Category Archives: Daf Yomi Analysis

Eruvin 18-19 The Stalker ,making women feel safe , and wasted semen

Posted on by

Until recently, the atmosphere in the Western world has made it extremely difficult to teach certain areas of Torah which appear to be unnecessarily stringent in an open society where members of the opposite sex mingle and interact completely freely.

Although modern society is certainly not alone in terms of its hedonistic excesses, for much of history, in most moral societies, it was understood and accepted that human nature is such that certain strict lines need to be drawn to avoid total moral breakdown.

For decades, since the cultural revolutions of the 60’s, Western society has lived in a state of ethical dissonance- On the one hand, the feminist movement has fought for equality for woman and the lines between the genders have been slowly blurred, yet in practise, girls and woman have been treated as badly or worse than any time in history, with “liberal” Hollywood turning woman into nothing other than sex symbols, and the most “respectable” of institutions turning a blind eye to rape, child abuse, and just about every outrage imaginable.

Many a young actress or businesswoman has literally had to sleep her way up the ladders of fame, and the rich, powerful and famous have carried out the worst abuses with virtual impunity.

A pornography industry has flourished that treats people like absolute garbage, taking advantage of the desperation of so many young people to sell them as commodities to serve people’s over-indulged libidos.

It is now, in recent years, with the advent of the much to talk about “me too” movement, that Western society is starting to come to terms with at least some of its excesses, and realize something that the Torah has always taught: true liberty is not the ability to give in to whatever selfish urges come your way, but rather the ability to control those urges and use them in a way that doesn’t harm the weak and the vulnerable but rather brings good to the world.

Reading these two daf, it is absolutely impossible not to think of the horrific events of the past week here in our beloved Israel, where in a scene reminiscent of the biblical פלגש בגבעה (concubine of Giv’ah who was gang-raped and murdered) a gang of teenagers and young adults reportedly stood in line outside a hotel room in Eilat waiting their turn to rape a drunk 16 year old girl.

In contrast to the biblical story which ended in a tragic civil war between the tribe of Binyamin who refused to stand up to those responsible, and the other tribes who demanded justice, the condemnation across our society and demand for change has been unanimous- whether anything will actually be done in practise is something only time will tell.

Yet despite people’s shock, how many of us have internalized the fact that such occurrences are a likely direct result of decades of subtle and not so subtle sexualization of woman and children in the media and on the streets?

The fact that it took an event like this for the city of Tel Aviv to finally remove an outrageous mural painted on a beach change-room of some “macho guys” peaking into the girls change-room, speaks volumes of where society has been.

The bastion of so-called liberalism has been absolutely ok with such a disgraceful “piece of art” which is only one of many such pieces of junk being produced by our subculture.

On our daf, the view is expressed that the first man and woman were created as one entity, with a male face on one side, and a female face on the other.

The Gemara asks which side was on front, and answers that the male side was probably in front.

This is because we have learnt in a Beraisa that a man should never walk behind a woman, even his own wife, and if he meets a woman on a single-file bridge, he should ask her to move to the side so that he can pass her.

The same Beraisa concludes that anyone who follows a woman in a river has no share in the world to come.

The question one immediately needs to ask is what exactly is so terrible about walking behind a woman.

The modern person’s first reaction might be to get defensive and say that this is an example of old-fashioned chauvinism that has no place in modern society- after all, were we not always taught as kids that “ladies go first?”

Indeed, a first glimpse at Rashi on the first statement of the Beraisa, who says that it is גנאי לו, loosely translated as “degrading for him,” might strengthen this claim, if we take it to mean that it is beneath the honor of a man to be behind a woman

Another important think to note is the difference between the first parts and last parts of the Beraisa- the former instruction not to walk behind a woman applies even to one’s own wife, but does not get the forceful condemnation of the later.

The later statement discusses following a woman in a river, does not mention one’s own wife, but issues a far more severe condemnation.

A look at Rashi’s comments on this later statement shows that he understands this to be referring only to another man’s wife, a view that seems to be accepted by the consensus of the Rishonim. He explains that the concern here is that she removes her clothes while washing or bathing in the river.

However, even an adulterer has a share in the world to come, so why would someone who follows someone else’s naked wife into a river forfeit this share?

As one continues down the daf, one sees that the suggestion that our Gemara makes light of woman is completely incorrect.

The Gemara labels Manoach, father of Shimshon, as an עם הארץ ignorant person(, for following his wife, when he should have gone first, but then counters this claim by pointing out that the prophets Elkana (father of Shmuel) and Elisha also “went after their wives.”

The Gemara notably seems to take for granted that a prophet cannot possible be an עם הארץ (c.f. 12a B.B. וחכם עדיף מנביא ” אבל אכמ”ל”) and concludes that they did not literally walk behind their wives which would be wrong, but rather went after their wives’ words and advice.

Given that Chazal were at the least ok, and possibly full of praise, for one who follows the advice of his righteous wife, something we have already seen both in the Torah , where Hashem tells Avraham to do whatever his wife says )(Beraishis 21/14) , and in Midrash (think, for example און בן פלת who was saved by his wife’s advice not to follow Korach -Sanhedrin 109b,) it is impossible to make the superficial claim that they denigrated woman. (There are admittedly some other statements of Chazal that might seem at face-value to do so, but this is not one of them.)

It is far more likely that this has more to do with the well-known concept of כל כבודה דבת מלך פנימה – the honor of a princess is all inside )Tehillim 45/14.)

When it comes to giving advice, woman might be considered more intuitive than men, in many ways the “brains” behind everything.

One does not send one’s most precious resources at the front of the battle as a pawn, one looks after them carefully.

For a man to walk behind his wife, making her walk ahead into the unknown dangers ahead on the road, might be degrading, not because she should be treating him with more respect, but on the contrary, because he should treat her with more consideration, paving the way for her.

It is thus precise that when it comes to walking behind one’s wife, the Beraisa specifically mentions -“בדרך” “on the road.”

It is possible that such considerations would not apply to opening the car-door for one’s wife before entering oneself, where in general no such concern for her safety should apply.

When it comes to another woman, and even more so another man’s wife, the consideration is completely different.

Here the concern could be both that one might make her feel uncomfortable and arouse himself unnecessarily, and at worst, come to rape her, chas veshalom.

This form of premeditated stalking might be even worse than a consensual affair, and in the case of someone’s else’s wife, combined with the additional severe of adultery, results in one’s losing one’s portion in the world to come, assuming this statement is to be taken literally.

For decades, the price of feminism has been that women have to ignore their natural female sense of vulnerability and just accept the fact that the nature of men has not and will not change, and that the guy behind them might just be that stalker she has always had nightmares above.

Hopefully, the balance will be restored to the point where women are revered, cherished and respected , but allowed to feel safe, without men harassing them constantly, the way the Torah has taught us.

The Gemara brings the words of Rabbi Yirmiya ben Elazar who tells us that after the sin of אדם הראשון (the first man) , he was “excommunicated” by Hashem for 130 years, and during this time, he gave birth to “רוחין, שידין, וליליו ” , understood by Rashi as various types of מזיקין (harmful entities, whatever that means…)

The Gemara questions how this was possible, given that Rabbi Meir has already taught us that he was a חסיד גדול (a pious person) who when seeing that he had been sentenced to death, fasted and separated from his wife from 130 years.

If he had separated from his wife, how could he have given birth to these “harmful entities.”

It answers that the entities were created from the wasted semen that he spilled unintentionally during this time.

This seemingly bizarre statement raises many questions that I have no time to analyze today, but which we will hopefully address in future posts:

  1. What exactly were these מזיקין that he gave birth to?
  2. Was this a natural process of some kind or was it supernatural?

If it was natural, how can it be explained naturally? If it was supernatural, then why was the Gemara bothered by the fact that he had separated from his wife, given that the process was supernatural anyway?

  1. Is the assumption that given his pious nature, he could not have intentionally spilled seed during this time, so the only possible option is that the מזיקין came from unintentional spill (מקרה לילה)? If so, how do we understand that someone who was now even more flawed than before the sin was able to withstand this strong temptation in the absence of his wife for so long? Furthermore, assuming he had reached such a supreme level of control that he was able to avoid intentionally spilling his seed at all during this time, what more could be expected of him? Why should harmful entities be the result of what would have arguably been essentially the greatest long-lasting act of self- control in history?

It is known that Chazal (see Niddah 13b) had very strong things to say about “המוציא שפחת זרע לבטלה” – (spilling seed in vain ;obviously the definition of לבטלה needs careful study), comparing it (probably metaphorically) to idol-worship, murder, and adultery.

It does not say such things about unintentional spill, and though a man who experiences such an emission becomes impure ,and one is also not supposed to intentionally have impure thoughts that might cause this to happen, it seems obvious that something beyond someone’s control should not be condemned in any way.

It seems more likely that the “מזיקין” were not a punishment in any way for unintentional spillage, but rather a result of his original sin itself, and the unintentional spillage was merely the means that they came about through.

However harsh Chazal seem to be in their condemnation of intentional wasting of seed, the Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 23/1) claims that this is the most severe sin in the Torah

Though this claim is very difficult for multiple reasons, and many other authorities (see B.S and C.M there for example, quoting Sefer Chasidim) have either disputed this ruling or clarified that it is not to be understood literally, the Zohar (p arshasVayechi 219b) seems to have gone further and claim that this is the only sin for which one cannot repent and whose perpetrator cannot “see” the face of Hashem’s shechina( whatever that means.)

