Pesachim 65-66 שבות במקום מצוה , קל וחומר, and גזירה שוה

The Opening Mishna of our new perek lists the various מלאכות  that form part of the process of the קרבן פסח  that override Shabbos.

These include slaughtering it, sprinkling its blood, מחוי קרביו  (cleaning the insides), and burning its fat, but not roasting it or rinsing the insides-Rashi explains that  the later two can done after dark on Pesach night itself and thus do not override the shabbos laws.

Furthermore, the Tana Kama rules that הרכבתו  (carry it on one’s shoulders), bringing it from outside the techum, or cutting a יבולת  (wart) off it may not be done on shabbos.

Rabbi Eliezer, however, attempts to learn by way of קל וחומר that if מלאכה דאורייתא is pushed aside by the קרבן פסח , surely a שבות  should be.

Rashi explains the view of the Tanna Kama, later expressed by Rabbi Akiva, that  although these are all only שבותים  (rabbinical prohibitions- see inside for why,) they could have been done before shabbos and are thus not permitted, an explanation Rabbi Akiva himself gives after some back and forth which itself requires further analysis.

It should be noted that although we have indeed seen places where a שבות  is treated more stringently than a מצוה דאורייתא  in order that people should not make light of it (see my post of Eruvin 2 for sources and some discussion), neither Rabbi Eliezer nor Rabbi Akiva appear to apply this argument to our discussion.

 This seems consistent with what appears to be the default principle that biblical prohibitions are to be treated more seriously than rabbinical ones, in the absence of Chazal ruling to the contrary, something which itself is subject to much discussion and analysis.

The Gemara on daf 66 opens by relating how the בני בתירה  had forgotten the rule that the קרבן פסח  pushes aside the laws of shabbos, as per the above Mishna.

Hillel then proceeded to prove it to them by way of גזירה שוה based on the word “במועדו”  which is used both by the תמיד  and the פסח- just like the תמיד  pushes aside the laws of shabbos, so does קרבן פסח.

He then adds that this can also be derived by means of a  קל וחומר- if a regular תמיד  which does not cause one who fails to bring it to be liable to כרת  overrides shabbos, surely the קרבן פסח whose neglect brings about כרת  should do so.

The Gemara asks how we know that the תמיד  itself may be offered on shabbos, and concludes that we learn this from the  passuk “עולת שבת בשבתו על עולת התמיד ונסכה”( “ The burnt-offering of Shabbos on its Shabbos, in addition to the regular burnt-offering” – Bamidbar 28/10), which clearly implies that the  regular burnt-offering (תמיד)  is offered even on Shabbos.

The Gemara then ask how  Hillel could base himself on the קל וחומר  when the logical argument is flawed- the תמיד   is תדיר (regular) and is also a   burnt offering, the holiest type of sacrifice which is completely burnt whereas the קרבן פסח  is only once a year and is eaten by the owners!

Although the קרבן פסח  is taken more seriously regarding punishment, the תמיד  is taken more seriously in other ways and the former can thus not be said to be objectively more important than the later.

It answers that the קל וחומר   was actually argued first, and when the בני בתירה countered its logic as per the above argument, he then presented the גזירה שוה.

Unlike a קל וחומר  argument, which any sage could make based on his own logic but could also be countered by another sage’s logic, a גזירה שוה   is based not on logic (at least alone) but on מסורת  (tradition.)

A sage may not simply derive anything he wishes from a גזירה  שוה, but may only apply a גזירה שוה  which he has received from his teacher as part of the oral tradition (see Rashi ד”ה “וכי מאחר”  for his precise explanation of this rule, which we shall hopefully be able to revisit in a later post.)

This limitation also gives it an advantage, in that a countering logical argument cannot push It aside.

The Gemara explains that despite this advantage, Hillel initially preferred to use the קל וחומר  argument , seeing as his contemporaries could retort that they not received this גזירה שוה  by way of tradition like he had- only once the קל וחומר  failed, did he resort to the גזירה שוה.

Although the Mishna clearly holds like Hillel, it remains unclear if and how he was able to convince the בני בתירה  of this, given that they had countered the logic in the קל וחומר  and also did not have the גזירה שוה  as part of their tradition.

Are we to learn from this event that even if a certain sage has not received a גזירה שוה  from his Rabbi, once another sage has revealed a גזירה שוה  to them from his מסורות, they are also to accept it?

If so, why was Hillel initially reluctant to use this גזירה שוה?

