sugya, whatever the accepted version of havdala is works completely, and one has fulfilled one’s obligation with it. In contrast, it is possible that in the case in Shabbos, one would still need to say the full havdala properly later.
- In our sugya, it is clear that even the shorter version is said over a cup of wine, whereas the solution mentioned in shabbos seems to be for a situation where wine is not available (after all, it is brought as an alternative answer to בין הגיתות .)
- In our sugya, one is clearly permitted to do anything that havdala stood in the way of doing once the correct version has been said, including not only doing מלאכה but also eating and drinking. There is no mention in the sugya in Shabbos about permission to eat and drink, just permission to work. Some analysis is required to ascertain whether there should be a practical different regarding work and eating and drinking, but it is possible that even if the symbolic declaration is sufficient to allow work, the general rule forbidding eating before a time-urgent mitzva is performed might still apply until the full version has been said correctly over a cup of wine.
Although there is much discussion in the ראשונים here and particularly in Shabbos as to the above points and how these two סוגיות relate to each other, there appears to be near consensus that in our sugya, we are talking an abridged but fully fledged bracha, with שם ומלכות, made over a cup of wine.
There is some debate however, whether the view of עולא is equivalent to that of רבי יהודה הנשיא, includes only one phrase of הבדלה rather than four, and lacks the concluding phrase “ברוך אתה ה'” typical of longer brachos (see for example Rashi , and רבינו חננאל ) or whether עולא’s version included all 4 phrases and simply left out the concluding bracha (see Tosfos 195a, also see Rashbam 104b)
When it comes to the case in Shabbos, most ראשונים (רש”י שם, רבינו חננאל שם,רשב”א שם,רי”ד שם וכו) seem to hold that the shorter version there is just a סימנא בעלמא (symbolic statement) which permits work, but not eating and drinking, and that needs to be followed as soon as possible by the full הבדלה .
As such, it does not include the phrase “ברוך אתה ה’ ” even once , containing just the words “ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול “ and no cup of wine.
According to this view, although the same phrase is used in both סוגיות, they are actually two completely things- The version in our sugya is רבי יהודה הנשיא’s shortened version of a fully-fledged הבדלה with which one fulfills one’s obligation in full, whereas the version in Shabbos is a symbolic phrase that lacks the form of a ברכה at all and merely delays the full הבדלה, allowing one to work but not eat or drink in the meanwhile.
In contrast, The ריף, (also quoted by various Rishonim such as , רשב”א ,ר”ן ריטב”א) seems to link the two sugyos and hold that the version mentioned in Shabbos is the same version of רבי יהודה הנשיא . He rules that in our case, seeing as the מנהג was not in accordance with רבי יהודה הנשיא , one has to say the full version of הבדלה before eating or drinking. In contrast, in the case in Shabbos, the custom follows רבי יהודה הנשיא and the shorter version of הבדלה suffices in order to allow one to work but must include שם ומלכות and according to some interpretations (See Rashba) even requires a cup of wine.
A similar approach is evident in רבינו חננאל (Shabbos 150b) who also requires שם ומלכות but like the Rif, makes no explicit mention of requiring a cup of wine and so rules the Tur (O.C. 299), bringing the ראש and the בה”ג for support!
In practise, later authorities rule that the full Havdala is required before eating or drinking, and that the shortened symbolic version with no שם ומלכות and no wine is sufficient to permit working.
Some Rishonim (רשב”א שבת קנ: ,טור או”ח 299 וכו) seem to only permit this if one has ALSO made הבדלה in his amida, but most seem to consider either this symbolic statement OR the הבדלה in the amida sufficient to allow work to be performed, while requiring the full הבדלה to be said before eating or drinking . (עיין רש”י שם,ר”ן שם,ריטב”א שם, רמב”ם ה’ שבת כט-ו לפי הבנת הריטב”א אלא שצ”ע), and this is the way post later poskim rule ( ש”ע או”ח רצט-ורמ”א שם )
This seems to be an interesting example where the Shulchan Aruch rules against both the Rif and the Tur, even more so given that the Rambam’s words could be somewhat ambiguous!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
After discussing Kiddush arrangements where a meal continues straight into Pesach, Shabbos, or another Yom-Tov (something some Hasidic Purim meals actually did this year,) our perek moves away temporarily from Pesach matters and focusses on matters relating to Kiddush, Brachos, and Havdala.
