Monthly Archives: August 2020
My father’s “Shalom Rav”
Simplified Model for excellent affordable Yeshiva High School
This is a draft model for an affordable private Yeshiva School, which can be integrated into existing school structures, or the basis for building new ones.
It has been designed by me with input from people currently in the education and financial space, but it obviously only an estimate and will need to be adapted to the realities of each school and community.
Specifications:
I. every group of 20 learners needs 2.5 hours a day of frontal learning from a real time teacher ( either online or offline) for kodesh and another 2.5 for secular studies and the balance can be done by very cheap existing online resources such as yuTorah,mishnarun, master maths, kahn academy etc, as well as in chavrutot/self-study groups,coordinated by the teachers and menahel
2. each teacher teaches 5 hours a day in person and/or online and spends another 3 hours a day on prep and marking, using online resources, testing, and marking methods to reduce the workload and maximize efficiency.
3. Every 120 learners needs a menahel/principle to oversee the curriculum,support manage the teachers and online material, train teachers for the new environment, oversee the ethos of the institution, and look after the holistic needs of the learners
4. Every 600 learners should have a Rosh Yeshiva/Head of School who is a major Talmid Chacham with a strong secular and administrative background.
His task is to be the “glue” of the entire operation, a role-model for all students, give weekly talks/classes to different groups of students, support and supervise menahalim/principals.
5. Every two principles/menahalim or 240 learners have a secretary/P.A./administrator/book-keeper assigned to them – this task will include ensuring all fees have been paid and referring the hopefully small minority who cannot afford these reduced fees to community organizations for scholarships. All payments and book-keeping to be done online and automated.
6. every 240 learners have a sports coach AND a social worker/councillor assigned to them.
7. Schools use existing campuses that are already mainly owned and paid-off by the schools or by the community. Costs are limited to maintenance of existing facilities, and any additional building or renovations are covered by private donations.
An online version of this model will exclude most of this component of the expenses but still have the benefit of real-time “Zoom-style” instruction by real Rebbeim and teachers, in an interactive peer-based online environment.
Proposed Costs:
1. a Rebbe/teacher earns a cost to company package of $7500 per month in the U.S. or R30,000 per month in South Africa.
At one Rebbe/teacher assigned to every 20 learners, This comes to $375 per learner in the U.S. and R1500 per learner in South Africa.
2. A principal/menahel is needed for every 120 learners and earns $15,000 per month in the U.S. or R50,000 per month in South Africa.
This comes to $125 per learner in the U.S. and R417 per learner in South Africa/
3. A Rosh Yeshiva/Head of School is required for every 600 learners and earns $25,000 per month in the U.S. or R100000 per month in South Africa . This superstar needs to be a Talmid Chacham with a good secular education, long succesful track record in education, and majors in finance plus either management science, actuary, operations research , computer science or similar .
This comes to $42 per learner in the U.S. and R167 per learner in South Africa/
4. A secretary/P.A/book-keeper will be needed for every two heads (240 learners) at $4000 per month in the U.S. and R20,000 per month in S.A.
This comes to $17 per learner in the U.S. and R83 per learner in South Africa/
5. a sports coach is needed for every 240 students at $5000 per month (U.S.) or R25,000 per month (S.A.)
This comes to $21 per learner in the U.S. and R104 per learner in South Africa/
6.a social worker/councillor will be needed for every 240 learners at $7500 per month ( U.S) or R30,000 per month (S.A.)
This comes to $32 per learner in the U.S. and R125 per learner in South Africa/
7. Miscellaneous costs: Campus maintenance, stationary, internet, accounting fees etc ( i have guessed this and more input is needed)- $10000 per month ( U.S.) or R40000 per month ( S.A. ) based on 240 learners
This comes to $42 per learner in the U.S. and R167 per learner in South Africa
Total monthly costs per learner: $654 (in the U.S.) or R 2563 (in S.A.)
Eruvin 11 Eruv principles- צורת הפתח and מן הצד
One of the most important halachik constructs in the laws of Eruvin and מחיצות (partitions) in general is the idea of a צורת הפתח, the “form of an entrance.”
Although an area needs to be closed on 4 sides to be treated like a רשות היחיד (private domain) as far as permitting carrying there-in is concerned, this does not mean that all 4 sides need to be completely closed.
We have already seen in the first Mishna that the open fourth side of a מבוי can be marked symbolically with either a pole or a beam, so long as it is less than ten אמות wide.
The Mishna also taught us that if it has a צורת הפתח , the form of an entrance, it is fine even if it is more than 10 אמות wide.
It has been made clear that the “pole or beam” solution only works for a מבוי, with its strict criteria, but not for חצירות (courtyards) or other enclosures, which require either פסים (boards of at least 4 handbreadths wide) on one or more corners, or a צורת הפתח, which works even if the open fourth side is even wider than 10 אמות.
We see on today’s daf that a צורת הפתח can work to close openings of more than 10 אמות width even on the other mainly closed sides of an enclosure, and according to some opinions, can even serve as complete partitions on all 4 sides!
It is clear from the above that this is an extremely powerful tool, and today I would like to highlight a few of the rules relating to it, that are discussed on this daf.
A צורת הפתח is defined on our daf as “קנה מכאן וקנה מכאן וקנה על גביהן”- A reed on each side and a reed on top of them.
