Monthly Archives: March 2021

Yerushalmi Shekalim 8-9 The importance of being above suspicion:

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the Mishna on daf 8a forbids the person  who  takes money out from the contribution boxes for use in the divine service  to wear a garment with a folded hem or even to wear  shoes or tefillin while doing so !  
This is  in case people suspect that he might have taken some money  for himself and placed them in the fold, in his shoes, or even untied the tefillin boxes and hidden some money inside. 

If he becomes poor , people might think that it is due to such wicked actions, and if he becomes rich, they might think that it is from the money he stole. 
The possibility  that the person entrusted with such holy work could abuse his power in such a way or even abuse holy items such as  Tefillin to aid his crime might be shocking , but unfortunately is as applicable today than ever. 

Two sources are brought for the requirement to be completely above  suspicion:”והייתם נקיים מה’ ומישראל “( and you shall be clean (of suspicion) from Hashem and Yisrael)- just like a person has to be  clean in deeds  in front of Hashem ( who knows all thoughts and actions), he also needs to be clean of suspicion from others who do not know his thoughts and actions .
It is thus not enough to be honest in reality, but one also has to be above any suspicion of dishonesty. 
This passuk is found in the Chumash itself ( Bamidbar 32/22) in the context of the promise made by the tribes of Reuvain, Gad, and half of Menashe  to help the other tribes conquer Eretz Yisroel proper in exchange for being allowed to settle on the other side of the Jordan. 
An alternative source is brought from Nach (Mishlei 3/4) 
“ומצא חן בשכל טוב בעיני אלוקים ואדם “( and he found grace and good intellect in the eyes of G-d and man.) 
The passuk is describing the result of one’s  following the Torah properly , and a version of it in prayer form is found in the additions we say in the benstching .
The Gemara on daf 9a brings further examples , among them :
A קווץ ( person with long hair ) should not be given this task , presumably because he might be suspected of hiding money in his hair. 
They would keep talking with him all the time he is in the room so he would not be suspected of hiding money in his mouth !
It also brings a third source for the requirement to be above above suspicion from the Navi and concludes that the first source brought from the Chumash is the clearest of all !
We have already  seen this passuk being brought as a source for this requirement in the Bavli  in our post on Pesachim 12-13 where we discussed this topic in more detail and together with other sources and examples ,  referenced our Mishna here in Shekalim.
As with everything in the Torah  , and particularly in ethical matters , it cannot be highlighted enough! 

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 107-108 Eating snacks during the מגיד

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The Gemara on 107b concludes that the reason for the prohibition against eating  from סמוך למנחה  on ערב פסח  is in order not to become full and land up eating the מצה  in a way that is considered אכילה גסה (gluttonous eating.)

Rashi  (see Pesachim 99b “לא יאכל”) seems to take this further than face value and explain this as a form of הדור מצוה  (performing the mitzva in a more beautiful way.)

Rather than literally avoiding אכילה גסה , which as Tosfos (קז. ד”ה “דילמא) notes is generally not considered eating at all, Rashi explained that one actually needs to build up an תאיבון  [appetite] for the matza, an idea he seconds here on our daf using the even stronger phrase תאוה[lust.]

This seems to make this law a rather unusual case of a גזירה דרבנן  (rabbinical decree) made to protect a הדור מצוה , something requiring its own analysis.

In contrast, the above-mentioned Tosfos on our daf understands that the concern is literally that one will be so full by the time he comes to eating his מצה  that it will not qualify as eating at all, the fully-fledged kind of אכילה גסה  for which one is exempt on Yom-Kippur!

This makes this a more usual גזירה דרבנן  designed to prevent one from entirely missing an עשה דאורייתא , similar to that requiring one to say שמע  before midnight to avoid missing it entirely (Brachos 2a.)

A possible נפקא מינה  (practical difference) between these two views could be what types of snacks one is permitted to eat even after this time and/or the quantity of snacks that one is permitted to eat.

We have already seen from Tosfos at the beginning of the פרק  (see post on Pesachim 99 and 100) that this prohibition is referring to  something very specific, not to all forms of eating, namely מצה עשירה.

In contrast, מצה  is forbidden all day, and מיני תרגימא  (certain snacks) are permitted all day.

We have also seen that the Rambam distinguishes between eating a lot of anything which is prohibited, and eating a small amount of snacks, which is permitted.

The source for the היתר  (permission) to eat מיני תרגימא lies on our daf and is stated expressly by ר’ אסי  and illustrated by ר’יצחק’s practise of “dipping” them.

