Category Archives: Ethical Teachings/Bein Adam leChaveiro

Shabbos 114 Shabbos clothes, The definition of a Talmid Chacham and Chillul Hashem

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Our daf continues to discuss the Mitzva of having special clothes for Shabbos, based on the famous Pesukim (Yeshayahu 58), read as the Haftarah for Yom Kippur.

These Pessukim teach us that just like Hashem is not just interested in the technical aspects of the sacrifices, but is even more concerned about the concept behind them, the “spirit of the sacrifices” so to speak, so also when it comes to Shabbat, it is not only the technical specifications about whether something is considered a forbidden melacha that are important, but also the special sanctity of the day- the “spirit of shabbos, “ so to speak.

As such, we are required not only to refrain from biblical forbidden melacha on shabbos and their rabbinically related prohibitions, but also to refrain from things that are associated with the vibe of the weekday (עובדין דחול) and to engage in activities that are special for shabbos and that are in keeping with the sanctity of the day.

This is not an extra chumra (stringency), as many mistakenly believe, but a complete מצוה מדי סופרים (Mitzva of the prophets or later sages), that is binding on everyone, and that might also affect biblical law (possibly a גלוי מלתא as to what is included in the biblical requirement of תשבות, but that is for a different analysis!)

In addition to avoiding any business transactions or even business related talk, walking quickly in long steps or running (see previous daf), one of these requirements is that one’s shabbos clothes should not be the same as those worn during the week, and our daf brings a source in the Chumash itself that changing one’s clothes is a sign of respect from the Kohanim who needed to change their clothes between cleaning out the ashes and performing the actual offerings.

The logic given is that one should not use the same vessel he has used to mix a drink for his master to serve one’s master with.
Similarly, part of the mitzva of honoring shabbos referring to in Yeshayahu, must surely include putting on special clothes that befit the sanctity of the shabbos.

Often, I see people, children and teens in particular, who come to shul on shabbos wearing weekday clothes, such as jeans and t-shirts, and although it is clearly preferable that they come dressed that way rather than not come at all,I believe that parents and Rabbis should use common sense where appropriate to encourage those who are likely to listen to wear the appropriate formal and special attire for Shabbos.

I also often see people, once again children and teens in particular, changing out of their shabbos clothes after lunch on shabbos, and going to play sports in shorts, t-shirts, and the like.

This is a more complex issue, which involves the question of which, if any, sports are permitted or forbidden on shabbos, and whether they fit into the requirement to avoid weekday activities and focus on things appropriate for the day.

If, and only if, one is able to permit such activities as part of עונג שבת, subject to any halachik restrictions involved, are we able to deal with whether it is permitted to change into weekday clothes for such activities.

On the one hand, just like running might be permitted for youth because that is their עונג שבת (enjoyment of the day,) rather than a stressful weekday activity, perhaps wearing comfortable clothing suitable for such activities might also be.

On the other hand, it is possible that any activity that cannot be performed comfortably in shabbos clothes (other than resting or sleeping obviously) might be a weekday activity by definition!

In addition to clothes being a way of highlighting the honor of shabbos and the divine services, they are also a way of highlighting one’s honor for davening(prayer) , and the honor of the Torah , as represented by Talmidei Chachamim (Torah scholars.)

As such, Talmidei Chachamim traditionally wore special clothing, and were expected to be particularly careful not to have any dirt or stains on their clothes.

The later not only fails to show honor to the Torah they represent, but causes a terrible Chillul Hashem, and as a result, the Gemara uses the very harsh expression חייב מיתה (deserving of death) for one who does so.

This is based on the verse משניאי אהבו מוות (those who make people hate me, love death-Misheli 8/36)
As Rashi explains, when a Talmid Chacham appears dirty, it causes people to hate the Torah that he represents, and ultimately Hashem himself!

These words might seem harsh, but they certainly convey the sensitivity that a Torah society should show to cleanliness, and that a person who is looked up to by others, should highlight in himself.
This presumably applies not only to a stain, but also wearing torn or smelly clothing, or giving off bad body odor or breathe.

Although it is logical that all of us should show sensitivity to this essential value, it is clear from our sugya that the more of a Talmid Chacham one is, the more careful one needs to be.
At this point, this begs the question- how do we define a Talmid Chacham, at least as far as this rule is concerned?