This shocking statement was used by non-other than one of the leading Torah scholars of his time, Rav Yaakov Emden (mitpachas Seforim 1/on Vayechi) as one of multiple “proofs” for his controversial claim that parts of the Zohar contradict the Talmud and cannot possibly be authored by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai!

His points out that Chazal taught us that nothing stands in the way of teshuva and always went out of their way to encourage teshuva. It is also not even listed in the more serious categories of sins which are subject to Kareit or death in court and require more than just repentance and Yom-Kippur to atone for.

Though I am certainly not qualified to get into this debate, which seems to hinge partly on how literally such statements in a very non-literal work are meant to be taken, and which is only the domain of experts in both the Talmud and the Zohar, there certainly seems to be one such proof from Daf 19 here in Eruvin that one can certainly do Teshuva for this sin.

The Gemara (I am admittedly merging a number of statements that the Gemara see as inter-dependant for the sake of brevity) relates how the sinners amongst the Jewish people all do Teshuva at some stage, and are “pulled out” of Gehinom by Avraham Avinu himself.

One exception given is a yisroel who has relations with an idol worshiper – Rashi’s clarifies that (probably to to impress her), he covers up his circumcision and Avraham can thus not recognize him.

Whatever the symbolism behind this exception is (which in no way means that a person cannot repent in his lifetime for such a deed,) it is clear that one who spills his seed is certainly not excluded even from this last-minute repentance and “rescue” operation, how much more so one who has made the effort to fully repent in his lifetime.

As mentioned above, only people well-versed in both the Talmud and Zohar might be qualified to comment on the claims of Rav Yaakov Emden, but assuming the Zohar was never intended to be taken literally in the first place, this would not an issue either way.

Eruvin 17 The army and spiritual challenges

Posted on by

We have pointed out various times during our posts how everything in Torah is related, and that very often that relationship stands out so clearly that one is absolutely awestruck.

The direct connection between our daf and this weeks parsha is certainly one such example.

The parsha opens with the highly unusual law of אשת יפת תואר, the beautiful captive girl taken in war.

In an unprecedented ruling, the Torah permits the soldier who falls for an enemy captive to begin a process whereby he will be able to marry her and even gives him permission to sleep with her once before this process begins, in order to satisfy that lust.

The explanation for this most unusual capitulation to human sexual desire on the part of the Torah is that לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע – “The Torah only spoke against the evil inclination. “

In the heat of war, the Torah understood that if a soldier was not permitted any outlet for his desires, he would carry them out anyway, and thus came up with a permitted way that allowed him to do so if necessary, while never encouraging it.

There is much to discuss about this idea, and the first question that jumps to mind is why is this extreme lust treated any differently to other extreme situations of lust?

The Torah always insists that people have free will and are responsible for their actions, no matter what the temptations, yet here, suddenly it acts completely differently.

Is the lust of a soldier at war really so much stronger than a man whose wife is a Niddah, a homosexual man who has no permitted outlet for his passions, or a single man who isn’t even permitted to masturbate to satisfy his urges, let alone carry on a sexual relationship with someone outside marriage?

Even if we argue that this is a question of פקוח נפש, given the emotional pressures that a soldier is under, we have found that a person is not permitted to practise forbidden sexual relations even to save his life (Sanhedrin 74a,) one of three great transgressions which one may not even transgress with a gun to one’s head.

In the case where the danger to his life comes from his emotional state caused by his desires, this could apply even to a non-married Jewish woman!

We see this from the case (Sanhedrin 75a) where a certain man fell so badly for a woman that he became desperately ill from desire.

The doctors opined that he would never heal unless he got to sleep with her.

The Rabbis ruled that it is better to let him die than to allow him to sleep with her, or even “talk with her from behind the fence.”

Clearly, the fact that a person gets himself into an emotional state that endangers his life does not justify illegitimate sexual behaviour.

It might be possible to distinguish between the two cases in a few ways, among them:

  1. The reason given by the Gemara why such a harsh ruling was given even in the case of un unmarried Jewish girl (who was not even a Niddah) was either because of פגם משפחה (damage done to the girl and her family) or שלא יהו בנות ישראל פרוצות בעריות (so the daughters of Israel would not be engaged in sexual immorality. )

The former reason focusses on the individual girl and her family whereas the later focusses on societal needs – The good of society takes precedence than the good of this individual, as we need to uphold a moral society at all times.

The case in our parsha is different given that the girl is an enemy captive, and neither of those two concerns apply, at least on a technical legal level.

The fact that the soldier is away from society also lessens the impact on society.

  1. In the case mentioned in Sanhedrin, the threat to the person’s life came from his lust itself. We cannot allow our girls to become the “medicine” for every person who is unable to control himself. In the case of the solder, the danger is from the war, the lust simply increases that danger, and the permission given by the Torah simply removes that extra danger allowing him to focus on the prime directive of survival and most important, victory for the nation as a whole.

Despite the above, given the extreme stringency with which the Torah usually treats these matters, there is little doubt that the situation of war should be treated as the exception rather than the rule, and however we try our best to understand it, it is likely that it cannot be applied to any other situations and אין בו אלא חדושו .

On our daf, we see that this is not the only allowance made for people at war.

Our Mishna tells us that there are 4 areas in which Chazal were lenient went it comes to soldiers in an army camp:

  1. They may collect wood from anywhere, even if it does not belong to them.
  2. They are exempt from washing hands before eating bread.
  3. They are permitted to eat דמאי (produce bought from an ignorant person who might not have taken tithes.
  4. They are exempt from putting aside an ערוב חצירות (though they still need basic מחיצות in order to carry within a designated area.

With the exception of the first which involves the biblical prohibition of stealing (probably permitted through the rule of הפקר בית דין הפקר,) these are all rabbinical laws that are waived, but the facts that such allowances were made also makes it clear how much of a need Chazal saw to allow soldiers to focus on the sacred task at hand of achieving victory without having to allocate too much energy to other things that were not practical at the time.

In an even larger concession, the Gemara (Chullin 17a) says that during the wars to conquer the land, the soldiers were permitted to eat forbidden foods if they are hungry, even pig!

What all these things have in common is that the Torah and Chazal have waived certain very important halachik requirements in order to allow soldier to focus on the battle and not use all their energies battling hunger, the evil inclination, or circumstance.

In the context of all of these things, it seems that the although the Torah only spoke against the evil inclination in the case of the captive girl, this is not because the Torah allows people to sin “legally” in order that they not come to sin “illegally,” but because of the unusual situation soldiers face in war where survival and victory has to be their only goal and the Torah therefore chooses not to make them spend their energy fighting their evil inclination in almost certain losing battles.

One of the major objections raised by many in the Torah world against religious youth going to the Israel army involves the spiritual dangers that they face there, given that much of the army is irreligious.

One of the strongest arguments against this comes from the many extreme allowances that the Torah itself makes for those at war, to the point of permitting some very serious transgressions- what it does not do is in any way discourage soldiers from going to fight, whether the war is obligatory or voluntary in nature.

If this is the case in situations where religious life is not possible, how much more so, we could argue, should it be in a Jewish army where so many allowances are made for religious soldiers, such as kosher food, Shabbos observance, and even time to pray and study.

On the other hand, one could counter that there is a difference between leaving one’s own camp to go into battle or to enemy territory, where the religious threat is from the outside, and being in a Jewish camp where the religious temptations come from the inside, from one’s own side.

The former is more likely to be a temporary setback, whereas the chance of long-term assimilation into secular society poised by being part of an irreligious unit is on a completely different level.

One can argue back and forth on this issue, but one thing that we see for sure on our daf is that certain leniencies were applied by Chazal even INSIDE our own camp.

The army certainly does not seem like a place for imposing extra stringencies above the basic requirements of the law, and even certain laws themselves, namely the 4 mentioned in our Mishna, are pushed aside even while in the מחנה itself.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 15-16 More on Eruv principles, dispute, and הלכה למשה מסיני

Posted on by

Our two daf contain pivotal sugyos regarding the laws of partitions and Eruvin.

One of them is a famous dispute between Abaya and Rava regarding a לחי העומד מאליו (a post that was already there prior to it being designated for use in closing off a מבוי.

The classic example is if a part of the one wall sticks out at a 90-degree angle to the wall, forming an effective post.

So long as he had in mind the day before that it should be used as a post for the Eruv, Abaya is of the view that it is acceptable.

On the other hand, Rava is of the view that seeing as it was not placed there specifically to serve as an Eruv pole, it is invalid.

After much back and forth, the Gemara brings a proof that Rav held like the lenient opinion of Abaya, which seems to be conclusive in allowing us to rule in his favor.

It is interesting that although we have a general rule that whenever Abaya and Rava disagree, we follow the ruling of Rava, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 22b ) gives an acronym יעל קגם for 6 cases where we follow Abaya, and Rashi identifies our case, לחי העומד מאליו as one of them.

We should note that at least in the case of our sugya, as well as the sugya quoted above, this is because the Gemara was able to find strong evidence in his favor.

We mentioned in our previous post that the Rambam (Mamrim 1/3) is of the view that things mentioned explicitly in the Torah or passed on orally to Moshe at Sinai are not subject to מחלוקת (debate,) and debates are only find regarding laws based on Chazal’s interpretations of the former through the rules of interpretation or rabbinical decrees and the like.

