Monthly Archives: August 2020

Eruvin 18-19 The Stalker ,making women feel safe , and wasted semen

Posted on by

Until recently, the atmosphere in the Western world has made it extremely difficult to teach certain areas of Torah which appear to be unnecessarily stringent in an open society where members of the opposite sex mingle and interact completely freely.

Although modern society is certainly not alone in terms of its hedonistic excesses, for much of history, in most moral societies, it was understood and accepted that human nature is such that certain strict lines need to be drawn to avoid total moral breakdown.

For decades, since the cultural revolutions of the 60’s, Western society has lived in a state of ethical dissonance- On the one hand, the feminist movement has fought for equality for woman and the lines between the genders have been slowly blurred, yet in practise, girls and woman have been treated as badly or worse than any time in history, with “liberal” Hollywood turning woman into nothing other than sex symbols, and the most “respectable” of institutions turning a blind eye to rape, child abuse, and just about every outrage imaginable.

Many a young actress or businesswoman has literally had to sleep her way up the ladders of fame, and the rich, powerful and famous have carried out the worst abuses with virtual impunity.

A pornography industry has flourished that treats people like absolute garbage, taking advantage of the desperation of so many young people to sell them as commodities to serve people’s over-indulged libidos.

It is now, in recent years, with the advent of the much to talk about “me too” movement, that Western society is starting to come to terms with at least some of its excesses, and realize something that the Torah has always taught: true liberty is not the ability to give in to whatever selfish urges come your way, but rather the ability to control those urges and use them in a way that doesn’t harm the weak and the vulnerable but rather brings good to the world.

Reading these two daf, it is absolutely impossible not to think of the horrific events of the past week here in our beloved Israel, where in a scene reminiscent of the biblical פלגש בגבעה (concubine of Giv’ah who was gang-raped and murdered) a gang of teenagers and young adults reportedly stood in line outside a hotel room in Eilat waiting their turn to rape a drunk 16 year old girl.

In contrast to the biblical story which ended in a tragic civil war between the tribe of Binyamin who refused to stand up to those responsible, and the other tribes who demanded justice, the condemnation across our society and demand for change has been unanimous- whether anything will actually be done in practise is something only time will tell.

Yet despite people’s shock, how many of us have internalized the fact that such occurrences are a likely direct result of decades of subtle and not so subtle sexualization of woman and children in the media and on the streets?

The fact that it took an event like this for the city of Tel Aviv to finally remove an outrageous mural painted on a beach change-room of some “macho guys” peaking into the girls change-room, speaks volumes of where society has been.

The bastion of so-called liberalism has been absolutely ok with such a disgraceful “piece of art” which is only one of many such pieces of junk being produced by our subculture.

On our daf, the view is expressed that the first man and woman were created as one entity, with a male face on one side, and a female face on the other.

The Gemara asks which side was on front, and answers that the male side was probably in front.

This is because we have learnt in a Beraisa that a man should never walk behind a woman, even his own wife, and if he meets a woman on a single-file bridge, he should ask her to move to the side so that he can pass her.

The same Beraisa concludes that anyone who follows a woman in a river has no share in the world to come.

The question one immediately needs to ask is what exactly is so terrible about walking behind a woman.

The modern person’s first reaction might be to get defensive and say that this is an example of old-fashioned chauvinism that has no place in modern society- after all, were we not always taught as kids that “ladies go first?”

Indeed, a first glimpse at Rashi on the first statement of the Beraisa, who says that it is גנאי לו, loosely translated as “degrading for him,” might strengthen this claim, if we take it to mean that it is beneath the honor of a man to be behind a woman

Another important think to note is the difference between the first parts and last parts of the Beraisa- the former instruction not to walk behind a woman applies even to one’s own wife, but does not get the forceful condemnation of the later.

The later statement discusses following a woman in a river, does not mention one’s own wife, but issues a far more severe condemnation.

A look at Rashi’s comments on this later statement shows that he understands this to be referring only to another man’s wife, a view that seems to be accepted by the consensus of the Rishonim. He explains that the concern here is that she removes her clothes while washing or bathing in the river.

However, even an adulterer has a share in the world to come, so why would someone who follows someone else’s naked wife into a river forfeit this share?

As one continues down the daf, one sees that the suggestion that our Gemara makes light of woman is completely incorrect.

The Gemara labels Manoach, father of Shimshon, as an עם הארץ ignorant person(, for following his wife, when he should have gone first, but then counters this claim by pointing out that the prophets Elkana (father of Shmuel) and Elisha also “went after their wives.”

The Gemara notably seems to take for granted that a prophet cannot possible be an עם הארץ (c.f. 12a B.B. וחכם עדיף מנביא ” אבל אכמ”ל”) and concludes that they did not literally walk behind their wives which would be wrong, but rather went after their wives’ words and advice.

