Category Archives: shabbos

Pesachim 101-102 Kiddush in shul, קדוש במקום סעודה, and Mezonos.

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After discussing Kiddush arrangements where a meal continues straight into Pesach, Shabbos, or another Yom-Tov (something some Hasidic Purim meals actually did this year,) our perek moves away temporarily from Pesach matters and focusses on matters relating to Kiddush, Brachos, and Havdala.

The first such sugya opens by discussing the common practise of making Kiddush in Shul on Shabbos.

The question is whether those who did so themselves or through the chazan have fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush already, or whether they have not done so.

Although both Rav and Shmuel agree that one should make Kiddush in Shul and at home, they differ as to why:

Rav holds that they have fulfilled their obligation in shul already and only make Kiddush at home for their families who were not at shul- it could follow that if one eats at home alone after saying or hearing Kiddush in shul, one does not say Kiddush again at home.

In contrast, Shmuel holds that one can only fulfill one’s obligation of Kiddush במקום סעודה (in the place of a meal) and seeing as they did not eat a meal in shul after making Kiddush, they have not fulfilled their obligation of Kiddush.

According to Shmuel, the only reason why Kiddush is said in shul is for the sake of visitors from out of town who used to eat and sleep in the shul- they would fulfill their obligation of Kiddush with the chazan or someone else from the community after-which they would carry on with their meal there!

 (according Tosfos, due to the prohibition against eating or sleeping in shul, this would be in a side-room, but this is a discussion in itself -see Ran on the Rif who also suggests this but also suggests that visitors might be permitted to eat in shul because of the public mitzva that the townspeople are keeping by hosting them)

It could follow according to the later view, if there are no visitors in shul, Kiddush should not be said, and this is indeed how Tosfos  (ד”ה “ידי קדוש”)   and the Tur (O.C. 269) rules.

Of course, it is also possible that Chazal instituted Kiddush in shul and at home for the above-mentioned reasons but that they did applied this across the board, regardless of circumstances, and that even when the reason for the תקנה does not apply, it should still be said (see Ran דפי הריף כ  who rules this way and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 269 who accepts the custom to say it regardless but prefers that it be annulled!)

Before looking at some of the details of Shmuel’s requirement that קדוש  must be said in the place where a meal will be held thereafter, it is important to note that the Gemara puts Rabbi Yochanan on record as agreeing with Rav that this is not necessary.

Using the usual rules of psak, we usually follow Rabbi Yochanan against Rav and Shmuel, and Rav against Shmuel- how much more so when both Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree with Shmuel.

Yet the Gemara proves that later Amoraim such as Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel, and on that basis, the above cited Tosfos rules in accordance with Shmuel, as do the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam(Shabbos 29/8)  !

Having established that we follow Shmuel’s requirement that Kiddush has to be במקום סעודה  , we now need to identify or define

  1. The source or reason for this requirement.
  2. The definition of a סעודה  regarding this law- does it need to be a halachik meal with bread, does פת הבאה בכיסנין (snack or “Mezonos” bread such as cake or crackers) count, is any food that requires the bracha of מזונות  sufficient, or is even  perhaps an additional portion of wine, grape-juice, or even meal, fish, fruit, or other שהכל  foods acceptable?
  3. The definition of מקום  as far as this law goes- does it mean the same building, the same house, the same floor, the same room, or even the same corner of the room?
  4. The scope of this law- does it apply even to Kiddush in the morning, or only to Kiddush at night or vice-versa.

In order to understand the nature of this requirement, and also because of its possible relevance to the other questions, let us beginning by focusing on the first question.

Before attempting to identify the source or reason of the law of קדוש במקום סעודה , it would be appropriate to identify the source of reason for the requirement to say Kiddush altogether.

Whereas the biblical source for the mitzva to say Kiddush on Shabbos is derived from the מצות עשה  of “זכור את יום השבת לקדשו”  (remember the shabbos day to sanctify it), Chazal understood  (Pesachim 106a) that this “sanctification” needs to be done over a cup of wine – זכרהו על היין .

The requirement to make a special declaration about shabbos is also mentioned later in Tanach (Yeshayahu 58) where we are told וקראת לשבת עונג  (and you shall call the shabbos a pleasure.)

The Rashbam and Tosfos both understand that the later source is the basis of Shmuel’s rule, based on a דרשה- in the place where you call the shabbos (make Kiddush), you shall have pleasure (a meal)- This דרשה  is also brought in the Rif and the Rosh, possibly as part of their גירסא  in the Gemara itself, in which case it is possible that the Rashbam also had it in his text but was not convinced it was a דרשה  as such.

Rashbam suggests an alternative basis for Shmuel’s law, this time a סברא (reason based on logic)- HE argues that seeing as Kiddush was instituted on wine already, it is logical that it was instituted on the more important wine drunk before a meal, and not just on a casually drunk cup of wine.

It follows that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan would not accept either of these sources,  not making such a דרשה  from the passuk, and not accepting the above סברא- the reasons for this of course require further analysis, but we will move on for now.

According to the first reason requiring the Kiddush to be made in a place of עונג, it seems likely that any food that is defined as an עונג  (likely in addition to the actual cup of wine used for the Kiddush) should suffice, but that food that does not involve עונג  would not.

In contrast, according to the second reason, it seems that a meal with halachik importance, namely a bread meal, or at least פת הבאה בכיסנין  might be required.

I do not see a major נפקא מינה  of these two different explanations  regarding the third question about the definition of מקום  (though those who study the daf will see that it is the subject of much discussion in the Gemara and the Rishonim) , and the answer to the fourth question would probably relate to whether the above sources and סברא  also apply to the day-time Kiddush or only to the night-time Kiddush, a topic I hope to be able to go into another time (see discussion later in the perek on 106a regarding the night and day-time  Kiddush themselves.)

Returning to the question of how we define a סעודה  as far as קדוש במקום סעודה  is concerned , the stories brought to illustrate how Rav Huna and Rabbah ruled like Shmuel  could also be pivotal.

In both cases the food eaten is referred to as “מידי” – “something.”

Although a simple reading of this word seems to indicate that eating pretty much anything is sufficient  for the purposes of קדוש במקום סעודה, both Tosfos and the Rosh understand that this refers to פת  or לחם  respectively ( both words for bread), bringing proofs for this assertion from other sugyos, which I wish we had time to analyze here.

This seems to follow the סברא  of the Rashbam but seeing as they both seem to see the דרשה  as the source for the requirement and not the סברא, it seems like they understand that the word עונג  itself implies a proper bread meal וצ”ע.

Either way, it seems that in their food that even Mezonos is not sufficient and a halachik meal with bread has to accompany the Kiddush- it is also possible though that פת הבאה בכיסנין  is considered bread for these purposes too, and even if eaten in smaller quantities than that which would make it a halachik meal subject to המוציא , it suffices for our purposes- a thorough analysis of the sugyas brought as proof for the requirement for bread as well as the סוגיא  of פת הבאה בכיסנין  would be needed to assess this possibility, but this does seem to be common practise. (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 273/5 and its commentaries for practical rulings on this matter.)

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 71-73 מקלקל ומתעסק בחבורה

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In the fifth Perek (Pesachim 59a,) the Mishna teaches that even once it has been set aside to be a קרבן פסח, if the lamb or goat was slaughtered with intent to use it for another קרבן, or other invalid purposes, it is פסול.

In our chapter, we have focussed a lot on the fact that the קרבן פסח  pushes aside the prohibition of מלאכה  on Shabbos, and is thus offered even on Shabbos, unlike the חגיגה  which does not push this prohibition aside and is thus not offered on shabbos.

The Mishna on 71b puts these two rules together and teaches that if someone slaughtered a קרבן פסח  for an invalid purpose on shabbos, seeing as the קרבן  is invalid and the מצוה  has not been fulfilled, he has also unknowingly desecrated שבת  and needs to bring a קרבן חטאת  (sin offering) to atone for this.

The Gemara on 72b notes that seeing as the קרבן  is invalid, the slaughter was actually an act of מקלקל (a destructive action) and the general rule is that מקלקל בשבת פטור (one is not liable for a melacha whose result is only destructive- See post on Shabbos 105-106)

There is a view,however, namely that of Rabbi Shimon  (Shabbos 106a  ) that holds that כל המקלקלין פטורים חוץ ממבעיר וחובל – one is not liable for any destructive act other than lighting a fire and injury (the later falling under the מלאכה of שוחט.