This practise seems to be further illustrated by a ברייתא  which states that the שמש(servant) may dip (and eat) the בני מעיים  (innards) of the animals and also place them in front of the guests.

According to Rashi, the proof from the ברייתא  is somewhat difficult, given that he defines מיני תרגימא  as פירות  (fruits) but does not seem to permit meats, like Rashbam does,  let alone  Mezonos snacks (as permitted by Tosfos, at least according to his first answer in ד”ה “מיני”.

Rashi’s limitation of the leniency to fruit appears to fit in well with his requirement for הדור מצוה  which presumably requires a greater degree of caution than simply avoiding אכילה גסה  and Tosfos’s generous extension of this permission even to Mezonos snacks which are certainly more filling seems to match his lower bar of simply avoiding אכילה גסה.

Yet how would Rashi explain the proof in the Beraisa, which seems to permit eating meat snacks as well, at least the way he himself explains it (see Rashbam for alternative explanation.)

As Rashbam himself seems to note Rashi understands this in several steps:

  1. It is normal for the שמש  to eat while preparing food, and not doing so causes him צער. (distress)
  2. Seeing that he is eating while he works to prevent צער and not for pleasure, meat snacks are also less likely to fill him up, and have the status of מיני תרגימא  specifically for him
  3. From the fact that the בני מעיים  get the more lenient status of מיני תרגימא  for him and this permits them to him, it follows that fully fledged מיני תרגימא, namely fruits, are permitted for all people.

Be that as it may, we have seen that Rashi limits the היתר   of מיני תרגימא  to fruit , Rashbam expands it to meat snacks, and Tosfos permits even “Mezonos” snacks like non chametz cake, cookies, kneidlach etc, and this can be directly linked to how Rashi and Tosfos see the basis for the prohibition.

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Once we have seen that the ban on eating is not total but linked to the risk of being satiated by the type of quantity of snacks eaten, which in turn is linked to how we understand the prohibition, it is possible to investigate another possible נ”מ  of this debate.

Is it permitted to eat after dark, after Kiddush, during the Seder itself, but before eating the matza?

On the one hand, we have not seen a specific prohibition against doing so, and the Mishna specifically seems to limit the prohibition עד שתחשך  (until it gets dark.)

On the other hand, if we are concerned about being too full for matza for the entire later half of the afternoon, surely we should be more concerned during the Seder itself, closer to the time we need to eat the matza?

The second law in the Beraisa brought as a support for permitting מיני תרגימא  states that the שמש   places the בני מעיים  in front of the visitors.

As it is normal for the visitors to arrive after dark for the seder, the simple reading of this statement seems to imply that the visitors are permitted to eat them after dark during the Hagada. (though note that what is normal for us might have been normal in the times of Chazal, and the discussion on 100a about interrupting eating or drinking when Shabbos or Yom-Tov starts  does seem to indicate that serving visitors  (probably sleep-over visitors from out of town which was the main form of הכנסת אורחים  practiced)  was done for pre -Yom-Tov snacks as well.)

Though Rashbam understands that the visitors are fed these snacks during the afternoon before dark as appetizers for later, Rashi specifically limited the היתר  to eat בני מעיים  in the late afternoon to the שמש, so it is also more consistent for him to view the placing in front of the visitors after dark when the official prohibition is over, if it indeed is.

Tosfos (צט.. ד”ה “סמוך למנחה” ) seems to have offered explicit proof that eating after dark is permitted from an earlier sugya (Pesachim 40a) which permits one to eat בציקות של נכרים  (matza baked by non-Jews but essentially non shmura-matza) during the seder so long as one eats at least a kezayis of fully fledged (shmura) matza afterwards to fulfil one’s mitzva.

Whereas the main lesson of the Gemara there is that it is permitted to eat non Shmura matza on pesach, even during the seder, but cannot use it to fulfil the mitzva of eating matza, it appears from it that eating בציקות של נכרים  is permitted before one fulfills the mitzva of matza!

As these taste like מצה, are just as filling as מצה, and far more filling than מיני תרגימא (certainly Rashi’s “fruit” מיני תרגימא ), this seems to fly completely in the face of the prohibition of eating on ערב פסח  and even defeat the purpose.

Whereas there are other ways of learning the earlier sugya and Rashi seems to understand that the מצה באחרונה  referred to there is the afikomen, which is meant to be eaten while satisfied anyway, it seems clear from their question and answer that Tosfos understands it to refer to the מוציא מצה!

