Tag Archives: shabbos

Mazal Tov! Shabbos 157 The great finale, and back to מלאכת מחשבת

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It would probably to wrong to expect a masechet of this nature to end with some “lighter” material, and true to expectation, Maseches Shabbos is a marathon from beginning to end.

On the concluding daf of this epic tractate, we went back to discussing the complex topic of Muktza, focusing on the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether certain forms of muktza are prohibited on shabbos at all.

We meet exotic types of muktza again, such as מוקצה מחמת חסרון כיס , which even Rabbi Shimon forbids, and which we have already learned may not even be moved if needed for a permitted purpose or for the space it is occupying.

We see that the Amoraim appear to be split down the middle regarding whether to follow Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda, with Ula, Rav, and Levi following Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel, Zeiri, and Rabbi Yochanan following Rabbi Shimon.

As if this is not enough to pack into the last daf, we learn about annulment of vows on shabbos and in general, and revisit other hot topics we have discussed, such as blocking windows and טומאה.

A final חדוש of the Mishna is that it is permitted, at least under certain circumstances to measure things on shabbos.

Although measuring is usually forbidden on Shabbos or Yom Tov as a form of weekday activity (see Beitza 28a,) our Mishna explicitly permits measuring a cloth to see if it is large enough to become impure, as well as measuring a mikveh to see if the water has the minimum required depth.

At the end of the Mishna, we are told that “from their words, we learnt that we may block, measure, and tie on shabbos.”

Although there is no stipulation in this final sentence that this must be for the sake of a mitzva such as mikva, we will see later that the Gemara understood it precisely in that limited way.

It seems, however that Chazal could not have found a better way to end off though, by bringing in once again the most important concept in Shabbos law- the rule of מלאכת מחשבת.

The Gemara ends with a story where Ula was visiting the house of the exilarch. He saw Rabbah bar Rav Huna sitting inside a bathtub full of water and measuring it while inside.

Shocked, Ullah asked him how he could be measuring on shabbos!

Even though the Mishna permitted measuring on shabbos for the sake of various mitzvot, we do not see that it gave a blanket permission to do so in the absence of a mitzva.

(Why he was not bothered by him being in a bathtub on shabbos was the topic of an earlier post too!)

Rabbah bar Rav Huna responded that he was simply being מתעסק בעלמא (literally busying himself.)

Rashi explains that he was not doing it for any specific need but just to keep himself busy.

We have seen the term מתעסק a few times in this Masechta, and it always refers to performing an action unintentionally in some way.

Performing an action intentionally “just to keep busy” but with no specific need in mind is certainly not the normal use of the word in this masechta, and the masechta has certainly left us with some unexpected homework!

I guess we going to have to come back to Shabbos one day…

הדרן עליך מסכת שבת ודעתן עליך

Shabbos 152-153 Are the dead aware of what we do?

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At the bottom of daf 152, Rav Yehuda tells us that if a dead person has no comforters, we need to get together 10 people during the mourning period and sit at his grave.

Rashi explains that this is referring to someone who has no relatives mourning him, and thus no people coming to comfort them.

The implication of Rav Yehuda’s ruling is that the comforting mourners that we perform is not only done to make the mourners feel better, but also to “comfort” the dead person during his transition to the afterlife.

The Gemara brings a case where someone died in Rav Yehuda’s neighborhood.

They brought 10 people to his grave for 7 days- at the end of the 7 day mourning period, the dead person appeared to Rav Yehuda in a dream and told him that his mind could now be at rest, seeing as he had put his mind at rest.

Rabbi Abahu then makes the incredible statement that whatever is said in front of a dead person can be heard by him, until the grave is sealed.

Another view is brought that he can hear everything said in front of him until the flesh of the body has disintegrated inside the grave.

Towards the end of the daf, the Gemara relates how a heretic once confronted Rabbi Abahu and asked him about our belief that the souls of the righteous are buried under Hashem’s throne of glory.

If this is indeed true, said the heretic, how could the sorcerer have brought back the prophet Shmuel from the dead, as accounted in Shmuel I 28- how could his calls be heard from so far away?

Rabbi Abahu answered that this was done during the 12 months after death, when the body has not yet disintegrated, and the soul still moves up and down between the gravesite and the throne of glory.

The idea that the soul somehow remains tied to the body as long as it has not disintegrated and keeps getting pulled back to the grave sounds bizarre enough and rather chilling indeed, but Tosfos is not content even with this.

Based on other sugyos, Tosfos claims that even after 12 months, when the soul has found its rest, it can still come back to the gravesite and hear what is going one there when it so desires.

The Gemara then makes another statement which seems to imply that a person can tell by listening to his own eulogies whether he is going to the world to come or not.

This is dependant on how much people cry for him, once aroused to do so by the person delivering the eulogy.

Abaya then asks a rather shocking question of his Rebbe, Rabbah, the leading sage of the time.

He asked how Rabbah would be able to tell at his funeral if he was going to the world to come, seeing as everyone in his hometown of Pumbedita hated him!

The idea that the Torah leader of the generation could be hated by the people might sound crazy to the modern mind, but Tanach and the rest of Jewish history are unfortunately full of such cases where the people resent their leaders for rebuking them and speaking truth to power.

Rashi explains that the people of Pumbedita were particularly dishonest and got into a lot of trouble in court with Rabbah.

It is even more bizarre to imagine that the leading Torah center of Babylon was filled with dishonest people who hated their Torah leader, but once again, unfortunately this is not such a novel phenomenon in our history.

We often have the worse situation where Torah leaders are exploited by the corrupt masses and unable to stand up to their pressure, but here, we how the leading Amora of the period stood up to them, like the prophets Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Amos, and other like them had done, and paid the price in terms of popularity.

Seemingly unphased by the question, Rabbah replied that Abaya himself and another sage called Rabbah bar Rav Chanan would deliver such effective eulogies that even those people would be stirred to tears, and that would be the sign he needs that he is going to the afterlife.

The idea that the dead are conscious of what is happening in this world, particularly at the site of the grave during the 12 months after death, is far from taken for granted in Torah sources.

The passuk (Koheles 9/5) says: והמתים אינם יודעין מאומה – “the dead do not know anything.”

In discussing the prohibition against saying words of Torah not related to the dead person at a grave, in order not to mock the dead, the Gemara (Brachos 18a ) questions this entire prohibition based on the above possuk- after all, if they do are not conscious of what is going on even at the grave-site, why should it matter to them if one learns Torah there?

After a long discussion, the Gemara fails to come to a conclusion in this matter, but does seem to hold that at least in matters that affect them, the dead are aware of what is happening, which would solve the issues raised in our sugya.

The Gemara (Taanis 16a) asks why we visit graves on fast days, and two answers are given.

The one answer given is that it is a way of declaring to Hashem that we are like the dead in front of him (totally lifeless and unable to help ourselves.)

The other answer given is that it in order that they will ask for mercy on our behalf.

Although even the first answer does not suggest that we direct our prayers at the dead themselves (something highly problematic), it does suggest that our presence at their graves somehow gets them to intercede on our behalf, something which seemingly would require them to be aware of what is happening at their gravesite, even after the initial 12 month period.

The author of the second answer, in contrast, might not be comfortable with the idea of the dead being aware of our visit, or alternatively, believe that even if they are aware, they are unable to pray on our behalf- “לא המתים יהללו קה”- the dead do not praise Hashem (Tefillin 115/17), nor do they perform other commandments such as praying.

For him, the visit might be less about invoking the assistance of the dead and more about humbling ourselves before Hashem.

Shabbos 150-151 לפני עור, work done by a non-Jew on shabbos, and שבות דשבות re-examined

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On the previous daf, the Mishna taught us that it is forbidden to hire workers on shabbos or to ask one’s friend to do so on one’s behalf.

Although hiring workers does not involve any specific melacha as such, Rashi explains that it goes against the passuk in Yeshayahu (58) which tells us to honor the shabbos and refrain from weekday activities and discussions, namely a “rabbinic” prohibition.

The Gemara ask why it is necessary to forbid asking one’s friend to do so- after all, he is equally obligated in the laws of shabbos!

Rashi understand that because he is equally obligated not to engage in weekday conversation, telling him to do so goes under against the prohibition of “putting a stumbling block in front of the blind,” interpreted by chazal among others things to refer to causing someone to sin)A.Z. 6b.)

It requires some analysis to determine whether one can transgress the biblical command against causing someone to sin by causing him to do something that is only rabbinically prohibited.

