Tag Archives: Eruvin

Eruvin 8 The sea as an eruv

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We have learnt that to be defined as a רשות היחיד (private domain,) an area needs to be surrounded by walls or partitions, at least 10 טפחים (handbreadths) high or deep.

We have also seen that מדאורייתא (biblically), מחיצות (partitions) on 3 sides is sufficient, but that מדרבנן (rabbinically), the fourth side needs to be marked or partially enclosed, depending on its width and status.

One of the most practical questions regarding the partitions used for the eruv concerns whether the sea or a river can be counted as a partition on one or more sides.

One the one hand, the water level could be very close to the level of the land, without the required 10 טפחים per 4 אמות drop (תל המתלקט) required for a partition.

On the other hand, given that water is not solid matter, and the ground underneath it often does drop at this gradient, perhaps the gradient should be measured by that of the solid ground which a person wading through the water would be walking down.

We have found explicitly (Shabbos 100a) that if a pit 10 טפחים deep is filled with water, even if the water reached the walls of the pit, it is still considered to be its own private domain.

This seems to show that a valley or depression filled with water could still be considered its own domain so long as its banks or the ground underneath it has the required gradient, serving as its partitions.

It follows logically that if these banks or slopes act as barriers for a different domain, they should also act as barriers for the domain that they separate this different domain from.

Our daf discusses the case of a מבוי that was surrounded on one side by a garbage pile and the other side by the sea.

There is a debate amongst the Rishonim whether these two sides were along the length of the מבוי or along the narrower widths of the מבוי, which could have its own ramifications, but we shall assume for now that 2 sides were closed correctly and 2 sides relied on the garbage heap and sea as partitions.

The Gemara related that רבי (Rabbi Yehuda haNasi) did not wish to either permit or forbid carrying in this מבוי.

He declined to forbid it seeing as there were valid partitions at the end of the day, but did not wish to permit it either, because of two concerns:

  1. The garbage might be removed leaving the one side without a partition.
  2. The sea could “bring up שירטון”- recede leaving washup-up stones and sand along the banks, thus destroying the natural partition.

The Gemara then asks what the opinion of the רבנן (the majority of sages) is, and two versions of events follow:

  1. רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they forbid carrying in such a מבוי and Rav Nachman then rules like them.
  2. רב יוסף בר אבדימי says that they permit it, but Rav Nachman rules against them.

According to both versions brought by the Gemara, Rav Nachman forbids carrying in this מבוי , and given the lack of debate amongst the Amoraim, it is likely that this will be the halacha.

One question still open is whether the רבנן forbade carrying in this מבוי for both reasons thatרבי was concerned about, or only for one of them.

Perhaps their main concern was that that the garbage heap, which the Gemara concludes was privately owned, might be removed, a very likely event, but the less likely concern about the sea receding and leaving an unenclosed and relatively flat area of stones along its shore would not be a reason on its own to forbid it.

Another important question in this case is whether we are dealing with the sea or ocean, or with a river or lake.

Although the word ים is used, and this term usually refers to the seas specifically as opposed to rivers (see for example Brachos 9/Mishna 1 re ימים ונהרות )the concern of שירטון might apply to both, depending on precisely how we understand it.

Furthermore, most of the main Torah centers in Israel and possibly all of those in Bavel were not on the ocean.

Whereas the case that רבי dealt with could have been by the sea- major rivers are not present in Israel, the next case the Gemara brings seems almost certainly to have involved one of the main rivers of בבל, where most of its main centers were situated.

The Gemara describes how the Amora מרימר closed off the alleys of the city of Sura with nets, so as not to rely on the ים, for the same reason that רבי was initially concerned about.

As Sura was along the Euphrates River and certainly not on the coast, it seems that the term ים in this sugya certainly must also be referring to major rivers.

We see precedent for this in Tanach where the round pool in Shlomo’s palace was referred to as a ים (Melachim I 7/23) and was referred to by Chazal (Eruvin 14a) as the ים שעשה שלמה.

It is also clear from this case that מרימר was not only concerned about the garbage being removed but also about natural changes in the seashore or riverbank.

As such, the chapter should end here, and we should conclude that the sea or a river may not be used as the boundary of an eruv, period.

However, it is not quite as simple as that, thankfully.

Rabbeinu Chananel appears to have a different גירסא (version of the text) of the Gemara. In his girsa, the second version of the Gemara has Chachamim permitting the מבוי and Rav Nachman ruling leniently like them. It also narrates how אמימר closed the alleys of Sura with nets and was NOT concerned about שירטון .

This seems self- contradictory as if there was no concern for שירטון, why would nets be required, and many Rishonim reject this version out of hand (see for example Rashba on the daf)

This permissive view is given more teeth, however, by the Rambam, who rule (Shabbos 17/5 ) that the sea may serve as a partition, and we are not worried about שירטון.

The Meiri on our daf also rules leniently.

Perhaps what was meant by Rabbeinu Chananel’s version of the Gemara is that מרימר closed alleys that were not open to the sea with nets, and allowed the alleys that were open to the sea to be treated as closed even without nets, as he was not concerned about שירטון .

There is another major sugya in the second chapter of this masechta(Eruvin 22b) that is extremely relevant to this discussion, which I hope to discuss when we get there.

Practically speaking, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 363/29) rules leniently like the Rambam, whereas the Rema rules stringently like the Tur, Rashi’s version of the Gemara and other stringent poskim.