He also said (ibid 1/4) that even such debates were always settled eventually by the בית דין הגדול (great court or “Sanhedrin” of 71 ordained judges,) and once they were settled, there was no room for halachik debate.

In contrast, once the great court ceased to function, new debates remained essentially unsettled and each sage was free to follow and teach his own view to his students, who would typically follow their Rabbi- the default rule for undecided debates was to be stringent in biblical matters and lenient in rabbinical ones. (Mamrim 1/5)

In reality, this has not been the case, and in Amoraic Bavel where the much-weakened Sanhedrin back in Tiberius had little power, as well as after it ceased to function altogether, later Amoraim have come to conclusions regarding disputes which have thereafter also been regarded as binding.

There have even been rules of thumb formulated, such as following Rav over Shmuel, Rabbi Yochanan over Rav or Shmuel, and Rava over Abaya etc.

The Rambam himself (introduction to M.T.) explains the dictum of רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה (Bava Metzia 86a) as meaning that the later Amoraim, Ravina and Rav Ashi, who sealed the Talmud Bavli, essentially had the authority of בית דין הגדול for the last time in history, given that their rulings spread and were accepted by the Jewish people as a whole and all or most of its sages.

Although there is much to discuss and analyse here, it seems clear that a simple understanding of the earlier-quoted Rambam that makes authoritative dispute resolution entirely dependant on בית דין הגדול itself is not sufficient.

In another pivotal dispute, רב פפא, and רב הונא בריה דר’יהושע debate whether פרוץ כעומד (open area equivalent to closed area) is acceptable to consider a side as partitioned off or not.

The general rule is that when מחיצות (partitions) are used to close off a רשות היחיד, gaps of up to 10 אמות are permitted, and considered to be an acceptable פתח (opening) rather than a פירצה (gap)

However, there is an additional requirement recorded in the Mishna on 15b, that there may not be more open space than closed space (in the absence of a צורת הפתח in which case it is more complex.)

The Gemara on this Mishna opens with the above-mentioned debate regarding whether it is sufficient if the closed area is equal to the open area, or whether it needs to be MORE than the open area.

The Gemara seems to understand that the requirement that most of the partition not be open is a הלכה למשה מסיני (law given orally to Moshe at Sinai and passed on via tradition.)- (the precise term used here is “אגמריה רחמנא למשה” which seems pretty self-explanatory!)

It then understands the dispute to be a question of the nature of this הל”מ.

Was it a requirement not to allow most of the partition to be open, or was it a requirement requiring most of the partition to be closed?

Much debate follows onto daf 16 until in a major curveball, the halacha is resolved according to the lenient view, but this seems to be an explicit example of a dispute regarding something passed on explicitly to Moshe at Sinai, a counter-example to the Rambam’s hypothesis limiting such debate to matters involving the rules of interpretation or rabbinic decrees.

Once again, it seems that a simple explanation of the Rambam might not seem feasible and more analysis is required!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 14 Science and Torah- Matters of PI

Posted on by

Recent years have brought some extremely “vibrant” and often downright hostile discussions about the correct approach to apparent contradictions between the Torah, Chazal and modern scientific knowledge.

This applies across the board from astronomy, medicine, geography, physics, mathematics, and through archeology, even to history.

There are those like my good friend, the famous “Zoo Rabbi,” Rabbi Nathan Slifkin, who after his books touching on the subject were banned by various Chareidi authorities, has made it a major part of his life’s work to restore the popularity of “Rationalist Judaism.”

This, loosely speaking, encompasses the approach of many of the Geonim, the Rambam, and many other great early authorities that statements made by Chazal which appear to conflict with nature and science are not to be taken literally, and that when Chazal express their views on scientific matters, they are basing themselves on the accepted science of the time, and not on neo-prophetic revelation.

In contrast, Rabbi Moshe Meiselman, a renowned Chareidi Rosh Yeshiva who also has an academic background, has written his own work “Torah, Chazal, and Science” with the primary intention of both condemning and refuting this view, as well as attempting to prove that even the oft-quote protagonists amongst the Rishonim have been misunderstood.

In all humility, in a series of shiurim of my own on Agada, and a Hebrew analysis that I am still working on, I have brought numerous sources, including the introduction to the Talmud attributed to Rabbeinu Shmuel haNagid (printed at the back of most traditional versions of Masechta brachos,) which explicitly say that Agada is not comparable to halacha in its divine source and authority, but rather consists of Chazal’s own interpretations of the pesukim.

I also brought the words of the Ran (drasha 5) in his Derashos that seem to say the exact opposite and define anyone who does not believe that every word of Chazal’s Agadot are sourced at Sinai as a heretic.

As complex and sometimes aggressive this debate tends to be, it is exponentially more problematic when Chazal’s apparently out of date scientific knowledge forms the basis for practical halachik rulings.

In such cases, agreeing to disagree is not even an option, as huge areas of halacha are affected and a practical decision must made. What in one view invalidates a Sukkah or an Eruv, for example, can be essential to making it valid in the other. What renders a fish permitted according to one view, might render it forbidden according to another.

The above applies both ways, but although some authorities do indeed take into account discrepancies between modern scientific knowledge and that which Chazal were presumed to have, it is virtually always when it results in a stringency and not in a leniency.

It is not my intention to take sides in this longstanding and critical debate, but rather, as is my way in general, to examine the relevant sugyas on their own merit, together with the way the Rishonim interpret them, and see what we can learn from them

In our mishna, we are told that the minimum width of the pole used to “close” the open side of a מבוי is 1 handbreadth.

If the pole is round, we are to view it as if it is square and go by the width of its diameter.

As directly measuring the diameter of a solid cylinder is tricky, the Mishna advises us to measure its circumference, something far more practical and rely on a universal ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter to calculate the diameter.

The ratio given by the Mishna is the number three, according to the formula:

“כל שיש בהקיפו שלשה טפחים יש בו רוחב טפח”

“any (circle) whose circumference is 3 handbreadths has a diameter of one handbreadth.

As such, it follows that so long as the circumference of the round pole is at least 3 tefachim, we can assume that the diameter meets the minimum width of 1 tefach (handbreadth).

The same principle is employed (Sukkah 7b) to measure the diameter of a circular Sukkah to ensure it meets the minimum width of 4 amos. In the same sugya, the square-root of 2 is also assumed to be 1.4.

Every student of basic mathematics is immediately faced with the fact that the Mishna’s ration of 3 to 1 appears extremely inaccurate.

The universal ration between the circumference and diameter of any circle is of course the constant pi, a little more than 3.14, which has been known for some time already to be an irrational number.

Tosfos on our daf is so bothered by this apparent contradiction that after pointing out that it seems that our Gemara understood our Mishna’s ratio of 3 to be precise, based on the continuation of the sugya and another sugya in Bava Basra, he notes that this requires further investigation, since the mathematical experts hold that 3 is certainly not the precise ratio.

One should note that Tosfos leaves this question unanswered- he does not suggest explicitly that either Chazal or the contemporary mathematicians were wrong!

In contrast, both the Rambam and Tosfos haRosh on this Mishna are adamant that the Mishna is simply giving an estimation, and each have their own approaches as to why and how this is acceptable.

Whereas this approach certainly seems more logical, we obviously need to learn the sugya and its parallel sugyas properly to see if this fits into the flow of the Gemara.

Please join me on this exciting journey:

The Gemara opens its analysis on this part of the Mishna towards the bottom of the first side of today’s daf.

It asks the simple question: מנא הני מילי – from where are these words?

The very fact that the Gemara is looking for a verse to prove a mathematical reality that should be known to all is itself indicative of something deeper at work.

The Gemara answers that we derive this from the description of the circular ים (lit “sea” but probably referring to a water feature)) that Shlomo haMelech made, which had a diameter of 10 amos and a circumference of 30.

By describing the precise measurements of this circular feature, the passuk seems to be telling us that the ration of a circle’s circumference to its diameter is 3.

Once again, the fact that a verse is brought to teach us a simple mathematical fact seems very strange.

This question is strengthened by the fact that the ancient Greeks were very familiar with the concept of PI, and although they could not measure it precisely (though they might have suspected it was an irrational number,) it seems from my research that they certainly knew that it was more than 3, and could approximate it to at least 2 decimal points as around 3.14 .

It is hardly likely that Chazal, who took their mathematics very seriously, were unaware of this common knowledge of their time.

The Gemara then asks how we account for the width of the rim itself, which needs to be added to the actual diameter before working out the ratio with the circumference.

The Gemara responds that the possuk also tells us that the rim was extremely narrow (and thus negligible in the calculations.)

Seemingly unsatisfied by the assumption that the passuk was even nominally inaccurate in its workings, the Gemara points out that however narrow the rim was, it still would widen the exterior diameter slightly and effectively change the ratio accordingly.

The Gemara concludes that the circumference of 3 tefachim mentioned in the passuk was also measured from the inside, excluding the rim.

By now, it seems blatantly obvious that Chazal seem to take this measurement extremely precisely, and Tosfos’ observations to this affect are more than understandable.

It is harder to understand the Rambam’s approach, where he claims that any fraction that cannot be accurately measured is rounded off by Chazal.