According to this view, these two melachot are exemptions to the exemption of מקלקל and it thus makes sense that slaughtering an animal in a way that renders it unfit is still a punishable act on shabbos.

However, according to the view that מקלקל בחבורה (making a wound in a destructive way) is also פטור, why should one who slaughters an animal on shabbos in a way that disqualifies it be liable- his act was purely destructive!

The Gemara  first asks this question in relation to someone who slaughtered the קרבן פסח with the intention for people other than those assigned to it to eat it.

It responds that seeing as such a קרבן  is not taken down from the מזבח if it was already put up, there is still some benefit to the slaughter, and it is not considered מקלקל.

It then asks the same question regarding the case where the animal is found to be a בעל מום (blemished) after slaughter.  In this case, even if the animal has been put on the מזבח already, it must be taken down.

The Gemara answers that the mishna is only referring to certain blemishes that Rabbi Akiva holds do not require it to be taken down once it has already been put up.

The Gemara proceeds to query the case where it was slaughtered and then found  to be a טריפה (terminally wounded animal)  in a place which could not have been seen before slaughter, and answers that there is still some benefit in that the animal can no longer become טמא like a נבילה (an animal that died without halachik slaughter.)

We see from this sugya that even according to the opinion that the exemption of מקלקל applies to the מלאכה  of שוחט\חובל , the slightest benefit achieved from the animal itself because of the slaughter prevents the action from being defined as  מקלקל , even if the action is clearly more destructive than constructive.

Whether this limitation applies only to these two exceptional מלאכות or to all cases of מקלקל requires further analysis.

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Tosfos notes that in addition to מקלקל, there is another reason for exemption that should apply in these cases, namely the exemption of מתעסק, which usually applies when one intends to perform an action on a permitted item and lands up performing it on a forbidden one.

One who slaughters a קרבן פסח for another purpose presumably does so because he thought that it was set aside for another purpose (though see the discussion regarding the precise case on daf 72a where this might not be so straightforward an assumption.)

Similarly, one who thinks that he is slaughtering an animal without a blemish or that is not a טריפה and later finds out that it was indeed blemished or טריפה, has also performed an action on a forbidden item thinking it was a permitted item.

He notes that although there is admittedly a view (Kerisot 19b), in connection with the case of the two babies discussed on daf 72, that just like מקלקל  is not an exemption when it comes to חובל, neither is מתעסק, a view which of course needs its own explanation, it is clear from the same sugya that according to the view that the exemption of מקלקל  does apply to חובל, it applies to מתעסק  too.

As such, it is difficult why the Gemara does not question the liability of such a person based on the exemption of מתעסק, even if it is not considered מקלקל.

We should note that this question fits the way תוספות  understands מתעסק  (see post on Shabbos 72.)

However, Rashi  holds that the exemption of מתעסק only applies where the action was applied to a DIFFERENT item than the one which he intended to apply it to, for example if his hand slips, and in  a case where he intended it to be applied to the same item but merely thought that it was a permitted item, he would be liable as שוגג seeing as נעשתה מחשבתו  (his intended action was carried out on its intended recipient.)

According to this view, the question does not even begin!

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Another difficulty is the assumption that even a small benefit stops an action from being considered מקלקל even according to the opinion (Rabbi Yehuda) that exempts מקלקל בחבורה .

Virtually every destructive action could be viewed as beneficial in some far-fetched way, rendering the often-used exemption rather mute.

Yet Rabbi Yochanan (Shabbos 106a) denied that Rabbi Shimon held that מקלקל is liable when it comes to חובל ומבעיר and said that if he did indeed hold that way, it is only when there is some small benefit.

It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds that מקלקל  is exempt even when it comes to these 2 מלאכות  , he must mean that this is EVEN if there is some small benefit!

The Tosfos therefore  suggest that when our sugya refers to the view that exemptsמקלקל בחבורה  , it is not referring to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather to Rabbi Shimon according to Rabbi Yochanan’s interpretation  by which Rabbi Shimon only holds one liable for מקלקל בחבורה  if there is some small benefit.

It is possible that Rabbi Yochanan would still agree that Rabbi Shimon holds that מתעסק בחבורה is liable just like מקלקל בחבורה  is under his more limited circumstances, and that our sugya is not bothered by the מתעסק  issue.

This also allows us to conclude that Rabbi Yehuda exempts מקלקל בחבורה  even where there is some small benefit and that this certainly applies to מלאכות  other than it and הבערה!

There is much more to discuss on this issue, some of which we have done in earlier posts, and some of which I hope to revisit in later posts.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 69-70 The Pesach night Chagiga and the egg on the seder plate

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The Mishna on 70b tells us that the  קרבן חגיגה   (festive sacrifice) brought together with the קרבן פסח  was not subject to many of the rules that the קרבן פסח itself was subject to:

Unlike the קרבן פסח  which could only be a male goat or lamb, under two years of age, the חגיגה  could come from cattle as well, and be female or male, younger or older than two years.

Furthermore, unlike the קרבן פסח  which only had one day and one night after its slaughter to be eaten, the חגיגה  may be eaten within two days and one night.

However, unlike the קרבן פסח which was always brought, the חגיגה  was neither brought on Shabbos, nor if most of the community was impure, nor if the group associated with the קרבן פסח  was small enough to be satisfied by the קרבן פסח   itself.

The Gemara deduces from this that the author of the Mishna holds that the חגיגה  is not obligatory- After all, if it was obligatory, it should be offered on shabbos like all obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time.

We should note that the Gemara uses the language “לאו חובה היא”  (is not obligatory) to describe the special chagiga of Pesach night.

The simple meaning of this means that although it could be דאורייתא (biblical in nature,) it is a voluntary mitzva and not an obligatory one.

Yet it is not the norm for the Torah to give us voluntary mitzvot without specifically saying so, and we also do not usually  דורש טעמא דקרא (expound the verse’s reasons, a topic for another post, but see meanwhile Sanhedrin 21a ) and conclude that a mitzva in the Torah does not apply when the reason does not seem to apply.

It is thus not surprising that the Tosfos understand that the Gemara means to say that it is only  דרבנן (a rabbinical command.) and that this is why it cannot push aside the prohibition of melacha on shabbos.

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The Gemara proceeds to bring a Beraisa that explains that the חגיגה  is eaten first in order that the קרבן פסח  can be eaten על השובע  (while satisfied.)

Rashi understands that the reason the קרבן פסח  in turn needs to be eaten על השובע  is ” שיהו נהנין באכילתו ותיחשב להם” (so that they should get pleasure from eating it and it should be significant to them.)

He seems  to understand the phrase על השובע  not literally as “while fully satisfied” but rather as while not very hungry, or partly satisfied.

The חגיגה  thus plays the roll as a filler in order that the relatively small amount of meat that each member of a large group gets from the קרבן פסח will be eaten after one has already satisfied his hunger and be able to relax and enjoy it- after all, even though it is clearly not healthy, one who is very hungry often tends to eat quickly in order to satisfy his hunger and doesn’t take the time to enjoy his food properly.

In contrast, the Tosfos quotes the ריב”א  based on the Yerushalmi as explaining that this requirement is a גזירה דרבנן  (rabbinical decree) to prevent one from rushing to eat it in his hunger and while doing so, transgressing the prohibition of שבירת עצם (breaking a  bone of the קרבן פסח.)

Whereas it is אפשר  (possible), though not  מוכרח  (a foregone conclusion)  that Rashi views על השובע to be an intrinsic element in the mitzva of קרבן פסח, without which one might not fulfil one’s obligation, the approach brought by Tosfos clearly sees it as a side- requirement on a rabbinical level, which probably, though not certainly, would not מעכב (hold back) one’s fulfillment of the mitzva.

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Back to the Beraisa quoted by our Gemara, we should note that it does not bring the requirement that the קרבן פסח  be eaten על השובע as the reason that the חגיגה is brought in the first place but only as the reason why it is eaten before the קרבן פסח – it is the Gemara that seems to goes further and take this as the reason for bringing the חגיגה , and thus the reason why the חגיגה  is not brought by small groups.

We should note that all the above applies to the special חגיגה  brought on erev Pesach and eaten on the night of Pesach, and not to the regular obligatory חגיגה  brought on the first day of Pesach and other festivals.

Whereas it is not yet clear whether  the regular חגיגה can be brought by an impure community, it seems implicit at this stage that being דאורייתא ,it is brought on shabbos, and certainly isnt dependant on the number of people eating it.