However, even those who allow the sea or river to be used as a partition could have rather strict conditions , among them:

  1. The gradient of the sea, river, or its banks has to be at least as steep as 10 handbreadths per 4 armlengths.
  2. The gap between the מבוי and the sea or river may not be more than the 10 handbreadth limit ( a wide beach between the street and the ocean could thus invalidate the entire partition.)
  3. The river cannot freeze solid during the winter (see Taz O.C. 363/20)

In addition, many Ashkenazi communities in Europe did use rivers as partitions for their Eruvin, and it thus seems that some of their authorities also held that the Gemara’s ban on using the sea or a river was not absolute, and depends on the circumstances.

As we have seen, this is a complex issue, and there is tons more to say, but one thing certain from this discussion is that anyone planning on relying on the sea or a river as an eruv boundary needs to know precisely what he is doing, or/and get guidance from someone who does!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 7 A philosophy of stringencies or leniencies

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There is a tendency in parts of the Torah world to err on the side of caution in all halachik matters and take on the more stringent opinions in all areas of halacha.
On the other hand, there is a tendency amongst other sectors to constantly search for  leniencies, picking and choosing the easier opinion in each area of halacha.
Are either of the above policies legitimate, or is one perhaps required to choose one or more recognized halachik authorities and follow their views in every area of halacha, irrespective of whether they are lenient or stringent?
On the previous daf, we recorded a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding how to close off a מבוי מפולש (alley open to the public domain at both ends.)
Rav ruled leniently like the Tana Kama in the beraisa and held that a צורת הפתח (form of an entrance) on one end and a pole or beam on the other end was sufficient.
On the other hand, Shmuel ruled stringently like Beis Hillel according to Chananya, and held that a צורת הפתח was not sufficient on the one side, but doors were required.
We also saw a different dispute, also between Rav and Shmuel, regarding a    מבוי עקום (bent alley.)
Until then, we had been dealing solely with a straight, rectangular מבוי, closed along its lengths and open either on one or two ends.
This dispute, however, centered around an “L” shaped מבוי that makes a right-angled turn in the middle, but is still open at both ends.
As such, the one end is not aligned with the other, and it is unclear whether such a מבוי  is to be treated at each end as if it is only open on that end, making a pole or beam sufficient, or whether it is to be treated like a מבוי open on both ends to a public domain, and thus require one of the more stringent solutions discussed in the Beraisa .
In this case, Rav is stringent, and holds that it is to be regarded as open on both sides (מפולש), whereas Shmuel is lenient and treats it as if it is only open on one side (סתום).
When we combine both disputes, it comes out that such a מבוי does not require doors according to either Rav or Shmuel.
This is because:
1.       Although Rav rules that it is to be treated like a מבוי מפולש (open alley), he also rules like the Tana Kama that a מבוי מפולש (open alley) does not require doors on either side.
2.       Although Shmuel rules that a מבוי מפולש requires doors on one side, he rules that such a מבוי עכום is to be treated like a מבוי סתום (closed alley.)
 
Despite the fact that we have thus not found ANY authority who holds that a מבוי עכום  requires doors, the Gemara tells us that there was such a מבוי  in the city of Neharda, Shmuel’s home town, and the authorities treated it with the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, requiring doors on one side!
This means essentially that they “collected” the stringencies of both, treating it like an open מבוי in accordance with Rav, and requiring an open מבוי to have doors in accordance with Shmuel.
The Gemara is extremely bothered with this approach of collecting חומרות (stringencies,) due to a Beraisa that focusses on general principles applying to disputes between בית הלל and בית שמאי.
The Beraisa rules that the law is in accordance with Beis Hillel in all cases. Yet, one is permitted to choose which of them to follow (the Gemara later explains that this was only before the בת קול  (voice from heaven) that proclaimed that the law is always like Beis Hillel, or according to the view of Rabbi Yehoshua who did not accept the authority of voices from heaven, or that this statement refers to similar disputes amongst later sages that have not yet been resolved.)
The Beraisa, however, condemns those who rely on the leniencies of both of them, calling them “wicked,” and mocks those who follow the stringencies of both of them, applying to them the verse הכסיל בחושך הולך (“the fool walks in darkness”- Koheles 2.)
On today’s daf, 2 approaches are given to explain how the authorities in Neharda had not behaved like “fools” by being stringent like both opinions:
1.       Rav Nachman bar Yitchak is of the view that in practise, even Rav would not be lenient and accept only a צורת הפתח, a claim made already by Rav Huna.
2.       Rav Shizvi seeks to explain this even according to the view of Rav Ada bar Ahava that Rav was indeed lenient in practise. He interprets the Beraisa’s application of the term “fools” to those who practise the stringencies of both houses in a far more limited fashion.
He claims that this only applies when the two disputes are inter-connected, with the lenient view in the one case logically requiring a stringent view in the other, and vice versa.
Where the two debates are completely independent of one another, there is no issue with practicing the stringencies of both.
 
To support the second approach, Rav Shizvi brings the case of the “spine and the skull,” discussed in a Mishna (Ohalos 2/3)
This Mishna deals with the bones of a corpse that are considered like the whole corpse itself and cause everything in the same אהל (covered area) to become impure.
In contrast, most bones on their own do not cause such impurity, and only cause impurity to things that touch them.
It is universally accepted that the whole spine and whole skull, being the most essentially bones of the body, are treated with the stringencies of the body itself, and make everything under the same roof of them impure.
If the spine or skull is no longer whole, however, they are treated more leniently like any other bone.
There is a dispute between בית הלל and בית שמאי regarding how much of the spine or skull needs to be missing for it to no longer be considered whole.
Regarding the spine, בית שמאי holds that unless at least 2 vertebrae are missing, it is still considered whole and the more stringent rules of impurity apply. בית הלל, on the other hand, hold that as soon as one vertebrae is missing, the spine is no longer considered whole and the more lenient rules of impurity apply.
Regarding the skull, בית שמאי are once again stringent and hold that it still considered whole unless enough is missing to cause death in a living person.
בית הלל once again are more lenient, and say if the amount normally removed by a doctor’s drill (possibly in therapeutic  surgery) from a live person is missing from the dead man’s skull, it is already considered incomplete.
Rav Shizvi then refers to the ruling of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that the same criteria apply to the laws of טריפות (terminally injured animals.)
Missing pieces in the spine and skull before slaughter are counted amongst the terminal injuries that render an animal non-kosher even after proper slaughter.
In order for it to be considered “incomplete” and thus non-kosher, בית שמאי use the more stringent criteria they applied to a corpse, essentially making it harder for it to be considered non-kosher. This turns out effectively to be a leniency in the rules of kashrus.
בית הלל in contrast, use the more lenient criteria they use to release the spine and skull from the more stringent laws of impurity, in effect making it easier for the animal to be considered non-kosher, and thus creating a stringency in the laws of kashrus!
This means that in this case, a leniency in one area of halacha, namely impurity, logically requires a corresponding stringency in a different area, namely the laws of kashrus, and vice versa.
Thus being stringent in both areas, and applying the stringent laws of impurity to a spine missing only one bone, but also considering an animal with such a spine to be non-kosher, is logically inconsistent, as is applying the lenient laws of impurity but also considering it to be kosher.
In such cases, says Rav Shizvi, being stringent like both opinions is logically inconsistent and thus foolish.
A generally cautious and stringent approach to halacha in which the stringencies of different authorities are adopted is thus not considered like a “fool walking in the darkness”  according to his interpretation of the Beraisa, unless it leads to logically inconsistency in one’s behaviour.
It is not stringency per se that is the issue, but logically inconsistent behaviour.

A spine missing one vertebra is either considered whole or not, but cannot be both whole and incomplete.

In order to develop a broader approach to this issue, a number of questions need to be raised, among them:
1.       IS Rav Shizvi’s interpretation of the Beraisa only brought in order to reconcile Rav Ada bar Ahava’s view that Rav was lenient in practise regarding a צורת הפתח in a מבוי מפולש, but Rav Nachman bar Yitchak would still prefer the original and  simpler interpretation of the Beraisa that considers collecting stringencies in general to  be a foolish and dark approach?
2.        If this is not so, we would need to explain why Rav Nachman bar Yitchak doesn’t make the obvious distinction that Rav Shizvi makes and instead chooses a view of Rav that is subject to debate.
3.       If Rav Nachman bar Yitchak indeed favors the original and simple approach, do we accept his broader view of the “fool in the dark” or the more limited interpretation of Rav Shizvi?
4.       If Rav Shizvi’s distinction is to be accepted, does this apply only to the Beraisa’s mockery of the chronic מחמיר  (one who is stringent) or does it also apply to the Beraisa’s condemnation of the chronic מקיל   (one who is lenient.) On the one hand, he only makes the distinction regarding stringency, but the need for consistency within the wording of the Beraisa seems to indicate that it applies equally to leniencies. If this is so, he would see no “wickedness” in “collecting” leniencies from different authorities, so long as they are not logically inconsistent with each other.
 
 
Answering these questions requires a thorough study of all parallel and related sugyos  and the Rishonim who comment on them. As this is way out of the scope of this post, we shall have to wait for future opportunities to revisit this topic!


These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 6 An Eruv in a public domain

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Until now, we have discussed how to close off the fourth side of a מבוי (alley) already closed on 3 sides, to permit carrying within the מבוי and to and from the מבוי and the adjoining courtyards.

We will see later that in addition to the pole or beam on the open side, one needs to make the actual eruv, known in this case as שתוף מבואות  (joining of alleys) by placing some food in one of the courtyards on behalf of all the inhabitants of the מבוי.

These laws are all based on the assumption that at a scriptural level, an area enclosed on 3 sides is already considered a private domain, and it is only a rabbinical requirement that the fourth side be marked or closed off in some way.

On today’s daf, we begin to address the more complex question of how to make an eruv in a real public domain, where carrying is a biblical prohibition.

The case discussed is a public thoroughfare with buildings flanking either side.

A Beraita is brought where the Tana Kama (first opinion) rules that one can make a צורת הפתח (a structure resembling an entrance, consisting of 2 poles on either side and a plank running from one side to the other on top) on one side, and the other side only requires pole or a beam (acc the version of the Rif and Rosh,) like a closed מבוי.

The Tana Chananya disagrees and says that the law in this case is subject to a dispute between Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai, and both are more stringent than the Tana Kama.

Beis Shamai holds that both ends need to be shut by doors which need to be locked as people enter or exit, a rather cumbersome process in a busy public place.

Beis Hillel are more lenient and require a door only on one side, making do with a pole or a beam on the other side, like a closed מבוי.

Even though Chananya’s view is substantially more stringent when it comes to a making an Eruv in a public domain, the Gemara is still unwilling to accept it due to 2 other statements of Chazal.

In the first, a Beraisa, Rabbi Yehuda opines that if someone has two houses on either side of a public thoroughfare , one may put either a pole or a beam on both of the open sides and carry from one house to another. This view is even more lenient than the Tana Kama in the previously Beraisa who requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.

The Chachamim retorted that a public domain may simply not be closed off in such a lenient way.