Does this apply only to one of the Gedolei haDor (leading Torah sages), to anyone with a good general knowledge of all areas of Torah, or perhaps to someone with a high level of knowledge in one area of Torah, someone who serves as a community Rabbi or Torah teacher, or anyone who studies Torah daily or who is more knowledgeable than average?

On our daf, Rabbi Yochanan presents 3 definitions of a Talmid Chacham:

  1. A Talmid Chacham on the level that one would return lost property to him without him being requirement to produce simanim (identification signs), as long as he says that he recognizes it- Rabbi Yochanan identifies this as someone who is careful to turn over his shirt if he put it on the wrong way.
  2. A Talmid Chacham who is worthy of being appointed as a פרנס (leader) of the community- this is defined as someone who can be asked a halacha in any area of the Torah and is able to answer, even in less commonly studied areas like the “minor tractate” of Kallah.
  3. A Talmid Chacham whose labor the community is required to perform on his behalf (possibly meaning to support)- Anyone who puts asides his own concerns and focusses on the concerns of heaven.

It seems from the above definitions that the term “Talmid Chacham” is not only used to describe a person’s actual knowledge, but also his trustworthiness, reputation, and self-sacrifice for divine matters (see our earlier post on ירידת הדורות for an interesting parallel.)

When it comes to appointing someone as Rabbinic leader, the person is expected not only to have the correct character traits (which should go without saying, after all דרך ארך קדמה לתורה), but also have total knowledge of the entire corpus of Jewish law, to the point that he can answer any questions that come his way.

As the Gemara later says, in order to be a local community Rabbi, such knowledge in one מסכתא (tractate) is actually sufficient (presumably he will then have the skills to look up or refer questions in area outside his expertise) , and to be the Rosh Yeshiva (presumably of the entire country or nation), such knowledge of the entire Torah is required, as per Rabbi Yochanan’s definition.

However, there are other traits that make the title of Talmid Chacham appropriate for someone:

When it comes to trusting his honesty as a Talmid Chacham is supposed to be trusted, the fact that he has the reputation of an honest and generally well-learned figure is sufficient. (the later requirement being my own assumption, as it is unlikely than any honest person would be referred to as a Talmid Chacham without any minimum level of Torah wisdom/knowledge)

When it comes to giving him the support needed to carry on his holy work, his level of learning and reputation is less of a factor, and his motivation and self-sacrifice is what counts the most.
Seeing as the laws we have discussed regarding being clean and presentable are based on preventing Chillul Hashem and thus dependent very much on the person’s reputation, it seems logical that the appropriate definition for the purposes of this law would be anyone with the reputation of being a Torah personality, such that one would trust his honesty in monetary matters.

As such, it is possible that in today’s time, anyone who is a Ben Torah- someone whose life-center is the study and application of Torah regardless of what trade or profession he follows, might well be in the spotlight of the majority who unfortunately do not yet fit into this category.

In a world where the majority of Jews are not yet observant unfortunately, this argument could possibly be applied to ALL “frum” (religiously observant) people.

As such, anyone in this category needs to be particularly concerned about how he presents him/her self, and of course even more so, about how he/she behaves!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 97 False Accusations and justifiable censorship

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On this daf, we continue dealing with a fascinating מחלוקת (disagreement) between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira, regarding the identity of the מקושש (the person found guilty of gathering wood on Shabbos.)

Every cheider kid will tell you that there is no question here- it was obviously צלפחד, the man whose daughters were later granted his estate.

However, nowhere in the text of the Torah is his identity mentioned, and it is Rabbi Akiva, who derives it from a גזירה שוה (an orally transmitted tradition hinted at by use of similar language in the text.)

This identification of the מקושש as צלפחד seemed so radical to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira, that he rebuked Rabbi Akiva with the argument that if he was wrong, he was guilty of false accusations, and even if he was right, he was guilty of revealing information that the Torah had chosen not to reveal!

The Gemara questions how Rabbi Yehuda could take issue with Rabbi Akiva, given that a גזירה שוה is a legitimate form of interpreting the Torah, and in fact, anything derived from one is considered as if it was actually written in the Torah explicitly!

The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yehuda ben Baseira had not received that גזירה שוה in his oral tradition from his Rabbi.

The nature of דרשות in general, and a גזירה שוה in particular, could make an essential study in its own right, perhaps in a later post, but for today, I wish to focus on the 2 things that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira accused (irony noted) Rabbi Akiva of doing, i.e.

i. Possibly falsely accusing צלפחד of something he never did

ii. Possibly revealing the identity of the מקושש when the Torah had chosen to cover it up.

