On the previous daf, we learnt the frightening statement of Rava that Yerushalayim was destroyed because there were no אנשי אמנה (trustworthy people.)
He backs this shocking accusation up with a verse (Yirmiyahu 5):
שׁוֹטְט֞וּ בְּחוּצ֣וֹת יְרוּשָׁלִַ֗ם וּרְאוּ־נָ֤א וּדְעוּ֙ וּבַקְשׁ֣וּ בִרְחוֹבוֹתֶ֔יהָ אִם־תִּמְצְא֣וּ אִ֔ישׁ אִם־יֵ֛שׁ עֹשֶׂ֥ה מִשְׁפָּ֖ט מְבַקֵּ֣שׁ אֱמוּנָ֑ה וְאֶסְלַ֖ח לָֽהּ:
Go walk around the courtyards of Jerusalem and please see, and know, and search in its streets, if you can find a man, if there is one who performs justice and seeks trustworthiness, and I shall forgive her.
In a no holds barred rebuke, the prophet Yirmiyahu gives the about to be exiled inhabitants of the city a divine message that if even one honest man can be found in her streets, Hashem is prepared to spare her.
Rava deduces from this that the inability to find even one such person, is the reason for the destruction!
It is beyond our ability to even fathom that the holiest city of the holiest nation in history had sunk to the depths where not even one honest man could be found in it.
It could well be that this statement is to be seen as somewhat of an exaggeration which comes to teach us that the people as a whole did not meet the high levels of total honesty that was expected of the “chosen people.”
However, even if this is the correct way of reading this verse and passuk (which is questionable,) there is no escaping the severity of the statement and the fact that the prophets and sages viewed lack of honesty as one of the worst possible characteristics, making it a leading candidate for the cause of the destruction.
The frightening fact that these were not necessarily the most evil, crooked people, or that different from many of us, can be further backed from the continuation of the sugya.
The Gemara questions Rava’s harsh statement with a seemingly contradictory statement of Rav Katina, who states that even at the lowest point reached in the city, there were always honest people left in it, and brings another, rather cryptic, verse to back himself up.
The Gemara interprets this verse to mean that people at the time would confess that they hadn’t invested in their Torah studies and that they were basically ignorant of all 3 main areas of study, Mikra (the written word), Mishna, and Talmud.
This seems to imply that people were so honest that they would not even claim to have learnt more than they had.
The Gemara attempts to retort that this could simply be because they didn’t want people to question them and find their knowledge lacking, but have nothing to do with their inherent honesty, and thus not apply in situations where others were not likely to find out.
It answers that this would not be a reason to be this honest and harsh on themselves, because if asked a question they were unable to answer, they could simply reply that they had learnt it but forgotten!
The fact that they were completely straight about their lack of effort in their learning and resultant lack of knowledge shows that they were doing it out of honesty!
This might seem trivial, but I can personally attest that one of the hardest things for someone who is in a position of leadership is to admit his shortcomings regarding his qualifications.
People go to incredible lengths to make themselves seem more qualified than they are, sometimes to the point of forging the necessary documentation.
Those of us in the world of Torah teaching also like our students and followers to look up to us and see us as good examples in our learning, to the point that we are sometimes tempted to exaggerated our knowledge .
Sometimes we even convince ourselves that it is in the greater good to do so, so that we will be able to get their ear and at least influence them to learn more(this was admittedly part of my initial motivation for obtaining semicha (rabbinical ordination.)
Numerous times, I have been asked by students if I have finished the Shas, and admitting that I haven’t come close has been a major embarrassment.
Contrast this with the behaviour of truly great Torah scholars, who often minimize the extent of their knowledge, in the spirit of chazal’s permission to tell a “white lie” in three cases, one of them being מסכתא , denying having learnt a particular tractate even if one has done so (Bava Metzia 23b.)
This reminds me of a talk that I merited to hear in person from haGaon Rav Herschel Shachter, שליט”א, someone we all know is familiar with Shas virtually by heart.
It was at our annual shul Siyum hashas(completion of the Talmud) that had been divided amongst members of the community, and Rav Schachter, in his typical fashion, quipped “Its an incredible achievement to finish the Shas. I haven’t finished the Shas yet!”
Even when we are able to be honest about the extent of the knowledge we have accumulated, we often tend to quote primary sources as if we have studied them first hand, when we really only became aware of them because of a database search, one of the modern works on the subject who quotes them, or even a Tosfos quoting a Yerushalmi.