In case one answers that the Chachamim did not mean to reject even Beis Hillel’s more stringent suggestion involving a door on one side, the Gemara brings an extremely stringent  view stated by Rabbah bar bar Hana in the name of the leading Amora, Rabbi Yochanan.

Rabbi Yochanan’s reported view is that even a walled city like Yerushalayim, would be considered a public domain on a biblical level, if its doors were not locked at night.

We are talking about a walled city enclosed on ALL sides, open only at the gates, yet Rabbi Yochanan holds that the gates required doors which were locked at night to convert it into a private domain (termed a חצר כל רבים, or public courtyard.)

We see from there that turning a public domain into a private domain is no simple matter, and even Beis Hillel’s requirement to have doors on one side are not sufficient for this- all sides have to be completely enclosed and even aligned gates on opposite sides of the city need to be completely closed with doors that are locked at night.

On the basis of this stringent ruling of Rabbi Yochanan, the Gemara reinterprets the first Beraisa to refer not to a real public domain, but to a מבוי that is open on both sides to a public domain, referred to as a מבוי מפולש לרשות הרבים.

Unlike the מבוי that is closed on 3 sides, this is treated more stringently, and the three opinions in the Beraisa refer to closing off its two open sides.

The Gemara then records a dispute between the leading first-generation Amoraim of Babylon, Rav and Shmuel, as to which opinion we follow for this open מבוי.

Rav rules like the Tana Kama and requires only a צורת הפתח on the one open side of the מבוי and a pole or beam on the other.

Shmuel is more stringent and requires doors on one side and a pole or beam on the other side, like Beis Hillel according to Chananya.

It follows that there are 3 different situations we have discussed so far:

1.       A real public domain, that satisfies all the criteria to be defined as such- making an eruv is almost impossible and requires doors in all openings that are locked at night.

2.       A מבוי that is open on two sides to the public domain, but is not itself considered a public domain, for reasons that need to be clarified. According to Rav, a צורת הפתח is required on one side and a pole or beam is sufficient on the other.  According to Shmuel, one side requires doors and the other can make do with a pole or beam.

3.       A מבוי that is only open on one side- This is the case we have been discussing from the beginning of the masechta, and either a pole or a beam on the open side is sufficient.

I have a few questions on the שקלא וטריא (give and take/flow) of the sugya, among them

1.       The Gemara initially rejected the simple interpretation of the first Beraisa based on the second Beraisa’s rejection of Rabbi Yehuda’s lenient view.

Although the Gemara later admits that one can retort that the views are not equivalent, and Rabbi Yehuda was more lenient than Beis Hillel who requires doors, it seems strange that it did not immediately see that.

2.       In addition, Rabbi Yehuda’s view making do with either a pole or a beam on both sides seems even more lenient than the most lenient view  seen in the first beraisa, namely that of the Tana Kama who at least required a צורת הפתח on one side.

As such, Even if we found a way to explain why the Gemara initially thought that the second Beraisa was a good proof against the simple explanation of the first, we need to explain why the Gemara assumes that it is at least a proof for the more stringent view of Chananya requiring doors. Surely all it proves is that a beam or a pole on both sides is not sufficient?

3.       Once the second Beraisa is rejected as a proof against the simple understanding of the first Beraisa, Rabbi Yochanan’s statement about Yerushalayim is brought to show that even Beis Hillel according to Chananya are too lenient.

Yet Rabbi Yochanan was only an Amora, and his view was only reported by another Amora. Is such a view authoritative enough to reject the simple meaning of a Beraisa and interpret it to refer not to a real public domain but rather a מבוי open on two sides to one?

Perhaps one can answer based on the fact that Rabbi Yehuda holds that an area enclosed on two sides is already considered a private domain on a biblical level.

As such, it is the equivalent to him of an area enclosed on 3 sides according to the majority opinion.

If the Chachamim rebuked Rabbi Yehuda for allowing such an area to be enclosed with just a pole or a beam, it could be that they are saying that even according to his lenient definition of a public domain, such an area is still a public domain on a rabbinic level and requires at least a צורת הפתח on one side.

It follows that according to Chachamim who consider such an area to be a proper public domain even on a biblical level, a צורת הפתח  would not be sufficient and doors would be needed, at least on one side, and possibly on both.

The Gemara then says that it is true that the second Beraisa implies that the Chachamim would require doors on one side, but who says that they would require these doors to be on both sides AND locked.

It then brings the statement of Rabbi Yochanan to prove that they would indeed. Although Rabbi Yochanan is an Amora, his statement is based on a reinterpretation of the first Beraisa, and given that no other Amora of his stature has suggested sticking to the simple interpretation, we need to consider his view as authoritative and discover what this reinterpretation is.

This is only my own analysis of the sugya, but a look at the various Rishonim will show that these issues are discussed, and similar answers are given.

What is a רשות הרבים (public domain.)

Now that we have seen that making an eruv in a true public domain is almost impossible, we can see that attempting to make an eruv in a busy and crowded city is fraught with difficulty.

The key to understanding where this could be possible is understanding what makes an area a public domain.

Given that the prohibition of transferring from domain to another or 4 אמות  within a public domain is derived from the mishkan in the biblical מחנה ישראל (camp of Israel,) it follows that the properties of this camp should serve as  guidelines for what is considered a public domain.

Rashi, on our daf, gives various criteria, which in his view, were shared by the public domain in the desert:

1.       It needs to be at least 16 אמות wide (approximately 8 metres)

2.       It needs to be a city where at least 600,000 people are present (שמצויין בה שישים רבוא)

3.       If it is walled on all sides, it needs to have two gates on opposite sides with a public thoroughfare running from one to the other.