It seems from the wording that even though this is a more complex structure than simply a pole or a beam, a strong entity such as a pole or beam is not needed for this, and a reed or other symbolic item is sufficient, though of course this needs to be further clarified- our daf contains some discussion regarding the required properties of the horizontal and vertical components as well.
Whereas a gap of less than 10 אמות in a mainly solid partition is defined by default as a valid פתח (entrance) and does not invalidate the partition, a gap of more than is considered by default to be a פרצה (break) that needs to be “redefined” as an entrance by a physical structure baring some resemblance to the posts and lintel of an official entrance-way. This is achieved by the צורת הפתח under discussion.
One important requirement relating to a צורת הפתח is Rav Chisda’s ruling that the vertical component that goes from one side to the other needs to be above the two vertical components , not connected to its sides. Although there is some give and take on our daf regarding how universally accepted this limitation is as well as its scope, the conclusion does seem to be that this restriction certainly applies on as far as Shabbos law is concerned for openings of more than 10 אמות wide.
Whether it needs to physically touch the two vertical “reeds” or can be suspended directly above them by other structures (such as telephone or electricity wires and poles) is a different issue and subject to debate later on the daf.
Rav Chisda’s rule makes constructing an Eruv using the צורת הפתח model rather challenging, as balancing a reed or string on top of two other reeds, or even solid posts, is far harder than tying it to both sides.
Despite this, constructing a צורת הפתח , either permanently for city Eruvin or temporarily at a holiday resort, is usually more practical than constructing actual partitions, and is the preferred method most of the time.
One important question is whether the disqualification of “מן הצד” refers only to when the horizontal component of the צורת הפתח is attached at a lower level than the top of the vertical poles, but if it is tied to the sides right at the top of the vertical components, it is still considered to be “at the top.”
Some justification for this distinction could be that so long as the horizontal component is tied to the top of the vertical ones, the structure still resembles a regular entrance in some way, and the observer cannot easily tell the difference.
Rashi explains the phrase “מן הצד” as follows:
“שמתח הזמורה מזה לזה באמצעיתו ולא על ראשיהן”- he stretched the horizontal component (in this case a branch) from one vertical component to another in the middle of the verticals and not at their heads.”
Although admittedly ambiguous, this seems to indicate that at least according to Rashi, the main concern of מן הצד is if the horizontal component is tied somewhere between the top and bottom of the verticals (in the middle), and not right at the top, leaving the door open for permitting it to be tied to the “top” of their sides.
However, this does not seem to be the way the Rashba interpreted Rashi’s words:
“ומן הצד היינו שלא מתח הזמורה למעלה בראש הקונדיסין אלא באמצע הקונדסין ועל גבן היינו על גבן ממש”
“From the side means that he never stretched the branch above at the head of the poles but rather in the middle of the poles, and “on top of them” means precisely “on top.”
The emphasis of “precisely on top” seems to be clearly excluding the option of tying it to the top of the sides and insisting on it being literally “on top.”
The phrase “ in the middle” would refer to tying it anywhere along the height of the vertical component, as opposed to literally placing it “on top.”
When one looks at other Rishonim on this topic, one sees various other explanations of what מן הצד means, that could cause both leniencies and stringencies regarding when a צורת הפתח works, but for our purposes, I will just add that the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 362/11) accepts Rashi’s basic understanding of מן הצד but does not discuss which understanding of Rashi is correct.
None other than the ט”ז himself, one of the most important commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, understands Rashi in the more lenient way and allows the upper rope or string to be tied right at the top of the sides of the vertical reeds or poles. The Mishna Berura, however, notes that most Achronim disagree with him and accept the more stringent interpretation of Rashi, which we pointed out seems to be the way the Rashba understood him.
As such, while general practise is not to accept this leniency and to require the horizontal component to be literally on top or above the verticals, in difficult circumstances where this is not possible, the more lenient interpretation of Rashi accepted by the ט”ז might be acceptable, given that we are usually dealing with areas that are not considered a public domain on a biblical level.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Petira of the גרז”ן
Baruch Dayan haEmes
תורה תורה חגרי שק
מורינו הרב הגרז”ן זצק”ל
This has been a year of aweful losses around the word, and in the world of Torah leadership, it has been just devastating.
Rav Zalman Nechemya was a legend throughout the Torah world, one of a few giants in all areas of Torah who was able to find himself equally revered in both the Chareidi and religious Zionist worlds.
For those of us who received our semicha from him, enabling us to achieve so much in our lives of spreading Torah, the sense of grief and loss is immeasurable.
May his family and thousands of talmidim and musmachim be comforted in his tremendous legacy and continue to spread Torah in his merit.
יהי זכרו הקדוש ברוך.
Eruvin 9 and 10 Eruv principles- לבוד and פס ארבע
One of the most important rules regarding מחיצות (partitions) is the principle of לבוד.
The Gemara (Eruvin 4b) told us that this rule is הלכה למשה מסיני (see post on that daf.)
It states that any gap in partitions less than 3 טפחים in width is considered as if it is closed.
This has major ramifications both in the laws of Eruvin and of Sukkah.
It is necessary, however, to formulate exactly what the precise mechanism and scope of this rule is.