If this is true, why were Chazal so bothered by the fact that the passuk could be doing exactly the same thing?

The Tosfos haRosh goes further and interprets the flow of the Gemara entirely differently in a way that he feels backs up his claim that we are dealing with approximations.

He understands that the Gemara’s original question, “from where are these words” is not referring to the precise value of PI but rather to the very rule that it is permissible to rely on approximations.

He understands that this leniency is sourced from the very passuk that described the properties of the circle in a way that is clearly an approximation, and quite a large one at that.

He does not say how large an approximation is needed, not under which circumstances it becomes acceptable- it could be that he agrees with Rambam who limits this to an irrational number, but is also possible that he would hold the same for other improper fractions that are hard to work with.

What remains is to understand how both the Rosh and the Rambam would explain the continuation of the sugya which certainly seems to be require precision rather than approximation.

Furthermore, even if we are able to reinterpret the rest of the flow of the sugya in a way that fits with this, or to distinguish between the approximations that are permitted and the one’s the Gemara adamantly seems to reject, we are faced with a very strong difficulty from another related sugya (Bava Basra 14b)

There, the Gemara describes how in addition to the tablets, a sefer Torah was also placed in the ark that rested in the holy of holies.

Based on the view that the circumference of a Torah needs to be 6 handbreadths, the Gemara uses our ratio to show how the 2 tefach wide Torah could fit into the 2 empty tefachim that remained in the Ark after the tablets where placed therein.

The Gemara then notes that an item with a precise width of 2 cannot fit into a precise space of 2 (presumably due to friction.)

It therefore concludes that the Torah was rolled in a way that was not precisely round (the last part was folded on top of the “cylinder”), and the width therefore was less than a third of its circumference.

It seems clear once again that the Gemara is assuming the value of PI to be precisely 3- after all, if it were more than three, a circumference of 6 would produce a width of less than 2 which would easily fit in the remaining space.

Hopefully to be continued

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 12-13 Tolerance, the origins of dispute, and “”אלו ואלו

Posted on by

In the Mishna on 12b, there is a 3-way dispute between Beis Shamai, Beis Hillel, and Rabbi Eliezer, regarding what is required to mark the open fourth side of a מבוי closed on the other 3 sides.

Whereas we have been working until now under the correct assumption that the lenient view requiring only one post on either side is authoritative, we see that though this is the view of Beis Hillel, Beis Shamai require a post and a beam, and Rabbi Eliezer requires 2 posts, one on each side.

In an early post )Shabbos 130b), we discussed the way Rabbi Eliezer was referred to by the Gemara there as a שמותי , a term that the Yerushalmi quoted in the second explanation in Rashi there, as well as in Tosfos, understood to mean that he belonged to Beis Shamai.

However, as we also know )Avos 2/9) that Rabbi Eliezer was one of the greatest students of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai, who received his tradition from both Hillel and Shamai, it is very possible that he had influence from the scions of both houses.

In this Mishna, it seems that Rabbi Eliezer was neither bound completely to either Beis Hillel or Beis Shamai, but fiercely independent.

This is somehow despite the fact that he took such pride in the fact that he never said anything that he never heard from his Rabbi (Sukkah 28a.)

This can be explained by the fact that his tradition came directly from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai who learnt from both Hillel and Shamai, as mentioned above, and thus sometimes was in line with Beis Shamai and sometimes with Beis Hillel.

It can also be that what he meant was not that he heard every precise ruling from his Rebbe, but that he always followed the methodology he learnt from his Rebbe, no matter what conclusion it led to, thus ironically adding to his independence in the realm of practical halacha.

It is a common experience that independents, despite often being revered on both sides of the aisle, usually struggle for acceptance on either side.

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer was both great and confident enough to have his feet in both worlds, but still able to interpret the Torah and rule according to his own view, even taking a separate stand from both strong “councils of sages.”

Even for the usually tolerant members of Beit Hillel, despite his having learnt from some of their teachers, he was never “Beis Hillel” enough, but a “שמותי”

This independence and consequent lack of acceptance came to a head in the case of the stove of Achnai (Bava Metzia 59b), where his refusal to accept the majority opinion of all the other sages resulted in his virtually unprecedented excommunication, which according to the first explanation in the above-quoted Rashi, was the reason for his being called a שמותי”” , from the word “שמתא” (excommunication.)

The truth is that lacking the safety in numbers that members of both main parties tend to have, independents often suffer the most, and are treated more harshly by members of the dominant party than members of the opposition are treated, even if their ideologies are somewhere in-between.

Whereas Rabbi Eliezer’s independence was virtually stamped out by his colleagues, who burnt all the things that he had declared pure, Beis Hillel are lauded towards the end of daf 13b for their respectful attitude to the views of Beis Shamai, not only quoting their views, but even mentioning them before their own, as illustrated in a Mishna in Sukkah brought by our Gemara.

My beloved son, Noam, asked me the other night, while learning mishnayos Shabbos together, why Beis Shamai are mentioned first so often in Mishnayos even though Beis Hillel are more authoritative.

I answered that this could very well be a reflection of this tolerant attitude first illustrated in the Mishna in sukkah quoted by our Gemara, which Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, a direct descendant of Hillel, carried on when he compiled the Mishna.

This tolerance of the other side, is given in our Gemara as the reason that the view of Beis Hillel became normatively accepted over that of Beis Shamai- In order for one’s view to be accepted, it seems important that one is open-minded, respectful, and confident enough to hear, consider, and even quote dissenting views. This shows that this view was acquired after fully considering all sides and without automatically putting down the other side and is thus a view worthy of acceptance.

Our Gemara points out that this preference given to Beis Hillel was not because the rulings of Shamai were not legitimate, but rather for the above reason- objectively speaking, “אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים”-“these and those are the words of the living G-d!”

It might seem logically impossible that two seemingly contradictory views can both be considered objectively part of the divine Torah, but this seems to be precisely what the Gemara is saying.

The Torah is the word of the “living G-d” and thus constantly branching off into different explanations and possibilities.

So long as different views are all based on the “מסורה”, that living chain of transmission that goes back to Moshe at Sinai, it is not so much the actual conclusion that makes them legitimate, but the way that was achieved.

Not every alternative view has halachik legitimacy- only those that can be justified based on previous stages in the tradition.

Both Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai were required to back their views up with pessukim in the Torah, or oral traditions dating back to Moshe at Sinai, and the same applies to those that come after them.

It is not tolerance alone that gave Beis Hillel their authority, as reading this sugya in isolation might imply. In other places, their authority is derived on their greater numbers and on the “voice from heaven” )see Eruvin 7a for example) that proclaimed that the halacha is like them.

In fact, in the earlier sugya in this masechta, it seems that before this voice from heaven, one was permitted to choose which one of these great schools of Torah to follows, and that according to those who did not consider a voice from heaven to be authoritative, such as none other than Rabbi Yehoshua himself, this was permitted even after this voice from heaven, despite the other factors in Beis Hillel’s favor!

We have explained the idea of “אלו ואלו” with the understanding that in matters subject to debate, there is no objectively true answer, but both sides are legitimate “Torah”- the superiority of Beis Hillel is only practical, and as a result of the traits they possess, their superior numbers, and the voice from heaven.

Yet the Rambam appears to limit this idea significantly.

According to him (Mamrim 1/4), matters mentioned explicitly in the Torah or received orally through tradition tracing back to Moshe’s revelation at Sinai are never subject to debate.

Only matters that are derived though Chazal’s use of the rules for interpreting the Torah, can be subject to debate.

Even the later, were subject to the final ruling of the great court, so long as that court was still functioning, and debate was only legitimate until such a ruling was given.

Once it ceased to function, such matters that had not yet been resolved became subject to debate again.

Given that many or most of the disputes between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel occurred at a time when the great court was still functioning, it follows that these disputes were subject to a final ruling by that court.

It is those rulings, according to the Rambam, not the tolerance of Beis Hillel or the voice from heaven, that were authoritative.

This fits well with the view that the main reason for their greater authority was their superior numbers, which would have allowed them to dominate the great court they were part of.

How the Rambam would explain the other reasons given for their authority, is subject to further analysis- it is possible, that as might often be his way, he simply regarded one source to be more authoritative in keeping with other accepted rules of halacha, and rules accordingly.

It is also possible that it is precisely that tolerance and extra willingness to engage in respectful debate that swung the majority of the Sanhedrin, including the “independents” towards their side, and that the “voice from heaven” was the מכה בפטיש (final blow) that brought them to this decision.

This also explains the harsh treatment meted out to Rabbi Eliezer by the members of Beis Hillel.

According to the Rambam above, even matters that were subject to dispute, were eventually concluded by the Sanhedrin while it functioned , and thereafter, no-one had the authority to act to the contrary.

Their opinions were still recorded out of respect, but they were now out of the realm of accepted halacha.

They might still have theoretical value in the study-halls, and even be considered “the words of the living G-d,” but the option for anyone to rule accordingly was now closed.

It follows that in post Sanhedrin times, debate in practical halacha is possible once again, and there is no threat of excommunication for those who follow their own or other minority views, but only in matters that had not already been decided by the Sanhedrin, and in matters that fit the Rambam’s strict criteria for debate.

If so, given that the Talmud itself was sealed by Ravina and Rav Ashi long after the Sanhedrin had ceased to function, how do we explain the universally accepted binding authority given to it by all followers of the מסורות?