In a logical curveball, the Tosfos answer that eating during the seder before the מצה  is actually less risky than eating during the late afternoon!- once one has started the meal (presumably with קדוש  and כרפס) one is aware of the risk of filling oneself up and is more careful not to do so.

As such, one would be permitted to eat even בציקות של נכרים  and certainly מיני תרגימא  during the meal even before eating מצה.

Whereas this logic might be arguable, and it is hard to believe that eating בציקות של נכרים  will not ruin one’s appetite for the מצה, Tosfos seems to be happy with it, and this might well be  consistent with his limiting  the prohibition of eating to that which risks real אכילה גסה.

It is unlikely that Rashi, who requires one to have a “lust” for the מצה, would permit eating בציקות של נכרים  before the first מצה  has been eaten, and by explaining this היתר  as referring to during the meal proper before the afikomen, he avoids the need to do so.

Yet it is quite possible that he accepts Tosfos’ basic logic that eating non-filling things like fruit, which in smaller quantities actually stimulate the appetite, is even less problematic than during the afternoon, and remains permitted during the entire seder, even before מצה  is eaten- This would be consistent with how he seems to understand the permission for the visitors to eat the בני מעיים  as being specifically after dark, during the seder, but before the מצה!

This thesis of Tosfos is put to the test, however, by a discussion at the end of daf 107b, moving onto 108a.

We are told how Rava used to drink wine throughout erev Pesach in order to stimulate his appetite for the מצה  later.

In order to prove that wine stimulates the, he draws on the Mishna which states that one is permitted to drink additional cups of wine between the first and second cups, and between the second and third cups.

If wine is filling, argues Rava, it would not be permitted to drink so much before eating the מצה!

Tosfos acknowledges that if his thesis is correct that eating during the seder is less problematic than during the afternoon, Rava’s entire proof falls away.

His first answer, once again consistent with his view of the prohibition, is that although one is careful during the seder not to eat too much, it is much harder to be careful not to drink too much wine, due to its intoxicating effect.

As such, whereas eating even בציקות של נכרים  and certainly מיני תרגימא  during this time is permitted, drinking additional wine is not.

The second answer, however, is more problematic in terms of permitting eating snacks during the מגיד.

Tosfos suggests that there is a distinction between the long period of the מגיד  between the first and second cups which is similar in practise to a different meal, and the short period between drinking the second cup and making המוציא .

According to this answer, the היתר  to eat בציקות של נכרים  is limited to the short period between the מגיד  and מוציא מצה when was is super conscious of the impending mitzva and can be very careful not to fill oneself.

There is no such permission during the long period of the מגיד  between the first and second cup, and it is from the permission to drink wine during this period despite it being like a different meal, that Rava derives his proof that wine, unlike בציקות של נכרים , are not filling.

It follows that according to this answer, eating בציקות של נכרי  during the מגיד  is certainly forbidden and it remains unclear whether מיני תרגימא  are still  permitted like they are during the later afternoon.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 103-105 the Shortened Havdala- המבדיל בין קודש לחול

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These daf focus on the laws of Havdala and the precise wording to be used in the main bracha ,other than the bracha on the wine, spices, candle, Shehecheyanu etc as appropriate.

Although the longer bracha we are accustomed to say is also sourced in this daf, the Gemara also records the shorter version of Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, which includes just one mention of havdala, namely ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול.

A number of Amoraim, including Rabbi Yaakov Bar Aba [see Rashbam Pesachim 103b ד”ה “א”ל” ],   רבי מנחם בר סימאי  , and Chananya  [see 104a) seem to follow this view, and the Gemara brings a case where Rav Yehuda told his son, Rabbi Yitchak, to take a basket of fruit to meet Ullah and observe what version of the Havdala he said.

Rather than going himself, he sent Abaya, who reported back to him that Ullah had said only ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול.

Rav Yitchak then reported this to his father, who rebuked him for not going himself, saying that his arrogance deprived him of the ability to hear this directly from Ullah himself.

In contrast, Rava would say the full version we have today, citing רבי אלעזר  and רבי אושעיא for support [see Rashbam 103b ד”ה “כי מטא], רב שמואל בר אידי  ruled against his brother חנניא, and רבי יהושע בן לוי  also rules that a concluding bracha is needed as well [104a.]

There are several possible differences between the longer version we say and that of רבי יהודה הנשיא .