Let us suggest two possibilities for now:
- A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is not considered a gap at all, under any circumstances
- A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is still considered a gap, but it is the type of gap that is negligible enough to be ignored regarding certain מצוות.
If the first, objective definition is used, then it is irrelevant whether the gap’s effect is significant in practise or not, it simply does not count as a gap but is considered closed.
In contrast, according to the second formulation, there could be certain situations where such a gap is not negligible, and we do not disregard it.
In practise, it seems impossible to claim that such a gap has no noticeable effect on the partitions. It certainly lets in air from the outside, as well as insects and many smaller or medium sized animals that can get through the space. It also allows people to see inside, certainly no small thing.
As such, if the purpose of the partitions was meant to protect against the elements, keep small animals out, or create visual privacy, this rule seems highly illogical.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the partitions is to demarcate the boundaries of a private domain, or keep larger animals out, then it makes sense that so long as the partitions are dominant and gaps are negligible, the partitions should still be valid.
At the bottom of the previous daf, the Gemara discussed a case where the beam is placed on two pegs protruding outwards from the public facing side of the existing walls of the מבוי.
As such, the beam is not on top of the מבוי, but the internal length of the beam is in contact with the walls.
Rav Chisda rules that the law depends on an earlier dispute we saw regarding the way in which the beam acts as a partition.
According to the opinion that normally permits one to carry underneath the beam, because we view the outside edge of the beam as the partition (as if it continues downwards to the ground,) this beam will be invalid, seeing as the outer edge is not in contact with the walls. Even though the beam might be only a טפח wide, and the gap between the outer edge and the walls should thus be viewed as “closed” due to the principle of לבוד, Rashi explains that seeing as this is not a real partition (but just a conceptual halachik construct) the leniency of לבוד does not apply.
According to the view that it is forbidden to carry underneath the beam because the inner edge of the beam forms the imaginary partition, in this case it will be permitted, seeing as the inner edge of the beam is in direct contact with the walls.
At this point, we already see that the rule of לבוד is not absolute but is limited to certain cases. After all, if it was absolute and a gap of less than 3 is never considered a gap at all, then it should apply even where the mechitzah is not real but only a halachik construct.
Rava holds that even according to the view that the imaginary partition is formed by the inner edge of the beam, this beam is not valid, seeing as it is not physically on top of the מבוי itself, something he requires.
Rav Ada bar Ahava objects on the basis of a beraisa that rules that if the beam is משוכה or תלויה less than 3 טפחים (or 4 טפחים acc רשב”ג) from the walls of the מבוי, it is sufficient due to the rule ofלבוד .
He understands that משוכה refers to when the beam is not directly over the מבוי but placed on pegs protruding outwards, as in the case we have been discussing.
He understands תלויה as referring to a case when the beam is suspended directly over the מבוי, but not directly over the walls of the מבוי- instead, it is supported by a reed placed in the middle of the opening and does reach the actual walls.
If the former assumption is correct, we see that there is no requirement for the beam to be physically on top of the מבוי, as claimed by Rava, and there also seems to be no limitation in the rule of לבוד that precludes it from being applied to another halachik construct such as an “imaginary” partition.
The Gemara answers that both the term משוכה and תלויה could be referring to a case when the beam is supported by a reed and doesn’t reach the wall but is still suspended directly over the מבוי.
The former term refers to a beam that reaches the walls of the מבוי on one side, whereas the later term refers to a beam that doesn’t not reach the walls on either side.
In both cases, the rule of לבוד makes it as if the beam reaches the walls.
However, in a case where the beam itself is not directly over the מבוי, לבוד does not help.
The Gemara explains that both these cases are needed, as we might have thought that the rule of לבוד can only be applied once, on one side, but not twice.
Once again, we see that the rule of לבוד is not a blanket rule, but has its limits- in this case, the Beraisa teaches us that both cases are within its limits, but if it did not have some limits, this would unnecessary.
Rav Ashi fails to see a significant distinction between applying the rule of לבוד on one side or on both sides, but says the Beraisa is referring to one case where the beam is both משוכה AND תלויה- thus removed both horizontally and vertically from the walls of the מבוי . In such a case, the rule of לבוד renders the horizonal gap ineffective and the rule of חבוט ( a different halachik construct whereby we view the edge of the beam as if it continues downwards till the walls) closes the vertical gap .
There is much to discuss regarding why the rule of לבוד isn’t used also for the vertical gap, and why the rule of חבוט is limited to only 3 טפחים, and Tosfos and other Rishonim go into this further, but for our purposes, the Gemara explains it was not a foregone conclusion that the rule of לבוד can be used in combination with another halachik construct like חבוט, and we needed the Beraisa to tell us that it can be.
We see from here also that the rule of לבוד was not seen as absolute by default but can have its limitations. To what extent the Beraisa has taught that that these limitations are not as great as we might have thought, or whether it has taught us that there are no limitations at all and that the rule of לבוד is indeed absolute, is still open for further analysis.
The rule of לבוד is applied once again at the bottom of 9b, in a discussion that flows over onto our new daf.
Here, we have been dealing with a case where a smaller courtyard opens on one side into a larger courtyard.
The walls that close the extra length of the outer courtyard can be seen from the larger courtyard, and the larger courtyard is thus not considered completely open on one side.