Rav Baruch Epstein of blessed memory, was one of the Torah giants of the previous century and author of the encyclopedic work “Torah Temima”, which links every passuk in the Torah to the corresponding midrashim of Chazal ,a particularly incredible feat in the days prior to computer search engines, and also analyzes them.
He was also the son of one of the greatest halachik authorities and writers of post Shulchan-Aruch times, the famed Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein, author of “Aruch haShulchan.”
In his epic biographic work “Mekor Baruch,” he has an enlightening section entitled “the wisdom of women,” where he tells, amongst others, a story about one of his encounters with his illustrious Aunt Rebbetzin Batya, the wife of his uncle, the famed Netziv of Volozhin.
He tells how in his younger years, he was at the table of his uncle and aunt and was asked to say some words of Torah.
During his talk, he referred to a piece from the Yerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud), something usually only studied by older Talmidei Chachamim who have already studied the Bavli (Babylonian Talmud) in great depth.
His Aunt asked him, in a not so gentle rebuke, whether he had actually studied the Yerushalmi.
He responded, honestly, that he had not, but had seen it quoted in a Tosfos, or one of the other Rishonim (see the book for a precise account- I am telling this from memory seeing as I do not have it in front of me right now.)
She then asked him how he could have the cheek to quote from the Yerushalmi if he had not studied it directly?
She admonished him that if he only saw the Yerushalmi inside a Tosfos, he should have made it clear that he had quoted it second hand, and had seen it in the Tosfos, and not given the impression that he was a scholar in Yerushalmi.
We see how such a common and innocent failure to disclose the secondary source from where one identified a primary source was taken so seriously in a palace of Torah such as that of the Berlin’s.
Coming back to our daf, the Gemara finally reconciles the contradictory views by shockingly differentiating between honesty related to one’s Torah knowledge, and honesty in business.
There were indeed people left in Jerusalem willing to admit their failure to learn and acquire Torah knowledge, but there was none who was truly honest in business!
This seems at first to be counter intuitive- surely none of use would dream of dishonesty in business, but we certainly could make the error of inflating our own achievements in learning?
Yet based on the conclusion, perhaps when we examine our actions more closely, we will see that behaving completely honestly in business is one of the biggest challenges that we face, and even those of us who would stick fastidiously to the advice of the formidable Rebbetzin Batya, might need to examine our actions in the business sphere more carefully- after all, we do not want to be in the category of those who caused the destruction of our Holy city and Temple, chas veshalom.
Category Archives: Daf Yomi Analysis
Shabbos 119 Siyum Masechta, Barmitzva, and Kabbalat Shabbat
On some of the daf we have been studying, we find a large concentration of references to various minhagim and mitzvot which Chazal praised themselves for doing.
These are the kind of dapim that could have a daf post like ours for virtually every line and choosing which one to focus on is a major effort.
However, “לא עליך המלאכה לגמור ולא אתה בן חורין להפטר ממנה” (the work is not on you to complete, but you are not free to exempt yourself from it.” (Avos 2/16)
Just as a complex and long sugya spanning many daf cannot be given justice in one daf post, neither can daf like these which contain large amounts of short but infinitely deep one-liners.
Let us at least try have a brief look at a few:
- The daf opens continuing with the statement of Abaya, who praises himself for making a festive day celebration for his Yeshiva students whenever they completed a Talmudic tractate.
This is an important primary source for the common practice to make a festive meal, or Siyum, when a tractate is completed, but the implication of the statement seems to be that such an event does not only justify a festive meal, but an actual festival like day, perhaps with the rules of other festive days where melacha is not forbidden, such as Rosh Chodesh, Purim, or Chanuka, on which activities such as fasting, eulogies, and saying תחנונים (supplications) are not allowed.
We see a similar concept (Bava Kama 87a ) where Rav Yosef declares that if he were to find out that the halacha follows the view that a blind man is liable to perform all commandments, he would make a ימא טבא לרבנן (a festive day for the Rabbis), seeing as Rabbi Chanina taught us (perhaps contra instinctively) that one who is commanded to fulfil a commandment is actually greater than who performs it voluntarily.