On the other hand, if those sages are not required to accept a גזירה שוה  revealed by a colleague, of what help was the גזירה שוה in advancing Hillel’s argument at the end?

The Gemara on daf 66b returns to discussing the relative weight of a שבות  as compared to aמלאכה דאורייתא  and asks whether a melacha may be performed כלאחר יד  (in a back-handed or unusual manner) for the sake of a mitzva.

The specific case discussed is what happens if one forgot to bring the knife needed for the שחיטה  before Shabbos, seeing as this is not one of the things one is permitted to do on shabbos for the sake of the קרבן.

On the previous amud, we learnt that Hillel and his teachers, Shmaya and Avtalyon, had permitted sticking the knife required for the שחיטה  in the wool or hair of the animal so that it is carried by the animal and not by a person.

The Gemara queries this for various reasons, among them the fact that it is biblically forbidden to  perform an action which causes one’s animal to carry something for him on shabbos  (מחמר).

It answers that this is מחמר כלאחר יד , an unusual way of getting an animal to carry something,and Rashi explains that this is because a lamb is not usually used for carrying things (like a donkey or camel are.)

The Gemara counters that מחמר  כלאחר יד is still forbidden on a rabbinical level, and answers that this is precisely the question that had been asked of Hillel.

As its wording seems rather cryptic, I choose to quote the original Aramaic:

דבר שיש לו התיר מין התורה ודבר שבות עומד לפניו לעקרו כלאחר יד במקום מצוה מאי?

Something which is permitted on a biblical level and a rabbinical prohibition stands in its way- may one up-route it in a back-handed manner for the sake of a mitzva?

Although the precise wording seems to be referring to performing a שבות  in a backhanded manner, closer to what we often referred to in halacha as a שבות דשבות לדבר מצוה, the comparison drawn to our case seems to be referring to performing a מלאכה דאורייתא  with  a  שנוי  for the sake of a mitzva, which would be a far more drastic leniency.

The answer he gave, as quoted on the previous amud was in the affirmative – הנח להם לישראל אם לא נביאים הם בני נביאים הם!

May one derive from here that any שבות  may be performed for the sake of the mitzva?

It seems clear from the Mishna (according to Rabbi Akiva)  that it certainly may not, even for the sake of a קרבן פסח, at least if it could have been done before Yom-Tov.

As such, this leniency needs to be applied less broadly, perhaps specifically to the שבות  of כלאחר יד .

Rashi (ד”ה שיש לו התיר) , explicitly notes this distinction and explains that doing something כלאחר יד  is less severe than other שבותים, seeing as it is (relatively) uncommon (Chazal usually only make their decrees in cases that are common!)

In contrast, the Tosfos do not appear to make this distinction, and query how this could be permitted, seeing that it is clear from the Mishna that even a שבות  may not be done for the sake of the mitzva of korban pesach if it could have been performed before Yom-Tov.

Whereas Rashi’s distinction would render their query rather mute, the Tosfos suggest a different distinction, namely between a שבות  performed by a Jew and one performed by his animal- only the later is permitted for the sake of a mitzva-a distinction that appears to fit less into the actual wording of the question asked to Hillel, where no mention of an animal is made.

There could be a major נפקא מינה  (practical ramification) between these two distinctions:

According to Rashi, it seems to follow that ANY melacha may be performed  כלאחר יד/ with a שנוי  for the sake of a mitzva but no other שבות  is permitted (except perhaps in the case of a שבות דשבות.)

In contrast , according to Tosfos, it seems like ANY שבות  might be performed by one’s animal for the sake of a mitzva, but not even כלאחר יד  is permitted by a Jew himself even for such a purpose.

Although this seems the most precise conclusion, given that the Gemara mentions “for the sake of a mitzva” in general and does not limit its version of the question asked to Hillel to the case at hand, it is also possible that both Rashi and Tosfos would limit their respective interpretations of this leniency to a mitzva of the stature of קרבן פסח, however that is defined, which sometimes pushes aside even severe biblical restrictions such the laws of shabbos, and not any other mitzva!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 58-59 When one mitzva clashes with another: עשה דוחה עשה

In loving memory of our dear friends, Judith Ginsburg and Ian Shapiro of blessed memory, who were both recently taken by the cursed COVID-19 plagues, as well as that pillar of the South Africa and world Jewish community, the great philanthropist and איש חסד, Eric Samson of blessed memory, who passed away yesterday in Los Angeles.

