On our daf, we are told an incredible idea about the letters in the aleph bet (alphabet)
The 5 letters that change form at the end of a word (מנפצך) were not always like that!
The open form of the letters used at the beginning and in the middle of words were actually a newer innovation of the נביאים prophets! (Rashi points out that in a parallel sugya (Megillah 2b), the claim is that the closed form at the end of the word was the later addition- see there for how he resolves this.)
It is the closed form of the letters that we only use at the end which were actually the original, and the prophets for some reason introduced the open form everywhere except at the end of the word!
The Gemara takes major issue with this statement, calling on the passuk ” אלה המצוות” (“THESE are the laws” – Devarim 36/13 )which teaches us that only the commandments given to Moshe at Sinai were valid and from then on, no prophet could innovate anything else- אין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר .
The Gemara replies that both forms actually existed already, the prophets simply decided which form to use at the end of the word and which form to use in the rest of the world.
That too is rejected, seeing as even such a decision would be considered an innovation, which prophets may not make.
The Gemara finally concludes that both forms of the letter as well as where they were to be used were indeed given over to Moshe, but they were forgotten, and the Nevi’im (prophets) reestablished them.
In a different sugya, even the reading of the Megila , a Mitzva instituted by the prophets Mordechai and Esther, was subject to scrutiny by Chazal (Megila 14a) , and they pointed out that none of the Nevi’im added to anything in the Torah except in this case, due to a קל וחומר (fortiori logical argument) that they found.
From our daf, however, we see that this rule doesn’t only apply to introducing new Mitzvos, but also applies to changing the form of the Hebrew letters, or even deciding when each form should be used!
As similar concept is found in the beginning of Bava Kama (2b) , where the Gemara tries to derive that נגיחה (goring) must be done with the horns of an ox to be considered נגיחה , from a Passuk in Navi (Melachim I 22/11.)
The wicked king of Israel, Achav, has convinced the righteous king of Yehuda, Yehoshafat, to go to war with Aram to claim back Ramot Gilad, which they had occupied.
All the false and/or idolatrous prophets tell Achav exactly what he wants to hear, namely that he will succeed, but Yehoshafat insists that he look for a surviving true prophet of Hashem from whom to seek council.
Meanwhile, one of these “yes men”, Tzidkiya ben Kenaanah, takes two large metal horns and told Achav and the people that they would use these horns to “gore” the enemy into submission
The true navi, Michayahu, in contrast, predicts that the war will be a disaster and advice them to stay home.
For this, he is imprisoned by Achav’s men, and the two kings lead their troops into battle together.
(We see similar treatment of our great prophets who refuse to give people the false sense of comfort that they want and speak truth to power, in many places in Tanach, one of the most famous being the horrendous incarceration of Yirmiyah but the last king of Yehuda, Tzidkiya, for similarly breaking ranks with all the false prophets and advising surrender to the approaching Babylonians.)
Back to the horns of Tzidkiya, Chazal derive from here that the word יגח ( yigach), refers to injuring with the horns.
However, another source from the Chumash is also given for this, and the Gemara explains that this is because one might counter that דברי תורה מדברי קבלה לא ילפינן – one may not derive words of the Torah from the words of Kabbalah (the term used by Chazal for prophecy, but that’s another discussion!)
In the end, the Gemara still accepts this proof, seeing as we are not deriving any laws per se, but simple learning the meaning of a word (גלוי מלתא) which is acceptable.
Here, we were not attempting to derive new mitzvas from the Neviim, but simply some details of the laws mentioned in the Torah through a גזירה שוה ( Masoretic comparison based on similar language) – namely that the damages that the Torah is referring to need to be by the horns of the ox ,in order for the relevant laws to apply.
Yet even this is not considered valid, and the only thing that we can actually apply from the words of the Nevi’im to Torah matters is shedding light on the meaning of words used in the Torah- this is not through a גזירה שוה but simply a גלוי מילתא.
However, it does not take much to see that this cannot be so straight forward as it looks.