  1. The longer version mentions four different types of הבדלות  (distinctions) that Hashem makes, whereas the shorter one only mentions one.
  2. The longer version both begins and ends withאתה ה’  ברוך, whereas the shorter version contains this phrase only once, if at all
  3. The longer version mentions Hashem’s name and is a fully fledged bracha, where it is not immediately clear from the Gemara whether the shorter  version does so and has the status of a fully fledged ברכה.  Whereas the wording quoted by the Gemara does not include the phrase ברוך אתה ה’, it could be that it is taken for granted as כל ברכה שאין בה שם ומלכות לאו שמיה ברכה  (any blessing that does not contain Hashem’s name and the word “king” is not a bracha-Brachos 12a.)  It is also possible though, that the shorter version is only valid for one who made Havdala in his Amida already, and that a second fully-fledged bracha is not required but rather a symbolic declaration is sufficient.

On the one hand, as a later authority, it sees that Rava’s view should be accepted, yet on the other hand, Ullah’s view seems to get the last word in our Gemara.

Some support could possibly be brought from a different sugya (Shabbos 150b) for those who follow רבי יהודה הנשיא  and say the shorter version.

The Mishna (Shabbos 150a  ) rules that it is permitted to wait at the border of the shabbos techum in order to do work in the field outside the techum as soon as Shabbos is over.

The Gemara asks how this is permitted, seeing as it is forbidden to work before Havdala, and two answers are given:

  1. רבי נתן בר אמי  in front of רבא -The Mishna is referring to בין הגיתות  (the wine-pressing season) where there is plenty wine in the field on which to make havdala.
  2. רבי אבא  to  רב אשי -The Mishna is referring to someone who says the phrase ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול  after which working is permitted.

The later answer seems to have been  accepted by רב אשי   (who reports this as having been their custom in the house of רב כהנא ), which indicates that we are likely to rule accordingly, hence validating the shorter version.

However, whereas the later answer seems very similar in wording to the view of רבי יהודה הנשיא  in our sugya, there are some major differences:

  1. In our sugya, we are talking about the ideal version of the havdala, whereas the case in Shabbos might simply be referring to a second-best solution when making havdala properly is not possible before work.
  2. In our sugya, whatever the accepted version of havdala is works completely, and one has fulfilled one’s obligation with it. In contrast, it is possible that in the case in Shabbos, one would still need to say the full havdala properly later.
  3. In our sugya, it is clear that even the shorter version is said over a cup of wine, whereas the solution mentioned in shabbos seems to be for a situation where wine is not available (after all, it is brought as an alternative answer to בין הגיתות .)
  4. In our sugya, one is clearly permitted to do anything that havdala stood in the way of doing once the correct version has been said, including not only doing מלאכה  but also eating and drinking. There is no mention in the sugya in Shabbos about permission to eat and drink, just permission to work. Some analysis is required to ascertain whether there should be a practical different regarding work and eating and drinking, but it is possible that even if the symbolic declaration is sufficient to allow work, the general rule forbidding eating before a time-urgent mitzva is performed might still apply until the full version has been said correctly over a cup of wine.

Although there is much discussion in the ראשונים  here and particularly in Shabbos as to the above points and how these two סוגיות  relate to each other, there appears to be near consensus that in our sugya, we are talking an abridged but fully fledged bracha, with שם ומלכות, made over a cup of wine.

There is some debate however, whether the view of עולא  is equivalent to that of רבי יהודה הנשיא, includes only one phrase of הבדלה  rather than four, and lacks the concluding phrase “ברוך אתה ה'” typical of longer brachos (see for example Rashi , and רבינו חננאל ) or whether עולא’s version included all 4 phrases and simply left out the concluding bracha (see Tosfos 195a, also see Rashbam 104b)

When it comes to the case in Shabbos, most ראשונים   (רש”י שם, רבינו חננאל שם,רשב”א שם,רי”ד שם וכו) seem to hold that the shorter version there is just a סימנא בעלמא  (symbolic statement) which permits work, but not eating and drinking, and that needs to be followed as soon as possible by the full הבדלה .

As such, it does not include the phrase “ברוך אתה ה’ ”  even once , containing just the words “ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול “ and no cup of wine.

According to this view, although the same phrase is used in both סוגיות, they are actually two completely things- The version in our sugya is רבי יהודה הנשיא’s shortened version of a fully-fledged הבדלה  with which one fulfills one’s obligation in full, whereas the version in Shabbos is a symbolic phrase that lacks the form of a ברכה  at all and merely delays the full הבדלה, allowing one to work but not eat or drink in the meanwhile.