In an all-encompassing field such as halacha, it is inevitable that at times, one value will clash with another, and it is reasonable to assume that the halacha itself provides solutions for such a clash.

One of the rules we have seen is the principle of עשה דוחה לא תעשה  – a positive mitzva pushes aside a negative one  (Yevamos from 3a.)

Although the basis behind this rule requires much analysis, one approach seems to be that when one action involves both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, we define the act based on the positive mitzva and not based on the prohibition.

For example, the act of circumcision when the 8’th day falls on shabbos involves a prohibition against melacha on Shabbos, as well as the mitzva of circumcision, and this rule tells us that the positive mitzva of circumcision pushes aside the prohibition of melacha on shabbos, and the act is performed.

Where a garment is made out of linen and the tzitzit are made out of wool, the same principle tells us that the act of wearing is defined by the positive mitzva of tzitzit and not by the prohibition of wearing shaatnez.

On the other hand, a different principle tells us that the ends does not always  justify the means- for example, one may not fulfil the mitzva of the 4 species on Sukkot if they have been stolen- this would be considered a מצוה הבאה בעבירה  (a mitzva that comes/came   with/through a sin), another rule requiring more precise definition.

On our dapim, we encounter another principle that relates to clashes between mitzvos, this time when one positive mitzva clashes with another.

There is a positive mitzva, known as עשה דהשלמה , which states that the תמיד של בין הערביים  (regular afternoon sacrifice) should be the last sacrifice of the day, with the notable exceptions of the נרות  (evening candles)  the evening קטורת  (incense), and the קרבן פסח  (pesach offering.)

Yet there are times when someone might need to offer a different sacrifice after the afternoon offering has already been made, in order to be declared fit again to eat the קרבן פסח .

For example, a מצורע  (leper) might need to still bring his final offerings that afternoon, without which he would not be permitted to eat his קרבן פסח .

The same might apply to one who needs to eat a קרבן שלמים  (peace offering) that he has brought.

Here, there is no blanket permission to actively be מבטל מצות עשה  (nullify a positive mitzva) in order to actively fulfill another.

Yet there are cases where due to the greater status of the one commandment, the other will take priority.

The Gemara on 59a brings a Beraisa which tells us that a מצורע  (leper) who needs to bring his final sacrifices to clear him to fulfill the command of eating the korban pesach, one of the only two positive mitzvot that one incurs the severe punishment of כרת  for neglecting to perform, the more severe commandment to eat the korban pesach pushes aside the requirement for the regular afternoon sacrifice to be the last non-Pesach sacrifice of the day!

The same Beraisa, however, also gave permission any time to a regular impure person on any evening of the year to bring his outstanding sacrifice after the   תמיד של בין-הערביים in order to be able to eat his קרבן שלמים that needs to be eaten that night!

The Gemara notes that seeing as refraining from eating these sacrifices is not subject to the same severe terms, they should not in and of themselves be enough to push away the עשה דהשלמה.

The Gemara thus qualifies the later permission to be referring to situations where the אסור עשה does not apply, seemingly concluding that only a positive mitzva that involves כרת  if not performed may push aside another positive mitzva (or its related אסור עשה.)

Yet, as mentioned above, there are other times when a positive mitzva pushes aside another one, among them:

  1. The laws of mourning (even the biblical ones on the first day) do not apply on Chol-hamoed, as the obligation to mourn is pushed off by the obligation to rejoice on the festivals, which is an  עשה דרבים  (positive command on the public-Moed Katan 14b.)
  2. The prohibition against freeing an עבד כנעני  (Caananite slave [in the days when slavery was acceptable]) is derived from the positive mitzva of לעולם בהם תעבודו  (you shall work them forever.)   Yet, the Gemara (Brachos 47b) tells us how Rabbi Eliezer freed his slave to make a minyan (Brachos 47b), and that it was not considered a מצוה הבאה בעבירה  because it was for the sake of a מצוה דרבים  (public mitzva.)

We should note that the term עשה דרבים  is not used there, probably because making a minyan is only a rabbinical mitzva, but that we see that even a rabbinical mitzva of the public, however that is defined, might push aside an אסור עשה , at least this particular one.

3. There is a similar case of the חצי עבד חצי בן חורין  (half slave half free person whose owner is compelled to free him so that he can fulfill the mitzva of פרו ורבו  (having children- Gittin 41a) Seeing as the mitzva of פרו ורבו  is based on the idea that the world should not become desolate of people, perhaps this is also considered a מצוה דרבים- see Tosfos and other Rishonim on the above sugyos for further discussion.

There is much to discuss about the rule that a more serious mitzva can push aside a less serious one, but I would like to focus on one issue brought up by the Tosfos.

One of the limitations of the rule of עשה דוחה לא תעשה is that one has to perform the לא תעשה  at the same time as the עשה .

If the לא תעשה  is done before the עשה, then the rule does not apply, its is forbidden, and might also be a מצוה הבאה בעבירה.

This makes sense according to the explanation we brought regarding the dynamics of עשה דוחה לא תעשה.

One can only define an action based on its mitzva component as opposed to its aveira component when they are both components of the same action, forcing one to choose how to define it. In such a case, the Torah teaches us that the mitzva component prevails.

If however,  two different actions are involved, then there is no need to choose, and the initial forbidden action cannot become permitted because of a later different “mitzva” action- here we say that the ends do not justify the means.

Assuming the mechanism whereby a more serious positive mitzva pushes aside a less serious one is similar to that of עשה דוחה לא תעשה, one would expect the same limitation to apply, and in the case of mourning on chol hamoed, it indeed could- one is pushing aside one’s obligation to mourn at precisely the same time that he is fulfilling the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival.

Yet in our case, we see that one may bring a sacrifice after the תמיד של בין בערביים in order that one will later be able to fulfill the mitzva of קרבן פסח, even though these do actions are clearly not at the same time!

Tosfos points out that the same applies in the case of freeing the slave in order to make the minyan (as it does while freeing a slave in order for him to be able to have children.)

In truth, one could have explained the case of the slave differently, saying that the very prohibition of freeing a slave only applies if it is not done for the sake of a mitzva, making it different from other אסורי עשה .

From the fact that Tosfos does not do this, we see that he sees the case of the slave not as an exception but as a precedent for any public mitzva pushing aside an אסור עשה, possibly even a rabbinical one, which would be a tremendous חדוש  requiring further discussion.

In any case, in our case, there is no possibility of such an explanation, and Tosfos concludes that when it comes to situations where we do apply the rule of עשה דוחה עשה, the limitation that the two need to take place simultaneously does not apply. This is because unlike its “sister” principle where a positive mitzva pushes off a negative mitzva which is generally treated as more severe than a positive mitzva, in this case it is the more serious mitzva which is pushing off the less serious one.

It is clear that even if Tosfos would accept the “lomdus” in עשה דוחה לא תעשה  that we have discussed, this same mechanism could not explain the principle of עשה דוחה עשה , making them two unrelated principles, rather than “sister principles” as we assumed!

It remains for us to suggest an alternative explanation for the dynamics of at least this second principle!

Hopefully we shall have a chance in the future to do precisely that.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 57 “Their pots and pans will go to heaven”

In memory of the Av Beis Din of Cape-Town, Rabbi Desmond Maisels of blessed memory who held the fort of halachik honesty for so many decades in that beautiful city.

One of the great achievements of the past few decades in the Jewish world has been the return to observance by so many people, spear-headed by the “Baal Teshuva” movement.

Whereas 60 years ago, Orthodox Judaism was considered almost dead and buried, the most vibrant and growing Jewish communities of today are found mainly in the Torah-observant world.

This trend is highly noticeable in the plethora of kosher supermarkets, Pesach products, eruvin,  mikvaos, and Torah day school that form the heart of any Jewish neighborhood.

Although many members of these communities are also involved in a large selection of outreach and charitable organizations, there seem to be many who still do not put the same focus on the area of ethical behaviour and inter-human relations as they do in the realm of ritual.

People very often get swept up in the “frumkeit” (ritualistic piety) without even realizing how it sometimes comes at the expense of other things that the Torah values even more dearly.

We have mentioned elsewhere  that the Gemara  (Brachos 17a) cautions against a person learning lots of Torah and acting in a disdainful fashion to his parents and teachers- the stereotype of the yeshiva bachur who will no longer eat in his shul Rabbi’s home because “his hechsher” is not good enough for him.

On our daf we are told how the son of בוהין used to leave פאה  (the corner of a field left for the poor) from certain vegetables, even though they are exempt from this requirement.

When בוהין  later saw poor people collecting the פאה, he told them to rather take double the amount from other produce of his that had already been tithed.

 All though פאה  is not subject to tithing , פאה  taken on vegetables is not considered פאה  and one who eats it without separating tithes is both eating טבל  and  stealing from the Levi and Kohain.

We see how easy it is to be so stringent in one mitzva that one lands up transgressing another, something that we have referred to elsewhere as a stringency that leads to a leniency, or a full-blown transgression.

We also note that rather than be seen to be strict about maaser at the expense of the poor, בוהין was prepared to double the portion collected by the poor from his own tithed produce, at great expense to himself!

Our  daf carries on painting a disturbing picture of a period when the כהונה  (priesthood) was so corrupt that the stronger kohanim used to forcibly take the portions of the weaker ones.

We are taught how Initially the skins from the sacrifices were divided amongst the kohanim on shift, but due to the above corruption, they started rather declaring them הקדש (sanctified for the Temple.)

We see the incredible irony that these thugs were still “frum” enough that they would never think of benefitting fromהקדש , but they were happy to steal from their fellow kohanim and intimidate them.

It reminds me of the famous story of the Yeshiva student who used to store his milk in the communal fridge of the yeshiva dormitory.

He noticed that certain students had been regularly drinking his milk without permission and responded by putting a sign on the milk container that read  : “not chalav yisroel!”- the stealing immediately stopped.

My father of blessed memory would often tell how his mentor, Chief Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz zt’l once intervened in the case of a very observant man who refused to give his wife a גט  (bill of divorce.)

After various warnings, he took to the pulpit to condemn his hypocrisy, noting that due to his high level of kashrus at home , he was certain that “his pots and pans will go to heaven!”

There are people who think that it is possible to serve Hashem by treating him like a king, while treating other people like slaves.

Hashem teaches us that an essential part of his service is doing good for his creations – if our service does not make the world a better place, it is not service, but rather an abomination, a point well illustrated by countless excerpts from our prophets and sages.

There are plenty “frum” people who try to follow the ethical and interpersonal elements of the Torah as precisely as they follow the rest of the commandments.

It is those people, and their leaders,  whom we should strive to emulate.

Rav Maizels zt’l  virtually created halachik observance in Cape Town, bringing standards of public kashrus and religious observance to incredible heights for a small community at the southern tip of Africa . At the same time, he always taught  by example that it is not a mitzva to be excessively stringent at the expense of others, and that growth in one’s relationship with Hashem is directly proportional to one’s growth in one’s relationship with one’s fellow human beings.

May we all merit to continue his legacy.

Pesachim 55-56 Honoring a wicked father

In the previous post, we quoted how the Gemara applied the passuk  “ועמך כולם צדיקים”  (and your nation are all righteous) to 2 different communities with opposite halachik practices, so long as they both grounded in halachically sound considerations.

This passuk is also applied at an individual level (Sanhedrin 90a) where the Mishna brings it to prove that “כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא”  (“all of Israel have a share in the world to come.”)

Yet unfortunately, neither the passuk nor the words of the Mishna are without qualifications.

The very same Mishna lists a variety of sins for which one can lose one’s portion in עולם הבא .

And on Daf 56 in our Masechta, we are told how King Chizkiyahu dragged the bones of his wicked father King Achaz on a cheap  bed made of ropes, and how the sages agreed with his actions.

The Mishna at the bottom of daf 55b tells us about 6 unusual practices of the people of Jericho, 3 of which the sages protested, and 3 of which they did not.

The Gemara opens with a Beraisa that records 6 things done by King Chizkiyahu, 3 of which the sages approved, and 3 of which they did not approve.

At face value, the only connection that stands out is the numbers of questionable practices performed and the equal split between the things that Chazal reacted negatively to and those that they were either silent  (in the case of the people of Jericho) or complementary about (in the case of Chizkiyahu.)

At a deeper level, it is possible that there many connections, and I would like to suggest one.

One of the practices of the people Jericho that Chazal did not protest was “כורכין את שמע”  (literally tying up the Shema.)

The Gemara brings various views as to what this means.  Rabbi Yehuda opines that they did not make any break between the first passuk of Shema and the first paragraph to say “ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד”  as we are accustomed to do.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the reason that we say this verse, and notes that it was the response Yaakov gave to his sons when they all confirmed their loyalty to the faith by saying the words of the Shema in front of him.

Yaakov was afraid that like his father Yitchak and Grandfather Avraham before him, not all his progeny would follow in his path, and when he was reassured by his sons that they would do so, this famous line was his response.

Unlike Yaakov, Chizkiyahu’s grandfather, the righteous king Yotam, did not have the same fortune, and his son and successor, Achaz, become one of the most wicked kings in our history (Melachim II/ 16.)

It is a sign of the greatness of King Chizkiyahu that he was able to rise above the evil legacy of his father and rebuild a Torah society (Melachim II/18), but he too shared the misfortune of his grandfather, and his own son, Menashe, become the most wicked king we ever had (Melachim II/21.)

Perhaps the people of Jericho felt that saying the passuk “ברוך שם”  was insensitive to those who despite their righteousness, did not share the same fortune as Yaakov when it came to all their offspring, and in the tragic cases of King Yotham and King Chizkiyahu, their very heirs.

Although Chazal did not agree with them and chose to focus on the ideal experience that our last forefather, Yaakov had, they did not wish to protest given the good intentions of the people of Jericho and their strong argument.

Back to the halachik subject at hand, Chizkiyahu was praised for degrading his late wicked father by dragging him on a bed made of ropes, which seems to indicate that the mitzva of honoring one’s father does not apply to a wicked man like Achaz.

Before jumping to any conclusions however, we need to examine the nature of and reasons for this action of Chizkiyahu.

Rashi offers two explanations:

  1. Rather than afford him the normal honors given to a king or wealthy person, he was given a poor mans treatment as an atonement for his terrible sins.
  2. This was done for the sake of Kiddush Hashem to show how a wicked man like that was disgraced and encourage other wicked people to mend their evil ways.

According to the first explanation, the actions of Chizkiyahu were for the benefit of his wicked father and helped him achieve atonement.  As such, it is possible that this was not a case of the mitzva of כבוד אב ואם    not applying to a wicked father, but rather of it being the best thing for his honor in the long term, similar perhaps to giving one’s father a curative injection.

According to the second explanation, this was not done for the long-term benefit of Achaz’s soul, but rather for the sake of the Mitzva of Kiddush Hashem.

Here again, there is no need to conclude that the mitzva of honoring parents does not apply at all to a wicked parent, but rather that the mitzva of Kiddush Hashem simply takes priority. It could well be that in a private setting, Chizkiyahu might have still shown honor to his father, and that a wicked person who did not have the same public status and power that King Achaz has, would still be entitled to a degree of כבוד.

Another difference between the two explanations in Rashi could possibly relate to the nature of Chizkiyahu’s actions:

According to the first explanation, Chizkiyahu did not necessarily degrade his father, but simply withheld honor from him.

According to the second explanation, however, Chizkiyahu intended to degrade him as a message to other wicked people, and Rashi highlights this by use of the word “שיתגנה”.

Whereas the second explanation seems to indicate that actively degrading one’s wicked father is permitted, the first merely indicates that withholding honor is acceptable.

We should also note that either way we learn this, Achaz was no longer alive at the time, and although there is a mitzva to honor parents after death as well (Kiddushin 31b) , it would be pushing things to attempt to prove anything from this case regarding honoring a wicked parent who is still alive.

Further, defining someone as wicked is a complex task, which most people are not even qualified to do, and comparing anyone to a totally wicked king like Achaz who not only sinned in the most awful ways but corrupted his people in those same ways is most of the time completely off the mark.

There are other important sugyas that are relevant to this topic (see for example Sanhedrin 85b and compare with Yevamos 22b), which ultimately lead to a significant halachik debate on this matter  (see Y.D. 240/18), but as is our way in these posts, we shall focus for now on what we can get from this daf and look forward to carrying on the discussion as the relevant sugyos come up!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

 

Pesachim 53-54 Yom-Kippur candles and positivity

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

The Mishna on daf 53a had discussed a difference in customs regarding whether to light candles for Yom-Kippur or not.

Unlike shabbos eve, where lighting candles was a universally accepted obligation, Yom Kippur eve had no such consensus in this regard, and whereas in some locations there was a practise to do so, in others, the practise was to refrain from this.

Keeping with the general requirement to follow local custom, the Mishna ruled that everyone must follow the custom of his place.

The Gemara pointed out that this was not an issue of being stringent or lenient ,as is the case in many of the customs we have discussed- rather, there was strong reasoning on both sides, both related to the same concern.

Rashi explains that on the one hand, if there is a candle lit on Yom-Kippur, people will be more likely to refrain from sexual relations due to the added prohibition of having such relations by the light of a candle.

On the other hand, if one can see one’s wife on the night of Yom-Kippur, one is more likely to be attracted to her and tempted to transgress the more severe prohibition of actual sexual relations.

Whereas some explanation is needed for both above claims, the Gemara sees this as an example of how two communities can have opposite customs both with righteous intentions, applying the  passuk “ועמך כולם צדיקים לעולם ירשו ארץ. (“and your nation are all righteous people, they will forever inherit the land!)

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Towards the bottom of daf 53, the Gemara presents a debate that took place while Ullah was travelling on his donkey, accompanied by Rabbi Aba and רבה בר בר חנה.

This centred around whether one makes the bracha בורא מאורי האש  on a candle during havdala after Yom-Kippur, or whether this bracha is reserved for motzai-shabbos exclusively.

רבה בר בר חנה had been  quoted as claiming that Rabbi Yochanan ruled like the later view, and Rabbi Aba queries Ullah about this.

He asked Ullah whether it was true that Rabbi Yochanan had agreed that one only makes the bracha  בורא מאורי האש  on motzai shabbos, and not motzai Yom-Kippur, and Ullah responded initially by giving Rabbah bar Chana a “bad look.”

He then explained that when he quoted Rabbi Yochanan, it was not regarding this law, but rather regarding a different debate regarding Yom Kippur that fell on shabbos.

רבה בר בר חנה then relented and accepted that Ullah was correct.

We should note that receiving a “bad look” from someone, particular a Torah leader, is not a simple thing, recalling how Rabbi Yochanan when angered by  a student’s heresy, stared at him, and turned him into a pile of bones. (see Bava Basra 75a )

Yet in this case, Rav Yosef seems to see this “bad look” in a positive light, praising Ullah for the ability to communicate his disapproval with a look rather than by verbally attacking רבה בר בר חנה, and praising רבה בר בר חנה for his ability to note such disapproval and accept it, applying  a relevant passuk in משלי  to both of them.

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We have learnt two amazing lessons in positivity, the one regarding how we view opposing halachik views as both coming from a place of righteousness, and the other regarding the benefits of using non- verbal communication to resolve disputes without the confrontation that usually comes with a war of words.

Pesachim 53-54 Yom-Kippur candles, good intentions, and the power of looks

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

Towards the bottom of daf 53, the Gemara presents a debate that took place while Ullah was travelling on his donkey, accompanied by Rabbi Aba and רבה בר בר חנה.

First, some background:

The Mishna had discussed a difference in customs regarding whether to light candles for Yom-Kippur or not.

Unlike shabbos eve, where lighting candles was a universally accepted obligation, Yom Kippur eve had no such consensus in this regard, and whereas in some locations there was a practise to do so, in others, the practise was to refrain from this.

Keeping with the general requirement to follow local custom, the Mishna ruled that everyone must follow the custom of his place.

The Gemara pointed out that this was not an issue of being stringent or lenient ,as is the case in many of the customs we have discussed- rather, there was strong reasoning on both sides, both related to the same concern.

Before we attempt to explain this, we should note that various reasons are given for the rabbinical mitzva of lighting candles for shabbos, among them:

  1. עונג שבת  (to allow one to enjoy shabbos- it being rather difficult to do so in the dark- see Rambam Shabbos 5/1)
  2. כבוד שבת  (honoring shabbos- a banquet without light is not  honorable – see Rashi Shabbos 25b ד”ה “חובה”  and Rambam Shabbos 30/5]
  3. שלום בית  (keeping the peace at home- it being rather difficult to do so if people are constantly falling over things or bumping into one another- see Rashi, Shabbos 25b ד”ה “הדלקת נר”

Whereas all these reasons could apply, perhaps with some nuances, to Yom-Tov, Yom Kippur might indeed be different.

Whereas there is no mitzva of עונג    (enjoyment) on Yom Kippur, there might certainly be a mitzva of כבוד  , yet according to Rashi, the כבוד  provided by the candles is achieved by making the meal more distinguished, and there is no meal on Yom-Kippur!

At first glance, it seems that given the holiness of the day, שלום בית  is certainly also  an applicable reason, and having people falling over things on Yom-Kippur is hardly a reason for this.

Yet שלום בית  has multiple implications, and its most highlighted component sometimes seems to revolve around the physical and emotional relationship between man and wife, the former being limited on Yom-Kippur by the prohibition against תשמיש המיטה  (sexual relations) and other physical contact. (See Shabbos 152a where Rabbi Shimon ben Chalafta refers to his אבר תשמיש  (sexual organ) as the עושה שלום בבית  (the peacemaker at home!)

It might be that the damage to this  important component of שלום בית  when people are bumping into each other, putting the husband and wife in a bad mood not suitable for such relations, is what makes shabbos candles on shabbos obligatory, and this consideration is lacking on Yom-Kippur.