So many new laws of Shabbos, including the mitzvas of honoring and enjoying shabbos (כבוד ועונג שבת ) as well as the prohibition of עובדין דחול ( weekday activities that are not melacha but inappropriate for shabbos) are derived from the famous speech of Yeshayahu, which we read as the haftarah from Yom Kippur (Yeshayahu 58/13.)
In addition, Chazal tell us )Shabbos 24b) that Shlomo haMelech instituted נטילת ידים (washing hand before eating bread)and Eruvin, mentions many decrees made by various biblical figures, and of course, made so made so many decrees of their own!
Even the Mitzva of Chanukah, instituted by Chazal long after the period of prophecy, is accepted, due to the biblical injunction to follow the Torah leadership and prohibition against going against it (Shabbos 23a).
Why could the same not apply to a relatively simple matter of the shape of the letters, or learning how נגיחה is done?
Perhaps the key lies in the famous words of the Rambam (Mamrim 2/9), where he asks how it is possible for Chazal to make decrees against things the Torah does not forbid, when there is a prohibition to add or subtract from the Torah.
He notes that the prohibition of adding to the Torah applies to making new laws and making out as if they are biblical laws.
However, so long as they are clear that they are rabbinical laws, there is no issue, and on the contrary, it is part of their mandate (probably from the passuk לא תסור and ושמרתם את משמרתי.)
The same argument might be applicable not only to the decrees the Rambam mentions, but also to entirely new rabbinical mitzvas, though one would want to explain why the Rambam fails to mention this.
The case we see on our daf is not a new rabbinical mitzva or decree, but an actual change in the biblical laws as to how to write a sefer-Torah and other holy scrolls.
Similarly, the case in Bava Kama is not a new rabbinical form of liability for damages, but a derivation by גזירה שוה of the details of biblical laws, from verses in the prophets.
In truth though, even without having thoroughly examined each sugya where the idea of אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר is mentione, I see a major issue with using this approach- the case of Megillah has no pretensions of being a biblical Mitzva, but is a מצוה מדברי סופרים ( a commandment initiated by the prophets or sages.)
If so, why was a קל וחומר argument needed in order for Mordechai and Esther to initiate it?
Surely it should have been permitted without such an argument for the same reason as Chanukah was!
Category Archives: general concepts
Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters
Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters
את חטאי אני מזכיר היום
I have admitted before that technical matters are not my strong point, and like many others, I usually tend to glide over the more technical sections of the Tanach and Talmud, without really understanding what is going on.
Hence, when it comes to Parshas Teruma, and other similarly styled parshiyos , I have a particularly hard time getting though the required weekly שניים במקרא ואחד תרגום (reading the weekly portion twice in Hebrew and once in the Aramaic translation/commentary of Onkelus.)
The depth of the technical descriptions of the makeup and precise dimensions of the Mishkan and its vessels simply are not recognized easily by me, and even when they are , the required level of focus and mental visualization usually proves too much for me- I thus usually land up making do with a quick leining- style reading and move on to the more conceptual or contemporary topics that seem to match my talent set better.
However, one takes oneself with wherever one goes, and such human weaknesses always come back to haunt us, not only each year, but also whenever we get to parts of the Talmud that analyze these matters, which given the nature of the Shas, can pop up in the most unexpected places.
Seeing as so much of the laws of Shabbos are derived from the work of the Mishkan, it is inevitable that at some point, they will lead back to the technical descriptions in the relevant verses of the same.
Our daf is one of those moments, and a discussion of whether a public domain covered by a roof is similar enough to the public domains in the biblical camp of Israel to be considered as such regarding the law of passing and carrying, takes us to a discussion of the wagons that were used to transport the components of the Mishkan, in particular its beams, and status of the enclosed space between them.
This in turn takes us to a discussion of the properties of the beams themselves and the bars that reinforce them, which brings us to a rather cryptic passuk that describes the central bar.
Each beam was 10 Amos (handbreadths) tall, 1.5 Amos wide, and 1 Amah thick (at least at the base.)
20 beams thus made up the 30 Amos length of the Mishkan on both the North and South side.
Another 6 beams made up the 10 Amos width, with 2 other beams on either side to fill the gaps.
Various bars were placed along the length of the planks, with one central bar in the middle.
The passuk tells us (Shmos 26/28) “והבריח התכון בתוך הקרשים מבריח מן הקצה אל הקצה” (and the main bar in the midst of the beams should run from one end to another.)
The simple meaning of this verse seems to imply that the wooden bar ran all the way from the south-eastern corner of the Mishkan, to the north-eastern corner, making a perfect right-angled turn twice along the way, a somewhat challenging if not impossible task for any carpenter, as Rashi on our daf points out.
So much so, that a Beraisa teaches that the middle bar of the Mishkan was put and held in place miraculously!
Tosfos, however, quotes the ר”י (Rabbeinu Yitchak, one of the leading Tosafists, who brings another Midrash that holds there was no miracle here at all.
It explains simply that the 2 lower and 2 upper rows of beams each contained 5 separate beams- One went from the south-east corner half -way down the southern wall of the Mishkan, another from there till the south-west corner. Another then covered the western wall, and the other two similarly covered the northern wall.
The main “beam”, in contrast, consisting of only 3 separate beams, one for each of the 3 walls, and when the passuk says that it went from one end to the other, it means from one end of each wall to the other end of the same wall, not along the entirety of the 3 walls!
Whereas this is far from the simple meaning of the verse, and requires one to interpret “the main beam” as the 3 “main beams of each wall”, as well as the “5 beams” of each side as the “5 sets of beams of the southern and northern side and one set of beams of the western side”, it allows us to explain this completely naturally without resorting to a miracle.
This seems to illustrate that the debate over how common miracles are and whether to try and interpret seemingly miraculous descriptions in the sacred texts in a natural way where possible, commonly largely ascribed to the Rambam and the Ramban (for another post) , is in fact a much older debate, amongst the sages themselves!
Another example of this can be found in the story of Rav Huna and his wine cellar (Brachos 5b)
The Gemara tells how a financial tragedy befell Rav Huna (who seems to have been either a wine merchant or a very serious collector), where 400 barrels of wine went rancid (turned to vinegar.)
On visiting him to, two other Amoraim respectfully advised him to investigate his financial affairs to see if he had done something to deserve this huge loss.
After some debate, he admits to something seemingly rather minor (and perhaps not even strictly forbidden-another post some time bli neder) and commits to making it right.
One opinion then tells us that that a miracle took place and the vinegar turned back into wine!
Another narrative is then suggested that it did not really turn back into wine, the price of vinegar simply went up and matched the price of wine!
While the later case shows a debate as to whether the reward he received was through a supernatural miracle, or an unlikely natural event that took place at the precise time it was needed, also a form of miracle, albeit a natural one, we again see two different views regarding whether to interpret events as supernatural miracles, or to explain them in a natural way where possible!
When one studies the original Talmudic sources in depth and breadth, rather than just reading summaries of far-reaching debates and controversies amongst the Rishonim and even contemporary authorities , one often sees how the debate can be traced back much further than one originally thought.
The later Amoraim after do that with a dispute amongst earlier Amoraim, with the claim of כתנאי (claiming that this argument is actually based on an earlier debate amongst the Mishnaic sages)
Is there any reason why we should not attempt to do the same with the disputes amongst the Rishonim?!
Shabbos 89 The teenager in halacha
It is commonly known that the age of majority in Jewish law is 12 for a girl and 13 for a boy, roughly the average age of the onset of puberty.
At this age, the Jewish adolescent becomes obligated to perform all positive commandments, refrain from all negative commandments, is liable to punishment in a court of law, and can participate in much of public Jewish life.
As such, it is the conception of many, that there is no real period of transition between childhood and adulthood recognized by the Torah, and that the term teenager really has no halachik meaning at all.
However, a closer look at various sources , including today’s daf, shows that this is not true at all.
In fact , there is no direct source for the age 13 being the age of majority in the Chumash itself- this is derived mainly through the equally authoritative oral law- we see in the text references to Yishmael having his circumcision at age 13, but given that Yitchak’s circumcision was at 8 days, this is hardly a clear proof for anything .
In fact, the most common age of adulthood referred to in the Torah is the age of 20, specifically when the teen years end.
This is the minimum age for army service, for counting, an important cutoff for ערכים ( evaluations), and the age at which people were sentenced to die in the wilderness after the sin of the spies .
And this is the age, according to numerous statements of Chazal, at which one becomes liable for punishment in the heavenly Court (דיני שמיים.)
One of the key statements about this is made on today’s daf (This source was first pointed out to me quite some years ago in Africa by our great teacher, haGaon haHagadol haRav Asher Weiss שליט”א)
In the future, Hashem approaches Avraham and tells him that the Jewish people have sinned.
He replies that they should be destroyed for the sanctification of Hashem’s name.
Hashem then goes to Yaakov, who gives the same reply .
Finally, he comes to Yitchak who asks Hashem to forgive them based on the following argument:
1. A person only lives 70 years on average
2. The first 20 years is not subject to punishment (in the hands of heaven)
3. Of the remaining 50 years, half are made up of nighttime ( while one is sleeping )
4. Of the remaining 25, half are spent davening, eating, and in the bathroom ( without much chance to sin)
5. Of the remaining 12.5 years , Yitchak offers to cover half with his own merit and asks Hashem to cover the rest .
6. If Hashem disagrees, Yitchak offers to cover them all, in the merit of the Akeida (binding of Yitchak)
There are multiple questions one should ask here, among them:
1. From where do we see that the first 20 years is not subject to punishment, and what exactly does that mean ?
2. Does one really sleep 50% of the time?
3. Does one really spend half one’s awake hours davening, eating, and in the bathroom?
4. Is there really no opportunity to sin during these 3 activities? I can think of plenty personally !
We will focus on the first question for now, bearing in mind the other three, as they might affect how we understand the first as well .
Rashi points out that we learn that the first 20 years are not subject to punishment from the generation of the spies .
After the nation believed the bad report that the spies brought back, they were condemned to wander in the desert for 40 years and die before entering Israel .
Those under 20 years were exempt from the second part of the punishment and would live to enter the land .
From this, we see that one isn’t punished by Hashem for one’s sins until the age of 20.
We said this idea in various other places too , among them :
In the beginning of Parshas Chayei Sarah, Rashi brings the Midrash that Sarah was free of sin at age 100 just like she was at 20.
In Parshas Korach, Rashi quotes Chazal who emphasize the severity of machlokes, in that whereas the heavenly court normally does not punish before the age of 20, due to the severity of the rebellion and machlokes it caused , even children died .
The question that cries out for an answer is as follows ?
How can it be that a 13 year old boy is treated as an adult in almost all regards, even to the point that he can be subject to capital punishment in a court, in the extreme case of the בן סורר ומורה ( wayward son), specifically at that age , but get off scott free for whatever he does, if he does not make it to a human court?
Paraphrasing the words of the נודע ביהודה, can we really accept that a teenage boy can party as much as he wants, sleep around as much as wants, eat whatever he wants, and get off the hook because he is not yet 20?
If he is mature enough to be liable in court and to be able to sign on legal documents, how can he just get off free in the hands of heaven , and not get kareis or מיתה בידי שמים for the worst of sins, or at least the יסורים ( suffering) required to atone for them ?
And if he does not, what motivation is there to hold him back from sin, at a time of life when sin literally crouches at the door?
Clearly this cannot be quite as straightforward as it seems .
Various approaches can be taken, and some have been suggested by various Achronim ( later authorities.)
1. Perhaps this is simply a concept exaggerated by Yitchak in order to speak in our favour.
Just like we clearly don’t sleep for half the 24 period, nor daven, eat, and go to the facilities for half our waking hours, not completely abstain from sin during that time, perhaps the idea is that the first 20 years are more prone to mercy and sometimes Hashem refrains from punishing during that period .
2. Perhaps the punishment is delayed until 20, but after that, one is punished for his earlier sins too.
3. Perhaps there is no punishment during one’s lifetime for sins done before age 20, but one is still punished after death in Olam Habah ( the world to come )
4. Perhaps one is not punished severely during this time, to the point of death or kareis, but one still gets some form of punishment
5. Perhaps one is not punished during this time at all, but one still does not get the great reward one gets for refraining from a sin one is tempted to do,
6. Perhaps one’s soul is still damaged by the aveira and requires repair through atonement
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