In contrast, The ריף, (also quoted by various Rishonim such as , רשב”א ,ר”ן  ריטב”א) seems to link the two sugyos and hold that the version mentioned in Shabbos is the same version of רבי יהודה הנשיא  . He rules that in our case, seeing as the מנהג  was not in accordance with רבי יהודה הנשיא , one has to say the full version of הבדלה  before eating or drinking. In contrast, in the case in Shabbos, the custom follows רבי יהודה הנשיא  and the shorter version of הבדלה  suffices in order to allow one to work but must include שם ומלכות  and according to some interpretations (See Rashba)  even requires a cup of wine.

A  similar  approach is evident in  רבינו חננאל  (Shabbos 150b) who also requires שם ומלכות  but like the Rif, makes no explicit mention of requiring a cup of wine  and so rules the Tur (O.C. 299), bringing the ראש  and the בה”ג  for support!

In practise, later authorities rule that  the full Havdala is required before eating or drinking, and that the shortened symbolic version with no שם ומלכות  and no wine is sufficient to permit working.

 Some Rishonim (רשב”א שבת קנ: ,טור או”ח  299 וכו) seem to only permit this if one has ALSO made הבדלה  in his amida, but most seem to consider either this symbolic statement OR the הבדלה  in the amida sufficient to allow work to be performed, while requiring the full הבדלה  to be said before eating or drinking . (עיין רש”י שם,ר”ן שם,ריטב”א שם, רמב”ם ה’ שבת כט-ו לפי הבנת הריטב”א אלא שצ”ע), and this is the way post later  poskim rule  ( ש”ע או”ח רצט-ורמ”א שם )

This seems to be an interesting example where the Shulchan Aruch rules against both the Rif and the Tur, even more so given that the Rambam’s words could be somewhat ambiguous!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 101-102 Kiddush in shul, קדוש במקום סעודה, and Mezonos.

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After discussing Kiddush arrangements where a meal continues straight into Pesach, Shabbos, or another Yom-Tov (something some Hasidic Purim meals actually did this year,) our perek moves away temporarily from Pesach matters and focusses on matters relating to Kiddush, Brachos, and Havdala.

The first such sugya opens by discussing the common practise of making Kiddush in Shul on Shabbos.

The question is whether those who did so themselves or through the chazan have fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush already, or whether they have not done so.

Although both Rav and Shmuel agree that one should make Kiddush in Shul and at home, they differ as to why:

Rav holds that they have fulfilled their obligation in shul already and only make Kiddush at home for their families who were not at shul- it could follow that if one eats at home alone after saying or hearing Kiddush in shul, one does not say Kiddush again at home.

In contrast, Shmuel holds that one can only fulfill one’s obligation of Kiddush במקום סעודה (in the place of a meal) and seeing as they did not eat a meal in shul after making Kiddush, they have not fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush.

According to Shmuel, the only reason why Kiddush is said in shul is for the sake of visitors from out of town who used to eat and sleep in the shul- they would fulfill their obligation of Kiddush with the chazan or someone else from the community after-which they would carry on with their meal there!

 (according Tosfos, due to the prohibition against eating or sleeping in shul, this would be in a side-room, but this is a discussion in itself -see Ran on the Rif who also suggests this but also suggests that visitors might be permitted to eat in shul because of the public mitzva that the townspeople are keeping by hosting them)

It could follow according to the later view, if there are no visitors in shul, Kiddush should not be said, and this is indeed how Tosfos  (ד”ה “ידי קדוש”)   and the Tur (O.C. 269) rules.

Of course, it is also possible that Chazal instituted Kiddush in shul and at home for the above-mentioned reasons but that they did applied this across the board, regardless of circumstances, and that even when the reason for the תקנה does not apply, it should still be said (see Ran דפי הריף כ  who rules this way and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 269 who accepts the custom to say it regardless but prefers that it be annulled!)

Before looking at some of the details of Shmuel’s requirement that קדוש  must be said in the place where a meal will be held thereafter, it is important to note that the Gemara puts Rabbi Yochanan on record as agreeing with Rav that this is not necessary.

Using the usual rules of psak, we usually follow Rabbi Yochanan against Rav and Shmuel, and Rav against Shmuel- how much more so when both Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree with Shmuel.

Yet the Gemara proves that later Amoraim such as Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel, and on that basis, the above cited Tosfos rules in accordance with Shmuel, as do the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam(Shabbos 29/8)  !