The first such sugya opens by discussing the common practise of making Kiddush in Shul on Shabbos.
The question is whether those who did so themselves or through the chazan have fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush already, or whether they have not done so.
Although both Rav and Shmuel agree that one should make Kiddush in Shul and at home, they differ as to why:
Rav holds that they have fulfilled their obligation in shul already and only make Kiddush at home for their families who were not at shul- it could follow that if one eats at home alone after saying or hearing Kiddush in shul, one does not say Kiddush again at home.
In contrast, Shmuel holds that one can only fulfill one’s obligation of Kiddush במקום סעודה (in the place of a meal) and seeing as they did not eat a meal in shul after making Kiddush, they have not fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush.
According to Shmuel, the only reason why Kiddush is said in shul is for the sake of visitors from out of town who used to eat and sleep in the shul- they would fulfill their obligation of Kiddush with the chazan or someone else from the community after-which they would carry on with their meal there!
(according Tosfos, due to the prohibition against eating or sleeping in shul, this would be in a side-room, but this is a discussion in itself -see Ran on the Rif who also suggests this but also suggests that visitors might be permitted to eat in shul because of the public mitzva that the townspeople are keeping by hosting them)
It could follow according to the later view, if there are no visitors in shul, Kiddush should not be said, and this is indeed how Tosfos (ד”ה “ידי קדוש”) and the Tur (O.C. 269) rules.
Of course, it is also possible that Chazal instituted Kiddush in shul and at home for the above-mentioned reasons but that they did applied this across the board, regardless of circumstances, and that even when the reason for the תקנה does not apply, it should still be said (see Ran דפי הריף כ who rules this way and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 269 who accepts the custom to say it regardless but prefers that it be annulled!)
Before looking at some of the details of Shmuel’s requirement that קדוש must be said in the place where a meal will be held thereafter, it is important to note that the Gemara puts Rabbi Yochanan on record as agreeing with Rav that this is not necessary.
Using the usual rules of psak, we usually follow Rabbi Yochanan against Rav and Shmuel, and Rav against Shmuel- how much more so when both Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree with Shmuel.
Yet the Gemara proves that later Amoraim such as Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel, and on that basis, the above cited Tosfos rules in accordance with Shmuel, as do the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam(Shabbos 29/8) !
Having established that we follow Shmuel’s requirement that Kiddush has to be במקום סעודה , we now need to identify or define
- The source or reason for this requirement.
- The definition of a סעודה regarding this law- does it need to be a halachik meal with bread, does פת הבאה בכיסנין (snack or “Mezonos” bread such as cake or crackers) count, is any food that requires the bracha of מזונות sufficient, or is even perhaps an additional portion of wine, grape-juice, or even meal, fish, fruit, or other שהכל foods acceptable?
- The definition of מקום as far as this law goes- does it mean the same building, the same house, the same floor, the same room, or even the same corner of the room?
- The scope of this law- does it apply even to Kiddush in the morning, or only to Kiddush at night or vice-versa.
In order to understand the nature of this requirement, and also because of its possible relevance to the other questions, let us beginning by focusing on the first question.
Before attempting to identify the source or reason of the law of קדוש במקום סעודה , it would be appropriate to identify the source of reason for the requirement to say Kiddush altogether.
Whereas the biblical source for the mitzva to say Kiddush on Shabbos is derived from the מצות עשה of “זכור את יום השבת לקדשו” (remember the shabbos day to sanctify it), Chazal understood (Pesachim 106a) that this “sanctification” needs to be done over a cup of wine – זכרהו על היין .