 However, on the next amud, Rav Ashi derives from a passuk that the regular chagiga is also not brought on shabbos. This seems to clash with our Gemara’s deduction from the fact that the חגיגה  brought with the פסח is not offered on Shabbos, that it is not obligatory- after all, the regular חגיגה  is certainly obligatory yet it is also not brought on shabbos!

Tosfos suggests that even if the חגיגה  brought with the פסח  is דאורייתא, it cannot be compared to the regular חגיגה which does not have a strictly fixed time and unlike it can be offered on all 7 days if missed on the first day!

As such, it  is only regarding the חגיגה  brought with the פסח that the Gemara claims a causal link between biblical level obligation and the ability to overide the prohibition of מלאכה  on shabbos!

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The Gemara continues to note the dissenting view of בן תימא who holds that the  חגיגה  that comes with the קרבן פסח  is subject to the same time restrictions that apply to the קרבן פסח , and only the regular חגיגה brought on Pesach day enjoys a  less restrictive time-period for it to be eaten.

In support for his view, the passuk “ולא ילין לבקר זבח חג הפסח”  is brought, where the word “זבח” is taken to refer to the חגיגה and “פסח”  to refer to the קרבן פסח.

The implication, as noted by Tosfos, is that בן תימא  considers the חגיגה to be דאורייתא whereas the חכמים  of the Mishna who disagree with him, consider it to be דרבנן.

After much discussion, the Gemara  also concludes that according to בן תימא, all or most of the other restrictions pertaining to the קרבן פסח also apply to that חגיגה.

Tosfos points out that later (Pesachim 71a) the Gemara brings a פסוק  to prove that the חגיגה may be eaten for 2 days and one night, unlike the קרבן פסח which clearly seems to support בן תימא  against our Mishna as saying that the חגיגה  is דאורייתא  and thus offered on shabbos as well!

He also notes that there is a view elsewhere (Chagiga ) that implies that the  חגיגה   of ערב פסח  is indeed דרבנן, and we are left with aמחלוקת תנאים  regarding whether

  1.  the חגיגה  on ערב פסח  has the same biblical status as the regular חגיגה  AND is offered on pesach as well

 OR

 whether it is simply a מצוה דרבנן  designed to ensure that the rule that the קרבן פסח  is eaten while partially satisfied is upheld AND is thus NOT offered on shabbos.

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Although we do not merit to bring either the קרבן חגיגה  or the קרבן פסח in our time, there are a number of possible practical ramifications of the above analysis, one of which I wish to bring up briefly:

The egg which is traditionally placed on the Seder plate is done so  זכר לחגיגה (see Orach Chaim 473/4 based on Tur O.C. 473 but see also other views brought, all based on Pesachim 114b.)

It seems that according to the view that חגיגה  on Pesach night is only דרבנן and not brought on shabbos , when Pesach falls on Shabbos, the egg should not be placed.

Although some Rishonim do indeed rule this way, the halachik consensus seems to be that being just a זכר  and also due to other reasons given for using the egg, we do so anywhere (see above sources for more details.)

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 65-66 שבות במקום מצוה , קל וחומר, and גזירה שוה

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The Opening Mishna of our new perek lists the various מלאכות  that form part of the process of the קרבן פסח  that override Shabbos.

These include slaughtering it, sprinkling its blood, מחוי קרביו  (cleaning the insides), and burning its fat, but not roasting it or rinsing the insides-Rashi explains that  the later two can done after dark on Pesach night itself and thus do not override the shabbos laws.

Furthermore, the Tana Kama rules that הרכבתו  (carry it on one’s shoulders), bringing it from outside the techum, or cutting a יבולת  (wart) off it may not be done on shabbos.

Rabbi Eliezer, however, attempts to learn by way of קל וחומר that if מלאכה דאורייתא is pushed aside by the קרבן פסח , surely a שבות  should be.

Rashi explains the view of the Tanna Kama, later expressed by Rabbi Akiva, that  although these are all only שבותים  (rabbinical prohibitions- see inside for why,) they could have been done before shabbos and are thus not permitted, an explanation Rabbi Akiva himself gives after some back and forth which itself requires further analysis.

It should be noted that although we have indeed seen places where a שבות  is treated more stringently than a מצוה דאורייתא  in order that people should not make light of it (see my post of Eruvin 2 for sources and some discussion), neither Rabbi Eliezer nor Rabbi Akiva appear to apply this argument to our discussion.

 This seems consistent with what appears to be the default principle that biblical prohibitions are to be treated more seriously than rabbinical ones, in the absence of Chazal ruling to the contrary, something which itself is subject to much discussion and analysis.

The Gemara on daf 66 opens by relating how the בני בתירה  had forgotten the rule that the קרבן פסח  pushes aside the laws of shabbos, as per the above Mishna.

Hillel then proceeded to prove it to them by way of גזירה שוה based on the word “במועדו”  which is used both by the תמיד  and the פסח- just like the תמיד  pushes aside the laws of shabbos, so does קרבן פסח.

He then adds that this can also be derived by means of a  קל וחומר- if a regular תמיד  which does not cause one who fails to bring it to be liable to כרת  overrides shabbos, surely the קרבן פסח whose neglect brings about כרת  should do so.

The Gemara asks how we know that the תמיד  itself may be offered on shabbos, and concludes that we learn this from the  passuk “עולת שבת בשבתו על עולת התמיד ונסכה”( “ The burnt-offering of Shabbos on its Shabbos, in addition to the regular burnt-offering” – Bamidbar 28/10), which clearly implies that the  regular burnt-offering (תמיד)  is offered even on Shabbos.

The Gemara then ask how  Hillel could base himself on the קל וחומר  when the logical argument is flawed- the תמיד   is תדיר (regular) and is also a   burnt offering, the holiest type of sacrifice which is completely burnt whereas the קרבן פסח  is only once a year and is eaten by the owners!

Although the קרבן פסח  is taken more seriously regarding punishment, the תמיד  is taken more seriously in other ways and the former can thus not be said to be objectively more important than the later.

It answers that the קל וחומר   was actually argued first, and when the בני בתירה countered its logic as per the above argument, he then presented the גזירה שוה.

Unlike a קל וחומר  argument, which any sage could make based on his own logic but could also be countered by another sage’s logic, a גזירה שוה   is based not on logic (at least alone) but on מסורת  (tradition.)

A sage may not simply derive anything he wishes from a גזירה  שוה, but may only apply a גזירה שוה  which he has received from his teacher as part of the oral tradition (see Rashi ד”ה “וכי מאחר”  for his precise explanation of this rule, which we shall hopefully be able to revisit in a later post.)

This limitation also gives it an advantage, in that a countering logical argument cannot push It aside.

The Gemara explains that despite this advantage, Hillel initially preferred to use the קל וחומר  argument , seeing as his contemporaries could retort that they not received this גזירה שוה  by way of tradition like he had- only once the קל וחומר  failed, did he resort to the גזירה שוה.

Although the Mishna clearly holds like Hillel, it remains unclear if and how he was able to convince the בני בתירה  of this, given that they had countered the logic in the קל וחומר  and also did not have the גזירה שוה  as part of their tradition.

Are we to learn from this event that even if a certain sage has not received a גזירה שוה  from his Rabbi, once another sage has revealed a גזירה שוה  to them from his מסורות, they are also to accept it?

If so, why was Hillel initially reluctant to use this גזירה שוה?

On the other hand, if those sages are not required to accept a גזירה שוה  revealed by a colleague, of what help was the גזירה שוה in advancing Hillel’s argument at the end?

The Gemara on daf 66b returns to discussing the relative weight of a שבות  as compared to aמלאכה דאורייתא  and asks whether a melacha may be performed כלאחר יד  (in a back-handed or unusual manner) for the sake of a mitzva.

The specific case discussed is what happens if one forgot to bring the knife needed for the שחיטה  before Shabbos, seeing as this is not one of the things one is permitted to do on shabbos for the sake of the קרבן.

On the previous amud, we learnt that Hillel and his teachers, Shmaya and Avtalyon, had permitted sticking the knife required for the שחיטה  in the wool or hair of the animal so that it is carried by the animal and not by a person.

The Gemara queries this for various reasons, among them the fact that it is biblically forbidden to  perform an action which causes one’s animal to carry something for him on shabbos  (מחמר).