Having established that we follow Shmuel’s requirement that Kiddush has to be במקום סעודה  , we now need to identify or define

  1. The source or reason for this requirement.
  2. The definition of a סעודה  regarding this law- does it need to be a halachik meal with bread, does פת הבאה בכיסנין (snack or “Mezonos” bread such as cake or crackers) count, is any food that requires the bracha of מזונות  sufficient, or is even  perhaps an additional portion of wine, grape-juice, or even meal, fish, fruit, or other שהכל  foods acceptable?
  3. The definition of מקום  as far as this law goes- does it mean the same building, the same house, the same floor, the same room, or even the same corner of the room?
  4. The scope of this law- does it apply even to Kiddush in the morning, or only to Kiddush at night or vice-versa.

In order to understand the nature of this requirement, and also because of its possible relevance to the other questions, let us beginning by focusing on the first question.

Before attempting to identify the source or reason of the law of קדוש במקום סעודה , it would be appropriate to identify the source of reason for the requirement to say Kiddush altogether.

Whereas the biblical source for the mitzva to say Kiddush on Shabbos is derived from the מצות עשה  of “זכור את יום השבת לקדשו”  (remember the shabbos day to sanctify it), Chazal understood  (Pesachim 106a) that this “sanctification” needs to be done over a cup of wine – זכרהו על היין .

The requirement to make a special declaration about shabbos is also mentioned later in Tanach (Yeshayahu 58) where we are told וקראת לשבת עונג  (and you shall call the shabbos a pleasure.)

The Rashbam and Tosfos both understand that the later source is the basis of Shmuel’s rule, based on a דרשה- in the place where you call the shabbos (make Kiddush), you shall have pleasure (a meal)- This דרשה  is also brought in the Rif and the Rosh, possibly as part of their גירסא  in the Gemara itself, in which case it is possible that the Rashbam also had it in his text but was not convinced it was a דרשה  as such.

Rashbam suggests an alternative basis for Shmuel’s law, this time a סברא (reason based on logic)- HE argues that seeing as Kiddush was instituted on wine already, it is logical that it was instituted on the more important wine drunk before a meal, and not just on a casually drunk cup of wine.

It follows that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan would not accept either of these sources,  not making such a דרשה  from the passuk, and not accepting the above סברא- the reasons for this of course require further analysis, but we will move on for now.

According to the first reason requiring the Kiddush to be made in a place of עונג, it seems likely that any food that is defined as an עונג  (likely in addition to the actual cup of wine used for the Kiddush) should suffice, but that food that does not involve עונג  would not.

In contrast, according to the second reason, it seems that a meal with halachik importance, namely a bread meal, or at least פת הבאה בכיסנין  might be required.

I do not see a major נפקא מינה  of these two different explanations  regarding the third question about the definition of מקום  (though those who study the daf will see that it is the subject of much discussion in the Gemara and the Rishonim) , and the answer to the fourth question would probably relate to whether the above sources and סברא  also apply to the day-time Kiddush or only to the night-time Kiddush, a topic I hope to be able to go into another time (see discussion later in the perek on 106a regarding the night and day-time  Kiddush themselves.)

Returning to the question of how we define a סעודה  as far as קדוש במקום סעודה  is concerned , the stories brought to illustrate how Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel  could also be pivotal.

In both cases the food eaten is referred to as “מידי” – “something.”

Although a simple reading of this word seems to indicate that eating pretty much anything is sufficient  for the purposes of קדוש במקום סעודה, both Tosfos and the Rosh understand that this refers to פת  or לחם  respectively ( both words for bread), bringing proofs for this assertion from other sugyos, which I wish we had time to analyze here.

This seems to follow the סברא  of the Rashbam but seeing as they both seem to see the דרשה  as the source for the requirement and not the סברא, it seems like they understand that the word עונג  itself implies a proper bread meal וצ”ע.

Either way, it seems that in their food that even Mezonos is not sufficient and a halachik meal with bread has to accompany the Kiddush- it is also possible though that פת הבאה בכיסנין  is considered bread for these purposes too, and even if eaten in smaller quantities than that which would make it a halachik meal subject to המוציא , it suffices for our purposes- a thorough analysis of the sugyas brought as proof for the requirement for bread as well as the סוגיא  of פת הבאה בכיסנין  would be needed to assess this possibility, but this does seem to be common practise. (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 273/5 and its commentaries for practical rulings on this matter.)

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 93 The Status of Pesach Sheini- A Chag in its own right?

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The Mishna on 92b tells us that not only one who was impure or far away on Pesach, as per the biblical imperative (Bamidbar 9/9-13  ) but also one who was  שוגג ( unknowing) or אונס  (prevented from bringing it by reasons beyond his control) may and must bring his קרבן  a month later on פסח שני.

There is a significant debate between רבי  and רבי נתן  as to the nature of this day.

According to רבי, it is considered a  רגל בפני עצמו  (festival in its own right) whereas according to רבי נתן, it is merely תשלומין   (a “make-up” opportunity) for the mitzva missed on Pesach .

It seems that according to רבי, פסח שני  brings with it a default obligation to bring a קרבן פסח  but includes an exemption for those who have already brought one on Pesach itself.

In contrast, according to רבי נתן, there is no default obligation to bring a קרבן פסח  that comes with פסח שני, but just an inherited one from Pesach if it has not already been carried out. (to phrase it in “Lomdishe” terminology, According to רבי, the מחיב  is actually  פסח שני  with פסח  being a פטור  for those who brought their קרבן  already on it. In contrast, according to רבי נתן, the מחייב  is actually Pesach itself, with פסח שני  merely being תשלומין  if it was missed.)

A major נפקא מינה (practical ramification) of this debate regards someone who converted between Pesach and Pesach Sheini, or a child who became Bar/bat-Mitzva during this period.

Should we say that פסח שני  is a festival in its own right, then it follows that they should bring a קרבן  on פסח שני.  On the other hand, should we say that it is merely a תשלומין  for the missed mitzva on Pesach, then seeing as they were never obligated by פסח ראשון, there is no missed mitzva for them to make up!

Another נפקא מינה  relates to when the punishment of כרת  is applicable.

Rebbe holds that one can get כרת  for intentionally missing the קרבן פסח on either date, and the Gemara understands that this is consistent with his view that פסח שני  is its own independent festival.

Though, as Rashi points out, one person cannot get כרת  twice, this does mean that a person who knowingly missed either date and unknowingly missed the other, will be liable to כרת, and that in the above-mentioned case of the convert, knowingly missing פסח שני  will result in כרת. (interestingly enough Rashi mentions the case of the convert and not the case of the child regarding כרת – perhaps this is because he holds like the views in Chazal that אין בית דין של מעלה עונשין עד גיל עשרים , a topic requiring analysis of its own– see Shabbos 89b and my Hebrew analysis on this subject. Yet see Pesachim 91b and תוס’ ד”ה “איש ולא קטן”)

In contrast, רבי נתן  holds that one can only get כרת  for knowingly missing פסח ראשון , the primary מחיב , in which case פסח שני does not exempt him from the כרת  . If one unknowingly missed פסח ראשון  or missed it for legitimate reasons, he never incurred the כרת  in the first place and whereas פסח שני  gives him a chance to make up for the lost mitzva, it does not have  the independent status to create its own כרת  if missed.

A third view in this regard is that of רבי חנניא בן עקביא who agrees with רבי נתן  that פסח שני  is not an independent festival but holds that it is not only a תשלומין  (chance to make up the lost mitzva) but also a תקנתא  (remedy) for the כרת  incurred by knowingly missing פסח ראשון . As such, one would only be liable toכרת  if he knowingly missed both opportunities!

Another possible נ”מ , though not mentioned in the Gemara, could be whether Pesach Sheini is to be treated as a low-level festival in other ways too, perhaps even for those who have brought the קרבן פסח  and for all of us today who cannot do so? This could involve avoiding fasts, eulogies, saying Tachanun etc.

A more complex question that might be dependent on this debate but would also be affected by other considerations  would be whether we will be liable to keep Pesach Sheini if the conditions that obligate us to bring the קרבן פסח  were to return during the period between Pesach and 14 Iyar!   

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There is a general rule of פסק  (halachik rulings) that הלכה כרבי מחברו  (the halacha follows Rebbe in a dispute with any of his colleagues-see Eruvin 46b) -AT first glance, one might think that this would indicate that we should rule like רבי  that פסח שני  is a רגל בפני עצמו.

Yet, in various places (for example Pesachim 27b, Kesubos 21a   ) it is made clear that this rule usually only applies מחבירו  (against one of his colleagues )  and not מחביריו  (against more than one colleague)- In the latter case, the general rule of הלכה כרבים  (follow the majority) still applies.

As such, seeing as bothרבי נתן  and רבי חנניא בן עקביא  hold that Pesach Sheini is NOT a festival in its own right, the view of the two of them should override that of רבי, and we should rule that it is NOT a festival in its own right.

Yet, the Rambam (Korban Pesach 5/7) rules that a convert who converted between the two Pesach’s, as well as a child who reached the age of majority during that period, MUST bring a קרבן פסח  on פסח שני . his ruling regarding כרת  (K.P. 5/2) is also consistent with the view of Rebbe, a point not lost on the Raavad!

Even more in need of analysis is the ruling of the Meiri (Pesachim 93a), who holds that the convert referred to above does NOT bring a קרבן פסח  DESPITE the fact that we hold that פסח שני  is a רגל בפני עצמו  regarding כרת, a ruling that seems to contradict the link made between the two rulings by the Gemara!

The key to understanding the Rambam might lie in a different sugya (B.B 124b) where some views are brought that we follow רבי  even against more than one of his colleagues, or that one is permitted to do so if one agrees with the logic in his arguments?

Perhaps the Rambam follows this view and uses this discretion to rule like Rebbe even against more than one of his colleagues- (this would admittedly go against the consensus of the Rishonim in Bava Basra who rule either like Rava or Rav Papa but so long as it is consistent in the Rambam’s psak in general, something we would need to test, it would not be illegal.)

And perhaps the Meiri goes a step further and uses this discretion to rule like Rebbe regarding treating פסח שני  as an independent חג  on the one hand but not like Rebbe regarding the convert or the child. Understanding that although the Gemara connects the two rulings, the logic is not precisely the same and it is possible to agree with Rebbe’s logic in one place and not in another?

Alternatively , it could be that the main debate is regarding the convert and the child, and there are only two views there, that of רבי and that of רבי נתן  – it is just regarding the connected dispute regarding כרת  where there are two views against Rebbe, and perhaps in a case where the main debate contains only one opposing view, the rule that we follow Rebbe still applies- This explanation might explain the Kesef Mishna (K.P. 5/7) who ironically explains that the Rambam rules like Rebbe specifically because of the rule of הלכה כרבי מחבירו  against רבי נתן, seemingly ignoring the parallel dispute regarding כרת.

In truth, the Raavad raises this difficulty earlier on in the perek (K.P. 5/2) and the Kesef Mishna bring Rabbeinu Avraham son of the Rambam who explains that seeing as we are dealing with a 3-way dispute (whether פסח שני  is its own festival, תשלומין דראשון , or תקנתא דראשון) , Rebbe is weighted against each of his colleagues separately, not together, and the rule of הלכה כרבי מחבירו  still applies.

This explanation initially bothered me because at the end of the day, the Gemara did seem to indicate that the נקודת המחלוקת  (point of contention) as about whether Pesach Sheini is an independent festival or not, and on that, Rebbe is clearly in the majority.

It seems that the way Rabbeinu Avraham understands his father, this is not quite precise, and seeing as  רבי נתן   and רבי חנניה בן עקביא  derive their views from different readings of the verses, each one’s understanding of   אינה רגל בפני עצמו  is so different that they are seen as completely different views- This if course requires further analysis but might shed further light on the rather different  ruling of the Meiri as well.

Much more to investigate, and we would need to test whatever explanation we choose against the Rambam’s other relevant rulings and the other relevant sugyos to see if it holds any water.

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Be that as it may, given that the Rambam has ruled conclusively that פסח שני  is its own independent festival, does this have any significance for us in our day where no-one is able to perform Pesach Rishon?

Simply speaking, it seems not. Even according to Rebbe who holds that Pesach Sheini is an independent festival, this is most likely only for those whose obligation was pushed over to Pesach Sheini, not for those who obligation was fulfilled on Pesach Rishon or who despite not having fulfilled their obligation on Pesach Rishon do not have their obligation pushed over to Pesach Sheini.

Given that we have learnt explicitly )Pesachim 66b)  that only individuals and NOT the entire community, (or even the majority thereof) have their obligation pushed over to Pesach Sheini, this independent festival simply does not apply in a case where the whole Jewish people were unable to bring the Korban Pesach, despite the rule of טומאה הותרה בצבור, for other reasons beyond their control.

Yet there does appear to be a “taste” of this festival for everyone in that many have the custom not to say Tachanun on Pesach Sheini ( interestingly based on the Megilas Taanis which lists it as a day when fasting and saying eulogies are not allowed-whether this should apply after Megilas Taanis ceased to be authoritative  [see Rosh haShana 19b] is a question in its own right) ) and some even eat Matza!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.