Seeing as the gap between the smaller and larger courtyard is less than 10 טפחים, it is considered as a valid entrance and the larger courtyard is considered sufficiently enclosed to carry inside it.
In contrast, the gap between the two courtyards forms the entire fourth side of the smaller courtyard, and as it is completely open, even a gap of less than 10 טפחים wide needs to be closed somehow.
Yet Rabbah bar Rav Huna has already concluded that נראה מבחוץ ושוה מבפנים (where the לחי used to close the fourth side of the מבוי can be seen from outside but not from inside) is permitted. Seeing as when viewed from the outside, the opening does not appear to take up the entire side, the smaller courtyard should also be fine as is.
The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case where the sidewalls of the smaller courtyard extend into the larger courtyard, blocking the excess width of the shared wall from being seen from “outside” (the part of the larger courtyard that is opposite the smaller one.)
The Gemara asks that seeing as we are dealing with a larger courtyard that is no more than 1 Amah wider than the smaller one, there should be less than 3 טפחים between the side walls of the larger courtyard and those of the smaller one, and the rule of לבוד should effectively close this gap, making the whole area permitted.
It answers that we are dealing with a case where the smaller courtyard is not placed symmetrically in the middle of the larger one, but rather with a gap of 2 טפחים between its sidewalls and those of the larger courtyard on one side and 4 on the other.
Even though the rule of לבוד applies on the one side, it does not apply on the other, and according to the view of Rebbe who requires a courtyard completely open on one side to be marked on BOTH sides, the opening is still a problem.
This takes us into new territory entirely.
Until now, we have dealt with a מבוי that is closed on three sides but completely open on one side. מדרבנן it is forbidden to carry inside it until a post is placed on either side or a beam from one side to the other.
We already saw earlier that this does not apply to any area enclosed on 3 sides, but just to any area that has the very specific properties of a מבוי :
- At least 2 courtyards (with 2 houses each) opening to it
- Its length (2 closed sides) is greater than its width (one open and closed side.)
Today we see that a courtyard, which does not meet these qualifications, is treated more strictly, and according to Rebbe, needs to be partly closed on both ends of the open area, even if it is less than 10 אמות wide (if it is more, this might not even be sufficient.)
This has major ramifications for private front-yards and gardens, which we started discussing earlier in our post on daf 5, and I hope to be able to focus on this more as the discussion comes up in the Gemara.
Eruvin 8 The sea as an eruv
We have learnt that to be defined as a רשות היחיד (private domain,) an area needs to be surrounded by walls or partitions, at least 10 טפחים (handbreadths) high or deep.
We have also seen that מדאורייתא (biblically), מחיצות (partitions) on 3 sides is sufficient, but that מדרבנן (rabbinically), the fourth side needs to be marked or partially enclosed, depending on its width and status.
One of the most practical questions regarding the partitions used for the eruv concerns whether the sea or a river can be counted as a partition on one or more sides.
One the one hand, the water level could be very close to the level of the land, without the required 10 טפחים per 4 אמות drop (תל המתלקט) required for a partition.
On the other hand, given that water is not solid matter, and the ground underneath it often does drop at this gradient, perhaps the gradient should be measured by that of the solid ground which a person wading through the water would be walking down.
We have found explicitly (Shabbos 100a) that if a pit 10 טפחים deep is filled with water, even if the water reached the walls of the pit, it is still considered to be its own private domain.
This seems to show that a valley or depression filled with water could still be considered its own domain so long as its banks or the ground underneath it has the required gradient, serving as its partitions.
It follows logically that if these banks or slopes act as barriers for a different domain, they should also act as barriers for the domain that they separate this different domain from.
Our daf discusses the case of a מבוי that was surrounded on one side by a garbage pile and the other side by the sea.
There is a debate amongst the Rishonim whether these two sides were along the length of the מבוי or along the narrower widths of the מבוי, which could have its own ramifications, but we shall assume for now that 2 sides were closed correctly and 2 sides relied on the garbage heap and sea as partitions.
The Gemara related that רבי (Rabbi Yehuda haNasi) did not wish to either permit or forbid carrying in this מבוי.
He declined to forbid it seeing as there were valid partitions at the end of the day, but did not wish to permit it either, because of two concerns:
- The garbage might be removed leaving the one side without a partition.
- The sea could “bring up שירטון”- recede leaving washup-up stones and sand along the banks, thus destroying the natural partition.
The Gemara then asks what the opinion of the רבנן (the majority of sages) is, and two versions of events follow:
- רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they forbid carrying in such a מבוי and Rav Nachman then rules like them.
- רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they permit it, but Rav Nachman rules against them.
According to both versions brought by the Gemara, Rav Nachman forbids carrying in this מבוי , and given the lack of debate amongst the Amoraim, it is likely that this will be the halacha.
One question still open is whether the רבנן forbade carrying in this מבוי for both reasons thatרבי was concerned about, or only for one of them.
Perhaps their main concern was that that the garbage heap, which the Gemara concludes was privately owned, might be removed, a very likely event, but the less likely concern about the sea receding and leaving an unenclosed and relatively flat area of stones along its shore would not be a reason on its own to forbid it.