It answers that this is מחמר כלאחר יד , an unusual way of getting an animal to carry something,and Rashi explains that this is because a lamb is not usually used for carrying things (like a donkey or camel are.)

The Gemara counters that מחמר  כלאחר יד is still forbidden on a rabbinical level, and answers that this is precisely the question that had been asked of Hillel.

As its wording seems rather cryptic, I choose to quote the original Aramaic:

דבר שיש לו התיר מין התורה ודבר שבות עומד לפניו לעקרו כלאחר יד במקום מצוה מאי?

Something which is permitted on a biblical level and a rabbinical prohibition stands in its way- may one up-route it in a back-handed manner for the sake of a mitzva?

Although the precise wording seems to be referring to performing a שבות  in a backhanded manner, closer to what we often referred to in halacha as a שבות דשבות לדבר מצוה, the comparison drawn to our case seems to be referring to performing a מלאכה דאורייתא  with  a  שנוי  for the sake of a mitzva, which would be a far more drastic leniency.

The answer he gave, as quoted on the previous amud was in the affirmative – הנח להם לישראל אם לא נביאים הם בני נביאים הם!

May one derive from here that any שבות  may be performed for the sake of the mitzva?

It seems clear from the Mishna (according to Rabbi Akiva)  that it certainly may not, even for the sake of a קרבן פסח, at least if it could have been done before Yom-Tov.

As such, this leniency needs to be applied less broadly, perhaps specifically to the שבות  of כלאחר יד .

Rashi (ד”ה שיש לו התיר) , explicitly notes this distinction and explains that doing something כלאחר יד  is less severe than other שבותים, seeing as it is (relatively) uncommon (Chazal usually only make their decrees in cases that are common!)

In contrast, the Tosfos do not appear to make this distinction, and query how this could be permitted, seeing that it is clear from the Mishna that even a שבות  may not be done for the sake of the mitzva of korban pesach if it could have been performed before Yom-Tov.

Whereas Rashi’s distinction would render their query rather mute, the Tosfos suggest a different distinction, namely between a שבות  performed by a Jew and one performed by his animal- only the later is permitted for the sake of a mitzva-a distinction that appears to fit less into the actual wording of the question asked to Hillel, where no mention of an animal is made.

There could be a major נפקא מינה  (practical ramification) between these two distinctions:

According to Rashi, it seems to follow that ANY melacha may be performed  כלאחר יד/ with a שנוי  for the sake of a mitzva but no other שבות  is permitted (except perhaps in the case of a שבות דשבות.)

In contrast , according to Tosfos, it seems like ANY שבות  might be performed by one’s animal for the sake of a mitzva, but not even כלאחר יד  is permitted by a Jew himself even for such a purpose.

Although this seems the most precise conclusion, given that the Gemara mentions “for the sake of a mitzva” in general and does not limit its version of the question asked to Hillel to the case at hand, it is also possible that both Rashi and Tosfos would limit their respective interpretations of this leniency to a mitzva of the stature of קרבן פסח, however that is defined, which sometimes pushes aside even severe biblical restrictions such the laws of shabbos, and not any other mitzva!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 32-33 Mining Data- Pesach deoderant and מתעסק revisited, and קים ליה בדרבה מיניה

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In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

One of the guiding principles of these posts, as taught to me by my Rebbeim, is that while  it is both impossible and disingenuous to resolve complex questions based on isolated sugyas without considering all sugyos in the shas that pertain to the relevant question (obviously the domain of senior Talmidei-Chachamim) ,  passing through daf of Gemara superficially  without taking note of things that could impact these questions is a waste of an incredible opportunity to build one’s database, and likely a form of בטול תורה.

I would like to touch briefly one how some topics we have discussed before in our posts are enriched by these daf:

סיכה כשתיה   and deodorants on Pesach:

In our post on Shabbos 86a (please refer there for background,) we discussed using non-edible substances containing chametz (such as deoderant containing wheat-based alcohol) on one’s body on Pesach.

This was based on the Mishna (Shabbos 86a) which says that regarding Yom-Kippur, the rule is that סיכה כשתיה (annointing is like drinking( and not only drinking chametz liquids but annointing with them is also forbidden (albeit as noted there, not treated as stringently.)

We discussed whether this rule applies in other areas of halacha as well, specifically chametz on Pesach, in which case although the prohibition of deriving any benefit from chametz on Pesach only applies to chametz that is fit for a dog to eat, something that is fit for annointing such as deodorant might be considered as if it is fit for drinking and thus also forbidden (please refer to that post for a more detailed analysis of this and other factors involved.)

At the bottom of Pesachim 31b, the Gemara quotes a Mishna which forms much of the discussion on Daf 32a.

This Mishna (Trumos 6/a) tells us that a זר  (non kohain) who eats תרומה (the portion separated for the kohain) בשוגג  (unintentionally) must compensate the kohain with the קרן  (same amount of fruit) plus חומש  (a fifth penalty [actually a quarter of principle, making the penalty a fifth of the total paid]) and that this applies also to one who drinks תרומה  or anoints oneself with it.

Rashi (as well as the Bartenura on the Mishna)  explains that although the Torah only requires this penalty of one who ate תרומה, and not one who damaged it (as the Gemara derives later on the daf,) we know from elsewhere (Yoma 76b) that סיכה כשתיה  (annointing is like drinking) and for this reason, one who anoints himself unknowingly with תרומה is also liable to this penalty.

As such, we have seen at least one other area of halacha, namely the prohibition of eating תרומה, that the principle of סיכה כשתיה  applies, at least according to Rashi, and also according to this Mishna itself
(see ר”ש  who points out that this is based on a ת”כ ), in the absence of some other explanation.

While we can still not conclude that this is the case regarding chametz on Pesach, from this Mishna, things are starting to look more that way, though we have still not shown that the principle extends so far as to make something that is ראוי לסיכה (fit for annointing) as if it is ראוי לשתיה  (fit for drinking.)

All the above is based on this Mishna and daf, but a thorough study of the sugya in Yoma and elsewhere will show that many Rishonim say that Yom-Kippur and תרומה  are indeed exceptions, and discuss whether even there, the prohibition is only דרבנן, just another illustrating of the guiding principle we opened this post with.

קים ליה בדרבה מינה  – the greatest of two punishments.

One of the essential principles when it comes to punishments is that if a person performs an action which involves more than one prohibition, and thus more than one punishment, he receives the more severe punishment and is exempt from the lighter one.

There are two main sources for this principle, one regarding liability to payment for damages caused by a capital transgression (אין אדם מת ומשלם – see Kesubos 36b), and one regarding liability to payment for damages caused by corporal transgressions (אין אדם לוקה ומשלם- see Makkos  13b)

There is a debate as to whether the former principle replies only to transgressions subject to death by the courts, or whether it also applies to transgressions subject to כרת , with רבי נחוניה בן הקנה holding that כרת  treated like a death penalty in this respect  (as recalled from daf 29a.)

The Mishna at the bottom of  Pesachim 31b says that if a person eats chametz תרומה  on pesach unknowingly, he pays both the principle and the fine, but if he does so intentionally, he is exempt not only from the penalty (which only applies for unknowing transgression), but also for the principle.

After much discussion regarding why this is so, the Gemara on daf 32a seems to conclude that the mishna reflects the view of רבי נחוניא בן הקנה, who holds that the rule that one who is liable to death for an action is exempt from monetary obligations that come from the same action  applies also to someone liable to כרת.

Seeing as one who eats chametz on Pesach intentionally is liable to כרת, he cannot also be liable to compensate the kohain.

While certainly not the last word in the debate, a סתם משנה (anonymous Mishna with no debate) that supports this view certainly could add to its weight, unless there is a later Mishna which debates the matter  (סתם ואחר כך מחלוקת), something we shall have to keep our eyes open for!

מתעסק

In various posts on the subject (see post on Shabbos 72 for background), we have discussed the rule pertaining to someone who intends to perform an action on a permitted item and lands up performing it on a forbidden one.

For example, one who intends to cut something detached from the ground on shabbos and lands up cutting something attached, or one who intends to eat permitted fats and lands up eating forbidden fats.

We saw the general rule that when it comes to shabbos, one is exempt for such actions due to requirement for מלאכת מחשבת  (significant and calculated melacha), and when it comes to actions one derives pleasure for, such as forbidden fats (or forbidden sexual relations), one is liable.