Given that Chazal were at the least ok, and possibly full of praise, for one who follows the advice of his righteous wife, something we have already seen both in the Torah , where Hashem tells Avraham to do whatever his wife says )(Beraishis 21/14) , and in Midrash (think, for example און בן פלת who was saved by his wife’s advice not to follow Korach -Sanhedrin 109b,) it is impossible to make the superficial claim that they denigrated woman. (There are admittedly some other statements of Chazal that might seem at face-value to do so, but this is not one of them.)

It is far more likely that this has more to do with the well-known concept of כל כבודה דבת מלך פנימה – the honor of a princess is all inside )Tehillim 45/14.)

When it comes to giving advice, woman might be considered more intuitive than men, in many ways the “brains” behind everything.

One does not send one’s most precious resources at the front of the battle as a pawn, one looks after them carefully.

For a man to walk behind his wife, making her walk ahead into the unknown dangers ahead on the road, might be degrading, not because she should be treating him with more respect, but on the contrary, because he should treat her with more consideration, paving the way for her.

It is thus precise that when it comes to walking behind one’s wife, the Beraisa specifically mentions -“בדרך” “on the road.”

It is possible that such considerations would not apply to opening the car-door for one’s wife before entering oneself, where in general no such concern for her safety should apply.

When it comes to another woman, and even more so another man’s wife, the consideration is completely different.

Here the concern could be both that one might make her feel uncomfortable and arouse himself unnecessarily, and at worst, come to rape her, chas veshalom.

This form of premeditated stalking might be even worse than a consensual affair, and in the case of someone’s else’s wife, combined with the additional severe of adultery, results in one’s losing one’s portion in the world to come, assuming this statement is to be taken literally.

For decades, the price of feminism has been that women have to ignore their natural female sense of vulnerability and just accept the fact that the nature of men has not and will not change, and that the guy behind them might just be that stalker she has always had nightmares above.

Hopefully, the balance will be restored to the point where women are revered, cherished and respected , but allowed to feel safe, without men harassing them constantly, the way the Torah has taught us.

The Gemara brings the words of Rabbi Yirmiya ben Elazar who tells us that after the sin of אדם הראשון (the first man) , he was “excommunicated” by Hashem for 130 years, and during this time, he gave birth to “רוחין, שידין, וליליו ” , understood by Rashi as various types of מזיקין (harmful entities, whatever that means…)

The Gemara questions how this was possible, given that Rabbi Meir has already taught us that he was a חסיד גדול (a pious person) who when seeing that he had been sentenced to death, fasted and separated from his wife from 130 years.

If he had separated from his wife, how could he have given birth to these “harmful entities.”

It answers that the entities were created from the wasted semen that he spilled unintentionally during this time.

This seemingly bizarre statement raises many questions that I have no time to analyze today, but which we will hopefully address in future posts:

  1. What exactly were these מזיקין that he gave birth to?
  2. Was this a natural process of some kind or was it supernatural?

If it was natural, how can it be explained naturally? If it was supernatural, then why was the Gemara bothered by the fact that he had separated from his wife, given that the process was supernatural anyway?

  1. Is the assumption that given his pious nature, he could not have intentionally spilled seed during this time, so the only possible option is that the מזיקין came from unintentional spill (מקרה לילה)? If so, how do we understand that someone who was now even more flawed than before the sin was able to withstand this strong temptation in the absence of his wife for so long? Furthermore, assuming he had reached such a supreme level of control that he was able to avoid intentionally spilling his seed at all during this time, what more could be expected of him? Why should harmful entities be the result of what would have arguably been essentially the greatest long-lasting act of self- control in history?

It is known that Chazal (see Niddah 13b) had very strong things to say about “המוציא שפחת זרע לבטלה” – (spilling seed in vain ;obviously the definition of לבטלה needs careful study), comparing it (probably metaphorically) to idol-worship, murder, and adultery.

It does not say such things about unintentional spill, and though a man who experiences such an emission becomes impure ,and one is also not supposed to intentionally have impure thoughts that might cause this to happen, it seems obvious that something beyond someone’s control should not be condemned in any way.

It seems more likely that the “מזיקין” were not a punishment in any way for unintentional spillage, but rather a result of his original sin itself, and the unintentional spillage was merely the means that they came about through.

However harsh Chazal seem to be in their condemnation of intentional wasting of seed, the Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 23/1) claims that this is the most severe sin in the Torah

Though this claim is very difficult for multiple reasons, and many other authorities (see B.S and C.M there for example, quoting Sefer Chasidim) have either disputed this ruling or clarified that it is not to be understood literally, the Zohar (p arshasVayechi 219b) seems to have gone further and claim that this is the only sin for which one cannot repent and whose perpetrator cannot “see” the face of Hashem’s shechina( whatever that means.)

This shocking statement was used by non-other than one of the leading Torah scholars of his time, Rav Yaakov Emden (mitpachas Seforim 1/on Vayechi) as one of multiple “proofs” for his controversial claim that parts of the Zohar contradict the Talmud and cannot possibly be authored by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai!

His points out that Chazal taught us that nothing stands in the way of teshuva and always went out of their way to encourage teshuva. It is also not even listed in the more serious categories of sins which are subject to Kareit or death in court and require more than just repentance and Yom-Kippur to atone for.

Though I am certainly not qualified to get into this debate, which seems to hinge partly on how literally such statements in a very non-literal work are meant to be taken, and which is only the domain of experts in both the Talmud and the Zohar, there certainly seems to be one such proof from Daf 19 here in Eruvin that one can certainly do Teshuva for this sin.

The Gemara (I am admittedly merging a number of statements that the Gemara see as inter-dependant for the sake of brevity) relates how the sinners amongst the Jewish people all do Teshuva at some stage, and are “pulled out” of Gehinom by Avraham Avinu himself.

One exception given is a yisroel who has relations with an idol worshiper – Rashi’s clarifies that (probably to to impress her), he covers up his circumcision and Avraham can thus not recognize him.

Whatever the symbolism behind this exception is (which in no way means that a person cannot repent in his lifetime for such a deed,) it is clear that one who spills his seed is certainly not excluded even from this last-minute repentance and “rescue” operation, how much more so one who has made the effort to fully repent in his lifetime.

As mentioned above, only people well-versed in both the Talmud and Zohar might be qualified to comment on the claims of Rav Yaakov Emden, but assuming the Zohar was never intended to be taken literally in the first place, this would not an issue either way.

Eruvin 17 The army and spiritual challenges

Posted on by

We have pointed out various times during our posts how everything in Torah is related, and that very often that relationship stands out so clearly that one is absolutely awestruck.

The direct connection between our daf and this weeks parsha is certainly one such example.

The parsha opens with the highly unusual law of אשת יפת תואר, the beautiful captive girl taken in war.

In an unprecedented ruling, the Torah permits the soldier who falls for an enemy captive to begin a process whereby he will be able to marry her and even gives him permission to sleep with her once before this process begins, in order to satisfy that lust.

The explanation for this most unusual capitulation to human sexual desire on the part of the Torah is that לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע – “The Torah only spoke against the evil inclination. “

In the heat of war, the Torah understood that if a soldier was not permitted any outlet for his desires, he would carry them out anyway, and thus came up with a permitted way that allowed him to do so if necessary, while never encouraging it.

There is much to discuss about this idea, and the first question that jumps to mind is why is this extreme lust treated any differently to other extreme situations of lust?

The Torah always insists that people have free will and are responsible for their actions, no matter what the temptations, yet here, suddenly it acts completely differently.

Is the lust of a soldier at war really so much stronger than a man whose wife is a Niddah, a homosexual man who has no permitted outlet for his passions, or a single man who isn’t even permitted to masturbate to satisfy his urges, let alone carry on a sexual relationship with someone outside marriage?

Even if we argue that this is a question of פקוח נפש, given the emotional pressures that a soldier is under, we have found that a person is not permitted to practise forbidden sexual relations even to save his life (Sanhedrin 74a,) one of three great transgressions which one may not even transgress with a gun to one’s head.

In the case where the danger to his life comes from his emotional state caused by his desires, this could apply even to a non-married Jewish woman!

We see this from the case (Sanhedrin 75a) where a certain man fell so badly for a woman that he became desperately ill from desire.

The doctors opined that he would never heal unless he got to sleep with her.

The Rabbis ruled that it is better to let him die than to allow him to sleep with her, or even “talk with her from behind the fence.”

Clearly, the fact that a person gets himself into an emotional state that endangers his life does not justify illegitimate sexual behaviour.

It might be possible to distinguish between the two cases in a few ways, among them:

  1. The reason given by the Gemara why such a harsh ruling was given even in the case of un unmarried Jewish girl (who was not even a Niddah) was either because of פגם משפחה (damage done to the girl and her family) or שלא יהו בנות ישראל פרוצות בעריות (so the daughters of Israel would not be engaged in sexual immorality. )

The former reason focusses on the individual girl and her family whereas the later focusses on societal needs – The good of society takes precedence than the good of this individual, as we need to uphold a moral society at all times.

The case in our parsha is different given that the girl is an enemy captive, and neither of those two concerns apply, at least on a technical legal level.

The fact that the soldier is away from society also lessens the impact on society.

  1. In the case mentioned in Sanhedrin, the threat to the person’s life came from his lust itself. We cannot allow our girls to become the “medicine” for every person who is unable to control himself. In the case of the solder, the danger is from the war, the lust simply increases that danger, and the permission given by the Torah simply removes that extra danger allowing him to focus on the prime directive of survival and most important, victory for the nation as a whole.