Another important question in this case is whether we are dealing with the sea or ocean, or with a river or lake.
Although the word ים is used, and this term usually refers to the seas specifically as opposed to rivers (see for example Brachos 9/Mishna 1 re ימים ונהרות )the concern of שירטון might apply to both, depending on precisely how we understand it.
Furthermore, most of the main Torah centers in Israel and possibly all of those in Bavel were not on the ocean.
Whereas the case that רבי dealt with could have been by the sea- major rivers are not present in Israel, the next case the Gemara brings seems almost certainly to have involved one of the main rivers of בבל, where most of its main centers were situated.
The Gemara describes how the Amora מרימר closed off the alleys of the city of Sura with nets, so as not to rely on the ים, for the same reason that רבי was initially concerned about.
As Sura was along the Euphrates River and certainly not on the coast, it seems that the term ים in this sugya certainly must also be referring to major rivers.
We see precedent for this in Tanach where the round pool in Shlomo’s palace was referred to as a ים (Melachim I 7/23) and was referred to by Chazal (Eruvin 14a) as the ים שעשה שלמה.
It is also clear from this case that מרימר was not only concerned about the garbage being removed but also about natural changes in the seashore or riverbank.
As such, the chapter should end here, and we should conclude that the sea or a river may not be used as the boundary of an eruv, period.
However, it is not quite as simple as that, thankfully.
Rabbeinu Chananel appears to have a different גירסא (version of the text) of the Gemara. In his girsa, the second version of the Gemara has Chachamim permitting the מבוי and Rav Nachman ruling leniently like them. It also narrates how אמימר closed the alleys of Sura with nets and was NOT concerned about שירטון .
This seems self- contradictory as if there was no concern for שירטון, why would nets be required, and many Rishonim reject this version out of hand (see for example Rashba on the daf)
This permissive view is given more teeth, however, by the Rambam, who rule (Shabbos 17/5 ) that the sea may serve as a partition, and we are not worried about שירטון.
The Meiri on our daf also rules leniently.
Perhaps what was meant by Rabbeinu Chananel’s version of the Gemara is that מרימר closed alleys that were not open to the sea with nets, and allowed the alleys that were open to the sea to be treated as closed even without nets, as he was not concerned about שירטון .
There is another major sugya in the second chapter of this masechta(Eruvin 22b) that is extremely relevant to this discussion, which I hope to discuss when we get there.
Practically speaking, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 363/29) rules leniently like the Rambam, whereas the Rema rules stringently like the Tur, Rashi’s version of the Gemara and other stringent poskim.
However, even those who allow the sea or river to be used as a partition could have rather strict conditions , among them:
- The gradient of the sea, river, or its banks has to be at least as steep as 10 handbreadths per 4 armlengths.
- The gap between the מבוי and the sea or river may not be more than the 10 handbreadth limit ( a wide beach between the street and the ocean could thus invalidate the entire partition.)
- The river cannot freeze solid during the winter (see Taz O.C. 363/20)
In addition, many Ashkenazi communities in Europe did use rivers as partitions for their Eruvin, and it thus seems that some of their authorities also held that the Gemara’s ban on using the sea or a river was not absolute, and depends on the circumstances.
As we have seen, this is a complex issue, and there is tons more to say, but one thing certain from this discussion is that anyone planning on relying on the sea or a river as an eruv boundary needs to know precisely what he is doing, or/and get guidance from someone who does!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Eruvin 7 A philosophy of stringencies or leniencies
There is a tendency in parts of the Torah world to err on the side of caution in all halachik matters and take on the more stringent opinions in all areas of halacha.
On the other hand, there is a tendency amongst other sectors to constantly search for leniencies, picking and choosing the easier opinion in each area of halacha.
Are either of the above policies legitimate, or is one perhaps required to choose one or more recognized halachik authorities and follow their views in every area of halacha, irrespective of whether they are lenient or stringent?
On the previous daf, we recorded a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding how to close off a מבוי מפולש (alley open to the public domain at both ends.)
Rav ruled leniently like the Tana Kama in the beraisa and held that a צורת הפתח (form of an entrance) on one end and a pole or beam on the other end was sufficient.
On the other hand, Shmuel ruled stringently like Beis Hillel according to Chananya, and held that a צורת הפתח was not sufficient on the one side, but doors were required.
We also saw a different dispute, also between Rav and Shmuel, regarding a מבוי עקום (bent alley.)
Until then, we had been dealing solely with a straight, rectangular מבוי, closed along its lengths and open either on one or two ends.
This dispute, however, centered around an “L” shaped מבוי that makes a right-angled turn in the middle, but is still open at both ends.
As such, the one end is not aligned with the other, and it is unclear whether such a מבוי is to be treated at each end as if it is only open on that end, making a pole or beam sufficient, or whether it is to be treated like a מבוי open on both ends to a public domain, and thus require one of the more stringent solutions discussed in the Beraisa .
In this case, Rav is stringent, and holds that it is to be regarded as open on both sides (מפולש), whereas Shmuel is lenient and treats it as if it is only open on one side (סתום).
When we combine both disputes, it comes out that such a מבוי does not require doors according to either Rav or Shmuel.
This is because:
1. Although Rav rules that it is to be treated like a מבוי מפולש (open alley), he also rules like the Tana Kama that a מבוי מפולש (open alley) does not require doors on either side.