There is a degree of unclarity as to what happens with prohibitions that one does not derive pleasure from but are not shabbos related, though Chazal did seem to derive a general exemption for מתעסק  from the words “וחטא בה” (Kerisos 19a.)

We also saw a dispute between Rashi and Tosfos regarding what type of מתעסק  one is exempt from on shabbos.

Rashi understood the exemption to pertain only to one who intends to cut one item that he knows to be detached but whose hand slips and lands up cutting a different item which was attached.

However, if he intends to cut a certain item thinking it is detached, and after successfully doing so, realized that the same item had been attached, he could be liable.

In contrast, Tosfos holds that the main discussion centers around the later case, and that in the former case, one would be exempt even if he had intended to cut an attached item but landed up cutting a different attached item!

On daf 32-33, there is much discussion about the prohibition of מעילה, deriving benefit from הקדש ( sanctified things), something we also  touched on earlier (post on Pesachim 25-26) in discussing הנאה הבאה לאדם בעל כרחיה .

One of the things discussed is the source brought in a Beraisa for exempting one who performed מעילה intentionally from the required sacrifice, namely the words in the verse “וחטאה בשגגה”  

The Beraisa immediately asks why a special source is required regarding מעילה, where more serious intentional transgressions for which one is liable to כרת  also do not require a קרבן.

It responds that from a different perspective, מעילה  is actually more serious than the other prohibitions, and there are various versions in the Gemara as to what precisely the Beraisa says and means.

Two views, those of מר בריה דרבנא and רב נחמן בר יצחק relate directly to the sugya of מתעסק  and indeed portray it from a different angle.

The former claims that מעילה  is stricter than other prohibitions in that one is liable even בלא מתכוין  (without intention.)

For example, whereas if one intends to tear a detached item on shabbos and lands up cutting an attached item, he is exempt, if one intended to warm oneself with regular wool and landed up warming himself with wool from an animal set aside for a burnt offering, he is liable.

We note that:

  1. As expected, both Rashi and Tosfos explain the case of מתעסק  in shabbos and with מעילה  consistently with their explanations elsewhere
  2. The Gemara seems to take it as given that shabbos is only an example of the exemption but that it applies to all other prohibitions as well, other than מעילה, and Rashi actually brings both the source of מלאכת מחשבת  regarding Shabbos and “וחטא בה”  regarding other mitzvos, noting that there is no such מעוט  (exclusion) regarding מעילה.
  3. No mention is made here of the fact that we have seen in other sugyot on the subject that prohibitions that one derives pleasure from (presumably most prohibitions) also produce liability even for מתעסק.
  4. Although this indeed seems to be the classic definition of מתעסק  in the sugyas we have studied (at least according to Rava), The phrase מתעסק  is not used by מר בריה דרבנא but rather the phrase אין מתכוין .

In contrast, רב נחמן בר יצחק  explains that מעילה is stricter than other mitzvos in that one is liable for מתעסק in the case of מעילה  unlike in other mitzvos where one is exempt.

He gives the example of one who intends to lift a detached item on shabbos and lands up tearing an attached item, who is exempt, as opposed to one who puts his hand into a vessel containing oil of הקדש  (consecrated oil) intending simply to remove an item from it but lands up annointing his finger in the oil, who is liable.

We note that:

  1. Unlike מר בריה דרבנא, רב נחמן בר יצחק  does refer to the phrase מתעסק  as opposed to אין מתכוין.
  2. רב נחמן בר יצחק  gives examples of מתעסק  according to Abaya in the other sugyas we have studied, as Rashi explains, where one intends to do a permitted act (lifting) and lands up performing a forbidden act (tearing), seemingly agreeing with Abaya that in the case referred to by מר בריה דרבנא, this would be considered like regular שוגג  even on shabbos and one would be liable.

The above observations could be invaluable in understanding the different views regarding howמתעסק  works and how it relates to דבר שאין מתכוין  and הנאה הבאה לאדם בע”כ.

Hopefully we shall have a chance to return to them soon!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 105 Intellectual honesty opposed to a philosophy of leniencies

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This short daf deals with various work needed for the maintenance of the מקדש , to remove impure items from it, and how and by whom it should be done.

This is based on a debate in the concluding Mishna of the Masechta regarding how to remove a dead שרץ  (creeping creature/bug) from the Temple.

The Masechta ends, however, by focusing on a rather cryptic statement in the final Mishna by Rabbi Shimon: מקום שהתירו לך חכמים משלך נתנו לך שלא התירו לך אלא משום שבות – “The place where the sages permitted it to you, they gave you from your own, as they only permitted it because of a rabbinical prohibition.”

Whatever the meaning of this statement, we might instinctively think that it has something to do with the debate in this Mishna itself.

Yet the Gemara understands this as a flashback to two other debates that Rabbi Shimon was involved in:

  1. Although the Chachamim hold that even if one stepped one אמה outside the תחום  (shabbos zone), it is forbidden to return, Rabbi Shimon allows a leeway of up to 15 אמות  because the people who measure the תחום  do not do so precisely and leave a safety net of this distance inside the תחום.

The first part of his cryptic statement thus reads:

“That which they (according to me) permitted you, ie 15 amos, was really yours to begin with, due to the safety net made by the measurers.”

  • Although Chachamim permitted retying a string that came loose on a musical instrument required for the Temple service, due to the rule of אין שבות במקדש , Rabbi Shimon forbade it, seeing as he held that this is a biblical prohibition, and only permitted tying it with a bow.

The second part of his cryptic statement thus reads:

“They only permitted  tying a bow which is a שבות, not tying a knot which (according to me) is a biblical transgression.

Rashi and Tosfos both explain that Rabbi Shimon makes these statements here because they are connected to his ruling regarding the string of an instrument.

Tosfos adds that this discussion was interrupted by listing the other things permitted because אין שבות במקדש  (there are no rabbinical prohibitions when it comes to Temple service) and Rabbi Shimon is now returning to explain his position there.

They both explain that Rabbi Shimon is going out of his way to stress that his leniency regarding the תחום  was not due to his taking shabbos lightly and a general policy of leniency, but because he felt it was objectively the correct ruling, seeing as the safety net was intentionally placed for that reason.

In contrast, when  it comes to making  a knot, he believed that a biblical prohibition was involved and only permitted a bow, in keeping consistently with the rule of אין שבות במקדש, even though the Chachamim were lenient.

Although both Rashi and Tosfos explain the positioning of Rabbi Shimon’s “clarification” of his approach based on the recent placement of the late dispute, it seems fitting that the Maseches concludes in this way.

After all, as we have seen so many times, Eruvin is not just about the technical and specific laws of Eruvin, but also about the power of rabbinical decrees as a whole and many global rules of psak halocho.

We have seen many leniencies when it comes to rabbinic decrees, such as ספק דרבנן לקולא, אין שבות במקדש, אין גוזרין גזירה לגזירה etc , as well as many exceptions to these rules.

Rabbi Shimon, in particular, is known for many leniencies in the rules of Shabbos, among them דבר שאין מתכוין מותר, מלאכה  שאינה צריכה לגופא פטור, לית ליה מוקצה,  גגות חצירות וקרפפים רשוצ אחת הן,  כתבי קודש  etc.

However, as we discussed early in the Maseches (see post on Eruvin 7,) halacha ideally should not be about having a philosophy of leniency or stringency, but rather about searching for the objective truth.

It is so fitting that such a Masechta should end with no other than the “lenient” Rabbi Shimon clarifying his position that his leniencies do not flow from any זלזול (making light of) the laws of Shabbos, chas veshalom, but from his objective view of the truth in each case.

Just like he was lenient so often in cases where he believed the truth required leniency, he was not afraid to be stringent against consensus when he felt that the truth required it.

Although a poseik might often be required to take local circumstances or even “meta-halachik” factors into account when issuing rulings, Rabbi Shimon, forever the idealist, seems to be teaching us that the ideal derech of a poseik and Talmid Chacham, namely intellectual honesty and objectivity, must never be forgotten.

הדרן עליך מסכת עירובין והדרון עליך

Its been an incredible journey, and we will miss you, as we temporarily move on to exciting new territory with Maseches Pesachim, Hashem willing, truly inspired and looking forward to the next round!

Eruvin 104 Soccer on Shabbos and when a גזירה’s reason doesn’t apply

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One of the more contentious issues in many communities today is the question of children, teens, and even adults  playing  sports on Shabbos.