What Rashi does not tell us here is what happens if an area in a city fulfills all the requirements, but another area does not. He also does not tell us if the city requires 600,000 to be there all the time, or only at certain times.

A major issue raised by Tosfos on our daf, is how the second requirement can be derived from the biblical camp.

We already learnt (Shabbos 99 and see our post on that daf) that the area underneath the wagons was also considered part of the public domain, and there were certainly not 600,000 people there. In addition, the number 600,000 referred only to the adult male population in the camp, and once women and children were included, it would have been far higher.

Although Rabbeinu Tam explains that the area under the wagons was indeed used by all the people when they travelled, and we use the number 600,000 because it is the only number actually mentioned in the text, other Rishonim such as the Rambam do not make mention of the 600,000 requirement at all, possibly for these reasons.

One could possibly explain alternatively  that Rashi did not mean that all areas of the public domain needed to be frequented by 600,000, but if the area as a whole was indeed frequented by that number of people, all areas in it are also considered part of the same public domain. Perhaps this is part of what Rabbeinu Tam meant.

If this true, how we define which areas are considered part of this public domain requires more information, but it seems clear that the area underneath the wagons was indeed part of the biblical camp.

All these issues guide the debate regarding where an eruv can and cannot be built, and it is not surprising that there different, sometimes extreme views on either side regarding whether one may or may not rely on eruvim in bigger cities that are subject to these doubts.

Eruvin 5 The unfenced courtyard and a mathematics teaser

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We have learnt that although מדאורייתא (biblically,) an area enclosed on three sides is generally considered a רשות היחיד (private domain) as far as the laws of carrying on shabbos are concerned, there is a rabbinical requirement to mark or enclose the fourth side in some way.
 
It is important to note that the biblical rule could have both stringencies and leniencies associated, a subject I hope to discuss in a later post.
 
The leniency is that at least on a biblical level, one is permitted to carry within this area, or from this area to an adjacent private domain, without restriction.  The stringency is that if one carries from this area to a public domain, one would be liable for biblical level shabbos desecration, with all its ramifications.
 
The rabbinic requirement to enclose or mark the fourth side limits one’s ability to carry within that area or from that area to the adjacent רשות היחיד  without doing so, but probably does not affect the biblical prohibition against carrying from it to the רשות  הרבים.   
 
Until now, we have focused on a מבוי, or narrow street, which requires only a לחי (pole) or קורה (beam) to mark the fourth side.
 
What happens with an unfenced private front-yard or garden, either belonging to the owners of one house, or shared by various houses?
 
Does this also need to be enclosed, and if so, is the solution that works for a מבוי also sufficient for such an area?
 
On the one hand, this area is less public than a מבוי and more similar to a private domain by its nature, so perhaps Chazal didn’t see the same need to make it more distinguishable from the public domain.
 
On the other hand, it still shares an open fourth side to the public domain, or at least to a כרמלית ( open area not busy enough to be a public domain, but treated by Chazal with the stringencies of both public and private domains.)
 
On this daf, we see that there are strict rules defining the מבוי  that may be permitted by just a לחי  or קורה . Otherwise, it is considered a חצר (courtyard) and is actually treated more stringently!
 
1.       Its width needs to be narrower than its length, the width being the dimension only enclosed on one side, as opposed to the length which is the dimension enclosed on both sides.
2.       It needs to have houses and courtyards open to it. The Gemara (Shabbos 130b and Rashi) understands the later to mean at least two courtyards that each have two houses open to them.
 
As such, it seems clear that both a shared courtyard and a private one certainly do not meet the later criteria, and might sometimes not meet the former one either.
 
It seems to follow from here that at least the shared courtyard would definitely be treated stricter than the מבוי, and with the argument in favor of leniency for a less public area to be treated more leniently disregarded, in the absence of precedent to  the contrary , it seems that this would also be the case with a private front-yard or garden.
 
What precisely is required in order to be able to carry in such an area will hopefully be the topic of a later post as the sugyos develops.

 
There is a מחלוקת (dispute) on this daf between Rav Yosef and his student, Abaya regarding the minimum length of a מבוי.
 
Rav Yoseif holds that 4 טפחים (handbreadths) are sufficient, whereas Abaya requires 4 אמות (arm-lengths.)
 
Abaya attempts to prove his point from the above rule that we learnt- in order to be considered aמבוי  as far as the more lenient requirement for a לחי  or קורה, there have to be at least 2 courtyards that open to it.
 
As the minimum width of a פתח  (opening) is 4 טפחים  (the maximum being 10 אמות,) it is impossible for a courtyard to share one with a מבוי  that itself is only 4 טפחים long, without the entire length being open and thus disqualified .
 
The opening can also not be along the width that is already closed, as the width may not be wider than the length!
 
Rav Yoseif counters that one opening could still be possible on each side, if it is in the corner between the length and the width.
 
Rashi explains that this could be made of a 3 טפחים  gap along the length PLUS a 1 טפח  opening along the adjacent wall of the width, making the minimum 4 טפחים in total.
 
Tosfos , as well as other Rishonim make the rather strong observation that Rashi is not being precise, as the true entrance would then be marked by the diagonal between the enclosed part of the length and the enclosed part of the width, which mathematically (by pythagorus) will be the root of 10, still below the minimum width of 4 טפחים  !
 
Is Tosfos accusing Rashi of being unaware of basic mathematics such as the theorem of Pythagoras? Absolutely impossible, as there are various sugyos which mention this, approximating the root of 2 with 7 over 5 (See sukkah 8a for example)
 
It is also very simple for any mathematical layman to measure such a diagonal and see that the diagonal is much closer to 3 than 4.
 