We will have to leave this for a difference discussion, but a good place to start is the introduction of the Rambam himself to the Mishna Torah, the great masterwork we just quoted from.

Does everyone agree with the Rambam’s strict criteria regarding which matters are subject to debate, and does the huge collection of debates scattered throughout the Mishna and the Gemara back up this very strong claim? This too, will need to be left for a later discussion.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shmuli Phillips Ari Kahn Johnny Solomon

Eruvin 11 Eruv principles- צורת הפתח and מן הצד

Posted on by

One of the most important halachik constructs in the laws of Eruvin and מחיצות (partitions) in general is the idea of a צורת הפתח, the “form of an entrance.”

Although an area needs to be closed on 4 sides to be treated like a רשות היחיד (private domain) as far as permitting carrying there-in is concerned, this does not mean that all 4 sides need to be completely closed.

We have already seen in the first Mishna that the open fourth side of a מבוי can be marked symbolically with either a pole or a beam, so long as it is less than ten אמות wide.

The Mishna also taught us that if it has a צורת הפתח , the form of an entrance, it is fine even if it is more than 10 אמות wide.

It has been made clear that the “pole or beam” solution only works for a מבוי, with its strict criteria, but not for חצירות (courtyards) or other enclosures, which require either פסים (boards of at least 4 handbreadths wide) on one or more corners, or a צורת הפתח, which works even if the open fourth side is even wider than 10 אמות.

We see on today’s daf that a צורת הפתח can work to close openings of more than 10 אמות width even on the other mainly closed sides of an enclosure, and according to some opinions, can even serve as complete partitions on all 4 sides!

It is clear from the above that this is an extremely powerful tool, and today I would like to highlight a few of the rules relating to it, that are discussed on this daf.

A צורת הפתח is defined on our daf as “קנה מכאן וקנה מכאן וקנה על גביהן”- A reed on each side and a reed on top of them.

It seems from the wording that even though this is a more complex structure than simply a pole or a beam, a strong entity such as a pole or beam is not needed for this, and a reed or other symbolic item is sufficient, though of course this needs to be further clarified- our daf contains some discussion regarding the required properties of the horizontal and vertical components as well.

Whereas a gap of less than 10 אמות in a mainly solid partition is defined by default as a valid פתח (entrance) and does not invalidate the partition, a gap of more than is considered by default to be a פרצה (break) that needs to be “redefined” as an entrance by a physical structure baring some resemblance to the posts and lintel of an official entrance-way. This is achieved by the צורת הפתח under discussion.

One important requirement relating to a צורת הפתח is Rav Chisda’s ruling that the vertical component that goes from one side to the other needs to be above the two vertical components , not connected to its sides. Although there is some give and take on our daf regarding how universally accepted this limitation is as well as its scope, the conclusion does seem to be that this restriction certainly applies on as far as Shabbos law is concerned for openings of more than 10 אמות wide.

Whether it needs to physically touch the two vertical “reeds” or can be suspended directly above them by other structures (such as telephone or electricity wires and poles) is a different issue and subject to debate later on the daf.

Rav Chisda’s rule makes constructing an Eruv using the צורת הפתח model rather challenging, as balancing a reed or string on top of two other reeds, or even solid posts, is far harder than tying it to both sides.

Despite this, constructing a צורת הפתח , either permanently for city Eruvin or temporarily at a holiday resort, is usually more practical than constructing actual partitions, and is the preferred method most of the time.

One important question is whether the disqualification of “מן הצד” refers only to when the horizontal component of the צורת הפתח is attached at a lower level than the top of the vertical poles, but if it is tied to the sides right at the top of the vertical components, it is still considered to be “at the top.”

Some justification for this distinction could be that so long as the horizontal component is tied to the top of the vertical ones, the structure still resembles a regular entrance in some way, and the observer cannot easily tell the difference.

Rashi explains the phrase “מן הצד” as follows:

“שמתח הזמורה מזה לזה באמצעיתו ולא על ראשיהן”- he stretched the horizontal component (in this case a branch) from one vertical component to another in the middle of the verticals and not at their heads.”

Although admittedly ambiguous, this seems to indicate that at least according to Rashi, the main concern of מן הצד is if the horizontal component is tied somewhere between the top and bottom of the verticals (in the middle), and not right at the top, leaving the door open for permitting it to be tied to the “top” of their sides.

However, this does not seem to be the way the Rashba interpreted Rashi’s words:

“ומן הצד היינו שלא מתח הזמורה למעלה בראש הקונדיסין אלא באמצע הקונדסין ועל גבן היינו על גבן ממש”

“From the side means that he never stretched the branch above at the head of the poles but rather in the middle of the poles, and “on top of them” means precisely “on top.”

The emphasis of “precisely on top” seems to be clearly excluding the option of tying it to the top of the sides and insisting on it being literally “on top.”

The phrase “ in the middle” would refer to tying it anywhere along the height of the vertical component, as opposed to literally placing it “on top.”

When one looks at other Rishonim on this topic, one sees various other explanations of what מן הצד means, that could cause both leniencies and stringencies regarding when a צורת הפתח works, but for our purposes, I will just add that the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 362/11) accepts Rashi’s basic understanding of מן הצד but does not discuss which understanding of Rashi is correct.

None other than the ט”ז himself, one of the most important commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, understands Rashi in the more lenient way and allows the upper rope or string to be tied right at the top of the sides of the vertical reeds or poles. The Mishna Berura, however, notes that most Achronim disagree with him and accept the more stringent interpretation of Rashi, which we pointed out seems to be the way the Rashba understood him.

As such, while general practise is not to accept this leniency and to require the horizontal component to be literally on top or above the verticals, in difficult circumstances where this is not possible, the more lenient interpretation of Rashi accepted by the ט”ז might be acceptable, given that we are usually dealing with areas that are not considered a public domain on a biblical level.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 9 and 10 Eruv principles- לבוד and פס ארבע

Posted on by

One of the most important rules regarding מחיצות (partitions) is the principle of לבוד.

The Gemara (Eruvin 4b) told us that this rule is הלכה למשה מסיני (see post on that daf.)

It states that any gap in partitions less than 3 טפחים in width is considered as if it is closed.

This has major ramifications both in the laws of Eruvin and of Sukkah.

It is necessary, however, to formulate exactly what the precise mechanism and scope of this rule is.

Let us suggest two possibilities for now:

  1. A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is not considered a gap at all, under any circumstances
  2. A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is still considered a gap, but it is the type of gap that is negligible enough to be ignored regarding certain מצוות.

If the first, objective definition is used, then it is irrelevant whether the gap’s effect is significant in practise or not, it simply does not count as a gap but is considered closed.

In contrast, according to the second formulation, there could be certain situations where such a gap is not negligible, and we do not disregard it.

In practise, it seems impossible to claim that such a gap has no noticeable effect on the partitions. It certainly lets in air from the outside, as well as insects and many smaller or medium sized animals that can get through the space. It also allows people to see inside, certainly no small thing.

As such, if the purpose of the partitions was meant to protect against the elements, keep small animals out, or create visual privacy, this rule seems highly illogical.

If, on the other hand, the purpose of the partitions is to demarcate the boundaries of a private domain, or keep larger animals out, then it makes sense that so long as the partitions are dominant and gaps are negligible, the partitions should still be valid.

At the bottom of the previous daf, the Gemara discussed a case where the beam is placed on two pegs protruding outwards from the public facing side of the existing walls of the מבוי.

As such, the beam is not on top of the מבוי, but the internal length of the beam is in contact with the walls.

Rav Chisda rules that the law depends on an earlier dispute we saw regarding the way in which the beam acts as a partition.

According to the opinion that normally permits one to carry underneath the beam, because we view the outside edge of the beam as the partition (as if it continues downwards to the ground,) this beam will be invalid, seeing as the outer edge is not in contact with the walls. Even though the beam might be only a טפח wide, and the gap between the outer edge and the walls should thus be viewed as “closed” due to the principle of לבוד, Rashi explains that seeing as this is not a real partition (but just a conceptual halachik construct) the leniency of לבוד does not apply.

According to the view that it is forbidden to carry underneath the beam because the inner edge of the beam forms the imaginary partition, in this case it will be permitted, seeing as the inner edge of the beam is in direct contact with the walls.

At this point, we already see that the rule of לבוד is not absolute but is limited to certain cases. After all, if it was absolute and a gap of less than 3 is never considered a gap at all, then it should apply even where the mechitzah is not real but only a halachik construct.

Rava holds that even according to the view that the imaginary partition is formed by the inner edge of the beam, this beam is not valid, seeing as it is not physically on top of the מבוי itself, something he requires.

Rav Ada bar Ahava objects on the basis of a beraisa that rules that if the beam is משוכה or תלויה less than 3 טפחים (or 4 טפחים acc רשב”ג) from the walls of the מבוי, it is sufficient due to the rule ofלבוד .

He understands that משוכה refers to when the beam is not directly over the מבוי but placed on pegs protruding outwards, as in the case we have been discussing.

He understands תלויה as referring to a case when the beam is suspended directly over the מבוי, but not directly over the walls of the מבוי- instead, it is supported by a reed placed in the middle of the opening and does reach the actual walls.

If the former assumption is correct, we see that there is no requirement for the beam to be physically on top of the מבוי, as claimed by Rava, and there also seems to be no limitation in the rule of לבוד that precludes it from being applied to another halachik construct such as an “imaginary” partition.

The Gemara answers that both the term משוכה and תלויה could be referring to a case when the beam is supported by a reed and doesn’t reach the wall but is still suspended directly over the מבוי.

The former term refers to a beam that reaches the walls of the מבוי on one side, whereas the later term refers to a beam that doesn’t not reach the walls on either side.

In both cases, the rule of לבוד makes it as if the beam reaches the walls.

However, in a case where the beam itself is not directly over the מבוי, לבוד does not help.

The Gemara explains that both these cases are needed, as we might have thought that the rule of לבוד can only be applied once, on one side, but not twice.

Once again, we see that the rule of לבוד is not a blanket rule, but has its limits- in this case, the Beraisa teaches us that both cases are within its limits, but if it did not have some limits, this would unnecessary.

Rav Ashi fails to see a significant distinction between applying the rule of לבוד on one side or on both sides, but says the Beraisa is referring to one case where the beam is both משוכה AND תלויה- thus removed both horizontally and vertically from the walls of the מבוי . In such a case, the rule of לבוד renders the horizonal gap ineffective and the rule of חבוט ( a different halachik construct whereby we view the edge of the beam as if it continues downwards till the walls) closes the vertical gap .

There is much to discuss regarding why the rule of לבוד isn’t used also for the vertical gap, and why the rule of חבוט is limited to only 3 טפחים, and Tosfos and other Rishonim go into this further, but for our purposes, the Gemara explains it was not a foregone conclusion that the rule of לבוד can be used in combination with another halachik construct like חבוט, and we needed the Beraisa to tell us that it can be.

We see from here also that the rule of לבוד was not seen as absolute by default but can have its limitations. To what extent the Beraisa has taught that that these limitations are not as great as we might have thought, or whether it has taught us that there are no limitations at all and that the rule of לבוד is indeed absolute, is still open for further analysis.

The rule of לבוד is applied once again at the bottom of 9b, in a discussion that flows over onto our new daf.

Here, we have been dealing with a case where a smaller courtyard opens on one side into a larger courtyard.

The walls that close the extra length of the outer courtyard can be seen from the larger courtyard, and the larger courtyard is thus not considered completely open on one side.

Seeing as the gap between the smaller and larger courtyard is less than 10 טפחים, it is considered as a valid entrance and the larger courtyard is considered sufficiently enclosed to carry inside it.

In contrast, the gap between the two courtyards forms the entire fourth side of the smaller courtyard, and as it is completely open, even a gap of less than 10 טפחים wide needs to be closed somehow.

Yet Rabbah bar Rav Huna has already concluded that נראה מבחוץ ושוה מבפנים (where the לחי used to close the fourth side of the מבוי can be seen from outside but not from inside) is permitted. Seeing as when viewed from the outside, the opening does not appear to take up the entire side, the smaller courtyard should also be fine as is.

The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case where the sidewalls of the smaller courtyard extend into the larger courtyard, blocking the excess width of the shared wall from being seen from “outside” (the part of the larger courtyard that is opposite the smaller one.)

The Gemara asks that seeing as we are dealing with a larger courtyard that is no more than 1 Amah wider than the smaller one, there should be less than 3 טפחים between the side walls of the larger courtyard and those of the smaller one, and the rule of לבוד should effectively close this gap, making the whole area permitted.

It answers that we are dealing with a case where the smaller courtyard is not placed symmetrically in the middle of the larger one, but rather with a gap of 2 טפחים between its sidewalls and those of the larger courtyard on one side and 4 on the other.

Even though the rule of לבוד applies on the one side, it does not apply on the other, and according to the view of Rebbe who requires a courtyard completely open on one side to be marked on BOTH sides, the opening is still a problem.

This takes us into new territory entirely.

Until now, we have dealt with a מבוי that is closed on three sides but completely open on one side. מדרבנן it is forbidden to carry inside it until a post is placed on either side or a beam from one side to the other.

We already saw earlier that this does not apply to any area enclosed on 3 sides, but just to any area that has the very specific properties of a מבוי :

  1. At least 2 courtyards (with 2 houses each) opening to it
  2. Its length (2 closed sides) is greater than its width (one open and closed side.)

Today we see that a courtyard, which does not meet these qualifications, is treated more strictly, and according to Rebbe, needs to be partly closed on both ends of the open area, even if it is less than 10 אמות wide (if it is more, this might not even be sufficient.)

This has major ramifications for private front-yards and gardens, which we started discussing earlier in our post on daf 5, and I hope to be able to focus on this more as the discussion comes up in the Gemara.

Eruvin 8 The sea as an eruv

Posted on by

We have learnt that to be defined as a רשות היחיד (private domain,) an area needs to be surrounded by walls or partitions, at least 10 טפחים (handbreadths) high or deep.

We have also seen that מדאורייתא (biblically), מחיצות (partitions) on 3 sides is sufficient, but that מדרבנן (rabbinically), the fourth side needs to be marked or partially enclosed, depending on its width and status.

One of the most practical questions regarding the partitions used for the eruv concerns whether the sea or a river can be counted as a partition on one or more sides.

One the one hand, the water level could be very close to the level of the land, without the required 10 טפחים per 4 אמות drop (תל המתלקט) required for a partition.

On the other hand, given that water is not solid matter, and the ground underneath it often does drop at this gradient, perhaps the gradient should be measured by that of the solid ground which a person wading through the water would be walking down.

We have found explicitly (Shabbos 100a) that if a pit 10 טפחים deep is filled with water, even if the water reached the walls of the pit, it is still considered to be its own private domain.

This seems to show that a valley or depression filled with water could still be considered its own domain so long as its banks or the ground underneath it has the required gradient, serving as its partitions.

It follows logically that if these banks or slopes act as barriers for a different domain, they should also act as barriers for the domain that they separate this different domain from.

Our daf discusses the case of a מבוי that was surrounded on one side by a garbage pile and the other side by the sea.

There is a debate amongst the Rishonim whether these two sides were along the length of the מבוי or along the narrower widths of the מבוי, which could have its own ramifications, but we shall assume for now that 2 sides were closed correctly and 2 sides relied on the garbage heap and sea as partitions.

The Gemara related that רבי (Rabbi Yehuda haNasi) did not wish to either permit or forbid carrying in this מבוי.

He declined to forbid it seeing as there were valid partitions at the end of the day, but did not wish to permit it either, because of two concerns:

  1. The garbage might be removed leaving the one side without a partition.
  2. The sea could “bring up שירטון”- recede leaving washup-up stones and sand along the banks, thus destroying the natural partition.

The Gemara then asks what the opinion of the רבנן (the majority of sages) is, and two versions of events follow:

  1. רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they forbid carrying in such a מבוי and Rav Nachman then rules like them.
  2. רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they permit it, but Rav Nachman rules against them.

According to both versions brought by the Gemara, Rav Nachman forbids carrying in this מבוי , and given the lack of debate amongst the Amoraim, it is likely that this will be the halacha.

One question still open is whether the רבנן forbade carrying in this מבוי for both reasons thatרבי was concerned about, or only for one of them.

Perhaps their main concern was that that the garbage heap, which the Gemara concludes was privately owned, might be removed, a very likely event, but the less likely concern about the sea receding and leaving an unenclosed and relatively flat area of stones along its shore would not be a reason on its own to forbid it.

Another important question in this case is whether we are dealing with the sea or ocean, or with a river or lake.

Although the word ים is used, and this term usually refers to the seas specifically as opposed to rivers (see for example Brachos 9/Mishna 1 re ימים ונהרות )the concern of שירטון might apply to both, depending on precisely how we understand it.

Furthermore, most of the main Torah centers in Israel and possibly all of those in Bavel were not on the ocean.

Whereas the case that רבי dealt with could have been by the sea- major rivers are not present in Israel, the next case the Gemara brings seems almost certainly to have involved one of the main rivers of בבל, where most of its main centers were situated.

The Gemara describes how the Amora מרימר closed off the alleys of the city of Sura with nets, so as not to rely on the ים, for the same reason that רבי was initially concerned about.

As Sura was along the Euphrates River and certainly not on the coast, it seems that the term ים in this sugya certainly must also be referring to major rivers.

We see precedent for this in Tanach where the round pool in Shlomo’s palace was referred to as a ים (Melachim I 7/23) and was referred to by Chazal (Eruvin 14a) as the ים שעשה שלמה.

It is also clear from this case that מרימר was not only concerned about the garbage being removed but also about natural changes in the seashore or riverbank.

As such, the chapter should end here, and we should conclude that the sea or a river may not be used as the boundary of an eruv, period.

However, it is not quite as simple as that, thankfully.

Rabbeinu Chananel appears to have a different גירסא (version of the text) of the Gemara. In his girsa, the second version of the Gemara has Chachamim permitting the מבוי and Rav Nachman ruling leniently like them. It also narrates how אמימר closed the alleys of Sura with nets and was NOT concerned about שירטון .

This seems self- contradictory as if there was no concern for שירטון, why would nets be required, and many Rishonim reject this version out of hand (see for example Rashba on the daf)

This permissive view is given more teeth, however, by the Rambam, who rule (Shabbos 17/5 ) that the sea may serve as a partition, and we are not worried about שירטון.

The Meiri on our daf also rules leniently.

Perhaps what was meant by Rabbeinu Chananel’s version of the Gemara is that מרימר closed alleys that were not open to the sea with nets, and allowed the alleys that were open to the sea to be treated as closed even without nets, as he was not concerned about שירטון .

There is another major sugya in the second chapter of this masechta(Eruvin 22b) that is extremely relevant to this discussion, which I hope to discuss when we get there.

Practically speaking, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 363/29) rules leniently like the Rambam, whereas the Rema rules stringently like the Tur, Rashi’s version of the Gemara and other stringent poskim.

However, even those who allow the sea or river to be used as a partition could have rather strict conditions , among them:

  1. The gradient of the sea, river, or its banks has to be at least as steep as 10 handbreadths per 4 armlengths.
  2. The gap between the מבוי and the sea or river may not be more than the 10 handbreadth limit ( a wide beach between the street and the ocean could thus invalidate the entire partition.)
  3. The river cannot freeze solid during the winter (see Taz O.C. 363/20)

In addition, many Ashkenazi communities in Europe did use rivers as partitions for their Eruvin, and it thus seems that some of their authorities also held that the Gemara’s ban on using the sea or a river was not absolute, and depends on the circumstances.

As we have seen, this is a complex issue, and there is tons more to say, but one thing certain from this discussion is that anyone planning on relying on the sea or a river as an eruv boundary needs to know precisely what he is doing, or/and get guidance from someone who does!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 7 A philosophy of stringencies or leniencies

Posted on by


There is a tendency in parts of the Torah world to err on the side of caution in all halachik matters and take on the more stringent opinions in all areas of halacha.
On the other hand, there is a tendency amongst other sectors to constantly search for  leniencies, picking and choosing the easier opinion in each area of halacha.
Are either of the above policies legitimate, or is one perhaps required to choose one or more recognized halachik authorities and follow their views in every area of halacha, irrespective of whether they are lenient or stringent?
On the previous daf, we recorded a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding how to close off a מבוי מפולש (alley open to the public domain at both ends.)
Rav ruled leniently like the Tana Kama in the beraisa and held that a צורת הפתח (form of an entrance) on one end and a pole or beam on the other end was sufficient.
On the other hand, Shmuel ruled stringently like Beis Hillel according to Chananya, and held that a צורת הפתח was not sufficient on the one side, but doors were required.
We also saw a different dispute, also between Rav and Shmuel, regarding a    מבוי עקום (bent alley.)
Until then, we had been dealing solely with a straight, rectangular מבוי, closed along its lengths and open either on one or two ends.
This dispute, however, centered around an “L” shaped מבוי that makes a right-angled turn in the middle, but is still open at both ends.
As such, the one end is not aligned with the other, and it is unclear whether such a מבוי  is to be treated at each end as if it is only open on that end, making a pole or beam sufficient, or whether it is to be treated like a מבוי open on both ends to a public domain, and thus require one of the more stringent solutions discussed in the Beraisa .
In this case, Rav is stringent, and holds that it is to be regarded as open on both sides (מפולש), whereas Shmuel is lenient and treats it as if it is only open on one side (סתום).
When we combine both disputes, it comes out that such a מבוי does not require doors according to either Rav or Shmuel.
This is because:
1.       Although Rav rules that it is to be treated like a מבוי מפולש (open alley), he also rules like the Tana Kama that a מבוי מפולש (open alley) does not require doors on either side.
2.       Although Shmuel rules that a מבוי מפולש requires doors on one side, he rules that such a מבוי עכום is to be treated like a מבוי סתום (closed alley.)
 
Despite the fact that we have thus not found ANY authority who holds that a מבוי עכום  requires doors, the Gemara tells us that there was such a מבוי  in the city of Neharda, Shmuel’s home town, and the authorities treated it with the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, requiring doors on one side!
This means essentially that they “collected” the stringencies of both, treating it like an open מבוי in accordance with Rav, and requiring an open מבוי to have doors in accordance with Shmuel.
The Gemara is extremely bothered with this approach of collecting חומרות (stringencies,) due to a Beraisa that focusses on general principles applying to disputes between בית הלל and בית שמאי.
The Beraisa rules that the law is in accordance with Beis Hillel in all cases. Yet, one is permitted to choose which of them to follow (the Gemara later explains that this was only before the בת קול  (voice from heaven) that proclaimed that the law is always like Beis Hillel, or according to the view of Rabbi Yehoshua who did not accept the authority of voices from heaven, or that this statement refers to similar disputes amongst later sages that have not yet been resolved.)
The Beraisa, however, condemns those who rely on the leniencies of both of them, calling them “wicked,” and mocks those who follow the stringencies of both of them, applying to them the verse הכסיל בחושך הולך (“the fool walks in darkness”- Koheles 2.)
On today’s daf, 2 approaches are given to explain how the authorities in Neharda had not behaved like “fools” by being stringent like both opinions:
1.       Rav Nachman bar Yitchak is of the view that in practise, even Rav would not be lenient and accept only a צורת הפתח, a claim made already by Rav Huna.
2.       Rav Shizvi seeks to explain this even according to the view of Rav Ada bar Ahava that Rav was indeed lenient in practise. He interprets the Beraisa’s application of the term “fools” to those who practise the stringencies of both houses in a far more limited fashion.
He claims that this only applies when the two disputes are inter-connected, with the lenient view in the one case logically requiring a stringent view in the other, and vice versa.
Where the two debates are completely independent of one another, there is no issue with practicing the stringencies of both.
 
To support the second approach, Rav Shizvi brings the case of the “spine and the skull,” discussed in a Mishna (Ohalos 2/3)
This Mishna deals with the bones of a corpse that are considered like the whole corpse itself and cause everything in the same אהל (covered area) to become impure.
In contrast, most bones on their own do not cause such impurity, and only cause impurity to things that touch them.
It is universally accepted that the whole spine and whole skull, being the most essentially bones of the body, are treated with the stringencies of the body itself, and make everything under the same roof of them impure.
If the spine or skull is no longer whole, however, they are treated more leniently like any other bone.
There is a dispute between בית הלל and בית שמאי regarding how much of the spine or skull needs to be missing for it to no longer be considered whole.
Regarding the spine, בית שמאי holds that unless at least 2 vertebrae are missing, it is still considered whole and the more stringent rules of impurity apply. בית הלל, on the other hand, hold that as soon as one vertebrae is missing, the spine is no longer considered whole and the more lenient rules of impurity apply.
Regarding the skull, בית שמאי are once again stringent and hold that it still considered whole unless enough is missing to cause death in a living person.
בית הלל once again are more lenient, and say if the amount normally removed by a doctor’s drill (possibly in therapeutic  surgery) from a live person is missing from the dead man’s skull, it is already considered incomplete.
Rav Shizvi then refers to the ruling of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that the same criteria apply to the laws of טריפות (terminally injured animals.)
Missing pieces in the spine and skull before slaughter are counted amongst the terminal injuries that render an animal non-kosher even after proper slaughter.
In order for it to be considered “incomplete” and thus non-kosher, בית שמאי use the more stringent criteria they applied to a corpse, essentially making it harder for it to be considered non-kosher. This turns out effectively to be a leniency in the rules of kashrus.
בית הלל in contrast, use the more lenient criteria they use to release the spine and skull from the more stringent laws of impurity, in effect making it easier for the animal to be considered non-kosher, and thus creating a stringency in the laws of kashrus!
This means that in this case, a leniency in one area of halacha, namely impurity, logically requires a corresponding stringency in a different area, namely the laws of kashrus, and vice versa.
Thus being stringent in both areas, and applying the stringent laws of impurity to a spine missing only one bone, but also considering an animal with such a spine to be non-kosher, is logically inconsistent, as is applying the lenient laws of impurity but also considering it to be kosher.
In such cases, says Rav Shizvi, being stringent like both opinions is logically inconsistent and thus foolish.
A generally cautious and stringent approach to halacha in which the stringencies of different authorities are adopted is thus not considered like a “fool walking in the darkness”  according to his interpretation of the Beraisa, unless it leads to logically inconsistency in one’s behaviour.
It is not stringency per se that is the issue, but logically inconsistent behaviour.

A spine missing one vertebra is either considered whole or not, but cannot be both whole and incomplete.

In order to develop a broader approach to this issue, a number of questions need to be raised, among them:
1.       IS Rav Shizvi’s interpretation of the Beraisa only brought in order to reconcile Rav Ada bar Ahava’s view that Rav was lenient in practise regarding a צורת הפתח in a מבוי מפולש, but Rav Nachman bar Yitchak would still prefer the original and  simpler interpretation of the Beraisa that considers collecting stringencies in general to  be a foolish and dark approach?
2.        If this is not so, we would need to explain why Rav Nachman bar Yitchak doesn’t make the obvious distinction that Rav Shizvi makes and instead chooses a view of Rav that is subject to debate.
3.       If Rav Nachman bar Yitchak indeed favors the original and simple approach, do we accept his broader view of the “fool in the dark” or the more limited interpretation of Rav Shizvi?
4.       If Rav Shizvi’s distinction is to be accepted, does this apply only to the Beraisa’s mockery of the chronic מחמיר  (one who is stringent) or does it also apply to the Beraisa’s condemnation of the chronic מקיל   (one who is lenient.) On the one hand, he only makes the distinction regarding stringency, but the need for consistency within the wording of the Beraisa seems to indicate that it applies equally to leniencies. If this is so, he would see no “wickedness” in “collecting” leniencies from different authorities, so long as they are not logically inconsistent with each other.
 
 
Answering these questions requires a thorough study of all parallel and related sugyos  and the Rishonim who comment on them. As this is way out of the scope of this post, we shall have to wait for future opportunities to revisit this topic!


These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 6 An Eruv in a public domain

Posted on by

Until now, we have discussed how to close off the fourth side of a מבוי (alley) already closed on 3 sides, to permit carrying within the מבוי and to and from the מבוי and the adjoining courtyards.

We will see later that in addition to the pole or beam on the open side, one needs to make the actual eruv, known in this case as שתוף מבואות  (joining of alleys) by placing some food in one of the courtyards on behalf of all the inhabitants of the מבוי.

These laws are all based on the assumption that at a scriptural level, an area enclosed on 3 sides is already considered a private domain, and it is only a rabbinical requirement that the fourth side be marked or closed off in some way.

On today’s daf, we begin to address the more complex question of how to make an eruv in a real public domain, where carrying is a biblical prohibition.

The case discussed is a public thoroughfare with buildings flanking either side.

A Beraita is brought where the Tana Kama (first opinion) rules that one can make a צורת הפתח (a structure resembling an entrance, consisting of 2 poles on either side and a plank running from one side to the other on top) on one side, and the other side only requires pole or a beam (acc the version of the Rif and Rosh,) like a closed מבוי.

The Tana Chananya disagrees and says that the law in this case is subject to a dispute between Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai, and both are more stringent than the Tana Kama.

Beis Shamai holds that both ends need to be shut by doors which need to be locked as people enter or exit, a rather cumbersome process in a busy public place.

Beis Hillel are more lenient and require a door only on one side, making do with a pole or a beam on the other side, like a closed מבוי.

Even though Chananya’s view is substantially more stringent when it comes to a making an Eruv in a public domain, the Gemara is still unwilling to accept it due to 2 other statements of Chazal.

In the first, a Beraisa, Rabbi Yehuda opines that if someone has two houses on either side of a public thoroughfare , one may put either a pole or a beam on both of the open sides and carry from one house to another. This view is even more lenient than the Tana Kama in the previously Beraisa who requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.

The Chachamim retorted that a public domain may simply not be closed off in such a lenient way.

In case one answers that the Chachamim did not mean to reject even Beis Hillel’s more stringent suggestion involving a door on one side, the Gemara brings an extremely stringent  view stated by Rabbah bar bar Hana in the name of the leading Amora, Rabbi Yochanan.

Rabbi Yochanan’s reported view is that even a walled city like Yerushalayim, would be considered a public domain on a biblical level, if its doors were not locked at night.

We are talking about a walled city enclosed on ALL sides, open only at the gates, yet Rabbi Yochanan holds that the gates required doors which were locked at night to convert it into a private domain (termed a חצר כל רבים, or public courtyard.)

We see from there that turning a public domain into a private domain is no simple matter, and even Beis Hillel’s requirement to have doors on one side are not sufficient for this- all sides have to be completely enclosed and even aligned gates on opposite sides of the city need to be completely closed with doors that are locked at night.

On the basis of this stringent ruling of Rabbi Yochanan, the Gemara reinterprets the first Beraisa to refer not to a real public domain, but to a מבוי that is open on both sides to a public domain, referred to as a מבוי מפולש לרשות הרבים.

Unlike the מבוי that is closed on 3 sides, this is treated more stringently, and the three opinions in the Beraisa refer to closing off its two open sides.

The Gemara then records a dispute between the leading first-generation Amoraim of Babylon, Rav and Shmuel, as to which opinion we follow for this open מבוי.

Rav rules like the Tana Kama and requires only a צורת הפתח on the one open side of the מבוי and a pole or beam on the other.

Shmuel is more stringent and requires doors on one side and a pole or beam on the other side, like Beis Hillel according to Chananya.

It follows that there are 3 different situations we have discussed so far:

1.       A real public domain, that satisfies all the criteria to be defined as such- making an eruv is almost impossible and requires doors in all openings that are locked at night.

2.       A מבוי that is open on two sides to the public domain, but is not itself considered a public domain, for reasons that need to be clarified. According to Rav, a צורת הפתח is required on one side and a pole or beam is sufficient on the other.  According to Shmuel, one side requires doors and the other can make do with a pole or beam.

3.       A מבוי that is only open on one side- This is the case we have been discussing from the beginning of the masechta, and either a pole or a beam on the open side is sufficient.

I have a few questions on the שקלא וטריא (give and take/flow) of the sugya, among them

1.       The Gemara initially rejected the simple interpretation of the first Beraisa based on the second Beraisa’s rejection of Rabbi Yehuda’s lenient view.

Although the Gemara later admits that one can retort that the views are not equivalent, and Rabbi Yehuda was more lenient than Beis Hillel who requires doors, it seems strange that it did not immediately see that.

2.       In addition, Rabbi Yehuda’s view making do with either a pole or a beam on both sides seems even more lenient than the most lenient view  seen in the first beraisa, namely that of the Tana Kama who at least required a צורת הפתח on one side.

As such, Even if we found a way to explain why the Gemara initially thought that the second Beraisa was a good proof against the simple explanation of the first, we need to explain why the Gemara assumes that it is at least a proof for the more stringent view of Chananya requiring doors. Surely all it proves is that a beam or a pole on both sides is not sufficient?

3.       Once the second Beraisa is rejected as a proof against the simple understanding of the first Beraisa, Rabbi Yochanan’s statement about Yerushalayim is brought to show that even Beis Hillel according to Chananya are too lenient.

Yet Rabbi Yochanan was only an Amora, and his view was only reported by another Amora. Is such a view authoritative enough to reject the simple meaning of a Beraisa and interpret it to refer not to a real public domain but rather a מבוי open on two sides to one?

Perhaps one can answer based on the fact that Rabbi Yehuda holds that an area enclosed on two sides is already considered a private domain on a biblical level.

As such, it is the equivalent to him of an area enclosed on 3 sides according to the majority opinion.

If the Chachamim rebuked Rabbi Yehuda for allowing such an area to be enclosed with just a pole or a beam, it could be that they are saying that even according to his lenient definition of a public domain, such an area is still a public domain on a rabbinic level and requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.

It follows that according to Chachamim who consider such an area to be a proper public domain even on a biblical level, a צורת הפתח  would not be sufficient and doors would be needed, at least on one side, and possibly on both.

The Gemara then says that it is true that the second Beraisa implies that the Chachamim would require doors on one side, but who says that they would require these doors to be on both sides AND locked.

It then brings the statement of Rabbi Yochanan to prove that they would indeed. Although Rabbi Yochanan is an Amora, his statement is based on a reinterpretation of the first Beraisa, and given that no other Amora of his stature has suggested sticking to the simple interpretation, we need to consider his view as authoritative and discover what this reinterpretation is.

This is only my own analysis of the sugya, but a look at the various Rishonim will show that these issues are discussed, and similar answers are given.

What is a רשות הרבים (public domain.)

Now that we have seen that making an eruv in a true public domain is almost impossible, we can see that attempting to make an eruv in a busy and crowded city is fraught with difficulty.

The key to understanding where this could be possible is understanding what makes an area a public domain.

Given that the prohibition of transferring from domain to another or 4 אמות  within a public domain is derived from the mishkan in the biblical מחנה ישראל (camp of Israel,) it follows that the properties of this camp should serve as  guidelines for what is considered a public domain.

Rashi, on our daf, gives various criteria, which in his view, were shared by the public domain in the desert:

1.       It needs to be at least 16 אמות wide (approximately 8 metres)

2.       It needs to be a city where at least 600,000 people are present (שמצויין בה שישים רבוא)

3.       If it is walled on all sides, it needs to have two gates on opposite sides with a public thoroughfare running from one to the other.

What Rashi does not tell us here is what happens if an area in a city fulfills all the requirements, but another area does not. He also does not tell us if the city requires 600,000 to be there all the time, or only at certain times.

A major issue raised by Tosfos on our daf, is how the second requirement can be derived from the biblical camp.

We already learnt (Shabbos 99 and see our post on that daf) that the area underneath the wagons was also considered part of the public domain, and there were certainly not 600,000 people there. In addition, the number 600,000 referred only to the adult male population in the camp, and once women and children were included, it would have been far higher.

Although Rabbeinu Tam explains that the area under the wagons was indeed used by all the people when they travelled, and we use the number 600,000 because it is the only number actually mentioned in the text, other Rishonim such as the Rambam do not make mention of the 600,000 requirement at all, possibly for these reasons.

One could possibly explain alternatively  that Rashi did not mean that all areas of the public domain needed to be frequented by 600,000, but if the area as a whole was indeed frequented by that number of people, all areas in it are also considered part of the same public domain. Perhaps this is part of what Rabbeinu Tam meant.

If this true, how we define which areas are considered part of this public domain requires more information, but it seems clear that the area underneath the wagons was indeed part of the biblical camp.

All these issues guide the debate regarding where an eruv can and cannot be built, and it is not surprising that there different, sometimes extreme views on either side regarding whether one may or may not rely on eruvim in bigger cities that are subject to these doubts.