However, the Gemara’s analysis of this debate does not seem to center on these considerations, but rather on the prohibition of sexual relations on Yom-Kippur. (though see later the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding lighting candles before Yom-Kippur that falls on Shabbos, for reasons of כבוד שבת!)

Rashi explains that on the one hand, if there is a candle lit on Yom-Kippur, people will be more likely to refrain from sexual relations due to the added prohibition of having such relations by the light of a candle (itself quite a statement, given that this seems to be a relatively mild prohibition compared to that of having sexual relations itself on Yom-Kippur, as well as the fact that everyone agrees that a candle is need on shabbos and this seems to present no such concern).

On the other hand, if one can see one’s wife on the night of Yom-Kippur, one is more likely to be attracted to her and tempted to transgress the more severe prohibition of actual sexual relations.

Whereas some explanation is needed for both above claims, the Gemara sees this as an example of how two communities can have opposite customs both with righteous intentions, applying the  passuk “ועמך כולם צדיקים לעולם ירשו ארץ. (“and your nation are all righteous people, they will forever inherit the land!)

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Another dispute is recorded regarding whether one makes the bracha בורא מאורי האש  on a candle during havdala after Yom-Kippur, or whether this bracha is reserved for motzai-shabbos.

Rav Yehuda quotes Shmuel as ruling that one does not, seeing as fire was created on motzai shabbos, and the bracha on it is thus reserved exclusively for that time.

רבה בר בר חנה is quoted as agreeing and as claiming that Rabbi Yochanan agreed!

Now, we return to the incident we opened up our post  with:

Rabbi Aba asked Ullah if it was true that Rabbi Yochanan had agreed that one only makes the bracha  בורא מאורי האש  on motzai shabbos, and not motzai Yom-Kippur, and Ullah responded initially by giving Rabbah bar Chana a “bad look.”

He then explained that when he quoted Rabbi Yochanan, it was not regarding this law, but rather regarding Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s claim regarding Yom Kippur that fell on shabbos.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar claimed that everyone agrees that one needs to light candles on the eve of such a day, out of honor for shabbos, and Ullah had quoted Rabbi Yochanan as noting that the Chachamim did not agree, and held that it was still subject to the same debate above (note that כבוד שבת  seems according to this view to be more important than כבוד כפור  and to override the concern of being attracted to one’s wife- it also does not seem to be related to the shabbos meal)

רבה בר בר חנה then relented and accepted that Ullah was correct.

We should note that receiving a “bad look” from someone, particular a Torah leader, is not a simple thing, recalling how Rabbi Yochanan when angered by  a student’s heresy, stared at him and turned him into a pile of bones. (see Bava Basra 75a )

Yet in this case, Rav Yosef seems to see this “bad look” in a positive light, praising Ullah for the ability to communicate his disapproval with a look rather than by verbally attacking רבה בר בר חנה, and praising רבה בר בר חנה for his ability to note such disapproval and accept it, applying  a relevant passuk in משלי  to both of them.

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After asking what our custom is regarding the bracha on fire in havdala, the Gemara notes that רבי בנינין בר יפת  quoted Rabbi Yochanan (contrary to what was initially reported) as ruling that this bracha is made both on motzai shabbos and motzai Yom-Kippur, and that this is the way the people have spoken!    (note that this ruling is later qualified with the requirement that the candle used on motzai Yom-Kippur needs to be a נר ששבת  [a candle that was already lit over shabbos for permitted reasons, such as pikuach nefesh, or one that was lit before Yom-Kippur- see Rashi.])

Rashi explains that in the absence of the reason that fire was created on motzai shabbos, we require the other reason to make such a bracha, namely the fact that one is now able to use this fire for things one could not use it before (perhaps like lighting another fire with it.)

As such, we need a candle which was already burning but whose use was limited to us before Yom-Kippur ended due to the prohibition of melacha.

In conclusion, when it comes to lighting candles on erev Yom-Kippur, it seems that the usually authoritative view of Rabbi Yochanan is that it is still dependant on custom , whereas when it comes to making the bracha of בורא מאורי האש  on motzai shabbos, his view is that we do so, but only with a נר ששבת.

We have also learnt two amazing lessons in positivity, the one regarding how we view opposing halachik views as both coming from a place of righteousness, and the other regarding the benefits of using non verbal communication to resolve disputes.

As usual, counter examples to both the above could be found, but we shall focus on this angle for purposes of this post.