As such, it seems clear that Tosfos understood that Rashi was aware of this discrepancy but deliberately chose to ignore it and be happy with an approximate minimum with  slightly more than 3 in place of 4, something that seems rather odd.
 
We have seen elsewhere that the Tosfos have pointed out that Chazal themselves were not always precise with their measurements (see Eruvin 13b for example) , but this was a question of rounding to the nearest integer, not rounding down more than a  half  and resulting in a major leniency.
 
It thus seems more likely that Rashi did not measure the entrance from the diagonal, but from the imaginary wall that would exist in the corner if the 3 plus 1 handbreadths were closed.
 
This would be a rather substantial מחלוקת  with a huge נפקא מינה (practical ramification) regarding the status of the area in-between this imaginary boundary and the diagonal as well as whether a bent opening like this is valid.
 
It is also clearly not the way Tosfos understood Rashi!
וצריך עיון גדול

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 4 “Halacha leMoshe miSinai”

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On the previous 2 dapim, as well as the parallel sugya in Sukkah (2b) the Gemara has pointed out a number of times that in contrast to Sukkah which is a biblical requirement, the requirement to close the fourth side of a מבוי  is only rabbinical in nature.

On this daf, Rav Chiya bar Ashi quotes Rav’s saying that the laws of 3 things,  מחיצות  (boundaries that make up a private domain), חציצות  (barriers that get in the way of immersion in the mikveh such as clothes, dirt, knots etc,) and שעורים  (the minimum quantities of things  that are required for various mitzvot or in order to be liable for various transgressions) are all הלכה למשה מסיני  (laws given orally to Moshe on Mount Sinai.)

These are generally understood to not only form part of תורה שבעל פה, but have a full דאורייתא דין (biblical status.)

It is therefore surprising when the Gemara challenges Rav’s ruling about the “Halacha leMoshe miSinai” status of these 3 things, by bringing sources that indicate that they are really דאורייתא, based on verses.

Surely הלכה למשה מסני is just as דאורייתא as things written explicitly in the written Torah or derived from דרשות   from the verses?

The above 3 examples have major impacts on all areas of biblical law, determining biblical status regards to purity, shabbos law, punishments, marriage law, and so much else, that seem to be weigh beyond something without biblical status.

In addition, the first Mishna in Avos makes it clear that the oral tradition originates with Moshe at har Sinai, and what is this if not “halocho leMoshe miSinai?”

The original phrase “halacha leMoshe MiSinai” is found in a few Mishnayos.

We find (Peah 2/6) the following:

  אמר נחום הלבלר מקובל אני מרבי מיאשא שקבל מאבא שקבל מן הזוגות שקבלו מן הנביאים הלכה למשה מסיני בזורע את שדהו שני מיני חטין אם עשאן גורן אחת נותן פאה אחת שתי גרנות נותן שתי פאות

“Nachum the scribe said: I have received from Rabbi Myasha who received from his father, who received from the pairs, who received from the prophets a “halacha leMoshe miSinai” regarding one who sows his field with two types of wheat. If he sowed them for 1 threshing floor, he gives one peah (corner of field left for the poor.) If he made them into two threshing floors, he gives two .

We see clearly that halacha leMoshe miSinai is a tradition received orally that can be traced back through the זוגות   (pairs) to the prophets all the way back to what Hashem taught Moshe on har Sinai, which certainly sounds like something of divine origin which should be accorded biblical status.

In another mishna (Eduyos 8/7), we find the following:

אמר רבי יהושע מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו הלכה למשה מסיני שאין אליהו בא לטמא ולטהר לרחק ולקרב אלא לרחק המקורבין בזרוע ולקרב המרוחקין בזרוע….

“Rabbi Yehoshua said: I received from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai who heard from his Rabbi, who heard from his Rabbi a ‘halocho leMoshe miSinai’ that Eliyahu will not come to declare things impure or pure, to distance or bring close, but rather to distance those who were drawn near by force and draw near those who were distanced by force.”

Together with the dissenting views recorded therein, this Mishna presents a fascinating perspective on what the role of Eliyahu haNavi (Elijah the Prophet) will be in Messianic times.

For our purposes, it is interesting to note that  this does seem like  a halachik matter but rather a prediction, and even if it is a halachik matter which prescribes Eliyahu’s behavior in the future, it is in the realm of הלכתא דמשיחא (theoretical halacha only relevant in the messianic era,) yet the phrase “halocho leMoshe miSinai” is still applied.

It is also important to notice that unlike in the previous Mishna which traces this “halocho leMoshe miSinai” back through the sages and prophets, Rabbi Yehoshua only traces this back to Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai’s Rabbi.”

This could be understood in two ways:

It is possible that this is a different form of “halocho leMoshe miSinai,” less authoritative than the first, perhaps only rabbinic in nature, to which the phrase is still applied – some explanation would be needed for such a novel claim.

It is also possible that this is a regular halacha leMoshe MiSinai with divine origins and biblical status, and for some reason, Rabbi Yehoshua simply gave a more abridged version of his Masoretic chain than Rabbi Myasha did.

In another Mishna (Yadayim 4/3,) we find a major dispute regarding the status of the lands of Amon and Moav (identified by some Rishonim as the land of Sichon and Og which we inherited, i.e.  עור לירדן [Rambam] and others as the core land of Amon and Moav that we were not allowed to conquer [see for example Bartenura.  )

For various reasons, these lands were subject to some of the laws of the land of Israel, and although Teruma (the priests’ portion) and Maaser Rishon (the tithe given to the Levite)  did not need to be separated, either Maaser Sheini (the tithe eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed) or Maaser Ani (the tithe given to the poor)  had to be given. The dispute is to which one of these two needed to be given during the shemita (sabbatical) year, where produce in Israel was exempt from tithing, and the decision was that it should be given to the poor as Maaser ani.