Despite the above, given the extreme stringency with which the Torah usually treats these matters, there is little doubt that the situation of war should be treated as the exception rather than the rule, and however we try our best to understand it, it is likely that it cannot be applied to any other situations and אין בו אלא חדושו .

On our daf, we see that this is not the only allowance made for people at war.

Our Mishna tells us that there are 4 areas in which Chazal were lenient went it comes to soldiers in an army camp:

  1. They may collect wood from anywhere, even if it does not belong to them.
  2. They are exempt from washing hands before eating bread.
  3. They are permitted to eat דמאי (produce bought from an ignorant person who might not have taken tithes.
  4. They are exempt from putting aside an ערוב חצירות (though they still need basic מחיצות in order to carry within a designated area.

With the exception of the first which involves the biblical prohibition of stealing (probably permitted through the rule of הפקר בית דין הפקר,) these are all rabbinical laws that are waived, but the facts that such allowances were made also makes it clear how much of a need Chazal saw to allow soldiers to focus on the sacred task at hand of achieving victory without having to allocate too much energy to other things that were not practical at the time.

In an even larger concession, the Gemara (Chullin 17a) says that during the wars to conquer the land, the soldiers were permitted to eat forbidden foods if they are hungry, even pig!

What all these things have in common is that the Torah and Chazal have waived certain very important halachik requirements in order to allow soldier to focus on the battle and not use all their energies battling hunger, the evil inclination, or circumstance.

In the context of all of these things, it seems that the although the Torah only spoke against the evil inclination in the case of the captive girl, this is not because the Torah allows people to sin “legally” in order that they not come to sin “illegally,” but because of the unusual situation soldiers face in war where survival and victory has to be their only goal and the Torah therefore chooses not to make them spend their energy fighting their evil inclination in almost certain losing battles.

One of the major objections raised by many in the Torah world against religious youth going to the Israel army involves the spiritual dangers that they face there, given that much of the army is irreligious.

One of the strongest arguments against this comes from the many extreme allowances that the Torah itself makes for those at war, to the point of permitting some very serious transgressions- what it does not do is in any way discourage soldiers from going to fight, whether the war is obligatory or voluntary in nature.

If this is the case in situations where religious life is not possible, how much more so, we could argue, should it be in a Jewish army where so many allowances are made for religious soldiers, such as kosher food, Shabbos observance, and even time to pray and study.

On the other hand, one could counter that there is a difference between leaving one’s own camp to go into battle or to enemy territory, where the religious threat is from the outside, and being in a Jewish camp where the religious temptations come from the inside, from one’s own side.

The former is more likely to be a temporary setback, whereas the chance of long-term assimilation into secular society poised by being part of an irreligious unit is on a completely different level.

One can argue back and forth on this issue, but one thing that we see for sure on our daf is that certain leniencies were applied by Chazal even INSIDE our own camp.

The army certainly does not seem like a place for imposing extra stringencies above the basic requirements of the law, and even certain laws themselves, namely the 4 mentioned in our Mishna, are pushed aside even while in the מחנה itself.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 15-16 More on Eruv principles, dispute, and הלכה למשה מסיני

Posted on by

Our two daf contain pivotal sugyos regarding the laws of partitions and Eruvin.

One of them is a famous dispute between Abaya and Rava regarding a לחי העומד מאליו (a post that was already there prior to it being designated for use in closing off a מבוי.

The classic example is if a part of the one wall sticks out at a 90-degree angle to the wall, forming an effective post.

So long as he had in mind the day before that it should be used as a post for the Eruv, Abaya is of the view that it is acceptable.

On the other hand, Rava is of the view that seeing as it was not placed there specifically to serve as an Eruv pole, it is invalid.

After much back and forth, the Gemara brings a proof that Rav held like the lenient opinion of Abaya, which seems to be conclusive in allowing us to rule in his favor.

It is interesting that although we have a general rule that whenever Abaya and Rava disagree, we follow the ruling of Rava, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 22b ) gives an acronym יעל קגם for 6 cases where we follow Abaya, and Rashi identifies our case, לחי העומד מאליו as one of them.

We should note that at least in the case of our sugya, as well as the sugya quoted above, this is because the Gemara was able to find strong evidence in his favor.

We mentioned in our previous post that the Rambam (Mamrim 1/3) is of the view that things mentioned explicitly in the Torah or passed on orally to Moshe at Sinai are not subject to מחלוקת (debate,) and debates are only find regarding laws based on Chazal’s interpretations of the former through the rules of interpretation or rabbinical decrees and the like.

He also said (ibid 1/4) that even such debates were always settled eventually by the בית דין הגדול (great court or “Sanhedrin” of 71 ordained judges,) and once they were settled, there was no room for halachik debate.

In contrast, once the great court ceased to function, new debates remained essentially unsettled and each sage was free to follow and teach his own view to his students, who would typically follow their Rabbi- the default rule for undecided debates was to be stringent in biblical matters and lenient in rabbinical ones. (Mamrim 1/5)

In reality, this has not been the case, and in Amoraic Bavel where the much-weakened Sanhedrin back in Tiberius had little power, as well as after it ceased to function altogether, later Amoraim have come to conclusions regarding disputes which have thereafter also been regarded as binding.

There have even been rules of thumb formulated, such as following Rav over Shmuel, Rabbi Yochanan over Rav or Shmuel, and Rava over Abaya etc.

The Rambam himself (introduction to M.T.) explains the dictum of רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה (Bava Metzia 86a) as meaning that the later Amoraim, Ravina and Rav Ashi, who sealed the Talmud Bavli, essentially had the authority of בית דין הגדול for the last time in history, given that their rulings spread and were accepted by the Jewish people as a whole and all or most of its sages.

Although there is much to discuss and analyse here, it seems clear that a simple understanding of the earlier-quoted Rambam that makes authoritative dispute resolution entirely dependant on בית דין הגדול itself is not sufficient.

In another pivotal dispute, רב פפא, and רב הונא בריה דר’יהושע debate whether פרוץ כעומד (open area equivalent to closed area) is acceptable to consider a side as partitioned off or not.

The general rule is that when מחיצות (partitions) are used to close off a רשות היחיד, gaps of up to 10 אמות are permitted, and considered to be an acceptable פתח (opening) rather than a פירצה (gap)

However, there is an additional requirement recorded in the Mishna on 15b, that there may not be more open space than closed space (in the absence of a צורת הפתח in which case it is more complex.)

The Gemara on this Mishna opens with the above-mentioned debate regarding whether it is sufficient if the closed area is equal to the open area, or whether it needs to be MORE than the open area.

The Gemara seems to understand that the requirement that most of the partition not be open is a הלכה למשה מסיני (law given orally to Moshe at Sinai and passed on via tradition.)- (the precise term used here is “אגמריה רחמנא למשה” which seems pretty self-explanatory!)

It then understands the dispute to be a question of the nature of this הל”מ.

Was it a requirement not to allow most of the partition to be open, or was it a requirement requiring most of the partition to be closed?

Much debate follows onto daf 16 until in a major curveball, the halacha is resolved according to the lenient view, but this seems to be an explicit example of a dispute regarding something passed on explicitly to Moshe at Sinai, a counter-example to the Rambam’s hypothesis limiting such debate to matters involving the rules of interpretation or rabbinic decrees.

Once again, it seems that a simple explanation of the Rambam might not seem feasible and more analysis is required!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 14 Science and Torah- Matters of PI

Posted on by

Recent years have brought some extremely “vibrant” and often downright hostile discussions about the correct approach to apparent contradictions between the Torah, Chazal and modern scientific knowledge.

This applies across the board from astronomy, medicine, geography, physics, mathematics, and through archeology, even to history.

There are those like my good friend, the famous “Zoo Rabbi,” Rabbi Nathan Slifkin, who after his books touching on the subject were banned by various Chareidi authorities, has made it a major part of his life’s work to restore the popularity of “Rationalist Judaism.”

This, loosely speaking, encompasses the approach of many of the Geonim, the Rambam, and many other great early authorities that statements made by Chazal which appear to conflict with nature and science are not to be taken literally, and that when Chazal express their views on scientific matters, they are basing themselves on the accepted science of the time, and not on neo-prophetic revelation.

In contrast, Rabbi Moshe Meiselman, a renowned Chareidi Rosh Yeshiva who also has an academic background, has written his own work “Torah, Chazal, and Science” with the primary intention of both condemning and refuting this view, as well as attempting to prove that even the oft-quote protagonists amongst the Rishonim have been misunderstood.

In all humility, in a series of shiurim of my own on Agada, and a Hebrew analysis that I am still working on, I have brought numerous sources, including the introduction to the Talmud attributed to Rabbeinu Shmuel haNagid (printed at the back of most traditional versions of Masechta brachos,) which explicitly say that Agada is not comparable to halacha in its divine source and authority, but rather consists of Chazal’s own interpretations of the pesukim.

I also brought the words of the Ran (drasha 5) in his Derashos that seem to say the exact opposite and define anyone who does not believe that every word of Chazal’s Agadot are sourced at Sinai as a heretic.

As complex and sometimes aggressive this debate tends to be, it is exponentially more problematic when Chazal’s apparently out of date scientific knowledge forms the basis for practical halachik rulings.

In such cases, agreeing to disagree is not even an option, as huge areas of halacha are affected and a practical decision must made. What in one view invalidates a Sukkah or an Eruv, for example, can be essential to making it valid in the other. What renders a fish permitted according to one view, might render it forbidden according to another.

The above applies both ways, but although some authorities do indeed take into account discrepancies between modern scientific knowledge and that which Chazal were presumed to have, it is virtually always when it results in a stringency and not in a leniency.