On the one hand, many argue that not only does this practise not confirm with the required atmosphere for the holiest day of the week, it also involves many other halachik problems.

On the other hand, most of these points could be arguable, and there is a strong argument that for many, they can certainly enhance their “oneg shabbos” , itself a major mitzva.

Some of the issues raised against playing games like soccer even in a private domain, are:

  1. Running itself is prohibited on shabbos. (see Shabbos 113a)
  2. The game is not in keeping with the spirit of shabbos and could even be in the category of forbidden weekday activities (see Peninei Halacha Shabbos 24/9 based on Rav A.I. Kook)
  3. Running on long  grass is problematic as one might come to uproot the grass while doing so, itself a forbidden melacha on shabbos. (see M.B. 336/25)
  4. Playing with a ball along the ground is prohibited on shabbos. (see M.B. 308/158)
  5. A ball is muktza (see S.A. O.C. 308/45)
  6. There is  a Midrash (Eichah Rabba parsha 2, possibly also referenced in the Yerushalmi  Taanis 4/5 ) that blames the destruction of the city טור שמעון on the fact that they played with balls on shabbos.

We saw in a recent post (see Eruvin 100)  that although walking in a rushed manner and running on shabbos are forbidden due to the passuk in Yeshaya forbidding weekday activities, in particular walking in a weekday rushed manner, running for the sake of a mitzva is permitted, as is running for “oneg shabbos” or even to get to an activity from which one will get “oneg shabbos.”

As such, the first 2 points seem less problematic, and although some have argued that given its nature as a commercial sport, soccer might be different to running and still be considered a weekday activity (Pninei halacha based on Rav A.Y. Kook ), this argument seems rather subject to debate, given that  both running and all sports are popular both privately and commercially.

In fact, given one’s busy school or work schedule during the week, they are actually far more popular on weekends than on “weekdays” and singling out sports like soccer as being particularly commercial in nature when it is a game played casually by young people in their backyards in most places in the world seems somewhat subjective.

We saw in that post that there is no issue with walking on grass on shabbos, even on long grass, and even with shoes with nails in them, due to the principle of דבר שאין מתכוין מותר.

We also saw that although the Mishna Berura forbids running on long grass and consider it פסיק  רישיה, this does not apply on short grass, and the Aruch haShulchan disagrees strongly and permits running on short grass as well- we also  analyzed the basis for this disagreement in classical sources.

Even on long grass according to the Mishna Berura, this would at worst only be rabbinically prohibited as פסיק רישיה דלא ניחה ליה  , seeing as one derives no benefit from any grass uprooted during the game.

The fifth point is a sugya in its own right, and needs to be dealt with separately, but the Rema (O.C. 308/45) rules that this is not an issue in any case, and the sixth point is aggadic material which needs to be understood but is not necessarily halachically relevant. Indeed, it is not mentioned by most Rishonim and Achronim at all ( see though Aruch haShulchan O.C. 38/70  who does bring it into the discussion.)

For the purposes of this post, I would like to focus  on point 4, which is based on a discussion on this very daf.

The Gemara has been discussing the prohibition of השמעת קול, making sounds with objects (as opposed to the voice) on shabbos, which is rabbinically forbidden in case on comes to fix a musical instrument.

The Gemara has been entertaining the later rejected  possibility that not only קול של שיר, the kind of sounds that accompany song are forbidden, but even other sounds, such as knocking on the door, making noise to wake someone up ,clapping hands to scare away birds, or drawing water with a wheel-run device are also forbidden.

One of the attempted proofs the Gemara brings is from a ruling of Rav quoted by Rav Yehuda that women who are accustomed to play with hazel-nuts  (rolling them like marbles, which Rashi explains was a common pastime for ladies) may not do so on Shabbos.

The Gemara at first assumed that this is because of the sounds they make and that this ruling is proof that even non song-related noises are forbidden.

It rejects this proof by explaining that the reason for this rabbinical prohibition is completely different, and is due to the concern that they might fill-in any holes in the courtyard ground that get in the way of the game (where the hazelnuts could be trapped.)

This could involve the melacha of building (indoors or perhaps in  courtyard) or ploughing (outdoors.)

It brings further evidence that this must be the reason from the fact that Rav Yehuda also forbade rolling apples along the ground, though they do not make noticeable sounds like hazel nuts.

However, it is very possible that this decree is limited to

  1. Women who play this game commonly, and not others for whom the concern is not so common
  2. Hazelnuts and apples which are relatively small and easily trappable in small to medium sized holes in the ground, and not larger spherical   objects such as a melon or a modern-day soccer balls (I am using this term for the sake of clarity although it is not a precisely accurate description for these items.)
  3. Situations and/or times where the ground used is usually already smooth and/or it is not common for players to smooth the ground out before or while playing.

Due to points 2-3, playing soccer is clearly rather removed from the decree that formed the basis for Rav’s ruling, and applying this prohibition thus seems to be quite a stretch.

Although one might argue from the case of the apples that the decree was not limited to small spheres such a hazel-nuts but included round items of all sizes, it is just as likely that it included items as large as apples, but not significantly larger, as argued in point 2 above

The issue raised in point 3 requires much analysis:

There is a general rule of אין בית דין יכול לבטל דברי בית-דין חבירו אלא אם כן גדול ממנו בחכמה ובמנין  – one court may not annul the words of an earlier court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and numbers  (Megila  2a ) .

 This and the related rules of

  1. 1.        כל דבר שבמנין צריך מנין אחר להתירו  (Beitza 5a-anything voted as forbidden by a court/group of authorities  requires another vote to permit it)

AND

  •  לא פלוג רבנן (B.M 52a-the Rabbis do not differentiate between different cases in their decrees but rather make blanket rules )

seem to preclude annulling a decree such as this just because the concern of smoothing out holes does not apply commonly in a friendly soccer game.

Yet, there are various times where Tosfos argues that decrees do not apply in our day precisely because the reason for the decree is not relevant in our day.

For example, they argue that the prohibition of clapping, banging, and dancing even to song does not apply in our time because we are not expert in making/fixing musical instruments anymore and there is no concern one would do so (Beitza 30a ד”ה “תנן” )

They also argue that

  1.  the  prohibition of drinking מים מגולים  did not apply in their time as snakes were not common )Beitza 6a)
  2.  a bird used for children’s entertainment might not be muktza (Shabbos 45b),
  3.   the prohibition of entering into a partnership with idol-worshippers did not apply in his day seeing as the concern that they would make one swear by their idols was not relevant )Sanhedrin 63b ד”ה “אסור”, though the exact point Tosfos is making there is subject to much debate)

Whereas the question as to how the Tosfos are able to do this despite the principles quoted above requires a serious analysis, and one commonly suggested explanation is that they are not suggesting that the decree no longer applies but that the circumstances at hand are SO clearly different to those under which the decree was made that they were never included by Chazal in the decree in the first place.

While even this less controversial explanation of the approach of the Tosfos might not be accepted by many other Rishonim, there appears to be some precedent for it on our very daf.

One of the things that our Mishna permitted in the Mikdash as part of the long list of rabbinic prohibitions mentioned in our perek that do not apply there, was drawing water from certain pits with a wheel.

The implication of the Mishna is that this would be forbidden rabbinically  outside the Mikdash , and after suggesting that this is due to the prohibition against making sounds, the Gemara answered that it is out of concern that one might come to draw water to water his garden or ruin.

Despite this, the later Amora Ameimar permitted drawing water in such a way in the town of Mechoza, because there were no gardens or ruins there, until he saw that they used it for other forbidden purposes, such as soaking flax.

This seems to indicate that a later authority  (Ameimar) may permit something forbidden by an earlier authority (in this case none other than a Mishna) because the circumstances under which the decree was made do not exist.

The approach of the Tosfos thus seems clearly anchored in precedent, and even in the unlikely scenario that the decree against playing with hazelnuts and apples on a rough surface extended to larger spheres on a smooth surface, in a time and place where it is not common to play soccer on surfaces one would need to smooth during the game or directly before, there would still be reason to argue that such far-removed circumstances were never included in the decree in the first place.

Given the multiple reasons for leniency mentioned above and the fact that we are dealing with at most a rabbinical prohibition, forbidding soccer for reasons of this decree thus seems to be a rather stringent approach to the question.