When this decision was reported to Rabbi Eliezer, he responded that they should have no concerns about their ruling, seeing as:

מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו עד הלכה למשה מסיני שעמון ומואב מעשרין מעשר עני בשביעית

“I have received from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai who heard from his Rabbi and his Rabbi back till “halocho leMoshe miSinai” that in Amon and Moav, maser ani must be taken during shemita.”

While we see that Rabbi Eliezer put their mind at ease that their ruling was actually a “halacha leMoshe miSinai” (see Bava Basra 12b where we see that this sometimes happened with things said by a great man) it is important to note that this was a matter of prime halachik significance. Maaser sheini was considered קודש (sanctified property) and eating it outside Jerusalem if not redeemed was a punishable offense, whereas maaser ani was considered חולין  (non-sacred) and anyone could eat it anywhere, provided the poor person who received it gave him permission to do so.

We also note that the wording here is more similar to the second case, where the tradition is only traced back to the teacher of the early Tana Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai, who received the “halocho leMoshe miSinai” , and the rest of the chain of transmission through the pairs and the prophets was not mentioned.

On the other hand, in contrast with the second case which says that the tradition received by Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai’s Rabbi was a “halocho leMoshe miSinai,” here it says that his Rabbi received a tradition that goes back to “halocho leMoshe miSinai,” presumably through the pairs and the prophets.

Yet despite the later point, the Bartenura comments that this is not a regular “halocho leMoshe miSinai” but rather a rabbinic tradition which can sometimes be referred to by that title.

He admits, however, that the Tosefta (Yadayim 2) uses a version of the tradition similar to the first case, involving the pairs and the prophets (and interestingly enough, not Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai’s father), and leaves the question open.

All this seems to point in the direction of the second explanation we suggested, namely that these are just different abridged versions of the same full tradition recorded in the first Mishna of Avos, but essentially mean the same thing.

It is of course possible, that the second case, which does not say “back to halocho leMoshe miSinai” but simply “halocho leMoshe miSinai” could certainly be an example of a rabbinic tradition referred to as “halocho leMoshe miSinai” for some reason.

In another twist, the Gemara (Hagiga 4b) brings our Mishna in Yadayim, albeit with slightly different language.

There the wording is:

לך אמור להם: אל תחושו למניינכם, כך מקובלני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי, ששמע מרבו, ורבו מרבו: הלכתא למשה מסיני, עמון ומואב מעשרין מעשר עני בשביעית.

 Which is pretty much the same as the version in Eduyos, rendering the subtle difference in language in our version more likely a result of גירסא (different textual variants) than anything else.

Yet, Ironically, Rashi there says explicitly that this is a rabbinic law, and not a standard “halocho leMoshe miSinai.”

______________

Back to our daf:

We have seen that the Gemara has challenged Rav’s ruling that shiurim, mechitzah, and chatzitza are all halocho leMoshe MiSinai based on sources that derive them from verses, which make them  דאורייתא .

We questioned why the term דאורייתא is employed there, given the fact that Halocho leMoshe miSinai should also be considered biblical.

Having examined various usages of this phrase in the original Mishnayos, we have seen that there is a strong possibility, a view accepted by Rashi and the Bartenura, that there are indeed two types of “halocho leMoshe miSinai’- some of completely divine origin as handed over to Moshe “literally,” and others being strong rabbinic traditions that are given this title.

One could certainly entertain the possible that the 3 things mentioned in our sugya are examples of the later category, and thus although still called הלכה למשה מסיני, do not have the stringent status of biblical law.

However, given the major ramifications these rules have on so many areas of biblical halacha including biblical punishments, it seems very hard to reach this conclusion.

Even according to the Rishonim who suggested that there are two different types of halocho leMoshe miSinai, it seems far more likely that these are examples of the first type of pure divine origin.

As such, our original question as to why the term דאורייתא is not employed to them here has not been sufficiently resolved.

Perhaps we can suggest that the term דאורייתא  has both broad and narrow scope- when used on its own, it refers to everything that has the same legal stringency of biblical law, and that includes things written explicitly in the text, things learn from דרשות  on the text, using the principles of דרש  given to Moshe orally at Sinai, as well as laws given explicitly BUT orally to Moshe at Sinai.

However, when used in comparison to other things within the same legal category, it can also be used to denote things that are learnt from the written text, or at least tied to it via דרשות, as opposed to things that were transmitted only orally, ie.  הלכה למשה מסיני.

Addendum: The Meiri on the first daf seems to take a similar approach. He is of the seemingly radical opinion that even the requirement to mark the open side of a מבוי with a pole or beam is of Sinaitic origination and halocho leMoshe miSinai.

He is thus bothered by the fact that it is referred to in the Gemara as rabbinic in nature.

He proposes that although halocho leMoshe miSinai is always of Sinaitic origin, it is sometimes referred to by Chazal as דאורייתא and sometimes as דרבנן.

It seems that his intent is that even though it was given on Sinai and has the stringency of biblical law, it is not actually written in the Torah and thus technically not דאורייתא.

Why Chazal choose sometimes to refer to it based on its halachik status and sometimes based on its technical status requires further discussion, as does how the Meiri explains the “softer” language ימעט  used for a מבוי, according to the first answer in the Gemara on daf 2.