The requirement to make a special declaration about shabbos is also mentioned later in Tanach (Yeshayahu 58) where we are told וקראת לשבת עונג (and you shall call the shabbos a pleasure.)
The Rashbam and Tosfos both understand that the later source is the basis of Shmuel’s rule, based on a דרשה- in the place where you call the shabbos (make Kiddush), you shall have pleasure (a meal)- This דרשה is also brought in the Rif and the Rosh, possibly as part of their גירסא in the Gemara itself, in which case it is possible that the Rashbam also had it in his text but was not convinced it was a דרשה as such.
Rashbam suggests an alternative basis for Shmuel’s law, this time a סברא (reason based on logic)- HE argues that seeing as Kiddush was instituted on wine already, it is logical that it was instituted on the more important wine drunk before a meal, and not just on a casually drunk cup of wine.
It follows that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan would not accept either of these sources, not making such a דרשה from the passuk, and not accepting the above סברא- the reasons for this of course require further analysis, but we will move on for now.
According to the first reason requiring the Kiddush to be made in a place of עונג, it seems likely that any food that is defined as an עונג (likely in addition to the actual cup of wine used for the Kiddush) should suffice, but that food that does not involve עונג would not.
In contrast, according to the second reason, it seems that a meal with halachik importance, namely a bread meal, or at least פת הבאה בכיסנין might be required.
I do not see a major נפקא מינה of these two different explanations regarding the third question about the definition of מקום (though those who study the daf will see that it is the subject of much discussion in the Gemara and the Rishonim) , and the answer to the fourth question would probably relate to whether the above sources and סברא also apply to the day-time Kiddush or only to the night-time Kiddush, a topic I hope to be able to go into another time (see discussion later in the perek on 106a regarding the night and day-time Kiddush themselves.)
Returning to the question of how we define a סעודה as far as קדוש במקום סעודה is concerned , the stories brought to illustrate how Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel could also be pivotal.
In both cases the food eaten is referred to as “מידי” – “something.”
Although a simple reading of this word seems to indicate that eating pretty much anything is sufficient for the purposes of קדוש במקום סעודה, both Tosfos and the Rosh understand that this refers to פת or לחם respectively ( both words for bread), bringing proofs for this assertion from other sugyos, which I wish we had time to analyze here.
This seems to follow the סברא of the Rashbam but seeing as they both seem to see the דרשה as the source for the requirement and not the סברא, it seems like they understand that the word עונג itself implies a proper bread meal וצ”ע.
Either way, it seems that in their food that even Mezonos is not sufficient and a halachik meal with bread has to accompany the Kiddush- it is also possible though that פת הבאה בכיסנין is considered bread for these purposes too, and even if eaten in smaller quantities than that which would make it a halachik meal subject to המוציא , it suffices for our purposes- a thorough analysis of the sugyas brought as proof for the requirement for bread as well as the סוגיא of פת הבאה בכיסנין would be needed to assess this possibility, but this does seem to be common practise. (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 273/5 and its commentaries for practical rulings on this matter.)
The Mishna on 92b tells us that not only one who was impure or far away on Pesach, as per the biblical imperative (Bamidbar 9/9-13 ) but also one who was שוגג ( unknowing) or אונס (prevented from bringing it by reasons beyond his control) may and must bring his קרבן a month later on פסח שני.
There is a significant debate between רבי and רבי נתן as to the nature of this day.
According to רבי, it is considered a רגל בפני עצמו (festival in its own right) whereas according to רבי נתן, it is merely תשלומין (a “make-up” opportunity) for the mitzva missed on Pesach .
It seems that according to רבי, פסח שני brings with it a default obligation to bring a קרבן פסח but includes an exemption for those who have already brought one on Pesach itself.