We can also add to this the fact that the Tosfos on our daf say that even in the circumstances described on our daf with hazelnuts and apples, we should not protest and women and children who do this due to the principle of מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין , and there is strong argument that this principle also applies to teenage boys and other males who are also unlikely to listen.

At the end of the day, there are certainly worse things that kids could be up to these days, and although there might be other halachik, ideological, and policy issues that need to be taken into account before permitting it, this particular concern certainly doesn’t seem like cause for a major confrontation with them.

Having said this, achieving some balance is important- Given that Shabbos and Yom-Tov are supposed to  be special opportunities for spiritual pursuits such as davening, learning Torah, singing songs of praise, and strengthening the family, and not just for physical enjoyment, it seems clear that if these essential aspects of shabbos are replaced chas veshalom by sporting activities, this is a serious lack of כבוד שבת and is certainly forbidden.

As such, even if we permit  (or turn a blind eye to) kids playing sports during the afternoon while adults would usually be resting, it is essential to gently encourage and educate them to be a full part of the shabbos experience, both in shul and at home.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Eruvin 97-98 and 103 שבות במקדש וכתבי קודש

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Eruvin 97-98 and 103  שבות במקדש וכתבי קודש

One of the main themes in the later part of this concluding chapter of Eruvin is the rule that אין שבות במקדש – there are no rabbinical prohibitions of Shabbos in the Temple.

For example, one may

  1. use a bolt that is attached to the door but drags on the floor to lock a door  (Eruvin 102a)
  2. return the bottom hinge of a door to its place (Eruvin 102b)
  3. put a bandage back on (Eruvin 102b)
  4. retie the string of a musical instrument that broke (according to those who permit מכשירי מצוה  ( see Gemara Eruvin 102b-103a)
  5. Cut a lesion off the hands of a kohain with one’s hand (Eruvin 103b)
  6. Scatter salt on the ramp (Eruvin 104a)
  7. Draw water from certain pits (Eruvin 104a)

When required for Temple service, even though they all involve rabbinic prohibitions and are not permitted elsewhere.

This leniency is limited to rabbinically forbidden actions that are needed for the Temple service, and do not apply to actions done for personal benefit, even if they are performed in the Temple.

Although, due to our many sins, we do not have a Temple today, this rule might not be completely irrelevant in our times, at least according to certain views.

The Gemara (Eruvin 93a) discusses the converse of the above-mentioned case, namely whether a שבות  needed for the Temple service may be performed outside the Temple.

For example, may one cut off a lesion from a kohain outside the Temple to make him fit for the service inside the  Temple?

Rav Yosef claims that this would not be permitted!

Yet Rav Safra brings an earlier Mishna (Eruvin 97b)  to dispute this claim.

We have learnt that if one was reading from a holy scroll on the איסקופה (threshold of his house), assumed at this point to be a private domain, and the scroll rolled to the ground of the public domain below, so long as one is still holding it in one’s hand, one may roll it up again.

This is because it has not yet “rested” in the public domain, being still in his hand, and although there would normally still be a rabbinic prohibition against doing so in case it falls from his hand and he comes to bring it in from a public domain, a biblical prohibition, when it comes to כתבי קודש  (holy books), this שבות  does not apply.

Rav Safra  amazingly assumes that the sanctity of holy books has the same law as the Temple service, due to their sanctity (see Rashi on Eruvin 93) and attempts to derive from here that in the face of such concerns, the rule of אין שבות במקדש  extends to outside the Temple too.

According to this interpretation of the rule, it does not refer to the geographic location where the שבות  is concerned but rather to its purpose- There is no שבות  when it comes to matters of sanctity!

In fact, the Gemara (Eruvin 98a) actually first explains that this lenient ruling is based on the view of Rabbi Shimon that כל דבר שהוא משום שבות אינו עומד בפני כתבי הקודש- “anything rabbinically forbidden regarding shabbos does not stand in the face of holy writings.”

However, Rav Safra’s proof is rejected (Eruvin 93a) based on the Gemara’s conclusion (Eruvin 98a) that the mishna was dealing with an איסקופה כרמלית  , not one that is a private domain.

Seeing as bringing it back into this כרמלית  from theרשות הרבים  would only be rabbinically prohibited, one is permitted לכתחילה  to roll it back so long as it is still in one’s hands without being concerned that it will  fall from his hands- this is in keeping with a general rule of אין גוזרין גזירה לגזירה (see Tosfos Eruvin 98 ד”ה “אלא”  who discusses this in more detail.)

As such, there is no proof from this Mishna that one may perform a שבות  needed for the מקדש  (or sanctity) outside the מקדש  .

However, while the Gemara rejects Rav Safra’s proof that such a שבות  may be performed even outside the מקדש, it does not seem to question his analogy between Temple service and holy writing (though see Tosfos haRosh Eruvin 93a ד”ה “ולאו” .)

As such, should we conclude from other sources, as Rav Safra continues to attempt to do and Abaya seems to concede, that שבות דמקדש  may be performed even outside the מקדש, it might follow that holy writings may be recovered outside the מקדש  as well, so long as no biblical transgression is transgressed.

However, not only does Rava (Eruvin 93b)  seem to conclude that we have no proof that a שבות במקדש  may be performed outside the Mikdash, the conclusion of the Gemara on Eruvin 98 seems to be clear that we do not follow Rabbi Shimon’s leniency regarding כתבי קודש .

As such, it seems that there is no blanket rule that one may perform a rabbinical prohibition for the sake of holy writings on Shabbos, and on the contrary, the default rule seems to be that it is forbidden in cases where there is a concern of coming to a biblical prohibition.

Yet as Tosfos (Eruvin 93a) points out, the Gemara (Eruvin 97a) permits bringing in Tefillin that one finds in the public domain and are in danger of desecration, 4 amos at a time, something normally rabbinically forbidden.

He concludes that there are indeed times when   שבות  might be permitted for the sake of holy writings, such as in that case where they are in danger of actual desecration.

Tosfos haRosh goes further and suggests that when holy writings are in danger of desecration in the street, it is the equivalent of שבות במקדש במקדש  – a שבות  regarding the מקדש  INSIDE the מקדש, a rather abstract concept that requires further analysis.

In our case, however, it might not be dignified for the holy writings to be left in the public domain, but they are not in danger of actual desecration.

Although only Rabbi Shimon permits a שבות  in the latter case, everyone seems to agree that it is permitted in the former, an application of the rule of אין שבות במקדש  even in our day- Holy books are evidently the closest thing we have to a Temple!These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Eruvin 101-102 bolting the door, minhag, and the new Rav in town

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In our earlier post on Eruvin 74-75, we discussed the situation where a community had received a lenient ruling which it followed and was later given a more stringent ruling by a new authority.

We noted the ruling of the Rema that a new Rav may indeed repeal the lenient ruling of a previous Rav, and that this might also apply to repealing an earlier stringent ruling.

The later might be more problematic, given the general rule (Pesachim 51a ) that דברים המותרים ואחרים נהגו בהם אסור אי אתה רשאי להתירן לפניהם  – things that are permitted but others were accustomed to forbid, one is not permitted to permit in front of them.

If this is the case for a stringency that a community took on by itself, how much more so should it be the case for something which they took on because of a ruling from their previous Rav!

In our Misha at the bottom of Eruvin 101, there is an explicit reference to a similar situation where Rabbis repealed existing lenient or stringent practices, though it is not clear whether the original practise was based on an earlier ruling of a Torah scholar, or simply developed over time.

The mishna continues to discuss actions that might resemble the מלאכה  of building on shabbos, including inserting a bolt whose one head is large enough to use to pound food (and thus considered a useful vessel already ) into a door in order to lock it (I have followed Rashi’s explanation here for the sake of brevity but this is a complex discussion in the Rishonim in its own right.)

The  Gemara later makes clear that if the bolt is already permanently connected to the door and is easily moved without the rope breaking (see Rashi and other Rishonim who give different explanations) even Rabbi Eliezer permits locking the door with it, as doing so no longer resembles building.

In contrast, if it was already connected to the door, but cannot be moved without the rope breaking (once again following Rashi’s explanation) , Rabbi Eliezer forbids doing so, seeing as it is not properly connected already, whereas Rabbi Yossi permits, seeing as it already has the features of a useful כלי and doing so does not resemble building.

The Ritva explains that this is because a person does not usually permanently set aside a useful כלי  as a bolt and it is clear to all that this is only a temporary fix and not an act of building .

Fascinatingly, both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yossi bring support for their view from an incident in the shul in Teverya.