It could be argued that a rabbinical sin is not a stumbling-block on a biblical level and one can thus not transgress this prohibition if the sin one causes him to do is only rabbinical in nature.

On the other hand, one could argue that the prohibition is not specifically against causing someone to sin on a biblical level, but on putting a stumbling block in front of him on any level, and a rabbinical prohibition, once forbidden by Chazal, is certainly a stumbling block.

The irony would then be that hiring workers oneself on shabbos might only be a rabbinical prohibition but asking one’s friend to do so would be a biblical prohibition!

The way Rashi understands our Mishna seems to be a proof for this later understanding as he says explicitly that asking one’s friend to hire workers involves the prohibition of putting a stumbling block in front of the blind.

Whether the Gemara itself is a proof for this depends on whether there are any other legitimate ways of explaining why this should so obviously be forbidden.

It is of course possible that Rashi means that he transgresses the prohibition of “putting a stumbling block before the blind” on a rabbinic level, but we would need some precedent for such a thing for this argument to be convincing.

There are indeed times when chazal refer to transgressing a biblical prohibition and mean it on a biblical level (see for example Rashi Sanhedrin 82 regarding נשגז )but for Rashi to claim that this is such an example without saying so explicitly would seem unusual.

Perhaps the act of telling one’s friend to hire workers itself goes against the prohibition of weekday conversation?

However, this is not likely, seeing as the Gemara answers that the Mishna is needed to tell us that even asking a non- Jewish friend to do so is forbidden.

It answers that we already know that too, as it falls under the shvus (rabbinical prohibition) of אמירה לנכרי (asking a non-Jew to perform a forbidden melacha on shabbos.)

If telling someone else to engage in a weekday conversation was also considered weekday conversation, there should be no different between asking one’s Jewish friend or one’s non- Jewish friend

If yesterday we dealt with the general prohibition against telling a non-Jew to do melacha on shabbos, today’s daf deals with work which a non-Jew has done on his own initiative on shabbos.

The rule of the Mishna and accompanying Gemara is that if he performed it for his own benefit or for that of another non-Jew , one may benefit from it, whereas if he did it for a Jew, one may not.

The Mishna gives an example of a non-Jew who brings a reed-based wind instrument on shabbos to play during the eulogies for a Jew who died and is to be buried after shabbos.

It rules that it may only be used if it was brought from inside the techum (area in which walking is permitted on shabbos.

It then discusses a case where a non-Jew dug a grave or made a coffin on shabbos and It is now wanted for burying a Jew after shabbos.

It rules that if it was done for a non-Jew, it may be used for a Jew, but if it was intended for burying a Jew, he may not ever be buried in it.

The general rule coming out of the Mishna seems to be that it is permitted to benefit from a melacha done by a non-Jew on shabbos only if the non-Jew did it for himself or another non-Jew.

If he did it for a Jew, even without being told to do so, it may not be used.

The question is for how long it might not be used: in the first case of the reedpipes, the Mishna does not say that they may not ever be used again for a Jew (though see Rashi who does make this assumption.)

Yet in the second case of the grave/coffin, it says that they may never be used, at least for the Jew they were made for.

Perhaps the distinction lies in the fact that walking outside of the techum is only a rabbinic prohibition according to the view of this Tana (this is a dispute in various places, see Beitza 36: for example.)

On the other hand, making a coffin or grave is a biblical prohibition.

If this distinction is correct, we would conclude that if a non-Jew performs a biblical melacha for a Jew on shabbos, he may never benefit from it, but if he only performed a rabbinic prohibition , he may do so.

However, the assumption that the non-Jew who brought the reed pipe from outside the techum has only performed a rabbinically forbidden act is highly problematic for various reasons.

  1. Even if walking from outside the techum is only rabbinically prohibited, carrying an item from outside also involves the biblical melacha of הוצאה ( transferring something from one domain to another.) – If there was an eruv, there would not be an issue of the techum either.

One could answer that the Mishna is dealing with something brought through a non-built up area that is not defined as a private or public place , but a כרמלית, which too is only a rabbinical prohibition, but one would still be faced with the question why the important factor is whether it came from outside the techum and not whether a biblical or rabbinical melacha of carrying was performed. The Tosfos and other Rishonim deal further with this issue., but I will move on.

  1. We have learnt many times that according to most views, it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform an act that is only rabbinically forbidden on shabbos for the sake of a mitzva (שבות דשבות לדבר מצוה) .

We have seen that some later authorities understand that this principle even permits a Jew to himself perform an action that is only rabbinically prohibited for 2 independent reasons for the sake of a mitzva.

If so, seeing as the instrument is being used for the mitzva of כבוד המת (honoring the dead,) a truly great mitzva, and leaving the techum is only rabbinically forbidden, surely it would have been permitted to ask the non-Jew to bring it lechatchila on shabbos to avoid delaying the burial afterwards?

It is true that the Tosfos are of the view that this principle does not apply to any mitzva, but only certain special mitzvas mentioned explicitly such as circumcision and settling the land of Israel, and this could be a proof for this view, but this not the view of most authorities including the Rambam.

  1. In any case, the distinction we suggested between biblical and rabbinical melacha performed by a non-Jew would not survive the Gemara’s discussion of this Mishna.

The Gemara, for a different purpose ( establishing the law in a case where it is not certain if the non-Jew performed the melacha for a Jew or a non-Jew ) compares this to a different case, where a bathhouse is heated by a non-Jew on shabbos for whoever comes.

The ruling in that case is that if the bathhouse is in a place with a non-Jewish majority, we assume that it was heated for non-Jews and a Jew may bath there immediately after shabbos.

If the majority or even half the people the bathhouse serves are Jewish, then a Jew must wait כדי שיעשה (the time it takes to heat the bathhouse) after shabbos before using it.

Heating the bathhouse clearly involves at least one biblical melacha, lighting the fire and perhaps heating the water, depending on the temperature it reaches, yet the prohibition to use the bathhouse is limited to the period of כדי שיעשה and not forever.

Perhaps the real distinction lies in who the object of the forbidden action is going to serve. In a case where the non-Jew had a specific Jew in mind as the beneficiary of his actions, such as the case of the grave or coffin, that Jew may never benefit from his action.

On the other hand, other Jews, may benefit from it after the period of כדי שיעשה, and in a case where he had no specific person in mind, like the bathhouse and possibly the reed-pipes, any Jew may benefit from it after the period of כדי שיעשה .

These issues form the subject of long and major discussions in the Rishonim before the final halacha is determined- I have just come to take you through a preliminary analysis I have done on my own, in order to open the subject for further study.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 148 The unhelpful rebuke and clapping hands and dancing on Shabbos

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On our daf, Rava bar Rav Chanan asks Abaya about a Mishna (Beitza 36b) that says:
 
לא מספקין ולא מטפחין ולא מרקדין ביום טוב.
One may not “mesapeik”, “metapeiach”, or dance on Yom Tov.
 
When one examines the original Mishna, one sees that these prohibitions are brought as examples of a general rule that all שבותים (rabbinical decrees relating to forbidden work) that apply on Shabbos, also apply on Yom Tov.
 
The Gemara there explains that these 3 decrees were all made because of the concern that one might come to fix כלי שיר (musical instruments) on shabbos.
 
This   would involve the biblical prohibition of מתקן כלי (fixing a vessel,) a תולדה (derivative) of the אב מלאכה (category of forbidden work) of מכה בפטיש (the final hammer blow.)
 
Whereas the meaning of the third of these actions is relatively clear ,  the Rishonim discuss what  מספק  andמטפח  are exactly- for purposes of this post, we shall go with Rashi’s definition in Beitza, that they refer to clapping hands and clapping one hands on one’s leg.
 
Both of these activities involve making sounds which accompany music, and like with  dancing, Chazal were concerned that if they were to be done on Shabbos, one would also come to fix the musical instruments they accompany should they break.
 
 Following the  principle of לא פלוג רבנן  (the Rabbis did not discriminate with their decrees,) it follows that even in situations where musical instruments are not present, seemingly harmless activities performed for the enjoyment of Shabbos and Yom-Tov, such as clapping hands or banging on the table to singing, or dancing, are forbidden.
 
Rava bar Chana’s question to Abaya concerned the fact that despite this, it seems to be common practise amongst the people to do so, yet we do not protest about it.
 
There is an obligation in the Torah of “tochacha”- rebuking one’s neighbor when he is doing something wrong (Vayikra 19/17)- so why is this not applied in this case?
 
Abaya answered that הנח להם לישראל מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין – “leave the Jewish people alone: better they should transgress unknowingly rather than transgress knowingly.”
 
From his answer, it is clear that Abaya acknowledged that public practise was indeed incorrect, but justified the failure to protest with a general rule that when it comes to things that people are unlikely to follow even after rebuke, it is better to refrain from rebuking them in the first place and let their transgression remain in the far less severe category of שוגג    (unknowing transgression.)
 
Abaya brings another example where this rule applies from the laws of Eruvin, a fitting introduction to our next exciting masechta!
 
In order to be permitted to carry within a  מבוי  )side-street or alley that is closed on 3 sides, but open on one side to a public domain(, one has to place either a לחי  (upright pole) on one side of the entrance, or a beam across its width (the precise requirements and different opinions on the matter are discussed in the first chapter of Eruvin, see Mishna on Daf 11b.)
 
Rava had ruled  that one should not sit inside this מבוי  right by the לחי  in case something one is holding falls out of one’s hands, and rolls into the public domain, in which case one might come to retrieve it and desecrate shabbos.
 
 Abaya points out that people seem to ignore this ruling, sit in such places all the time, and no one protests. He explains that this is for the same reason.
 
The Gemara points out that this rule does not only apply for rabbinical prohibitions such as the above two decrees, but also to biblical prohibitions.
 
It gives the example of תוספת יום הכפורים (adding on to the fast by starting a little before nightfall) which is a biblical requirement, is ignored by many people, yet we still do not rebuke them for it.
 
Whether this would apply also to more serious biblical prohibitions and/or those that are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, such as eating on Yom-Kippur, lighting a fire on shabbos, or eating non-kosher animals requires more analysis.
 
 On the one hand, the Gemara does not seem to make any such distinction, on the other hand, from the fact that the example given is a relatively unknown biblical law derived by Chazal from דרשות  and possibly also not of the severity of eating on Yom-Kippur itself, it could be argued that this applies only to  less severe and/or lesser known biblical transgressions.  (see Rashba, Meiri, and others who indeed state that this rule does not apply to prohibitions which are explicitly stated in the Torah, and Rema O.C. 608/2 who rules this way.)
 
 
It is fascinating that this tendency to ignore this prohibition has followed us through centuries, and it is common practise to this very day among many observant Jews to ignore this prohibition and dance, clap, and bang while singing on shabbos.
 
While this is clearly reason not to rebuke people who are so accustomed to doing this that they are not likely to listen, it is certainly not justification for  Bnei Torah who are fully aware of the prohibition to intentionally ignore it.
 
Yet, one finds that many Bnei Torah and Torah scholars have also taken on this lenient practise over the centuries, and it is thus pertinent to try and find some reasons that justify this practise in the first place.
 
Below are a few possibilities.
 
1.    There is a well-known rule that אין גוזרין גזירה על הצבור אלא אם כן רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה – Chazal did not make decrees on the community unless most of the community were able to bare it (Bava Basra 60b.)
 
What happens if Chazal made a decree, thinking that the community was able to handle it, but it later become apparent that it was too much for the community to handle and the decree never took hold?
 
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/6) rules that in such a case, the decree is null and void!
 
The Rambam goes further (Mamrim 2/7) and says that even if it appeared for a while that the decree was or might take hold, but in later generations it became clear that it had never taken hold, the decree may be annulled, even by a lesser Beis Din..
 
Although it seems from Abaya’s answer that he admitted that the decree had taken hold but simply didn’t see rebuke as being effective in this case, it is possible that in later generations it became clear that it has in fact never taken hold at all, and can thus be annulled. (I saw later that Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C. 2/100) takes a somewhat similar approach to what I suggested here, with a few differences that might answer some of the outstanding issues.)
 
 
2.    It is possible that the things that even Bnei Torah do were never in the category of the forbidden decrees in the first place.
 
For example, it seems from a parallel sugya (Eruvin 104a), that not any noise is forbidden under this decree, but only “השמעת קול של שיר” – (making sounds of singing.)
 
Rashi explains that this refers to “הנשמע כעין שיר, בנעימה ובנחת”-the kind of sounds that sound like a song, with a gently rhythm. 
 
 
 
Later in the sugya, he goes further and explains that only soft, pleasant sounds that would help someone fall asleep are forbidden, but loud noisy sounds that would wake someone up are permitted.
 
As it is doubtful that the kind of noisy clapping and banging common amongst Yeshiva Bochrim and at a Chasidic Tisch (Friday night get-together with the grand Rabbi of the sect) would help anyone fall asleep, or be considered “pleasant” to the musical ear.
 
Such clapping or banging might thus not ever have been forbidden, seeing as it would not be done at any self-respecting musical event.
 
The Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 339/9) applies a similar idea to dancing, and claims that the type of dancing commonly done by Bnei Torah while singing  on Shabbos is not in rhythm to the music, and does not fit into the decree against dancing at all- see there for more details.
 
It seems to me that the wording of Rashi  )(Beitza 30a) back this distinction , as he defines מספקין   as “hand on hand”, מטפחים as “hand on the thigh”, and מרקדין as “with the legs.”
This seems to imply that dancing involves the same kind of accompaniment to the music as clapping does, namely in tune to the music, but with the feet, rather than the hands.
 
Otherwise, it is kind of spurious for Rashi to tell us that dancing is done with the legs!
 
If it wasn’t too much of novelty for me to make on my own, I would go further and argue that Rashi holds that מרקדין  is not simply referring to dancing movements, but to the sound one makes with one’s feet while dancing in tune to the music, and the main concern is this rhythmic sound generated by the dancing, not the dancing itself.
 
3.    Tosfos (Beitza 30a) rules that this decree only applied in Talmudic times where it was common for musicians to fix their own musical instruments on the spot if they broke, but in today’s times, where we are not trained to do that, and instruments are generally taken to professionals to fix, there is no such concern, and the decree does not apply.
 
The halachik weight of the Tosfos in Ashkenazi halacha is evident by the fact that the Rema (O.C. 339/3) brings this view, yet it is difficult for several reasons, among them:
 
a.    The biblical obligation to listen to the shofar on Rosh Hashanah or wave the Lulav on  Sukkot was pushed aside by a rabbinical decree out of concern that one might carry it  in the public domain to an expert who would teach him how to perform the mitzva (Rosh haShana 29b.) This shows that Chazal were not only concerned that one would come to fix something himself, but also that one would take it to an expert to show him what to do.  If this concern  pushes aside a biblical obligation, surely it would be enough to forbid voluntary actions such as these?  Although this seems like an obvious question, the major Achronim (later authorities) who take issue with the lenient view of the Tosfos do not seem to bring this as one of their concerns- perhaps this is because we do not compare one decree of Chazal to another, and the fact that they made such a decree specifically by Shofar, Lulav, Megila and nothing else could show that they had unique considerations in those cases (it should also be noted that this decree was made by the Amora Raba, many centuries after the tannaic decree against clapping and dancing.)
b.    The Gemara says (Beitza 5a) that anything that was forbidden by the decree of a court, needs another court to permit it, even if the reason for the decree no longer applies.  Elsewhere (Megila 2a,) it goes further and says that a later court may not annul the words of an earlier court unless it is greater in both wisdom and numbers.
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/2) learns a general rule from this and other places, that once Chazal have made a decree and the decree has taken hold, a later court may not annul it, even if the reason it was made for no longer applies, unless it is greater in wisdom and size.
He goes further and rules that decree made as a  סיג  (to prevent one transgressing a biblical transgression) cannot even be annulled by a later court that is greater both in wisdom and in numbers (even in the unlikely event that one is found.)
 
As  there was no such court in the time of the Baalei Tosfos, and there is also no mention by them of the decree being annulled,  even without the Rambam’s further stringency, it seems clear from this Talmudic rule that even if the original concern that we might come to fix musical instruments no longer places, the decree should remain in place.
 
 
Either one has to find a way to explain that despite the לא פלוג  principle, this decree never included  our modern circumstances in the first place, or one is forced to concede that the Baalei Tosfos have a different approach to the Rambam and indeed hold that decrees of Chazal can become permitted when the reason no longer applies in society at large.
 
Protagonists of the later suggestion would need to show that they apply the Talmudic principle that a later court cannot annul the words of an earlier court to something completely different to such decrees.
 
During the course of writing this up, I discovered that the Meiri (Beitza 5a) disagreed with the Rambam and holds that if the reason for the decree no longer applies, a later court may annul the decree even if it is inferior to the original one, and the requirement for the court to be greater in size and number only applies when the reason for the decree still applies!
 
Perhaps the Tosfos follow the approach of the Meiri and hold that seeing as the reason for the decree no longer applied in their time, they had the right to abolish the decree in their own courts despite their inferiority to the  courts of the Amoraim. Whether they did this explicitly (in which case it is somewhat missing from their words) or considered the common minhag together with rabbinic sanction thereof to be the equivalent of it being annulled requires further discussion, should this approach be followed (see the above quoted Igros Moshe where he makes the later suggestion.)
 
In practise, whereas many Talmidei Chachamim are indeed careful to stick to the parameters of the original decree, the Rema has brought the permissive ruling of the Tosfos, giving people permission to rely on it, and baring in mind all 3 above reasons for leniency and the fact that this is a dispute in a rabbinical prohibition, it seems that there is strong reason to permit leniency, certainly for the sake of Oneg Shabbos and Simchas Yom-Tov.
 
As everyone agrees (see O.C. 339) that clapping in a back-handed manner (with the top of one’s hand on the palm of the other hand) or banging without any rhythm at all is permitted, this is certainly a good solution for someone who wishes to satisfy all opinions, and for Sephardim who follow the rulings of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch on the subject.
 
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 148 The unhelpful rebuke and clapping hands and dancing on Shabbos
 
On our daf, Rava bar Rav Chanan asks Abaya about a Mishna (Beitza 36b) that says:
 
לא מספקין ולא מטפחין ולא מרקדין ביום טוב.
One may not “mesapeik”, “metapeiach”, or dance on Yom Tov.
 
When one examines the original Mishna, one sees that these prohibitions are brought as examples of a general rule that all שבותים (rabbinical decrees relating to forbidden work) that apply on Shabbos, also apply on Yom Tov.
 
The Gemara there explains that these 3 decrees were all made because of the concern that one might come to fix כלי שיר (musical instruments) on shabbos.
 
This   would involve the biblical prohibition of מתקן כלי (fixing a vessel,) a תולדה (derivative) of the אב מלאכה (category of forbidden work) of מכה בפטיש (the final hammer blow.)
 
Whereas the meaning of the third of these actions is relatively clear ,  the Rishonim discuss what  מספק  andמטפח  are exactly- for purposes of this post, we shall go with Rashi’s definition in Beitza, that they refer to clapping hands and clapping one hands on one’s leg.
 
Both of these activities involve making sounds which accompany music, and like with  dancing, Chazal were concerned that if they were to be done on Shabbos, one would also come to fix the musical instruments they accompany should they break.
 
 Following the  principle of לא פלוג רבנן  (the Rabbis did not discriminate with their decrees,) it follows that even in situations where musical instruments are not present, seemingly harmless activities performed for the enjoyment of Shabbos and Yom-Tov, such as clapping hands or banging on the table to singing, or dancing, are forbidden.
 
Rava bar Chana’s question to Abaya concerned the fact that despite this, it seems to be common practise amongst the people to do so, yet we do not protest about it.
 
There is an obligation in the Torah of “tochacha”- rebuking one’s neighbor when he is doing something wrong (Vayikra 19/17)- so why is this not applied in this case?
 
Abaya answered that הנח להם לישראל מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין – “leave the Jewish people alone: better they should transgress unknowingly rather than transgress knowingly.”
 
From his answer, it is clear that Abaya acknowledged that public practise was indeed incorrect, but justified the failure to protest with a general rule that when it comes to things that people are unlikely to follow even after rebuke, it is better to refrain from rebuking them in the first place and let their transgression remain in the far less severe category of שוגג    (unknowing transgression.)
 
Abaya brings another example where this rule applies from the laws of Eruvin, a fitting introduction to our next exciting masechta!
 
In order to be permitted to carry within a  מבוי  )side-street or alley that is closed on 3 sides, but open on one side to a public domain(, one has to place either a לחי  (upright pole) on one side of the entrance, or a beam across its width (the precise requirements and different opinions on the matter are discussed in the first chapter of Eruvin, see Mishna on Daf 11b.)
 
Rava had ruled  that one should not sit inside this מבוי  right by the לחי  in case something one is holding falls out of one’s hands, and rolls into the public domain, in which case one might come to retrieve it and desecrate shabbos.
 
 Abaya points out that people seem to ignore this ruling, sit in such places all the time, and no one protests. He explains that this is for the same reason.
 
The Gemara points out that this rule does not only apply for rabbinical prohibitions such as the above two decrees, but also to biblical prohibitions.
 
It gives the example of תוספת יום הכפורים (adding on to the fast by starting a little before nightfall) which is a biblical requirement, is ignored by many people, yet we still do not rebuke them for it.
 
Whether this would apply also to more serious biblical prohibitions and/or those that are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, such as eating on Yom-Kippur, lighting a fire on shabbos, or eating non-kosher animals requires more analysis.
 
 On the one hand, the Gemara does not seem to make any such distinction, on the other hand, from the fact that the example given is a relatively unknown biblical law derived by Chazal from דרשות  and possibly also not of the severity of eating on Yom-Kippur itself, it could be argued that this applies only to  less severe and/or lesser known biblical transgressions.  (see Rashba, Meiri, and others who indeed state that this rule does not apply to prohibitions which are explicitly stated in the Torah, and Rema O.C. 608/2 who rules this way.)
 
 
It is fascinating that this tendency to ignore this prohibition has followed us through centuries, and it is common practise to this very day among many observant Jews to ignore this prohibition and dance, clap, and bang while singing on shabbos.
 
While this is clearly reason not to rebuke people who are so accustomed to doing this that they are not likely to listen, it is certainly not justification for  Bnei Torah who are fully aware of the prohibition to intentionally ignore it.
 
Yet, one finds that many Bnei Torah and Torah scholars have also taken on this lenient practise over the centuries, and it is thus pertinent to try and find some reasons that justify this practise in the first place.
 
Below are a few possibilities.
 
1.    There is a well-known rule that אין גוזרין גזירה על הצבור אלא אם כן רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה – Chazal did not make decrees on the community unless most of the community were able to bare it (Bava Basra 60b.)
 
What happens if Chazal made a decree, thinking that the community was able to handle it, but it later become apparent that it was too much for the community to handle and the decree never took hold?
 
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/6) rules that in such a case, the decree is null and void!
 
The Rambam goes further (Mamrim 2/7) and says that even if it appeared for a while that the decree was or might take hold, but in later generations it became clear that it had never taken hold, the decree may be annulled, even by a lesser Beis Din..
 
Although it seems from Abaya’s answer that he admitted that the decree had taken hold but simply didn’t see rebuke as being effective in this case, it is possible that in later generations it became clear that it has in fact never taken hold at all, and can thus be annulled. (I saw later that Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C. 2/100) takes a somewhat similar approach to what I suggested here, with a few differences that might answer some of the outstanding issues.)
 
 
2.    It is possible that the things that even Bnei Torah do were never in the category of the forbidden decrees in the first place.
 
For example, it seems from a parallel sugya (Eruvin 104a), that not any noise is forbidden under this decree, but only “השמעת קול של שיר” – (making sounds of singing.)
 
Rashi explains that this refers to “הנשמע כעין שיר, בנעימה ובנחת”-the kind of sounds that sound like a song, with a gently rhythm. 
 
 
 
Later in the sugya, he goes further and explains that only soft, pleasant sounds that would help someone fall asleep are forbidden, but loud noisy sounds that would wake someone up are permitted.
 
As it is doubtful that the kind of noisy clapping and banging common amongst Yeshiva Bochrim and at a Chasidic Tisch (Friday night get-together with the grand Rabbi of the sect) would help anyone fall asleep, or be considered “pleasant” to the musical ear.
 
Such clapping or banging might thus not ever have been forbidden, seeing as it would not be done at any self-respecting musical event.
 
The Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 339/9) applies a similar idea to dancing, and claims that the type of dancing commonly done by Bnei Torah while singing  on Shabbos is not in rhythm to the music, and does not fit into the decree against dancing at all- see there for more details.
 
It seems to me that the wording of Rashi  )(Beitza 30a) back this distinction , as he defines מספקין   as “hand on hand”, מטפחים as “hand on the thigh”, and מרקדין as “with the legs.”
This seems to imply that dancing involves the same kind of accompaniment to the music as clapping does, namely in tune to the music, but with the feet, rather than the hands.
 
Otherwise, it is kind of spurious for Rashi to tell us that dancing is done with the legs!
 
If it wasn’t too much of novelty for me to make on my own, I would go further and argue that Rashi holds that מרקדין  is not simply referring to dancing movements, but to the sound one makes with one’s feet while dancing in tune to the music, and the main concern is this rhythmic sound generated by the dancing, not the dancing itself.
 
3.    Tosfos (Beitza 30a) rules that this decree only applied in Talmudic times where it was common for musicians to fix their own musical instruments on the spot if they broke, but in today’s times, where we are not trained to do that, and instruments are generally taken to professionals to fix, there is no such concern, and the decree does not apply.
 
The halachik weight of the Tosfos in Ashkenazi halacha is evident by the fact that the Rema (O.C. 339/3) brings this view, yet it is difficult for several reasons, among them:
 
a.    The biblical obligation to listen to the shofar on Rosh Hashanah or wave the Lulav on  Sukkot was pushed aside by a rabbinical decree out of concern that one might carry it  in the public domain to an expert who would teach him how to perform the mitzva (Rosh haShana 29b.) This shows that Chazal were not only concerned that one would come to fix something himself, but also that one would take it to an expert to show him what to do.  If this concern  pushes aside a biblical obligation, surely it would be enough to forbid voluntary actions such as these?  Although this seems like an obvious question, the major Achronim (later authorities) who take issue with the lenient view of the Tosfos do not seem to bring this as one of their concerns- perhaps this is because we do not compare one decree of Chazal to another, and the fact that they made such a decree specifically by Shofar, Lulav, Megila and nothing else could show that they had unique considerations in those cases (it should also be noted that this decree was made by the Amora Raba, many centuries after the tannaic decree against clapping and dancing.)
b.    The Gemara says (Beitza 5a) that anything that was forbidden by the decree of a court, needs another court to permit it, even if the reason for the decree no longer applies.  Elsewhere (Megila 2a,) it goes further and says that a later court may not annul the words of an earlier court unless it is greater in both wisdom and numbers.
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/2) learns a general rule from this and other places, that once Chazal have made a decree and the decree has taken hold, a later court may not annul it, even if the reason it was made for no longer applies, unless it is greater in wisdom and size.
He goes further and rules that decree made as a  סיג  (to prevent one transgressing a biblical transgression) cannot even be annulled by a later court that is greater both in wisdom and in numbers (even in the unlikely event that one is found.)
 
As  there was no such court in the time of the Baalei Tosfos, and there is also no mention by them of the decree being annulled,  even without the Rambam’s further stringency, it seems clear from this Talmudic rule that even if the original concern that we might come to fix musical instruments no longer places, the decree should remain in place.
 
 
Either one has to find a way to explain that despite the לא פלוג  principle, this decree never included  our modern circumstances in the first place, or one is forced to concede that the Baalei Tosfos have a different approach to the Rambam and indeed hold that decrees of Chazal can become permitted when the reason no longer applies in society at large.
 
Protagonists of the later suggestion would need to show that they apply the Talmudic principle that a later court cannot annul the words of an earlier court to something completely different to such decrees.
 
During the course of writing this up, I discovered that the Meiri (Beitza 5a) disagreed with the Rambam and holds that if the reason for the decree no longer applies, a later court may annul the decree even if it is inferior to the original one, and the requirement for the court to be greater in size and number only applies when the reason for the decree still applies!
 
Perhaps the Tosfos follow the approach of the Meiri and hold that seeing as the reason for the decree no longer applied in their time, they had the right to abolish the decree in their own courts despite their inferiority to the  courts of the Amoraim. Whether they did this explicitly (in which case it is somewhat missing from their words) or considered the common minhag together with rabbinic sanction thereof to be the equivalent of it being annulled requires further discussion, should this approach be followed (see the above quoted Igros Moshe where he makes the later suggestion.)
 
In practise, whereas many Talmidei Chachamim are indeed careful to stick to the parameters of the original decree, the Rema has brought the permissive ruling of the Tosfos, giving people permission to rely on it, and baring in mind all 3 above reasons for leniency and the fact that this is a dispute in a rabbinical prohibition, it seems that there is strong reason to permit leniency, certainly for the sake of Oneg Shabbos and Simchas Yom-Tov.
 
As everyone agrees (see O.C. 339) that clapping in a back-handed manner (with the top of one’s hand on the palm of the other hand) or banging without any rhythm at all is permitted, this is certainly a good solution for someone who wishes to satisfy all opinions, and for Sephardim who follow the rulings of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch on the subject.
 
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 147 Bathing, swimming, and showering on Shabbos

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The Mishna teaches that if someone washes on shabbos in a cave filled with water or in the hot-springs of Tiberius , he may not carry the towel home ( even where there is no prohibition of carrying) , in case he comes to squeeze it the water out of it .

Even if he used many towels and they are thus not so wet, it is still forbidden.

On the other hand, if there are many people who did so, they may carry the towel/towels back, even if they all shared one towel and it is soaking wet.

This is because they will likely remind one another not to squeeze out the wet towel.

We recall that there are two מלאכות that can be involved in squeezing liquids out of solids on Shabbos:

  1. When one intends to use the squeezed out liquid, the prohibition of דש, threshing is often involved , though it is only deorayso for grapes, olives, or possibly other things that are mainly squeezed for the liquids absorbed in them.
  2. When the liquid is absorbed into an absorbent item like a fabric, and the liquid is one that indeed has a cleaning affect ( such as water,) the melacha of מלבן ( whitening or laundering ) applies, even if the liquid goes to waste.

As the water squeezed out of the towel goes to waste, and it is not clear that the melacha of threshing would even be applied to a towel, it is mainly the later melacha of מלבן that we appear to be concerned with.

We also recall that Chazal )Shabbos 40a) forbade washing or immersing one’s whole body in hot water, even if it was heated before shabbos, but permitted it in cold water or in naturally heated springs such as the חמי טבריה ( the hot springs of Tiberias. )

We saw that Chazal )Shabbos 109b) considered washing in the sea on Shabbos perfectly acceptable but forbade floating or swimming ( without one’s feet on the ground) in case one would come to build a raft)Shabbos 40b/Beitza 36a.).

We saw that this prohibition applied not only to the sea or rivers, but also to a pool, even in a private domain, if it did not have a barrier or rim around it ( such as a simple pond or hole in the ground- Shabbos 40b)

Our Gemara deduces from the wording of the Mishna that discussed one who has already entered hot water, rather than permitting one to do so, that in the first place, one may not do so ( though see Tosfos based on the earlier sugya that washing in חמי טבריה are permitted even לכתחילה! )

However, it infers similarly that pouring water over one’s entire body is permitted in the first place, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon who only forbade entering a warm body of water, not pouring such water over one’s body.

Two other opinions are then brought, the Tana Kama who holds that even pouring cold water over ones entire body is forbidden, and Rabbi Yehuda who holds that one may pour cold water over one’s whole body, but not hot water.

Based on the above sugyos alone, we would conclude that

  1. Immersing one’s body in hot water, even if heated before shabbos, is forbidden rabbinically. This would include taking a hot bath, even if the water was heated before shabbos.
  2. Washing or Immersing in cold water or in hot springs is permitted, so long as one does not carry the wet towel back on his own inside an eruv or outside an eruv even with others.
  3. Standing in the sea to cool off or wash is permitted so long as one does not lift one’s feet off the ground, float, or swim.
  4. Swimming in a home pool with a rim is permitted by Talmudic law.

All the above would apply only if one is naked or wearing a plastic or non-absorbent bathing-suite (less absorbent types of nylon bathing-suits might fit into this category, but this is for a different post) – otherwise the concerns of actually laundering the garment or coming to squeeze it out afterwards could also apply.

In practise, given all the halachik complications, Ashkenazi poskim from the Magein Avraham (O.C. 326/8) to the Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 326/9), Mishna Berura(O.C. 326/21), and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Even haEzer 2/13) have consistently backed up the longstanding Ashkenazi custom, already quoted in earlier sources such as the Trumos hadeshen (255) not to enter bodies of water at all on shabbos, either for washing or swimming.

Rav Ovadia Yosef and his son, Rav Yitchak, the current Sephardi Chief Rabbi (see Yalkut Yosef Shabbos 2 siman 301/1-7), admit that there is no specific halacha or Sephardi custom that forbids swimming or washing in a private swimming pool on shabbos, but for some reason, are hesitant to allow it in practise.

Having a cold shower is a different story, and seems to be permitted- however, because of the small possibility that this minhag even includes pouring cold water over one’s entire body , Rav Moshe (O.C. 4 74/75) only permitted it in practise if one is suffering discomfort from the heat.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Shabbos 143-144 Squeezing lemons on Shabbos

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Our Mishna (143b) tells us that it is forbidden to squeeze fruit on shabbos in order to remove their juice, and that if the juice flows out on its own, it is forbidden to drink it.

Rashi explains that the prohibition of squeezing fruit for its juice falls under the melacha of דש (threshing.) Just like threshing involves extracting the edible grain from the inedible kernel, so squeezing fruit involves extracting the drinkable juice from the undrinkable (though edible) fruit.

It is important to note that not all squeezing is forbidden under this melacha, some forms of squeezing are forbidden under the melacha of מלבן (whitening or laundering,) seeing as squeezing water out of wet clothes is part of the laundry process, and other types might be permitted, at least biblically.

As a rule, when one needs the “new” product derived from the extraction, the action falls under the prohibition of threshing, either biblically or rabbinically.

Rabbi Yehuda is more lenient and rules that so long as the fruit were intended for eating and not for juicing, the juice that comes out on its own may be consumed.

The reason for the prohibition against drinking the juices that flowed out of the fruit on their own is in order that one doesn’t come to squeeze the fruit himself, which could be an אסור דאורייתא (biblical transgression.)

As one is less likely to come to juice a fruit which he intended for eating in its solid state, this concern is significantly lower in such cases, which is why Rabbi Yehuda is lenient.

The Gemara concludes that this debate is limited to one of 3 categories of fruit:

  1. The most stringent category is זיתים ורימונים (olives and grapes.)

As these are usually grown and intended for their juices (the oil and the wine,) considered as one of the 7 liquids regarding the laws of impurity, and given special status in the Torah in various places , they are most similar to threshing wheat which is usually grown and intended for the edible grain (There is much discussion amongst the Rishonim and poskim as to which of these factors is primary.)

They thus fall under the biblical melacha and even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that if the oil or grape-juice flows out on its own on shabbos, it is forbidden to drink it.

  1. The middle category is תותים ורימונים (strawberries and pomegranates,) which are usually eaten, but also commonly squeezed for their juice.

As the original fruit has a perfectly usual use to start off with, this is not the same as threshing the less usable unthreshed grain and might thus only be rabbinically forbidden. This is where the Tana Kama and Rabbi Yehuda argue regarding the juice that comes out on its own.

  1. The third category is שאר פירות (other fruits), which are almost always not used for their juice. Not only do the Chachamim agree with Rabbi Yehuda that the juice that comes out by itself is permitted, even squeezing them lechatchila (in the first place) could be permitted!

The Gemara brings a Beraisa which gives some examples of fruit that fit into the category , namely בפגעין ובפרישין ובעוזרדין(identified by some as plumbs, quinces, and sorb-apples [acc themerkava.com]) and that explicitly rules that it is permitted to squeeze them on shabbos . The Gemara understands that this is because they are לאו בני סחיטה נינהו (not fit or meant for squeezing.)

There are some essential questions that need to be discussed regarding the above 3 categories:

  1. Are the examples given here meant דוקא (specifically,) or are they are simply examples of each of these 3 categories?
  2. If they are simply examples, are the members of these categories cast in stone by the Torah and/or Chazal, or dependant on their usage in each time and place?
  3. Does the term לאו בני סחיטה נינהו mean that they are not meant for squeezing at all, or that their juice is not usually fit for most people to drink?
  4. If the juice of a particular fruit is not meant or fit for most people to drink as is, but is meant or fit for drinking when mixed with other drinks or diluted with water, is the fruit considered fit for juicing and thus in the first or second category, or does it still belong in the third permitted category?

From the actual wording of the Gemara, defining the first category as “olives and grapes,” the second as “strawberries and pomegranates,” and the third as “other fruit,”

It seems that the first two categories could be specifically limited to the two species mentioned in each category, and that other fruit fall into the “other fruit” category by default.

However, it makes little sense that fruit which are usually or often squeezed for their juice should be exempt from the prohibition of squeezing, just because they have not been listed explicitly in the first two categories.

Whereas the Torah itself accords oil and wine special status, and this might be the primary reason for squeezing them being biblically forbidden, the examples brought for the middle category hardly seem to be unique- there are plenty of fruit that are both commonly eaten whole and squeezed for their juice, such as apples, oranges, mangoes and more, certainly in our time.

One very important נפקא מינה (practical ramification) of this analysis would be squeezing lemons in order to add their juice into tea, water, or other drinks, or even to drink “neat” if a person is unusual enough to enjoy doing so.

The commonly accepted halacha, as stated in Shulchan Aruch )O.C. 320/6), was that lemons fall into the third category, and squeezing them is thus permitted, possibly even into an empty container, and even more so directly into another liquid, which he records in Bet Yoseif as being the custom in Egypt while making lemonade.

This indeed remained the opinion of the Aruch haShulchan in relatively recent times.

Yet other later poskim, such as the Mishna Berura, have noted that in today’s times, lemons are grown on mass for their juice and squeezed by the barrel- as such they question whether they truly belong in the third category today.

However, an argument can be made that even if we accept that even the first category is neither unique to olives and grapes, nor cast in stone, but differs according to time and place, lemons might still fit into the third category that are not meant or fit for squeezing.

This is because even though are very often squeezed into juice, the resulting product is not fit for the average person to drink on its own, due to its acidity, and is only really used to add flavor to other drinks or foods.

This is very different to the threshed product which can be and is commonly eaten raw, and thus not included in the biblical melacha, or even in the rabbinical one.

This argument is made explicitly by the Beit Yoseif in the same siman to justify the Egyptian practise of squeezing lemons for lemonade on shabbos and as mentioned above, it is clearly endorsed by the Aruch haShulchan.

Although it seems that the more common practise in Ashkenazi circles today is to be stringent, there is certainly what to rely on for those Ashkenazim who are lenient as well as for Sephardim.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)

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Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)

One of the most difficult categories of forbidden work on Shabbos must be the melacha of מכה בפטיש, literally “striking with a hammer.”

After all, when a hammer is used constructively, it will usually be used as part of other forbidden categories of work, such a building, and when it used to destroy things with no positive intention, it will usually be מקלקל (a destructive action,) which is only rabbinically prohibited .

Yet this is indeed list in the Mishna (Shabbos 73a) as one of the 39 categories of work forbidden on shabbos, and it is essential to understand what it is.

The Mishna on our daf lists this melacho as one of those which has no minimum quantity required for liability.

Rashi gives both a general rule and an example of this melacha.

He gives the example of the hammer blow given to a stone by those who hew stones, after it has been cut out of the rock but not completely detached .

The stone is then hit with a hammer which causes it to detach and fall from the rock surface.

This is the final stage in the act of hewing a stone, and Rashi then tells us the general rule that the final stage of any melacha makes up the melacha of מכה בפטיש . He told us this rule back on daf 73a as well.

In truth though, numerous difficulties can be raised with both the rule and the example.

Firstly, as Tosfos points out, a forbidden category of melacha needs to involve an action performed in the work of the mishkan, and no quarry work was involved in that at all ( there were no stones in the mishkan, and constructing an altar from hewn stone was actually forbidden- note also how the Aron, Menorah, and Shulchan were all made of one single piece of beaten gold, and NOT of anything that had been cut into parts and then joined together !)

Secondly, if מכה בפטיש is the final stage of any מלאכה, surely it is already included in that מלאכה itself , and why should it get its own category? Does that mean that any melacha done from start to finish would incur two punishments , one for that particularly מלאכה , and one for completing it ? If so, one would expect that to be discussed .

However, this definition of מכה בפטיש does not originate with Rashi, but actually goes back to the Talmud itself (Shabbos 75b) where Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira both tell us that anything that involves completing a מלאכה is מכה בפטיש.

Tosfos appropriately does not disagree with the rule cited by Rashi, but chooses rather an example that did take place in the work of the mishkan , namely the final hammer blow given to strenghen the vessels of the mishkan once they were ready .

Does this melacha perhaps apply to the final act in a creative process even if that process does not involve a forbidden melacha ?

If so , where do we see such an example – after all, if it is a creative act of work that wasn’t in the mishkan, it will usually be included in the toladot of that melacha .

The key might lie in a Yerushalmi often quoted by our teacher, haGaon haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א ( various teshuvos on electricity in מנחת אשר חלק 1 וחלק 3 for example )

The Yerushalmi (Shabbos perek 7/ halocha 2) accounts that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish spent 3 and a half years studying the matter of 39 melachos.

They found 39 Tolados ( derivatives) of each melacha.

Whatever melacha they were able to fit into one of those, they included in one of those .

Those that they could not include in one of those were included in מכה בפטיש .

It seems clear from this Yerushalmi that there exists NO melacha that is not forbidden on shabbos.

Every possible melacha, however it is defined, either falls under one of the 39 categories, their derivatives , or the מלאכה of מכה בפטיש.

Rav Weiss himself suggests the relatively radical idea that for this reason, any activation of an electric circuit fits under the prohibition of מכה בפטיש .

Although the Bavli gave a different definition, namely גמר מלאכה, and the rule is that one does not follow the Yerushalmi when it contradicts the Bavli, he contends that it is possible that the Bavli did not mean to exclude these “left out” melachot from מכה בפטיש but simply to also include the completion of any melacha .

However, as he himself is fully aware, many poskim before him rejected this possibility, and were most likely fully aware of this Yerushalmi.

Far from me with my barely existent understanding of the subject to argue, but those who do not follow this view regarding electricity have all these Poskim to rely on ( of course, electricity remains forbidden for numerous possible other reasons given, but there could be many נ”מ)

Perhaps what the Yerushalmi really means is that COMPLETING any melacha, even one that doesn’t fit into the forbidden categories, is still forbidden because of מכה בפטיש .

However it follows from this classification that unlike other melachot, some of which one could transgress just by doing some or most thereof ( even if one is sometimes exempt due to “בעשותה” ) , one would have to actually complete the goal of these “left out” melachot in order to transgress.

If one learns this way, there is no disagreement between the bavli and the Yerushalmi at all- מכה בפטיש indeed includes all “left all” melachos , but only the completion of them.

In fact, it is also stated in the same halacha on the Yerushalmi that גמר מלאכה is מכה בפטיש,

Admittedly, this might not be the simplest reading of the Yerushalmi, but it allows for a simpler reading of the Bavli and also avoids the need to say that the Bavli and Yerushalmi have such a basic difference in understanding the melacha, one that the Rishonim do not seem to mention at all ( though see the Rambam , for example in Pirush haMishnayos to perek 7 which Rav Osher suggests as a support for his words .)

Of course , we would now have to test all the examples given in the gemara of this melacha, as well as those on our daf that Rav and Shmuel argue about, before we can really see if this thesis can stand its ground .

We would also need to define exactly what מלאכה is , and what kind of גמר מלאכה is meant by the Gemara- is it the completion of any melacha, just the completion of a כלי, or just the completion of a מלאכה not already included in the 39.

Lots of work to do, but its late …

Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters

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Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters

את חטאי אני מזכיר היום
I have admitted before that technical matters are not my strong point, and like many others, I usually tend to glide over the more technical sections of the Tanach and Talmud, without really understanding what is going on.

Hence, when it comes to Parshas Teruma, and other similarly styled parshiyos , I have a particularly hard time getting though the required weekly שניים במקרא ואחד תרגום (reading the weekly portion twice in Hebrew and once in the Aramaic translation/commentary of Onkelus.)

The depth of the technical descriptions of the makeup and precise dimensions of the Mishkan and its vessels simply are not recognized easily by me, and even when they are , the required level of focus and mental visualization usually proves too much for me- I thus usually land up making do with a quick leining- style reading and move on to the more conceptual or contemporary topics that seem to match my talent set better.

However, one takes oneself with wherever one goes, and such human weaknesses always come back to haunt us, not only each year, but also whenever we get to parts of the Talmud that analyze these matters, which given the nature of the Shas, can pop up in the most unexpected places.

Seeing as so much of the laws of Shabbos are derived from the work of the Mishkan, it is inevitable that at some point, they will lead back to the technical descriptions in the relevant verses of the same.

Our daf is one of those moments, and a discussion of whether a public domain covered by a roof is similar enough to the public domains in the biblical camp of Israel to be considered as such regarding the law of passing and carrying, takes us to a discussion of the wagons that were used to transport the components of the Mishkan, in particular its beams, and status of the enclosed space between them.

This in turn takes us to a discussion of the properties of the beams themselves and the bars that reinforce them, which brings us to a rather cryptic passuk that describes the central bar.

Each beam was 10 Amos (handbreadths) tall, 1.5 Amos wide, and 1 Amah thick (at least at the base.)

20 beams thus made up the 30 Amos length of the Mishkan on both the North and South side.

Another 6 beams made up the 10 Amos width, with 2 other beams on either side to fill the gaps.

Various bars were placed along the length of the planks, with one central bar in the middle.

The passuk tells us (Shmos 26/28) “והבריח התכון בתוך הקרשים מבריח מן הקצה אל הקצה” (and the main bar in the midst of the beams should run from one end to another.)

The simple meaning of this verse seems to imply that the wooden bar ran all the way from the south-eastern corner of the Mishkan, to the north-eastern corner, making a perfect right-angled turn twice along the way, a somewhat challenging if not impossible task for any carpenter, as Rashi on our daf points out.

So much so, that a Beraisa teaches that the middle bar of the Mishkan was put and held in place miraculously!

Tosfos, however, quotes the ר”י (Rabbeinu Yitchak, one of the leading Tosafists, who brings another Midrash that holds there was no miracle here at all.

It explains simply that the 2 lower and 2 upper rows of beams each contained 5 separate beams- One went from the south-east corner half -way down the southern wall of the Mishkan, another from there till the south-west corner. Another then covered the western wall, and the other two similarly covered the northern wall.

The main “beam”, in contrast, consisting of only 3 separate beams, one for each of the 3 walls, and when the passuk says that it went from one end to the other, it means from one end of each wall to the other end of the same wall, not along the entirety of the 3 walls!

Whereas this is far from the simple meaning of the verse, and requires one to interpret “the main beam” as the 3 “main beams of each wall”, as well as the “5 beams” of each side as the “5 sets of beams of the southern and northern side and one set of beams of the western side”, it allows us to explain this completely naturally without resorting to a miracle.

This seems to illustrate that the debate over how common miracles are and whether to try and interpret seemingly miraculous descriptions in the sacred texts in a natural way where possible, commonly largely ascribed to the Rambam and the Ramban (for another post) , is in fact a much older debate, amongst the sages themselves!

Another example of this can be found in the story of Rav Huna and his wine cellar (Brachos 5b)

The Gemara tells how a financial tragedy befell Rav Huna (who seems to have been either a wine merchant or a very serious collector), where 400 barrels of wine went rancid (turned to vinegar.)

On visiting him to, two other Amoraim respectfully advised him to investigate his financial affairs to see if he had done something to deserve this huge loss.

After some debate, he admits to something seemingly rather minor (and perhaps not even strictly forbidden-another post some time bli neder) and commits to making it right.

One opinion then tells us that that a miracle took place and the vinegar turned back into wine!

Another narrative is then suggested that it did not really turn back into wine, the price of vinegar simply went up and matched the price of wine!

While the later case shows a debate as to whether the reward he received was through a supernatural miracle, or an unlikely natural event that took place at the precise time it was needed, also a form of miracle, albeit a natural one, we again see two different views regarding whether to interpret events as supernatural miracles, or to explain them in a natural way where possible!

When one studies the original Talmudic sources in depth and breadth, rather than just reading summaries of far-reaching debates and controversies amongst the Rishonim and even contemporary authorities , one often sees how the debate can be traced back much further than one originally thought.

The later Amoraim after do that with a dispute amongst earlier Amoraim, with the claim of כתנאי (claiming that this argument is actually based on an earlier debate amongst the Mishnaic sages)

Is there any reason why we should not attempt to do the same with the disputes amongst the Rishonim?!

Shabbos 96 הוצאה – the inferior מלאכה that rules the roost. 

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If you would ask any semicha student which of the מלאכות ( forbidden categories of shabbos work) are the most complex, my bet would be that it would be a tough choice between בשול ( cooking ) and הוצאה (transferring.)

If that student  had extended his usual semicha studies to include  ערובין , it would become a no brainer- הוצאה would definitely scoop the prize .

This is the only one of the מלאכות that takes up virtually an entire masechta ( Eruvin) , as well as at least 4 full chapters of Shabbos.

It is also one of the only 2 מלאכות ( I stand to be corrected ) that gets it own source:

  • the מלאכה of הבערה ( lighting a fire) is specifically mentioned  (Shmos  35/3) – לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת  ( You may not kindle a fire in any of your dwelling places on the Sabbath day .)
    Chazal debate why it is singled out and their are 2 major approaches to this (הבערה ללאו יצאת או הבערה לחלק יצאת)  , but thats  not for this post.
  • Our Gemara asks where the source is that הוצאה is forbidden on shabbos, and brings a passuk ויעבירו קול במחנה  (Shmos 36/6) , an instruction to stop bringing ( transferring) things for the Mishkan. 

Given that we are already aware from various sugyos that we have studied that the source for all the מלאכות is the verse “You shall not do any מלאכה ” and the  proximity of the verse that discusses Shabbos to the one that discusses the משכן (sanctuary) , teaches us that the מלאכות referred to in the prohibition are those that were done in the work of the משכן.

In our very Mishna, this same idea is applied to the מלאכה of הוצאה to explain why passing something from one private domain to another through a public domain is forbidden yet throwing is not, according to Chachamim ( Rabbi Akiva of course disagrees and forbids throwing as well- welcome to הזורק! )

In chapter 4 of our  Masechta (Shabbos 49b) , it also specifically mentioned that both הוצאה   ( literally taking out ) and  its תולדה ( derivative )  הכנסה ( bringing in ) , are derived from what was done in the Mishkan.

As such, the question screaming out at us is why do we need a separate passuk to teach us the prohibition of הוצאה and its תולדות of הכנסה, זריקה, etc , when it was  already one of the 39 מלאכות done in the Mishkan and is indeed derived from there too!

Tosfos on the first daf of the Masechta ( Shabbos 2a ” פשט” ) , deals with this  question at length, and focuses on the idea that הוצאה is a מלאכה גרועה ( inferior מלאכה ).

This seems to be because unlike most מלאכות where an actual physical change ( usually an improvement) is made in the object the מלאכה is applied to,  transferring an item from one domain to another does not have any physical affect at all- it remains the same item as it was before.

Tosfos points out that it is so questionable whether this should even qualify as a מלאכה  that transferring from one adjoining  private domain to another is completely permitted on a biblical level while transferring from a private domain to a public domain is forbidden, despite their similarity in terms of the action done!

The question that still bothers Tosfos though, is the converse .

If we already know that הוצאה is forbidden from a separate  verse despite it being a מלאכה גרועה , then why does our Mishna and other sugyos have to show that it was done in the Mishkan ?

He answers with the radical idea that had we not been able to show that הוצאה was indeed one of the מלאכות in the Mishkan, we would have learnt from the passuk that explicitly forbids it that ANY melacha like action, (perhaps even a weak one like הוצאה) , is forbidden on shabbos, even if it was NOT done in the Mishkan !

We thus need a separate passuk to teach us that even though it is a מלאכה גרועה, it is still included in the prohibition with its sister melachot that were done in the Mishkan, but we need the fact that it was in fact done in the Mishkan to save the famous rule that only מלאכות done in the Mishkan are in fact forbidden !

It thus comes as a leniency rather than a stringency  as we thought .

But what would we have done with the דרשה that derives the forbidden מלאכות from the משכן due to proximity of verses ?

Tosfos suggests that this would have simply been used  to teach us something else , perhaps a fascinating statement about how he views the world of דרשות in general , but thats for another time perhaps …

Lets take a minute go consider how far-reaching this suggestion is- The golden rule that we always take for granted about the connection between the Mishkan and Shabbos would have come tumbling down in a moment had Chazal not shown that this “inferior Melacha” was also done on the Mishkan!

There is another, philosophical lesson, I would like to learn from this .

What seems to us like the weakest of Melacho, one that has NO physical impact on the item at all, to the point that it needs its own unique prohibition, has become the Melacha which our Masechta opened up with, that occupies 2 of the longest and most complex chapters of the Masechta, and also gets its own entire Masechta virtually to itself !

Despite the emphasis placed on the laws of לשון הרע ( gossip) and אונאת דברים (offending people ), in practise , we  still often tend to harbour  the mistaken belief that ” sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never harm me .”
So long as one doesn’t actually physically hurt a person, it is OK to hurt him emotionally, after all emotions cannot be seen or measured !

Yet the message of this מלאכה is precisely the opposite. 

If a constructive action that involves no physical improvement to an item can not only be considered מלאכת מחשבת , a significant form of work, but even dominate all the other מלאכות in the time spent studying it , how much more so should we focus on the significance of non physical damage that appears to be less significant, but in fact, can be as damaging , or even more so, than physical actions, , as we know from the innocent  lives that have been utterly ruined by lashon harah.

Shabbos 95 Wearing make-up on Shabbos

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On the previous daf, our Mishna taught us a list of various things that Rabbi Eliezer considers to be biblically forbidden on Shabbos, and subject to the appropriate punishment, and which the Chachamim only consider to be rabbinically forbidden (שבות)

One of these things is כוחלת, painting her eye-lashes blue.

The Gemara suggests that the reason Rabbi Eliezer considers this a biblically punishable offense is because it is a form of כותב (writing.)

Rashi explains that this is because she uses the paint-stick to circle her eye like one who writes a letter with a pen.

The Gemara rejects this explanation because that is not a normal way to write and concludes at the beginning of our daf that it is because of צובע, the melacha of dyeing/painting.

It then brings a Beraita that says similarly that it is forbidden for a woman to put סרק (red coloring) on her face, because of צובע.

As the halacha usually follows the majority of Chachamim, it seems that we should rule like Chachamim that this is only a rabbinical transgression or שבות.

However, the Rambam (Shabbos 23/12) seems to rule like Rabbi Eliezer, but also like the Gemara’s first suggestion, that it is forbidden as it is like writing!

Whereas one might possibly interpret the Rambam’s wording to mean that it is considered rabbinically like writing ( a look in the Achronim shows that both interpretations are well represented) , it is still bizarre that he rules like a rejected suggestion in the Gemara.

This becomes even stranger when we see that in the previous chapter, (Shabbos 23,22), he ruled that using סרק is forbidden because it is like painting!

The Masores haShas, uncharacteristically comments on the Rambam he points to, and refers us to various Rishonim relevant to this.
Also, Rabbeinu Chananel, one of the earliest of the Rishonim (early commentators) ,actually rules explicitly like Rabbi Eliezer- his reasoning is that seeing as the Rabbis of the Gemara spend time debating his reasoning, it seems like they rule like him, and even though some say that the Halacho follows Chachamim, it makes more sense to rule like Rabbi Eliezer seeing as it is a possible אסור דאורייתא (biblical prohibition.)

Despite the above, both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 303) rule that it is forbidden because of צובע, as per the conclusion of the Gemara, and the consensus of the Achronim (see Beit Yoseif, Mishna Beruru, Aruch haShulchan etc) is that it is only rabbinically prohibited, in accordance with the view of the Chachamim.

It seems clear from the above, that using make-up or lipstick on Shabbos is a rabbinical prohibition, and as such, may clearly not be done, and this is the general consensus amongst poskim.

However, it might be that given certain social or family dynamics, a woman living in a less observant community feels that putting on make-up or lipstick is a great need, and that not doing so causes her great suffering, and perhaps even to be mocked by her less religious friends and relatives.

Even in fully observant communities, many women simply feel very uncomfortable being seen without make-up, and without a solid halachik way, might chas vesholom come to the rely on less permissible ways of putting it on .

It would seem reasonable to suggest that she should then be permitted to put it on with a שנוי ( in an unusual way), at least according to the views (see previous post) that a שבות דשבות is permitted even by a Jew for the sake of a Mitzva.

As this would be rabbinic for two separate reasons:

  • Coloring the skin is not considered real צובע, but just a שבות
  • Any melacha with a shinui is only derabonen (rabbinically forbidden)

This would be even less problematic if she uses short-term make-up that doesn’t last long, as it could also be considered דבר שאין מתקים (a melacha whose affect doesn’t last), and might never even have been included in the גזירה to start out with.

It would go we thought saying that it would have to be a texture that doesn’t involve the prohibition of ממרח (smearing ), which semi solid creams and lipsticks usually do ( here too though , if it isn’t thick enough to be ממרח דאורייתא, the שבות דשבות rule with a שנוי might also help!)

While I find my reasoning appealing, I have not found any major poseik who has made this suggestion, and in any case, these posts are not meant as halachik rulings, so anyone with a learning background who finds my suggestion convincing, should discuss it with an expert poseik.

In practise, with the development of various types of shabbos friendly makeup, and the increased sensitivity to halacha in many communities, this is probably less of an issue than it once was .

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.