2. Although Shmuel rules that a מבוי מפולש requires doors on one side, he rules that such a מבוי עכום is to be treated like a מבוי סתום (closed alley.)
Despite the fact that we have thus not found ANY authority who holds that a מבוי עכום requires doors, the Gemara tells us that there was such a מבוי in the city of Neharda, Shmuel’s home town, and the authorities treated it with the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, requiring doors on one side!
This means essentially that they “collected” the stringencies of both, treating it like an open מבוי in accordance with Rav, and requiring an open מבוי to have doors in accordance with Shmuel.
The Gemara is extremely bothered with this approach of collecting חומרות (stringencies,) due to a Beraisa that focusses on general principles applying to disputes between בית הלל and בית שמאי.
The Beraisa rules that the law is in accordance with Beis Hillel in all cases. Yet, one is permitted to choose which of them to follow (the Gemara later explains that this was only before the בת קול (voice from heaven) that proclaimed that the law is always like Beis Hillel, or according to the view of Rabbi Yehoshua who did not accept the authority of voices from heaven, or that this statement refers to similar disputes amongst later sages that have not yet been resolved.)
The Beraisa, however, condemns those who rely on the leniencies of both of them, calling them “wicked,” and mocks those who follow the stringencies of both of them, applying to them the verse הכסיל בחושך הולך (“the fool walks in darkness”- Koheles 2.)
On today’s daf, 2 approaches are given to explain how the authorities in Neharda had not behaved like “fools” by being stringent like both opinions:
1. Rav Nachman bar Yitchak is of the view that in practise, even Rav would not be lenient and accept only a צורת הפתח, a claim made already by Rav Huna.
2. Rav Shizvi seeks to explain this even according to the view of Rav Ada bar Ahava that Rav was indeed lenient in practise. He interprets the Beraisa’s application of the term “fools” to those who practise the stringencies of both houses in a far more limited fashion.
He claims that this only applies when the two disputes are inter-connected, with the lenient view in the one case logically requiring a stringent view in the other, and vice versa.
Where the two debates are completely independent of one another, there is no issue with practicing the stringencies of both.
To support the second approach, Rav Shizvi brings the case of the “spine and the skull,” discussed in a Mishna (Ohalos 2/3)
This Mishna deals with the bones of a corpse that are considered like the whole corpse itself and cause everything in the same אהל (covered area) to become impure.
In contrast, most bones on their own do not cause such impurity, and only cause impurity to things that touch them.
It is universally accepted that the whole spine and whole skull, being the most essentially bones of the body, are treated with the stringencies of the body itself, and make everything under the same roof of them impure.
If the spine or skull is no longer whole, however, they are treated more leniently like any other bone.
There is a dispute between בית הלל and בית שמאי regarding how much of the spine or skull needs to be missing for it to no longer be considered whole.
Regarding the spine, בית שמאי holds that unless at least 2 vertebrae are missing, it is still considered whole and the more stringent rules of impurity apply. בית הלל, on the other hand, hold that as soon as one vertebrae is missing, the spine is no longer considered whole and the more lenient rules of impurity apply.
Regarding the skull, בית שמאי are once again stringent and hold that it still considered whole unless enough is missing to cause death in a living person.
בית הלל once again are more lenient, and say if the amount normally removed by a doctor’s drill (possibly in therapeutic surgery) from a live person is missing from the dead man’s skull, it is already considered incomplete.
Rav Shizvi then refers to the ruling of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that the same criteria apply to the laws of טריפות (terminally injured animals.)
Missing pieces in the spine and skull before slaughter are counted amongst the terminal injuries that render an animal non-kosher even after proper slaughter.
In order for it to be considered “incomplete” and thus non-kosher, בית שמאי use the more stringent criteria they applied to a corpse, essentially making it harder for it to be considered non-kosher. This turns out effectively to be a leniency in the rules of kashrus.
בית הלל in contrast, use the more lenient criteria they use to release the spine and skull from the more stringent laws of impurity, in effect making it easier for the animal to be considered non-kosher, and thus creating a stringency in the laws of kashrus!
This means that in this case, a leniency in one area of halacha, namely impurity, logically requires a corresponding stringency in a different area, namely the laws of kashrus, and vice versa.
Thus being stringent in both areas, and applying the stringent laws of impurity to a spine missing only one bone, but also considering an animal with such a spine to be non-kosher, is logically inconsistent, as is applying the lenient laws of impurity but also considering it to be kosher.
In such cases, says Rav Shizvi, being stringent like both opinions is logically inconsistent and thus foolish.
A generally cautious and stringent approach to halacha in which the stringencies of different authorities are adopted is thus not considered like a “fool walking in the darkness” according to his interpretation of the Beraisa, unless it leads to logically inconsistency in one’s behaviour.
It is not stringency per se that is the issue, but logically inconsistent behaviour.
A spine missing one vertebra is either considered whole or not, but cannot be both whole and incomplete.
In order to develop a broader approach to this issue, a number of questions need to be raised, among them:
1. IS Rav Shizvi’s interpretation of the Beraisa only brought in order to reconcile Rav Ada bar Ahava’s view that Rav was lenient in practise regarding a צורת הפתח in a מבוי מפולש, but Rav Nachman bar Yitchak would still prefer the original and simpler interpretation of the Beraisa that considers collecting stringencies in general to be a foolish and dark approach?