Rabbi Eliezer reported that the original custom in that shul was to lock the door with such a bolt, and when Rabban Gamliel and the elders came, they forbade it.

In contrast, Rabbi Yossi accounts that the original custom had been not to do so, and that when Rabban Gamliel and the elders came, they permitted it!

Although they do not appear bothered at all by the fact that according to Rabbi Eliezer, Rabban Gamliel and the elders forbade something against the existing custom to permit it, Tosfos are bothered by how according to Rabbi Yossi, they permitted something against the existing custom to forbid it.

This is because , as mentioned above, we have learnt (Pesachim 51a) that if something is permitted but others have treated it as forbidden, it is forbidden to permit it in front of them.

Seeing as the member of that shul were long accustomed to prohibiting this, how could Rabban Gamliel and the elders come and permit it?

Their answer could have  far-reaching ramifications for the authority of minhagim in general, and we shall hopefully get the chance soon again in Pesachim to discuss this issue in more detail.

For our purposes, we shall note that Tosfos distinguishes between a custom which people took on because they mistakenly believed something was actually forbidden, and a custom which people took on as an extra chumra despite knowing that it was actually permitted.

In the former case, their minhag was taken on due to error, and one may certainly permit it to them.

In the later case, no error was involved, and one may not later permit it.

Tosfos understands that according to Rabbi Yosi, the members of the shul refrained from locking the door with such a bolt because they mistakenly believed it was forbidden, and Rabban Gamliel and the elders were well within their rights to correct their error and permit it!

What is still unclear is what the reason was for their initial error? Was it simply ignorance on their part, or was it because another Rabbi had mistakenly (at least in the view of the later Rabbi) told them that it was forbidden (as Rabbi Eliezer indeed held?)

If the later is true, it would solve our original problem of how a new Rabbi can permit something forbidden by the previous Rabbi if in his view, the previous Rabbi was wrong.

It is also possible, however, that seeing as the community was doing the right thing by following their Rabbi at the time, their stringent practise cannot be seen as an error, and in such a case, the new Rabbi may not permit it.

The role of rabbinic authority in the acceptance of minhagim is itself worthy of much discussion, and as mentioned, I hope to continue this when we reach the relevant sugya in Pesachim, Hashem willing!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Eruvin 100 Running on grass on Shabbos

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This is one of those daf that are  filled with an array of different colorful topics not directly related to Eruvin per se, spanning from other shabbos laws to advice regarding marital intimacy.

One of them is the prohibition of climbing or making use of trees on Shabbos and Yom-Tov.

The Gemara also brings a Beraisa that says that one may not even walk on grass on Shabbos, apparently in case one uproots it while walking.

This supports a ruling to that effect of Rami bar Aba in the name of Rav Assi, who bases this on the passuk )Mishlei 19/2)  “ואץ ברגלים חוטא”- one who is “אץ” with his legs is a sinner.

Rashi explains that this implies that walking can be considered a sin and doing so on grass on shabbos is precisely such a case.

The Gemara brings another Beraisa that rules to the contrary that walking on grass on shabbos is permitted.

The Gemara gives several options to reconcile these two Beraisa’s:

  1. The stringent  Beraisa is talking about walking on moist grass, which Rashi explains is forbidden, whereas the other is talking about walking on dry grass which Rashi explains is considered as if it has already been uprooted. Perhaps this is because dry grass  does not grow, is no longer deriving much nourishment from the grounded and detaching it might thus not fall under the מלאכה  of קוצר (harvesting) which includes detaching anything from the place where it grows.
  2. The one Beraisa is talking about during the dry season, and the other is talking about during the wet season.
  3. The stringent  Beraisa is talking about someone who is not wearing shoes. Rashi explains that the grass gets stuck around his toes and is easily torn.
  4. The stringent Beraisa is talking about one is who wearing shoes with nails in the bottom which cause grass to be torn .
  5. The stringent Beraisa is talking about walking on long grass which is more easily uprooted.

Though there appear to be some differences in the גירסא  (wording) of the above distinctions, they seem to be conclusively rendered mute by the Gemara that concludes that “today” that we follow Rabbi Shimon who holds that דבר שאין מתכוין מותר, it is permitted under all the above circumstances.

We have discussed multiple times in our posts on Maseches Shabbos the rule of דבר שאין מתכוין- when an otherwise permitted action might result in an unintended  secondary forbidden action.

Although Rabbi Yehuda and the Amora Rav forbid such an action, Rabbi Shimon and the Amora Shmuel permit it, and many Amoraim rule accordingly, including the later authority Rabbah- one of the only 3 times he supports a leniency of Shmuel against a stringency of Rav.

In our case, one wishes to perform the ostensibly permitted action of walking on grass, and there is a concern that while doing so, one will unintentionally transgress a second forbidden action of uprooting the grass

As we also know from various places, when the secondary forbidden action is inevitable, it is known as פסיק רישיה  and even Rabbi Shimon forbids the otherwise permitted action .

As such, it should follow from our Gemara’s application of Rabbi Shimon’s leniency to walking over grass in all these different circumstances that it does not consider uprooting the grass to be an inevitable result even when the shoes have nails in them or where the grass is long! (Alternatively, this could serve as a proof for the view of the ערוך who permits פסיק רישיה דלא ניחה but that is for a different discussion!)

If so, it seems that Rami bar Aba and Rav Assi who applied the passuk in Mishlei to this act, in line with the stringent Beraisa, must have held like Rabbi Yehuda and his view and accompanying דרשה  from the passuk is rejected together with the stringent Beraisa.

A very practical question involves whether this lenient ruling applies to running on grass as well.

On the one hand, the pressure exerted by running on the grass is certainly greater than that exerted by walking, both because of the speed as well as the different mechanism of running.

On the other hand, it is certainly not clear that running on short grass with regular shoes is more likely to uproot the grass than running on long grass with nailed shoes, and if the later is not considered פסיק רישיה, the former might not be either.

In addition, if there was a distinction between walking and running, one would expect the Gemara to make that distinction- it would be a perfect way to reconcile the two Beraisa’s!

One might counter that running is already forbidden on Shabbos as a weekday activity (see Shabbos 113a) but running  to learn, shul  or for the sake of another  mitzva is permitted (see Brachos 6b and Rif’s girsa there) , as is running for עונג שבת   (סמ”ק רפא) , so that argument seems rather mute.

If it was indeed פסיק רישיה  to run on grass on the way to shul, for example, one would expect the Gemara to say so at some point.

The Biur Halacha (O.C. 336/3) however, brings the סמ”ג  (לאוין סה) , who quotes the Yere’im as bringing our Gemara as a proof that one should not walk on grass on shabbos where it is impossible not to uproot it while walking!

He quotes others who questioned these words of the סמ”ג  based on the seemingly obvious fact that the Gemara rejected the view that forbids walking on grass because we follow Rabbi Shimon, implying that it does not consider it to be פסיק רישיה  under any circumstances- after all, this is how most of the Rishonim seem to have learnt the sugya!

He suggests that the סמ”ג  and יראים were bothered by the fact that the Gemara rejected all the distinctions made to reconcile the stringent Beraita with the lenient one, because we follow Rabbi Shimon, but did not reject the derasha of Rabbi Assi that started the discussion.

They therefore assume that Rabbi Asi’s derasha is still upheld and he must be referring to running on tall grass, which is considered to be  פסיק רישיה.

Based on this reasoning, he cautions in  the Mishna Berura (O.C. 336/25)  against running on long grass on Shabbos.

This seems to be quite a chumra, given that it is based on a distinction not made by the Gemara, as well as a novel interpretation of a סמ”ג  and יראים  that we do not see in most of the Rishonim (see Aruch haShulchan 336/21 who indeed rejects this stringency for these reasons,) but it opens the door to the possibility that under certain circumstances, there is a distinction between running and walking, and even when running is permitted on shabbos, for a mitzva or oneg shabbos, it might be problematic where uprooting the grass appears closer to inevitable.

Would the Mishna Berura extend that stringency to other types of running that might be closer to פסיק רישיה  such as running on regular grass without shoes or with nail-studded shoes?

Seeing as his ruling is already novel, and he never mentioned such obvious possibilities, it seems that even if we follow his stringency, we should apply the rule of אין בו אלא חדושו (we do not extend a novelty beyond what is stated,) unless it is clear to us under certain circumstances that there is a case of פסיק רישיה.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha