On some of the daf we have been studying, we find a large concentration of references to various minhagim and mitzvot which Chazal praised themselves for doing.
These are the kind of dapim that could have a daf post like ours for virtually every line and choosing which one to focus on is a major effort.
However, “לא עליך המלאכה לגמור ולא אתה בן חורין להפטר ממנה” (the work is not on you to complete, but you are not free to exempt yourself from it.” (Avos 2/16)
Just as a complex and long sugya spanning many daf cannot be given justice in one daf post, neither can daf like these which contain large amounts of short but infinitely deep one-liners.
Let us at least try have a brief look at a few:

1. The daf opens continuing with the statement of Abaya, who praises himself for making a festive day celebration for his Yeshiva students whenever they completed a Talmudic tractate.
   This is an important primary source for the common practice to make a festive meal, or Siyum, when a tractate is completed, but the implication of the statement seems to be that such an event does not only justify a festive meal, but an actual festival like day, perhaps with the rules of other festive days where melacha is not forbidden, such as Rosh Chodesh, Purim, or Chanuka, on which activities such as fasting, eulogies, and saying תחנונים (supplications) are not allowed.
   We see a similar concept (Bava Kama 87a ) where Rav Yosef declares that if he were to find out that the halacha follows the view that a blind man is liable to perform all commandments, he would make a ימא טבא לרבנן (a festive day for the Rabbis), seeing as Rabbi Chanina taught us (perhaps contra instinctively) that one who is commanded to fulfil a commandment is actually greater than who performs it voluntarily.
   This is the primary source for making a celebratory meal on the day that a boy becomes barmitzvah (and possibly when a girl becomes bat-mitzva), where he celebrates that fact that he is now in the superior category of those who are obligated to perform the mitzvos.
   Once again, although the implication of the words seems to imply that a festive day should be declared, not only for the barmitzvah boy, but for those who participate in his celebration ( a festive day for the Rabbis ,) the minhag seems to be somewhat more limited to having a festive meal, as well as to giving the boy priority when it comes to reading from the Torah- we have not found that this day is treated with the laws of a mini Yom-Tov either for the celebrants or the Barmitzva himself.
   Another apparent anomaly between the wording of Abaya’s statement is that given that the Talmud had not yet been sealed, the completion of a tractate he was referring to is likely to have consisted merely of the Mishnayot, perhaps together with the explanations of the leading Amoraim at the time (שמוש תלמידי חכמים)
   Yet common practice seems to be to only make a festive meal on the completion of an entire tractate of the Talmud as we have in front of us today, including not only the teaching from Abaya and Rava till Ravina and Rav Ashi, but also those parts of the Talmud that were completed after them, as well as all the aggadic material that is not directly tied to the Mishnayot at all.
   Perhaps the answer to these questions is that we do not find that either Abaya or Rav Yosef held that it was an obligation to follow their actions in these cases.
   As such, these were not decrees as such, but simply examples of good practices which the Amoraim performed, and on which similar, but not completely identical later customs were based.
   As a result, all we have is the part of their actions that actually became common practice, and the completion of a tractate and attainment of Bar Mitzva are indeed celebrated with a festive meal, as done by these Amoraim, but not with all the laws associated as a full on celebratory day.
   Similarly, common practice is to follow Abaya’s practise of making a festive meal on the completion of a Masechta, but only when the entire Masechta we have in front of us has been completed.
   Yet, it is always first prize when one can reconcile as much of the existing minhag with its basis in the Talmud as possible.
   Regarding the actual study material required to qualify for a Siyum, our teacher haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א , recently wrote an entire booklet on the subject for his annual shiur on Shas, held in memory of his late wife זצ”ל.
   In addition to showing that a Siyum is also commonly made on the completion of a book of Tanach, he opines that it can be made on an in depth study of even one of the more complex tractates of Mishna, such as those in Zeraim and Taharos which do not have accompanying Talmud Bavli- for more details on his view and reasoning, please refer to this .
   I was then delighted to find that our phrase יומא טבא לרבנן is also used regarding a celebratory meal for one who has recovered from illness.
   The Gemara (Brachos 46a) tells us that when Rabbi Zeira was ill, Rabbi Abahu took it upon himself to make a יומא טבא לרבנן (festive day for the Rabbis) when he would recover.
   The way he fulfilled this commitment was by making a festive meal for the Rabbis!
   This seems to reinforce the common practise of interpreting the phrase יומא טבא לרבנן as a perhaps exaggerated expression referring to making a festive meal, rather than taking it literally as referring to an entire day with the literal status of a minor Yom Tov!
2. We find in our daf another example of a practice of Amoraim that evolved over time into a related but not identical practice
   Rabbi Chanina used to wrap himself up on Erev Shabbos and say “באו נצא לקראת שבת מלכה”(“let us go out to greet the Shabbos queen.”)
   Rabbi Yannai used to dress up on Erev Shabbos and call out ” באי כלה באי כלה“(come o bride, come o bride.”
   This practice is the primary source for an entire service known as קבלת שבת, greeting the shabbos, which is held as shabbos is coming in, before Maariv.
   It is interesting to note that whereas Rabbi Chanina used to be the one to actively go out and greet the shabbos, Rabbi Yannai used to call to the shabbos to come in, perhaps two different approaches as to how to greet royalty, or alternatively, as to the nature of the special royalty of Shabbos.
   This approach is reflected in the much later Lecha Dodi poem, written roughly 1000 years after the Talmudic period by the Kabbalist of Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz in Safed, which forms a major part of our relatively modern Kabbalat Shabbat.
   The chorus of the verse calls on us to go out and meet the bride (לכה דודי לקראת כלה), whereas the final stanza ends with the words באי כלה באי כלה , (come of bride, come o bride), as on our daf.
   These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

On this Daf, we encounter a fascinating narrative where the sage Chizkiya asks his student, the famous Rabbi Yochanan , a complex question regarding the laws of impurity, and is so impressed with the answer he gives that he exclaims: “This is no man” (but rather an angel, according to Rashi’s explanation.)
A different version of this event is then brought where he exclaims: “THIS is a man.” (ie a real man.)
It appears that there could be a major disagreement between the 2 versions of what Chizkiya said regarding whether an outstanding Torah scholar is to be considered the sign of a truly great man, or an angelic quality, virtually out of reach of a mere human being.
The latter is supported by the well-known statement of Chazal (Bava Metzia 59b) that “לא בשמיים היא “- it is not in heaven. The Torah in supposed to be interpreted, and applied by human beings who have reached the highest levels they can as human beings, NOT by angels, and a voice from heaven is usually not admissible when it comes to halachik rulings.
This is further backed up the exhortation of Hillel (Avos 2\5) that in a place where there is no “man”, one should try to be a man!
However, the continuation of the Gemara does seems to leave both approaches as equally viable options.
It brings the famous statement of Rabbi Zeira in the name of Rava bar Zimuna that אם ראשונים בני מלאכים אנו בני אנשים ואם ראשונים בני אנשים אנו כחמורים… -if the early authorities are like angels, we are human beings, and if they are like human beings, we are like donkeys….
One cannot escape the fact that this statement is brought here in order to refer back to the two different versions of Chizkiya’s statement, and does not only consider both options, but sees the relationship between humans and angels as similar to that between donkeys and humans.
It is clear from this that angelic qualities are considered by our sugya to be superior to human one’s in this regard, but the only debate is as to how we are to be view the qualities of those before us and what Hizkiya considered Rabbi Yochanan’s level to be.
There is much to discuss about it, but one thing that is clear from this sugya is that the later Amoraim considered the scholars of the earlier generations to be far superior in their Torah scholarship to those in their generation.
This is so axiomatic throughout the Shas that entire sugyas are based on ensuring that Amoraim statements do not contradict the statements of the Tannaim before them.
It is necessary, however, to define what precisely this superiority is based on, as well as its scope.
We need to investigate whether this superiority based on the assumption that the quality of quantity of their knowledge and/or reasoning was better, the fact that their divine inspiration and guidance was better, their superiority in righteousness, or their being closer in history to the Sinaitic tradition?
Although Amoraim generally could not or would not argue with Tannaim, its is common for later Tannaim to disagree with earlier Tannaim or for later Amoraim to disagree with earlier Amoraim.
In fact, in a dispute between later Amoraim and earlier Amoraim, we ironically apply the rule of הלכתא כבתראי – the law is like the later authority! (see however Rosh, Bava Metzia 57 who opines that this rule only applies from Abaya and Rava onwards and not before, against the Rif who seems not to differentiate.)
How does this fit in with the idea of אם ראשונים כמלאכים?
In a fascinating case (Brachos 20), Rav Papa asks Abaya why it is that the earlier generations merited to experience miracles, and their generation did not.
He points out that it cannot be because they knew more Torah, as Rav Yehuda’s generation (notably second generation Amoraim) were focused on the part of the Talmud that focusses on damages, and they were focused on all 6 sections of the Talmud.
It also could not be that they understood it better, as Rav Yehuda expressed great difficulty with a certain Mishna while they were able to expand on it with ease.
Yet Rav Yehuda only needed to remove his shoe for rain to come, and their generation could daven all day and nothing happened!
Abaya responded that Rav Yehuda’s generation sacrificed themselves to sanctify Hashem’s name (did risky things in order to preserve the honor of the Torah) and their generation did not.
It seems from here that the superiority of the earlier generations lies NOT in their breadth of knowledge, nor in their greater analytical ability, but rather in their מסירות נפש (self-sacrifice.)
This contrasts greatly with the view expressed by Rabbi Zeira on our daf which seems to put it down to greater analytical ability.
It should also be noted that BOTH of these examples are brought by later Amoraim in reference to earlier ones (whether Rabbi Zeira comparing his generation of scholars to those of Rabbi Yochanan or Abaya comparing his to that of Rav Yehuda.)
Perhaps one answer lies in a radical Rambam (Mamrim 2/1 ) which states that even though when it comes to גזירות made by Chazal, a later Beis Din cannot annul the ruling of an earlier one unless it is greater than them in wisdom and numbers (see Megilla 2a), this does not apply to things that Chazal derives from the Torah itself via the logical rules of interpretation (יג עקרים ).
The Kesef Mishna is extremely bothered by this Rambam, given that we have a rule throughout the Shas that an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna in anything!
However, a reading of the Rambam’s introduction to the Mishna Torah reveals that he too agrees with this rule, and holds that nobody after the sealing of the Talmud can argue with the ruling of the Talmud either.
This is indeed the answer given by the Kesef Mishna, without reference to the above introduction.
However, his reasoning has nothing to do with the superiority of these different groups of sages in their learning, but rather is explained by the fact that the ruling of the Mishna and later the Gemara were accepted by the entire Jewish people and the leading scholars of the time, and thus had the status of a ruling of the great Sanhedrin.
However, within one period, such as amongst the Tannaim , amongst the Amoraim, or amongst the post-Talmudic sages, there is no such restriction, other than the general rule regarding decrees only being annullable by a greater and more numerous Beis Din.
In case one might argue that such is impossible, as each generation is weaker than the previous one, the Rambam ( Mamrim 2/2) makes it clear that it is certainly possible, even if one cannot get a larger court than that of 71 judges, should there be more Torah scholars who support them.
It is clear from the above that the Rambam has a very limited view of ירידת הדורות and does not subscribe any halachik weight to the statement of Rabbi Zeira on our daf.
It is possible that he views the case in Brachos which attributes the superiority of the earlier generations to their greater מסירות נפש, as the more authoritative of the two, but sees neither case as forbidding disagreement per say with the earlier generations, the only exception being Amoraim disagreeing with Tannaim and post Talmudic authorities disagreeing with Amoraim, for entirely different reasons as mentioned above.
Whether the view of the Rambam is accepted by other authorities and whether this indeed is his view required further study, but in the context of a daf post, this should serve as a basis for opening the discussion.