It is not my intention to take sides in this longstanding and critical debate, but rather, as is my way in general, to examine the relevant sugyas on their own merit, together with the way the Rishonim interpret them, and see what we can learn from them

In our mishna, we are told that the minimum width of the pole used to “close” the open side of a מבוי is 1 handbreadth.

If the pole is round, we are to view it as if it is square and go by the width of its diameter.

As directly measuring the diameter of a solid cylinder is tricky, the Mishna advises us to measure its circumference, something far more practical and rely on a universal ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter to calculate the diameter.

The ratio given by the Mishna is the number three, according to the formula:

“כל שיש בהקיפו שלשה טפחים יש בו רוחב טפח”

“any (circle) whose circumference is 3 handbreadths has a diameter of one handbreadth.

As such, it follows that so long as the circumference of the round pole is at least 3 tefachim, we can assume that the diameter meets the minimum width of 1 tefach (handbreadth).

The same principle is employed (Sukkah 7b) to measure the diameter of a circular Sukkah to ensure it meets the minimum width of 4 amos. In the same sugya, the square-root of 2 is also assumed to be 1.4.

Every student of basic mathematics is immediately faced with the fact that the Mishna’s ration of 3 to 1 appears extremely inaccurate.

The universal ration between the circumference and diameter of any circle is of course the constant pi, a little more than 3.14, which has been known for some time already to be an irrational number.

Tosfos on our daf is so bothered by this apparent contradiction that after pointing out that it seems that our Gemara understood our Mishna’s ratio of 3 to be precise, based on the continuation of the sugya and another sugya in Bava Basra, he notes that this requires further investigation, since the mathematical experts hold that 3 is certainly not the precise ratio.

One should note that Tosfos leaves this question unanswered- he does not suggest explicitly that either Chazal or the contemporary mathematicians were wrong!

In contrast, both the Rambam and Tosfos haRosh on this Mishna are adamant that the Mishna is simply giving an estimation, and each have their own approaches as to why and how this is acceptable.

Whereas this approach certainly seems more logical, we obviously need to learn the sugya and its parallel sugyas properly to see if this fits into the flow of the Gemara.

Please join me on this exciting journey:

The Gemara opens its analysis on this part of the Mishna towards the bottom of the first side of today’s daf.

It asks the simple question: מנא הני מילי – from where are these words?

The very fact that the Gemara is looking for a verse to prove a mathematical reality that should be known to all is itself indicative of something deeper at work.

The Gemara answers that we derive this from the description of the circular ים (lit “sea” but probably referring to a water feature)) that Shlomo haMelech made, which had a diameter of 10 amos and a circumference of 30.

By describing the precise measurements of this circular feature, the passuk seems to be telling us that the ration of a circle’s circumference to its diameter is 3.

Once again, the fact that a verse is brought to teach us a simple mathematical fact seems very strange.

This question is strengthened by the fact that the ancient Greeks were very familiar with the concept of PI, and although they could not measure it precisely (though they might have suspected it was an irrational number,) it seems from my research that they certainly knew that it was more than 3, and could approximate it to at least 2 decimal points as around 3.14 .

It is hardly likely that Chazal, who took their mathematics very seriously, were unaware of this common knowledge of their time.

The Gemara then asks how we account for the width of the rim itself, which needs to be added to the actual diameter before working out the ratio with the circumference.

The Gemara responds that the possuk also tells us that the rim was extremely narrow (and thus negligible in the calculations.)

Seemingly unsatisfied by the assumption that the passuk was even nominally inaccurate in its workings, the Gemara points out that however narrow the rim was, it still would widen the exterior diameter slightly and effectively change the ratio accordingly.

The Gemara concludes that the circumference of 3 tefachim mentioned in the passuk was also measured from the inside, excluding the rim.

By now, it seems blatantly obvious that Chazal seem to take this measurement extremely precisely, and Tosfos’ observations to this affect are more than understandable.

It is harder to understand the Rambam’s approach, where he claims that any fraction that cannot be accurately measured is rounded off by Chazal.

If this is true, why were Chazal so bothered by the fact that the passuk could be doing exactly the same thing?

The Tosfos haRosh goes further and interprets the flow of the Gemara entirely differently in a way that he feels backs up his claim that we are dealing with approximations.

He understands that the Gemara’s original question, “from where are these words” is not referring to the precise value of PI but rather to the very rule that it is permissible to rely on approximations.

He understands that this leniency is sourced from the very passuk that described the properties of the circle in a way that is clearly an approximation, and quite a large one at that.

He does not say how large an approximation is needed, not under which circumstances it becomes acceptable- it could be that he agrees with Rambam who limits this to an irrational number, but is also possible that he would hold the same for other improper fractions that are hard to work with.

What remains is to understand how both the Rosh and the Rambam would explain the continuation of the sugya which certainly seems to be require precision rather than approximation.

Furthermore, even if we are able to reinterpret the rest of the flow of the sugya in a way that fits with this, or to distinguish between the approximations that are permitted and the one’s the Gemara adamantly seems to reject, we are faced with a very strong difficulty from another related sugya (Bava Basra 14b)

There, the Gemara describes how in addition to the tablets, a sefer Torah was also placed in the ark that rested in the holy of holies.

Based on the view that the circumference of a Torah needs to be 6 handbreadths, the Gemara uses our ratio to show how the 2 tefach wide Torah could fit into the 2 empty tefachim that remained in the Ark after the tablets where placed therein.

The Gemara then notes that an item with a precise width of 2 cannot fit into a precise space of 2 (presumably due to friction.)

It therefore concludes that the Torah was rolled in a way that was not precisely round (the last part was folded on top of the “cylinder”), and the width therefore was less than a third of its circumference.

It seems clear once again that the Gemara is assuming the value of PI to be precisely 3- after all, if it were more than three, a circumference of 6 would produce a width of less than 2 which would easily fit in the remaining space.

Hopefully to be continued

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 12-13 Tolerance, the origins of dispute, and “”אלו ואלו

Posted on by

In the Mishna on 12b, there is a 3-way dispute between Beis Shamai, Beis Hillel, and Rabbi Eliezer, regarding what is required to mark the open fourth side of a מבוי closed on the other 3 sides.

Whereas we have been working until now under the correct assumption that the lenient view requiring only one post on either side is authoritative, we see that though this is the view of Beis Hillel, Beis Shamai require a post and a beam, and Rabbi Eliezer requires 2 posts, one on each side.

In an early post )Shabbos 130b), we discussed the way Rabbi Eliezer was referred to by the Gemara there as a שמותי , a term that the Yerushalmi quoted in the second explanation in Rashi there, as well as in Tosfos, understood to mean that he belonged to Beis Shamai.

However, as we also know )Avos 2/9) that Rabbi Eliezer was one of the greatest students of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai, who received his tradition from both Hillel and Shamai, it is very possible that he had influence from the scions of both houses.

In this Mishna, it seems that Rabbi Eliezer was neither bound completely to either Beis Hillel or Beis Shamai, but fiercely independent.

This is somehow despite the fact that he took such pride in the fact that he never said anything that he never heard from his Rabbi (Sukkah 28a.)

This can be explained by the fact that his tradition came directly from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai who learnt from both Hillel and Shamai, as mentioned above, and thus sometimes was in line with Beis Shamai and sometimes with Beis Hillel.

It can also be that what he meant was not that he heard every precise ruling from his Rebbe, but that he always followed the methodology he learnt from his Rebbe, no matter what conclusion it led to, thus ironically adding to his independence in the realm of practical halacha.

It is a common experience that independents, despite often being revered on both sides of the aisle, usually struggle for acceptance on either side.

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer was both great and confident enough to have his feet in both worlds, but still able to interpret the Torah and rule according to his own view, even taking a separate stand from both strong “councils of sages.”

Even for the usually tolerant members of Beit Hillel, despite his having learnt from some of their teachers, he was never “Beis Hillel” enough, but a “שמותי”

This independence and consequent lack of acceptance came to a head in the case of the stove of Achnai (Bava Metzia 59b), where his refusal to accept the majority opinion of all the other sages resulted in his virtually unprecedented excommunication, which according to the first explanation in the above-quoted Rashi, was the reason for his being called a שמותי”” , from the word “שמתא” (excommunication.)

The truth is that lacking the safety in numbers that members of both main parties tend to have, independents often suffer the most, and are treated more harshly by members of the dominant party than members of the opposition are treated, even if their ideologies are somewhere in-between.

Whereas Rabbi Eliezer’s independence was virtually stamped out by his colleagues, who burnt all the things that he had declared pure, Beis Hillel are lauded towards the end of daf 13b for their respectful attitude to the views of Beis Shamai, not only quoting their views, but even mentioning them before their own, as illustrated in a Mishna in Sukkah brought by our Gemara.

My beloved son, Noam, asked me the other night, while learning mishnayos Shabbos together, why Beis Shamai are mentioned first so often in Mishnayos even though Beis Hillel are more authoritative.

I answered that this could very well be a reflection of this tolerant attitude first illustrated in the Mishna in sukkah quoted by our Gemara, which Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, a direct descendant of Hillel, carried on when he compiled the Mishna.

This tolerance of the other side, is given in our Gemara as the reason that the view of Beis Hillel became normatively accepted over that of Beis Shamai- In order for one’s view to be accepted, it seems important that one is open-minded, respectful, and confident enough to hear, consider, and even quote dissenting views. This shows that this view was acquired after fully considering all sides and without automatically putting down the other side and is thus a view worthy of acceptance.

Our Gemara points out that this preference given to Beis Hillel was not because the rulings of Shamai were not legitimate, but rather for the above reason- objectively speaking, “אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים”-“these and those are the words of the living G-d!”

It might seem logically impossible that two seemingly contradictory views can both be considered objectively part of the divine Torah, but this seems to be precisely what the Gemara is saying.

The Torah is the word of the “living G-d” and thus constantly branching off into different explanations and possibilities.

So long as different views are all based on the “מסורה”, that living chain of transmission that goes back to Moshe at Sinai, it is not so much the actual conclusion that makes them legitimate, but the way that was achieved.

Not every alternative view has halachik legitimacy- only those that can be justified based on previous stages in the tradition.

Both Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai were required to back their views up with pessukim in the Torah, or oral traditions dating back to Moshe at Sinai, and the same applies to those that come after them.

It is not tolerance alone that gave Beis Hillel their authority, as reading this sugya in isolation might imply. In other places, their authority is derived on their greater numbers and on the “voice from heaven” )see Eruvin 7a for example) that proclaimed that the halacha is like them.

In fact, in the earlier sugya in this masechta, it seems that before this voice from heaven, one was permitted to choose which one of these great schools of Torah to follows, and that according to those who did not consider a voice from heaven to be authoritative, such as none other than Rabbi Yehoshua himself, this was permitted even after this voice from heaven, despite the other factors in Beis Hillel’s favor!

We have explained the idea of “אלו ואלו” with the understanding that in matters subject to debate, there is no objectively true answer, but both sides are legitimate “Torah”- the superiority of Beis Hillel is only practical, and as a result of the traits they possess, their superior numbers, and the voice from heaven.

Yet the Rambam appears to limit this idea significantly.

According to him (Mamrim 1/4), matters mentioned explicitly in the Torah or received orally through tradition tracing back to Moshe’s revelation at Sinai are never subject to debate.

Only matters that are derived though Chazal’s use of the rules for interpreting the Torah, can be subject to debate.

Even the later, were subject to the final ruling of the great court, so long as that court was still functioning, and debate was only legitimate until such a ruling was given.

Once it ceased to function, such matters that had not yet been resolved became subject to debate again.

Given that many or most of the disputes between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel occurred at a time when the great court was still functioning, it follows that these disputes were subject to a final ruling by that court.

It is those rulings, according to the Rambam, not the tolerance of Beis Hillel or the voice from heaven, that were authoritative.

This fits well with the view that the main reason for their greater authority was their superior numbers, which would have allowed them to dominate the great court they were part of.

How the Rambam would explain the other reasons given for their authority, is subject to further analysis- it is possible, that as might often be his way, he simply regarded one source to be more authoritative in keeping with other accepted rules of halacha, and rules accordingly.

It is also possible that it is precisely that tolerance and extra willingness to engage in respectful debate that swung the majority of the Sanhedrin, including the “independents” towards their side, and that the “voice from heaven” was the מכה בפטיש (final blow) that brought them to this decision.

This also explains the harsh treatment meted out to Rabbi Eliezer by the members of Beis Hillel.

According to the Rambam above, even matters that were subject to dispute, were eventually concluded by the Sanhedrin while it functioned , and thereafter, no-one had the authority to act to the contrary.

Their opinions were still recorded out of respect, but they were now out of the realm of accepted halacha.

They might still have theoretical value in the study-halls, and even be considered “the words of the living G-d,” but the option for anyone to rule accordingly was now closed.

It follows that in post Sanhedrin times, debate in practical halacha is possible once again, and there is no threat of excommunication for those who follow their own or other minority views, but only in matters that had not already been decided by the Sanhedrin, and in matters that fit the Rambam’s strict criteria for debate.

If so, given that the Talmud itself was sealed by Ravina and Rav Ashi long after the Sanhedrin had ceased to function, how do we explain the universally accepted binding authority given to it by all followers of the מסורות?

We will have to leave this for a difference discussion, but a good place to start is the introduction of the Rambam himself to the Mishna Torah, the great masterwork we just quoted from.

Does everyone agree with the Rambam’s strict criteria regarding which matters are subject to debate, and does the huge collection of debates scattered throughout the Mishna and the Gemara back up this very strong claim? This too, will need to be left for a later discussion.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shmuli Phillips Ari Kahn Johnny Solomon

Gang rape in Eilat

Posted on by


I still do not thing  that this would happen in religious  Zionist or Chareidi circles, certainly not on such a large and public scale ,but am very aware that the situation in private when it comes to  individual  or even chronic cases of abuse, is far from healthy in “frum” circles either.

We have harbored known  abusers of the worse kind and even harrased their victims and those who fight them with threats of defamation suites.

The fact that such an unspeakable event can happen amongst any of the “tribes of Israel” should leave us no rest.

The only 2 words that come to mind unfortunately  are “פלגש בגבעה”

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israeli-firms-strike-in-support-of-nationwide-protests-over-eilat-rape-639628