2. If this is not so, we would need to explain why Rav Nachman bar Yitchak doesn’t make the obvious distinction that Rav Shizvi makes and instead chooses a view of Rav that is subject to debate.
3. If Rav Nachman bar Yitchak indeed favors the original and simple approach, do we accept his broader view of the “fool in the dark” or the more limited interpretation of Rav Shizvi?
4. If Rav Shizvi’s distinction is to be accepted, does this apply only to the Beraisa’s mockery of the chronic מחמיר (one who is stringent) or does it also apply to the Beraisa’s condemnation of the chronic מקיל (one who is lenient.) On the one hand, he only makes the distinction regarding stringency, but the need for consistency within the wording of the Beraisa seems to indicate that it applies equally to leniencies. If this is so, he would see no “wickedness” in “collecting” leniencies from different authorities, so long as they are not logically inconsistent with each other.
Answering these questions requires a thorough study of all parallel and related sugyos and the Rishonim who comment on them. As this is way out of the scope of this post, we shall have to wait for future opportunities to revisit this topic!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Eruvin 6 An Eruv in a public domain
Until now, we have discussed how to close off the fourth side of a מבוי (alley) already closed on 3 sides, to permit carrying within the מבוי and to and from the מבוי and the adjoining courtyards.
We will see later that in addition to the pole or beam on the open side, one needs to make the actual eruv, known in this case as שתוף מבואות (joining of alleys) by placing some food in one of the courtyards on behalf of all the inhabitants of the מבוי.
These laws are all based on the assumption that at a scriptural level, an area enclosed on 3 sides is already considered a private domain, and it is only a rabbinical requirement that the fourth side be marked or closed off in some way.
On today’s daf, we begin to address the more complex question of how to make an eruv in a real public domain, where carrying is a biblical prohibition.
The case discussed is a public thoroughfare with buildings flanking either side.
A Beraita is brought where the Tana Kama (first opinion) rules that one can make a צורת הפתח (a structure resembling an entrance, consisting of 2 poles on either side and a plank running from one side to the other on top) on one side, and the other side only requires pole or a beam (acc the version of the Rif and Rosh,) like a closed מבוי.
The Tana Chananya disagrees and says that the law in this case is subject to a dispute between Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai, and both are more stringent than the Tana Kama.
Beis Shamai holds that both ends need to be shut by doors which need to be locked as people enter or exit, a rather cumbersome process in a busy public place.
Beis Hillel are more lenient and require a door only on one side, making do with a pole or a beam on the other side, like a closed מבוי.
Even though Chananya’s view is substantially more stringent when it comes to a making an Eruv in a public domain, the Gemara is still unwilling to accept it due to 2 other statements of Chazal.
In the first, a Beraisa, Rabbi Yehuda opines that if someone has two houses on either side of a public thoroughfare , one may put either a pole or a beam on both of the open sides and carry from one house to another. This view is even more lenient than the Tana Kama in the previously Beraisa who requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.
The Chachamim retorted that a public domain may simply not be closed off in such a lenient way.
In case one answers that the Chachamim did not mean to reject even Beis Hillel’s more stringent suggestion involving a door on one side, the Gemara brings an extremely stringent view stated by Rabbah bar bar Hana in the name of the leading Amora, Rabbi Yochanan.
Rabbi Yochanan’s reported view is that even a walled city like Yerushalayim, would be considered a public domain on a biblical level, if its doors were not locked at night.
We are talking about a walled city enclosed on ALL sides, open only at the gates, yet Rabbi Yochanan holds that the gates required doors which were locked at night to convert it into a private domain (termed a חצר כל רבים, or public courtyard.)
We see from there that turning a public domain into a private domain is no simple matter, and even Beis Hillel’s requirement to have doors on one side are not sufficient for this- all sides have to be completely enclosed and even aligned gates on opposite sides of the city need to be completely closed with doors that are locked at night.
On the basis of this stringent ruling of Rabbi Yochanan, the Gemara reinterprets the first Beraisa to refer not to a real public domain, but to a מבוי that is open on both sides to a public domain, referred to as a מבוי מפולש לרשות הרבים.
Unlike the מבוי that is closed on 3 sides, this is treated more stringently, and the three opinions in the Beraisa refer to closing off its two open sides.
The Gemara then records a dispute between the leading first-generation Amoraim of Babylon, Rav and Shmuel, as to which opinion we follow for this open מבוי.
Rav rules like the Tana Kama and requires only a צורת הפתח on the one open side of the מבוי and a pole or beam on the other.
Shmuel is more stringent and requires doors on one side and a pole or beam on the other side, like Beis Hillel according to Chananya.
It follows that there are 3 different situations we have discussed so far:
1. A real public domain, that satisfies all the criteria to be defined as such- making an eruv is almost impossible and requires doors in all openings that are locked at night.
2. A מבוי that is open on two sides to the public domain, but is not itself considered a public domain, for reasons that need to be clarified. According to Rav, a צורת הפתח is required on one side and a pole or beam is sufficient on the other. According to Shmuel, one side requires doors and the other can make do with a pole or beam.
3. A מבוי that is only open on one side- This is the case we have been discussing from the beginning of the masechta, and either a pole or a beam on the open side is sufficient.
I have a few questions on the שקלא וטריא (give and take/flow) of the sugya, among them
1. The Gemara initially rejected the simple interpretation of the first Beraisa based on the second Beraisa’s rejection of Rabbi Yehuda’s lenient view.
Although the Gemara later admits that one can retort that the views are not equivalent, and Rabbi Yehuda was more lenient than Beis Hillel who requires doors, it seems strange that it did not immediately see that.
2. In addition, Rabbi Yehuda’s view making do with either a pole or a beam on both sides seems even more lenient than the most lenient view seen in the first beraisa, namely that of the Tana Kama who at least required a צורת הפתח on one side.
As such, Even if we found a way to explain why the Gemara initially thought that the second Beraisa was a good proof against the simple explanation of the first, we need to explain why the Gemara assumes that it is at least a proof for the more stringent view of Chananya requiring doors. Surely all it proves is that a beam or a pole on both sides is not sufficient?
3. Once the second Beraisa is rejected as a proof against the simple understanding of the first Beraisa, Rabbi Yochanan’s statement about Yerushalayim is brought to show that even Beis Hillel according to Chananya are too lenient.
Yet Rabbi Yochanan was only an Amora, and his view was only reported by another Amora. Is such a view authoritative enough to reject the simple meaning of a Beraisa and interpret it to refer not to a real public domain but rather a מבוי open on two sides to one?
Perhaps one can answer based on the fact that Rabbi Yehuda holds that an area enclosed on two sides is already considered a private domain on a biblical level.
As such, it is the equivalent to him of an area enclosed on 3 sides according to the majority opinion.
If the Chachamim rebuked Rabbi Yehuda for allowing such an area to be enclosed with just a pole or a beam, it could be that they are saying that even according to his lenient definition of a public domain, such an area is still a public domain on a rabbinic level and requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.
It follows that according to Chachamim who consider such an area to be a proper public domain even on a biblical level, a צורת הפתח would not be sufficient and doors would be needed, at least on one side, and possibly on both.
The Gemara then says that it is true that the second Beraisa implies that the Chachamim would require doors on one side, but who says that they would require these doors to be on both sides AND locked.
It then brings the statement of Rabbi Yochanan to prove that they would indeed. Although Rabbi Yochanan is an Amora, his statement is based on a reinterpretation of the first Beraisa, and given that no other Amora of his stature has suggested sticking to the simple interpretation, we need to consider his view as authoritative and discover what this reinterpretation is.
This is only my own analysis of the sugya, but a look at the various Rishonim will show that these issues are discussed, and similar answers are given.
What is a רשות הרבים (public domain.)
Now that we have seen that making an eruv in a true public domain is almost impossible, we can see that attempting to make an eruv in a busy and crowded city is fraught with difficulty.
The key to understanding where this could be possible is understanding what makes an area a public domain.
Given that the prohibition of transferring from domain to another or 4 אמות within a public domain is derived from the mishkan in the biblical מחנה ישראל (camp of Israel,) it follows that the properties of this camp should serve as guidelines for what is considered a public domain.
Rashi, on our daf, gives various criteria, which in his view, were shared by the public domain in the desert:
1. It needs to be at least 16 אמות wide (approximately 8 metres)
2. It needs to be a city where at least 600,000 people are present (שמצויין בה שישים רבוא)
3. If it is walled on all sides, it needs to have two gates on opposite sides with a public thoroughfare running from one to the other.
What Rashi does not tell us here is what happens if an area in a city fulfills all the requirements, but another area does not. He also does not tell us if the city requires 600,000 to be there all the time, or only at certain times.
A major issue raised by Tosfos on our daf, is how the second requirement can be derived from the biblical camp.
We already learnt (Shabbos 99 and see our post on that daf) that the area underneath the wagons was also considered part of the public domain, and there were certainly not 600,000 people there. In addition, the number 600,000 referred only to the adult male population in the camp, and once women and children were included, it would have been far higher.
Although Rabbeinu Tam explains that the area under the wagons was indeed used by all the people when they travelled, and we use the number 600,000 because it is the only number actually mentioned in the text, other Rishonim such as the Rambam do not make mention of the 600,000 requirement at all, possibly for these reasons.
One could possibly explain alternatively that Rashi did not mean that all areas of the public domain needed to be frequented by 600,000, but if the area as a whole was indeed frequented by that number of people, all areas in it are also considered part of the same public domain. Perhaps this is part of what Rabbeinu Tam meant.
If this true, how we define which areas are considered part of this public domain requires more information, but it seems clear that the area underneath the wagons was indeed part of the biblical camp.
All these issues guide the debate regarding where an eruv can and cannot be built, and it is not surprising that there different, sometimes extreme views on either side regarding whether one may or may not rely on eruvim in bigger cities that are subject to these doubts.
Peace with U.A.E. or sovereignty
Too confused to comment right now, but if this is true, what do you think?
Is peace with the Arab world worth giving up sovereignty over Yehuda veShomron, with or without Palestinian buy-in?
https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/israel-and-uae-reach-historic-peace-deal-638524
yoniisaacson.com 