It certainly explains how one version in the sugya on daf 3 treats it more stringently than Sukkah where part of the top is below 20 amos and part is not without going against the usual rule that a rabbinical law is treated less stringently.

In his case, מבוי actually has the halachik stringency of halocho leMoshe miSinai, but due to it not being written explicitly in the Torah, it needs חזוק (strengthening) and is thus treated even more strictly!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 3 Biblical versus rabbinical prohibitions

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We have seen that the maximum height of the beam that goes from one side of a מבוי to the other is 20 amos, and if it is higher than that, it needs to be lowered.

The same applies to the סכך (“roof”) of a sukkah.

There is a debate on our daf regarding the law if only part of the beam or סכך is above 20 amos.

Rabbah rules that in the case of the מבוי, it is fine, but not in the case of the Sukkah.

The Gemara seems to understand that in theory, it should be fine in both cases, but there is a real concern that the lower part of the beam or סכך could rot or fall off, leaving only the higher invalid part. It then brings 2 reasons why in the case of a Sukkah, we take this concern into account, and not in the case of a מבוי.

I wish to focus on the second reason given by Ravina- I have seen that my colleague Rabbi @Johnny Solomon has already focused beautifully as usual on the first reason in his daily post.

Ravina explains that the main difference lies in the severity of the matter at stake.

Seeing as Sukkah is a biblical law, we are stringent and take this concern into account.

As the requirement to mark the fourth side of a מבוי is only rabbinical, this concern is not significant enough for us to consider.

This fits in well with what we saw on the first daf, at least according to the explanation of Tosfos quoted in the previous post, that the added severity of the biblical law of Sukkah is the reason why we use the stronger phrase “it is invalid” rather than the more positive phrase “it should be reduced.”

It also fits well with our general understanding that Torah law is treated more strictly than rabbinical law. One of the most common applications of this is the famous rule that in case of doubt in a biblical matter, we are stringent, whereas in case of a doubt in a rabbinical matter, we are lenient, but there are of course many others.

It thus comes as a surprise when a different version of this discussion is brought in the Gemara where Rabbah rules that we are lenient in the case of Sukkah and allow part of the סכך (covering) to be higher than the maximum height, but are stringent in the case of the מבוי and do not allow part of the beam to be above the 20 amot maximum height.

Two explanations are given, and Ravina explains that we are more stringent with the מבוי specifically because it is only a rabbinical requirement, and thus requires strengthening.

Seeing as people naturally, and as a result of the various halachik leniencies involved, tend to take rabbinical requirements less seriously than biblical ones, Chazal sometimes imposed harsher rules specifically on the former, in order to make us take them more seriously.

We see this idea in numerous other places as well.

There is the famous story of Rabbi Tarfon (Brachos 10b) who went against the ruling of Beis Hillel and lay down to read the night-time Shema, in accordance with the stringent view of Beis Shamai.

He was attacked by robbers and was told by his colleagues after surviving that he got off relatively light, and really had deserved to die for going against the authoritative view of Beis Hillel.

Although missing out on performing a positive mitzva does not incur any official penalty, we seem to see from the above that performing a positive mitzva in a different way to the accepted rabbinic position can be serious enough that the phrase “deserve to die” can be applied to one who does so.

Later in our perek (Eruvin 21a,) we see the following:

דרש רבא: מאי דכתיב ויתר מהמה בני הזהר עשות ספרים הרבה וגו’. בני! הזהר בדברי סופרים יותר מדברי תורה. שדברי תורה יש בהן עשה ולא תעשה, ודברי סופרים – כל העובר על דברי סופרים חייב מיתה.

Rava, based on a derasha from a passuk, exhorts us to be even more careful with דברי סופרים (a term usually applied to rabbinical law, though some analysis is needed regarding this) than one is with Torah law, seeing as Torah law is divided into positive and negative commands (the punishment for avoiding the former being less severe than the later,) whereas anyone who transgresses the words of the סופרים (lit scribes) is liable to death.

This phrase is used explicitly to refer to rabbinical law (Brachos 4b) regarding one who deliberately delays saying Shema until after midnight- We are told in that regard “כל העובר על דברי חכמים חייב מיתה “ – anyone who transgresses the words of the sages deserves to die.

While it is clear that neither of these refer to an official death penalty in a court, and it is even possible that this is also an example of exaggerated language used by Chazal to make a strong point (I am almost finished a detailed Hebrew analysis on this subject,) it is clearly more than enough to show us the seriousness with which rabbinical laws should be taken.

There are many other examples of both approaches we see in our sugya, some which treat rabbinical laws less strictly than biblical laws, and others that treat them even more stringently.

There is also a similar idea we see with Shabbos and Yom-Tov, this time both biblical commandments but of different severity.

Whereas intentionally desecrating the Shabbos can involve a capital transgression, doing the same on Yom-Tov is a regular negative prohibition which incurs at most corporal punishment.

There are also various melachot, namely some of those associated with food preparation, that are permitted on Yom-Tov but forbidden on Shabbos.

Despite the less stringent nature of Yom-Tov, and specifically because of it, we find that Chazal )Beitza 2b) were occasionally more stringent with Yom-Tov, and forbade forms of Nolad (a type of muktza status applying to “newly born/made “ things on Yom-Tov even though they are permitted on shabbos.

Much discussion is needed to define when “more severe” prohibitions are treated more seriously than less severe ones, and when the “less severe” ones are davka afforded extra “protection,” but the analysis required involves many more cases than can be brought in the scope of this post- I will thus make do for now with having raised the issues , and please stay tuned for a future post which will hopefully continue the discussion!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.