The Gemara proceeds to record a similar debate, where Rabbi Akiva claims that Aharon was punished the same as Miriam for speaking lashon haRah about Moshe, and became a מצורע (lepor) too.

Once again, Rabbi Yehuda rebukes him for either spreading falsehood about the righteous Aharon or revealing the fact that he was equally implicated and punished, when for some reason the Torah had chosen to cover it up.

The Gemara later on brings Reish Lakish who claims that Moshe Rabbeinu himself was afflicted with צרעת on his hand because he had falsely suspected the Jewish people of not being open to listening to his message- He learns from this a general rule that anyone who falsely suspects an innocent person will suffer physical afflictions on his body.

The Navi Yeshayahu too, appears to have fallen prey to this sin during his initiation as a Navi (Yeshayahu 6/5), when he accuses the nation of being a nation with impure lips- We see there as well that the angel strikes him on his mouth as a punishment.

Those who have learnt Brachos might also recall the famous story with Chana and Eli (Brachos 31b) where he accused her falsely of being drunk, and she responded that he needed to bless her in compensation.

There too, we see reference to the biblical case of a Sotah, who if falsely accused by her husband of adultery, is blessed with having children (Bamidbar 5/12.)

It is important to note that Rabbi Akiva does not in any way minimize the severity of false accusations, or revealing what the Torah covered up- he simply has a received oral tradition that his facts were correct, and thus also believed the Torah had never covered them up.

While anyone who has ever been falsely accused of anything can testify to what a crushing experience it is, It is also important to note that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira rebuked Rabbi Akiva for this in two cases where the relevant person was already dead and would not suffer the results of the accusation, at least as we livings humans do (what the dead do or don’t feel is another subject- you might recall the discussion on this in מי שמתו)

It seems that this would thus apply even more so to falsely accusing someone who is still alive (though one could also argue to the contrary, the living are able to defend their own reputation, but the dead cannot.)

Yet surely there is also a time when one needs to take the risk of falsely accusing someone?

The case of a Sotah is a clear example of this- the accusation is allowed, and the woman subjected to a very unpleasant procedure, and if it is false, she is compensated.

If there is compelling evidence that someone is a dishonest in business, even if it cannot yet be proven in court, is it not necessary to take the risk of publicizing this in order to protect others, and later compensate him if the proof is found wanting?

If there is compelling evidence that someone is a child molestor, is it not necessary to first warn people to keep their children away from, and later compensate him if the evidence is found to be lacking?

As to the second rebuke of Rabbi ben Beteira, is he really discouraging freedom of reporting? Does he really suggest that terrible travesties should not be publicized by those who know about him, because the authorities that be have decided to cover them up?

This question is extremely complex and lies at the heart of the way Jewish leaders need to deal with such things. It is certainly not solvable in the few lines that make up this essay, and requires, amongst much else, a thorough analysis of the idea of חושש מבעי (although one may not believe lashon haRah, one may sometimes take it into account in order to prevent harm- see Niddah 61a and Chafetz Chaim/Lashon haRah 6.)

However, it seems clear that one must very carefully weigh the damage done to the victim of possible false accusations against the damage that could be done to innocent people if the charges are true.

Sages like Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira knew how to make these calls. In the case of the Sotah, we had the miraculous bitter waters to make the call for us- for us, it is much harder.

Similarly, there are times that it is constructive to publicize the confirmed sins of people, particularly great people, for the public good- Yet there are also times that such revelations are not constructive.

The Torah is certainly the supreme authority over such decisions and can hardly be accused of covering up the sins of great people, as any biblical student can attest.

During the times that the Torah does choose not to publicize something, it is not for us to reveal it, and we must assume that doing so is not sufficiently constructive to justify it.

This fits in well with the fact that lashon haRah is forbidden even if it true unless there is justifiable benefit to spreading it.

Our great prophets and sages struggled with these choices and sometimes even they failed.

How much more so must those of us responsible for such decisions in our time, relate to them with great trepidation and after coming to a rational halacha based decision, daven hard שלא תבוא תקלה על ידי (that no damage should be caused by my decision.)

Shabbos 91 and Parshas Behaaloscha Racism, Self-Defense, and Prison Reform

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Today’s daf contains an unusually high amount of different Talmudic principles, all of which can be the subject of post after post on their own.

Among them we see again the concept of אחשביה, the idea that something (or quantity) generally not appreciated as significant by a society in general and thus not subject to the penalty for transferring on shabbos, can become significant when someone sets it aside for a useful purpose.

Besides, for being a recurring theme in our masechta regarding shabbos, we have also seen this in a recent post regarding inedible chametz on Pesach, which can become forbidden when someone chooses to eat it.

We also see the principle of בטל דעתו אצל בני אדם, ( a person’s view is nullified by the view of others), which in our case, shows that the converse DOES NOT apply- even if someone does not regard something as significant, if the majority of people do regard it as such, it is also considered significant.

And towards the end of the daf, we encounter a famous legal rule of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה (a person who does one action subject to multiple punishments, is only subject to the greater of the two.)

It is very tempting with our high, often justified, but often exaggerated, regard for the modern, western justice system, to chas veshalom view the Torah approach to justice as archaic, and even cruel chalila.

While there are certainly many aspects of it, that at least on the face of it, do create philosophical and ethical challenges for us , there are So many concepts, that even on the simple face of it, should be so easy for modern society to learn from.

Punishment is supposed to be constructive, fit the crime, and not over burden society.

On the one hand, self-defense, and defense of one’s property, is a legitimate reaction, and one of the main sugyas of the idea of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה, is the sugya in Sanhedrin (72a), where one is permitted to kill a robber breaking into one’s house, when the assumption is that the thief is coming to kill.

This is so much so, that the thief is exempt from monetary claims caused by his damage during the crime, seeing as he was subject at the time to a possible death penalty!

Yet, the rule is also very clear that this (as well as the general rule of a pursuer) is an absolutely last resort- If there is any way to save oneself by wounding the attacker, one is required to do so, and if one fails to, one is guilty of murder )Sanhedrin 74a.)

In a world where so many people are treated as second class citizens, the rule of אחשביה could teach us on an ideological level, that we are able to elevate these people and restore their dignity simply by starting with ourselves and being the one’s to appreciate them.

At the same time, we can never be guilty of being the ones to treat people with less dignity than the norms of the society in which we live.

In our parsha, Miriam is guilty of gossip against her brother, Moshe Rabbeinu, the greatest prophet of all time.

The passuk tells us that this gossip, had something to do with the Cushite (Ethiopian black) wife that Moshe had taken.

There are many varied explanations in Chazal and the Rishonim as to the precise nature of the gossip (some of which might have more appeal than others to our personal views on racial matters) , and of course, there are multiple facets to everything in Torah.

However, we have one iron-clad rule that Chazal themselves taught us (earlier in our masechta) : אין המקרא יוצא פשוטו (a verse does not depart from its simple meaning.)

This golden rule is usually taken to mean that the various midrashim, even those that seem to contradict the simple reading of the passuk, come to supplement and add additional messages to the simple meaning of the text, NOT to replace it, and although there is much to discuss about this idea in its own right, I will take it as a given for the purposes of this post at least. (for further reading, see the various explanations in Rashi, Ibn Ezra, the Targumim, and in particular, the Sifsei Chachomim on the two explanations in Rashi, on this episode.)

Although it is always hard to understand how great people can do terrible things, whatever the precise nature of this gossip was, the terrible punishment makes it clear that it was indeed a terrible mistake.

I would like to suggest what to me, at least in the context of our time (and the timeless Torah speaks to ALL of us, in ALL times), is the most obvious simple meaning of the text.

In the biblical society, like in today’s so called liberal western world, the illness of racism was a scourge, that even otherwise great, and good people, were affected by.

Moshe Rabbeinu’s marriage to a black woman, was frowned on so much in that society, that even his own great and righteous sister couldn’t handle it.

And what happened- she become ill with an affliction which makes the skin go snow-white!

In Judaism, diversity in creation is actually celebrated, and even has its own bracha, משנה הבריות, (one who diversifies his creations), one that is actually made on rare animals like elephants (depending on time and place), as well as unbelievably, black people, who were very rarely seen in Talmudic Israel and Babylon (Brachos 58b.)

Perhaps the simple lesson from Miriam is that if one doesn’t appreciate that “black is beautiful”, one can land up as a leprous outcast, as white as white can be!

Shabbat Shalom ,and may we see the end of the terrible scourge of racism and the appreciation of every person created in the Image of Hashem.