In contrast, according to רבי נתן, there is no default obligation to bring a קרבן פסח that comes with פסח שני, but just an inherited one from Pesach if it has not already been carried out. (to phrase it in “Lomdishe” terminology, According to רבי, the מחיב is actually פסח שני with פסח being a פטור for those who brought their קרבן already on it. In contrast, according to רבי נתן, the מחייב is actually Pesach itself, with פסח שני merely being תשלומין if it was missed.)
A major נפקא מינה (practical ramification) of this debate regards someone who converted between Pesach and Pesach Sheini, or a child who became Bar/bat-Mitzva during this period.
Should we say that פסח שני is a festival in its own right, then it follows that they should bring a קרבן on פסח שני. On the other hand, should we say that it is merely a תשלומין for the missed mitzva on Pesach, then seeing as they were never obligated by פסח ראשון, there is no missed mitzva for them to make up!
Another נפקא מינה relates to when the punishment of כרת is applicable.
Rebbe holds that one can get כרת for intentionally missing the קרבן פסח on either date, and the Gemara understands that this is consistent with his view that פסח שני is its own independent festival.
Though, as Rashi points out, one person cannot get כרת twice, this does mean that a person who knowingly missed either date and unknowingly missed the other, will be liable to כרת, and that in the above-mentioned case of the convert, knowingly missing פסח שני will result in כרת. (interestingly enough Rashi mentions the case of the convert and not the case of the child regarding כרת – perhaps this is because he holds like the views in Chazal that אין בית דין של מעלה עונשין עד גיל עשרים , a topic requiring analysis of its own– see Shabbos 89b and my Hebrew analysis on this subject. Yet see Pesachim 91b and תוס’ ד”ה “איש ולא קטן”)
In contrast, רבי נתן holds that one can only get כרת for knowingly missing פסח ראשון , the primary מחיב , in which case פסח שני does not exempt him from the כרת . If one unknowingly missed פסח ראשון or missed it for legitimate reasons, he never incurred the כרת in the first place and whereas פסח שני gives him a chance to make up for the lost mitzva, it does not have the independent status to create its own כרת if missed.
A third view in this regard is that of רבי חנניא בן עקביא who agrees with רבי נתן that פסח שני is not an independent festival but holds that it is not only a תשלומין (chance to make up the lost mitzva) but also a תקנתא (remedy) for the כרת incurred by knowingly missing פסח ראשון . As such, one would only be liable toכרת if he knowingly missed both opportunities!
Another possible נ”מ , though not mentioned in the Gemara, could be whether Pesach Sheini is to be treated as a low-level festival in other ways too, perhaps even for those who have brought the קרבן פסח and for all of us today who cannot do so? This could involve avoiding fasts, eulogies, saying Tachanun etc.
A more complex question that might be dependent on this debate but would also be affected by other considerations would be whether we will be liable to keep Pesach Sheini if the conditions that obligate us to bring the קרבן פסח were to return during the period between Pesach and 14 Iyar!
There is a general rule of פסק (halachik rulings) that הלכה כרבי מחברו (the halacha follows Rebbe in a dispute with any of his colleagues-see Eruvin 46b) -AT first glance, one might think that this would indicate that we should rule like רבי that פסח שני is a רגל בפני עצמו.
Yet, in various places (for example Pesachim 27b, Kesubos 21a ) it is made clear that this rule usually only applies מחבירו (against one of his colleagues ) and not מחביריו (against more than one colleague)- In the latter case, the general rule of הלכה כרבים (follow the majority) still applies.
As such, seeing as bothרבי נתן and רבי חנניא בן עקביא hold that Pesach Sheini is NOT a festival in its own right, the view of the two of them should override that of רבי, and we should rule that it is NOT a festival in its own right.
Yet, the Rambam (Korban Pesach 5/7) rules that a convert who converted between the two Pesach’s, as well as a child who reached the age of majority during that period, MUST bring a קרבן פסח on פסח שני . his ruling regarding כרת (K.P. 5/2) is also consistent with the view of Rebbe, a point not lost on the Raavad!
Even more in need of analysis is the ruling of the Meiri (Pesachim 93a), who holds that the convert referred to above does NOT bring a קרבן פסח DESPITE the fact that we hold that פסח שני is a רגל בפני עצמו regarding כרת, a ruling that seems to contradict the link made between the two rulings by the Gemara!
The key to understanding the Rambam might lie in a different sugya (B.B 124b) where some views are brought that we follow רבי even against more than one of his colleagues, or that one is permitted to do so if one agrees with the logic in his arguments?
Perhaps the Rambam follows this view and uses this discretion to rule like Rebbe even against more than one of his colleagues- (this would admittedly go against the consensus of the Rishonim in Bava Basra who rule either like Rava or Rav Papa but so long as it is consistent in the Rambam’s psak in general, something we would need to test, it would not be illegal.)
And perhaps the Meiri goes a step further and uses this discretion to rule like Rebbe regarding treating פסח שני as an independent חג on the one hand but not like Rebbe regarding the convert or the child. Understanding that although the Gemara connects the two rulings, the logic is not precisely the same and it is possible to agree with Rebbe’s logic in one place and not in another?
Alternatively , it could be that the main debate is regarding the convert and the child, and there are only two views there, that of רבי and that of רבי נתן – it is just regarding the connected dispute regarding כרת where there are two views against Rebbe, and perhaps in a case where the main debate contains only one opposing view, the rule that we follow Rebbe still applies- This explanation might explain the Kesef Mishna (K.P. 5/7) who ironically explains that the Rambam rules like Rebbe specifically because of the rule of הלכה כרבי מחבירו against רבי נתן, seemingly ignoring the parallel dispute regarding כרת.
In truth, the Raavad raises this difficulty earlier on in the perek (K.P. 5/2) and the Kesef Mishna bring Rabbeinu Avraham son of the Rambam who explains that seeing as we are dealing with a 3-way dispute (whether פסח שני is its own festival, תשלומין דראשון , or תקנתא דראשון) , Rebbe is weighted against each of his colleagues separately, not together, and the rule of הלכה כרבי מחבירו still applies.
This explanation initially bothered me because at the end of the day, the Gemara did seem to indicate that the נקודת המחלוקת (point of contention) as about whether Pesach Sheini is an independent festival or not, and on that, Rebbe is clearly in the majority.
It seems that the way Rabbeinu Avraham understands his father, this is not quite precise, and seeing as רבי נתן and רבי חנניה בן עקביא derive their views from different readings of the verses, each one’s understanding of אינה רגל בפני עצמו is so different that they are seen as completely different views- This if course requires further analysis but might shed further light on the rather different ruling of the Meiri as well.
Much more to investigate, and we would need to test whatever explanation we choose against the Rambam’s other relevant rulings and the other relevant sugyos to see if it holds any water.
Be that as it may, given that the Rambam has ruled conclusively that פסח שני is its own independent festival, does this have any significance for us in our day where no-one is able to perform Pesach Rishon?
Simply speaking, it seems not. Even according to Rebbe who holds that Pesach Sheini is an independent festival, this is most likely only for those whose obligation was pushed over to Pesach Sheini, not for those who obligation was fulfilled on Pesach Rishon or who despite not having fulfilled their obligation on Pesach Rishon do not have their obligation pushed over to Pesach Sheini.
Given that we have learnt explicitly )Pesachim 66b) that only individuals and NOT the entire community, (or even the majority thereof) have their obligation pushed over to Pesach Sheini, this independent festival simply does not apply in a case where the whole Jewish people were unable to bring the Korban Pesach, despite the rule of טומאה הותרה בצבור, for other reasons beyond their control.
Yet there does appear to be a “taste” of this festival for everyone in that many have the custom not to say Tachanun on Pesach Sheini ( interestingly based on the Megilas Taanis which lists it as a day when fasting and saying eulogies are not allowed-whether this should apply after Megilas Taanis ceased to be authoritative [see Rosh haShana 19b] is a question in its own right) ) and some even eat Matza!