This is the primary source for making a celebratory meal on the day that a boy becomes barmitzvah (and possibly when a girl becomes bat-mitzva), where he celebrates that fact that he is now in the superior category of those who are obligated to perform the mitzvos.
Once again, although the implication of the words seems to imply that a festive day should be declared, not only for the barmitzvah boy, but for those who participate in his celebration ( a festive day for the Rabbis ,) the minhag seems to be somewhat more limited to having a festive meal, as well as to giving the boy priority when it comes to reading from the Torah- we have not found that this day is treated with the laws of a mini Yom-Tov either for the celebrants or the Barmitzva himself.
Another apparent anomaly between the wording of Abaya’s statement is that given that the Talmud had not yet been sealed, the completion of a tractate he was referring to is likely to have consisted merely of the Mishnayot, perhaps together with the explanations of the leading Amoraim at the time (שמוש תלמידי חכמים)
Yet common practice seems to be to only make a festive meal on the completion of an entire tractate of the Talmud as we have in front of us today, including not only the teaching from Abaya and Rava till Ravina and Rav Ashi, but also those parts of the Talmud that were completed after them, as well as all the aggadic material that is not directly tied to the Mishnayot at all.
Perhaps the answer to these questions is that we do not find that either Abaya or Rav Yosef held that it was an obligation to follow their actions in these cases.
As such, these were not decrees as such, but simply examples of good practices which the Amoraim performed, and on which similar, but not completely identical later customs were based.
As a result, all we have is the part of their actions that actually became common practice, and the completion of a tractate and attainment of Bar Mitzva are indeed celebrated with a festive meal, as done by these Amoraim, but not with all the laws associated as a full on celebratory day.
Similarly, common practice is to follow Abaya’s practise of making a festive meal on the completion of a Masechta, but only when the entire Masechta we have in front of us has been completed.
Yet, it is always first prize when one can reconcile as much of the existing minhag with its basis in the Talmud as possible.
Regarding the actual study material required to qualify for a Siyum, our teacher haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א , recently wrote an entire booklet on the subject for his annual shiur on Shas, held in memory of his late wife זצ”ל.
In addition to showing that a Siyum is also commonly made on the completion of a book of Tanach, he opines that it can be made on an in depth study of even one of the more complex tractates of Mishna, such as those in Zeraim and Taharos which do not have accompanying Talmud Bavli- for more details on his view and reasoning, please refer to this .
I was then delighted to find that our phrase יומא טבא לרבנן is also used regarding a celebratory meal for one who has recovered from illness.
The Gemara (Brachos 46a) tells us that when Rabbi Zeira was ill, Rabbi Abahu took it upon himself to make a יומא טבא לרבנן (festive day for the Rabbis) when he would recover.
The way he fulfilled this commitment was by making a festive meal for the Rabbis!
This seems to reinforce the common practise of interpreting the phrase יומא טבא לרבנן as a perhaps exaggerated expression referring to making a festive meal, rather than taking it literally as referring to an entire day with the literal status of a minor Yom Tov! - We find in our daf another example of a practice of Amoraim that evolved over time into a related but not identical practice
Rabbi Chanina used to wrap himself up on Erev Shabbos and say “באו נצא לקראת שבת מלכה”(“let us go out to greet the Shabbos queen.”)
Rabbi Yannai used to dress up on Erev Shabbos and call out ” באי כלה באי כלה“(come o bride, come o bride.”
This practice is the primary source for an entire service known as קבלת שבת, greeting the shabbos, which is held as shabbos is coming in, before Maariv.
It is interesting to note that whereas Rabbi Chanina used to be the one to actively go out and greet the shabbos, Rabbi Yannai used to call to the shabbos to come in, perhaps two different approaches as to how to greet royalty, or alternatively, as to the nature of the special royalty of Shabbos.
This approach is reflected in the much later Lecha Dodi poem, written roughly 1000 years after the Talmudic period by the Kabbalist of Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz in Safed, which forms a major part of our relatively modern Kabbalat Shabbat.
The chorus of the verse calls on us to go out and meet the bride (לכה דודי לקראת כלה), whereas the final stanza ends with the words באי כלה באי כלה , (come of bride, come o bride), as on our daf.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 117 and 118 Shalosh Seudot, Melava Malka, and relying on others for support
Our Mishna tells us that should a fire break out in one’s home chalila, it is permitted to save food from a fire that is sufficient for 3 shabbos meals.
This applies if the fire breaks out before dinner on Friday night, otherwise one is only permitted so save enough for the remaining meals on Shabbos.
It should be pointed out that it was normative in Talmudic times to have only 2 meals a day, one in the morning, and one in the evening, and thus having a third meal on shabbos stuck out as a special act of honoring the shabbos.
This might be the reason why this meal, which should technically be called סעודה שלישית (the third meal), is traditionally referred to simply as שלוש סעודות (three meals.)- It is through this meal that it is apparent that all 3 meals are done in honor of shabbos, and not just to satisfy one’s needs.
In our day, when we eat 3 meals a day in any case, how is this result achieved without having 4 meals?
As it is usually forbidden to eat before davening, one generally does not have breakfast, so we are still left with only 3 meals.
Perhaps this is the reason for the custom to have a Kiddush after davening at shul, in lieu of breakfast, so סעודה שלישית is truly an extra meal.
However, if we treat the third meal as a form of early supper as we often do, we are effectively just replacing our Saturday night dinner with an early one (which in summer can be quite late indeed.)
Perhaps this is a halachik reason for the custom to have a Melava Malka (extra meal to escort the Shabbos on her way ) after shabbos as well, so that it is clear that סעודה שלישית is being eaten just for the sake of shabbos?
Yet, as nice as the above ideas sound, we need to investigate whether
there is really an obligation to have one more meal than usual on shabbos, as a fulfilment of the general Mitzva of honoring and enjoying the Shabbos day
OR whether perhaps there is simply a technical obligation to have 3 halachic meals on Shabbos, regardless of circumstance, based on its own independent source, whether or not one eats more meals than one does during the week in practice.
This question could have special application when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, and bread or Matza is not permitted after midday.
Some have the custom to daven early, wash for Kiddush early as breakfast, and then count lunch as the third meal.
Some communities or Yeshivot also have the custom every week to wash for Kiddush straight after davening, have a light non-meat meal, and then have a heavier meat meal in the afternoon for the third meal.
If there is a requirement that the meal needs to specifically be for shabbos, simply replacing breakfast is probably not sufficient.
On the other hand, if all that is required is to fulfill the technical Mitzva of eating 3 meals on shabbos, then one has clearly done so.
A third possibility is that one can fulfill the basic Mitzva just by fulfilling the technical requirement, but that it is a מצוה מין המובחר (higher level of performing the Mitzva) to make sure that one actually has a meal one would not normally eat during the week.
A further look at our sugya shows that the requirement to eat 3 meals on shabbos is derived according to Rabbi Yochanan from the repetition of the word יום ( day) 3 times , in the passuk containing the instruction to eat מן (Manna) gathered the day before shabbos on shabbos.
The passuk reads (Shmos 16/25):
וַיֹּ֤אמֶר מֹשֶׁה֙ אִכְלֻ֣הוּ הַיּ֔וֹם כִּֽי־שַׁבָּ֥ת הַיּ֖וֹם לַיקֹוָ֑ק הַיּ֕וֹם לֹ֥א תִמְצָאֻ֖הוּ בַּשָּׂדֶֽה:
(“and Moshe said, eat it today, for today is Shabbos for Hashem, today you will not find it in the field.”)
A Beraita is brought showing the view of the Chachamim that one is required to eat 3 meals on shabbos, but also cites the view of Rabbi Chidka that one is required to eat FOUR meals on shabbos.
Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Chidka’s view is based on the same passuk, but given that the requirement is based on the word היום (the day), 3 meals in the day are required, in addition to the one held at night!
The Gemara challenges both views with a Mishna which says that someone who has enough food for 14 meals (one week) is not considered poor enough to collect money from the קופה (charity collection).
If one really needs to have 3 or 4 meals on shabbos, surely the cutoff point should be 15 or 16 meals, not only 14?
The Gemara explains that according to Chachamim, we can simply tell him to have his Saturday night dinner while it is still shabbos and fulfill the Mitzva of שלוש סעודות that way.
This seems to imply that one is not required to have a special Melava Malka meal on Saturday night and that one can fulfill the mitzva of 3 meals on shabbos even if one simply has an early supper, strengthening the possibility that the 3 meals is an objective requirement and there is no obligation for the meal to be specifically for shabbos.
One could counter, however, that all that we see from here is that the requirement to have a meal specifically for shabbos is not מעכב (holding back) the fulfillment of the mitzva, and thus not enough of an obligation that we are required give him charity money for it. It could still be an obligatory part of the mitzva under normal circumstances, or at least a הדור מצוה (better way of doing the Mitzva.)
The Gemara then goes a step further and suggests that according to Rabbi Chidka, we could tell him to have his Friday daytime meal at night once shabbos is in, thus fulfilling one’s Friday evening obligation with his regular Friday dinner and still leaving 2 meals for Shabbos plus his Saturday night meal for the fourth shabbos meal. This possibility is rejected out of hand, seeing as it is not reasonable to expect him to fast all day on Erev Shabbos.
The Gemara then comes out with an idea that in today’s age of entitlement sounds truly unbelievable.
It says that both Chachamim and Rabbi Chidka follow the view of Rabbi Akiva that a person should rather make his shabbos like a weekday (regarding the food he eats) than take help from other people!
Rashi understands this to not only replace the suggestion that he eat his Friday meal on Friday night, but also the suggestion that he eat his Saturday meal early.
Instead, the Gemara understands that the obligation to eat 3 meals on shabbos (according to Chachamim) or 4 meals (according to Rabbi Chidka) only applies to one who has enough of his own money for them.
However, one who cannot afford 3 or 4 meals on shabbos should rather have only 2, just like on a weekday, rather than be a burden on others.
It follows that the Beraisa that talks about the criteria for charity has nothing to do with the requirements for a regular person to have 3 or 4 meals dedicated meals for shabbos, seeing as a person who needs charity should miss this mitzva rather than take charity!
We should note that this is despite the fact that missing the third meal on shabbos is considered so serious by Chazal that it is called עשה שבתך חול, making one’s shabbos into a weekday, clearly a strong admonishment against those who treat this meal lightly.
Without this special meal, the shabbos meal schedule is similar to during the week, and that is called “making one’s shabbos into a weekday!”
Although not a water-tight proof, this strong wording seems to support the view that it is not sufficient just to technically perform the obligation derived from the passuk to have three meals- the extra meal has to be noticeably in addition to the number of meals one has during the week.
As such, it indeed seems preferable that in today’s time, one should indeed be particular to have both Kiddush and Melava Malka, in order to make sure that his סעודה שלישית is not simply in place of breakfast or Saturday dinner.
However, this proof is not water-tight, and at the end of the day, the obligation to have a third meal is independently based by Chazal on a different passuk to the one from which we derive the obligation of honoring the shabbos.
As such, one could probably be lenient on Erev Pesach given that it is שעת הדחק (unusually difficult circumstances), and fulfill one’s second meal with a “breakfast Kiddush” and third meal with an early lunch, if none of the other suggested solutions are appropriate.
It would however seem preferable for shuls and yeshivos not to make a regular practice of it on regular Shabbatot in order to make sure that the third meal is indeed noticeable as something one would not eat during the week- one certainly gains an element of the Mitzva of honoring the shabbos that way, even if it is not an intrinsic part or even an embellishment of the Mitzva of the three meals.
Perhaps those Rabbis and Rashei Yeshiva who do advocate the kiddush/lunch model hold that there is no such requirement whatsoever for there to be quantitively more meals on shabbos than during the week but there is rather simply a technical requirement to eat 3 meals on shabbos, regardless of how many one eats during the week.
Or perhaps, they hold that so long as the extra meal is qualitatively better than it would be during the week, as a lavish Kiddush/lunch could be compared to a regular breakfast, that is sufficient to make it noticeably for shabbos.
In any case, two undebatable messages from this discussion is that
- The third Shabbos meal is in some ways the most important of the shabbos meals, and not to be taken lightly
- One is supposed to do one’s best to avoid being a burden on the community, and whereas one is permitted to take charity when one really needs it for one’s basic needs, even a mitzva like the third shabbos meal, which is SO intrinsic to the honor of Shabbos is NOT enough of a reason to do so .
(p.s. the 4 cups of wine on Pesach is indeed an exception due to the addition aspect of publicizing the mitzva- see Ran on our sugya who makes this distinction.)
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 115-116 Saving Holy scrolls, amulets, and the Torah of a heretic
On Daf 115b, we are told that even though it is permitted to save holy scrolls from a fire on Shabbos (understood by the Gemara as moving them to somewhere which only involves a rabbinic transgression), blessings and amulets, even if they contain scriptural verses with Hashem’s name, are not included in this leniency, and must be left to burn.
One possible reason for this is that they simply do not have the necessary level of holiness warranted to transgress shabbos for, albeit on a rabbinical level.
This could be backed up by the parallel sugya (Shabbos 61a) which proves that even they are not holy enough to warrant shabbos transgression, they certainly do require burial if damaged, and leaves open the possibility that one might even be forbidden to take them into the toilet.
Another possible, though, is that there is actually something wrong with these things and/or the person who wrote them, and although the earlier sugya would require a rather creative reading in order to justify such an interpretation, there is certainly much evidence pointing in this direction as well.
Rashi, as an example of a verse written in such amulets, gives the example of כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצריים לא אשים עליך (all the illnesses that I placed on Egypt, I shall not place on you- Shmos 15/26 ), an apparent סגולה (charm) against illness.
Yet we cannot ignore the fact that this is the very example used by the Mishna (Sanhedrin 90a) which, if chanted to cure a wound, renders the chanter part of the unenviable group of people who have no share in the world to come!
Although the Gemara there, and elsewhere (see earlier post on the subject) limits the scope of these harsh words to one who spits in the process, it is clear from the parallel sugya (Shvuos 15b) that using words of Torah to cure people is still completely forbidden, even if it doesn’t always warrant such a harsh punishment.
Furthermore, the Rambam (Avodah Zara 11/12) appears to ignore the opinion in the Gemara that limits its scope to one who spits, and rules that chanting pessukim for healing purposes is not only completely forbidden under the prohibition of superstitious practices, but also a form of כפירה (denial of the Torah…) in that he turns words of the Torah, which are supposed to be medicine for the soul, into medicine for the body… (See Kesef Mishna who deals with this at length.)
Perhaps it is this kind of amulet or “blessing scroll) which is being referred to here, and that should be allowed to be burned, given that the writer showed almost heretical beliefs, as did the wearer?
In truth, on daf 116a, we are told similar things about a Sefer Torah written by a מין (heretic)
In a truly shocking statement, the Gemara tells us that a Sefer Torah written by a heretic is not be saved on Shabbos, and should be allowed to burn, together with its pessukim and divine names.
In fact, Rabbi Tarfon goes a step further and declares that should such a Torah come into his hands, he would physically burn it himself!
In discussing how it is possible to allow the name of Hashem to be destroyed, against the biblical prohibition of לא תעשון כן לשם אלוקיכם (do not do so [what you do to idolatry] to Hashem your G-d [Devarim 32/33 ], the Gemara replies that we learn this using a קל וחומר (fortiori) from the case of the סוטה (woman suspected of being unfaithful.
Just like the parchment with Hashem’s name on it is erased in order to make peace between man and wife (i.e. prove her innocence), so it can surely be erased due to the impact that the writers heresy has on the relationship between the Jewish people and our father in Heaven (by showing that we are faithful to him and reject a Torah written by one who is not,)
There is SO much to analysis here, so many nuances in the text, but one issue that needs to be stressed immediately is the need to define what a “heretic” is- it is clear from this sugya (and Rashi’s explanation of it) that this does not refer to anyone who practices idolatry, but only to someone who has experienced the truth of belief in Hashem and his Torah and intentionally rejected it- a very rare, if not non-existent phenomena in our times.
Yet even still, It is hard to imagine that a scroll that is physically identical to the Torah we all live by, and contains the same names of Hashem, can be allowed to burn, or even intentionally burnt, simply because of the heretical beliefs of the person who wrote them.
It seems, at least from here, that the notion of “accept the truth wherever it comes from,” which seems to be the simple meaning of the Mishnaic dictum איזהו חכם הלומד מכל אדם (Who is wise, one who learns from every man,” ]Avos 4/1] is rejected by Chazal, at least in this case.
Whatever happened to the idea that דברי תורה אינם מקבלים טומאה (words of Torah do not become impure?), the basis for the accepted view of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira that a baal keri does not have to go to mikva before learning Torah or davening (Brachos 22a and Chullin 136b), but also used by the Rambam to permit even a Nidah to touch a Torah? (Tefillin ,Mezuzah,veSefer Torah 10/8)
This rules implies that a Torah cannot be impurified by virtue of an impure person touching it, so why should a person of impure views (heresy) invalidate a Torah simply by being the one to write it?
In addition, how do we explain the words and actions of Rabbi Meir, who continued to learn from his Rebbe, Elisha ben Abuya, now known as אחר ( someone else) , after he became a heretic, On the basis that he removes the dirty peel and eats the clean fruit on the inside. (Chagiga 15b)
How do we explain the way the Rambam so often quoted Aristotle in matters that he agreed with him on, using similar arguments, if the words of a heretic are to be burnt?
The late Chief Rabbi Dr Hertz of the British empire, in his famous Chumash which was arguably the most used English translation in the pre-Artscroll days, makes use of this dictum and even quotes friendly Christian bible scholars in his commentary when he feels what they say is appropriate, something he admittedly received much criticism for, particularly with the rise of the Artscroll generation, but also by senior Talmidei Chachamim.
In fact I recall this very debate as a teen growing up in Johannesburg, where the Hertz Chumash was the gold standard for English translations in the traditional Orthodox Shul’s of Johannesburg, and was used all the time by my father שליט”א at home and many other leading Rabbis in the community.
My high School Rebbe, Rav Eliezer Chrysler, שליט”א, is one of those Talmidei Chachamim who truly made a long-lasting impression on me in many great ways, even if we have not always agreed on ideological matters.
He is a man who displays one of the greatest examples of Ahavas Torah (love of Torah) I have ever seen, to the point that he used to give his daily Yomi class to a tiny group of dedicated people at a time when daf Yomi was not exactly well known in South Africa ( I was not one of those committed people, unfortunately.)
There were times when no-one showed up for the shiur, but he nevertheless continued as usual, literally giving the shiur into the tape recorder!
Rabbi Chrysler comes from the English Chareidi Gateshead school, as unsurprisingly, used to often discourage us from using the Hertz Chumash, due to his quoting the explanations of “heretics,” a view that I myself took on for at least a large part of my youth, and still certainly take into account, but which is arguable, given the very limited definition of a “heretic” referred to earlier on. (it could be that it was bothered more by the idea that the commentaries were of non-Jewish origin than necessarily written by heretics, based on the dictumחכמה בגויים תאמין תורה גויים אל תאמין [Eicha Rabbah 2/13])
Yet in another twist and turn in this fascinating discussion, when it comes to learning Torah from someone who is not a good role-model, Chazal take an even stronger stand and rule that “If your Rabbi appears to you to be similar to an angel, then learn from him, otherwise do not learn from him.” (Chagiga 15b)- This is indeed the difficulty the Gemara there raises with Rabbi Meir’s actions!
It is unlikely that this requirement for a Torah teacher to be a perfect role model in all ways can be taken literally, at least on a pragmatic level, and in case, people are not supposed to be angels as evidence by the famous rule of לא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת (the Torah was not given to angels.)
In fact, in a seemingly contradictory statement, Chazal tell us that if you have seen a Talmid Chacham who has sinned at night ]Brachos 19a] (probably a reference to sins in the sexual realm, such as forbidden sexual acts, or wasting of seed ) , do not think badly about during the day, as he has probably done Teshuva.
This shows clearly that we do not expect Talmidei Chachamim to be sin free like angels, but rather to not only accept their teshuva, but to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume they have done Teshuva, rather than make them prove their angelic qualities. (It seems obvious that this does not apply to one who is a danger to others, or one who refuses to acknowledge his errors and has clearly NOT done teshuva.)
Yet at a bare minimum, the statement quoted earlier can be seen to giving a very message as to how students can and should demand the highest standards of example-setting from their teachers.
Perhaps, the answer lies in the type of flawed individual we are dealing with.
To sin is human, and even great people sin. They are to be held to account and liable to repent, but not rejected once they have done so.
However, when a person shows intrinsic negative character traits, it is a completely different matter.
One’s teacher might indeed be forgiven for sins, particular those that do not harm other people, but he certainly must be expected to show almost angelic character traits- after all, דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה (polite behavior comes before Torah.)
The classic heretic of our Gemara is completely rejected not because of his sins, or even his worship of idols, but because he shown the worst possible character traits possible- a lack of הכרת הטוב and rejection of what he knows to be true.
His sin is so severe because, to paraphrase the pessukim quoted by the Gemara, he has seen the truth of Hashem and his Torah, but deliberately thrown it behind the door, out of the way.
Such a person cannot be a Rebbe, nor can his Torah be saved, and his Torah is in fact so tainted that Rabbi Tarfon would have physically burnt it himself.
As the Neviim ,various statements of Chazal, and of course the Rambam among others have stressed so many times (think for example of the Midrash which describe the blood pouring out of the curtain when the enemy entered the Temple), holy items and practices are not magical charms- they only holy because they serve as a way of improving our relationship with Hashem- when they fail to do this, they are as good as burnt already.
In contrast, it can be argued that someone who has sinned by using words of Torah to heal, but who has good intent and certainly has not rejected Hashem and his Torah, should not be in the category of a heretic to the point that we would physically burn his amulets, and Rabbi Tarfon certainly did not make any suggestion that amulets should be burnt- their products do not have the necessary level of holiness to override the shabbos, but they if damaged, they certainly should still be treated with respect and buried.
One must of course, still take into account Rambam’s harsh words which indeed do seem to equate using Torah to heal with heresy- perhaps he would hold that abusing the truth of Torah which a person has experience for physical gain (particularly when money is made from them ) is also a sign of bad character traits which deserve the most severe of sanction.
Yet the truth is that as pointed out in earlier posts, the Rambam himself follows the Gemara in allowing amulets from proven experts to be worn on shabbos for at least for protection, probably for psychological reasons, and it is doubtful that he would condemn one who writes them to help someone, even on a psychological level, as a heretic.
As such, I tend towards preferring our earlier suggestion, that the reasons for allowing amulets to burn are completely different from the reasons for allowing the Torah of a bona fide heretic to burn, or even physically burning it.
I also suggest that we should differentiate between a person who sins like all people do, even perhaps with a degree of heresy, but afterwards repents or at least comes from a sincere place, and someone whose flawed character traits lead him to deny the Torah he believes in, for the sake of his own convenience.
Let us recall that according to Chazal, the Jewish people never worshipped idolatry because they believed in it, but rather in order to permit forbidden sexual relationships to themselves )Sanhedrin 63b)- although this is sometimes quoted as a relative positive, according to what we have said, it might actually be a negative- they experienced the truth of Torah , had absolutely no intellectually honest way of rejecting it, and knew that idolatry was meaningless, yet threw their beliefs behind the door in order to be able to live a lifestyle antithetical to Torah values.
Perhaps, this is why Rabbi Meir was able to still see the good in his Rebbe and learn the good things from him- Elisha ben Abuya was probably not the classic heretic of flawed character described here who knew the truth but conveniently and/or intentionally buried it.
He was more likely a very sensitive and great individual who lost his faith due to very traumatic experiences he encountered. His peels had become dirty, but he was clean and sweet on the inside!
This can be backed up by the case which is blamed for his heresy- the boy who climbed up to the roof on his father’s intructions to perform the Mitzva of שלוח הקן (sending away the mother-bird), which together with honoring parents is a specific mitzva for which long life is promised, and fell off the tree and died.
This might be somewhat comparable to the holocaust survivor who was simply unable to come to terms with the horrors he saw and how they could reflect the promises made by the Torah, particularly given the facts that the pious and religious Jews of Eastern Europe were amongst those most affected.
This heresy is incorrect and not to be encouraged, but it is also not to be condemned in the same way- it is a heresy that stems from a beautiful and sensitive character, and such people are still redeemable, still role models in other areas and worthy of learning from, and ultimately to be drawn close, not pushed away.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 114 Shabbos clothes, The definition of a Talmid Chacham and Chillul Hashem
Our daf continues to discuss the Mitzva of having special clothes for Shabbos, based on the famous Pesukim (Yeshayahu 58), read as the Haftarah for Yom Kippur.
These Pessukim teach us that just like Hashem is not just interested in the technical aspects of the sacrifices, but is even more concerned about the concept behind them, the “spirit of the sacrifices” so to speak, so also when it comes to Shabbat, it is not only the technical specifications about whether something is considered a forbidden melacha that are important, but also the special sanctity of the day- the “spirit of shabbos, “ so to speak.
As such, we are required not only to refrain from biblical forbidden melacha on shabbos and their rabbinically related prohibitions, but also to refrain from things that are associated with the vibe of the weekday (עובדין דחול) and to engage in activities that are special for shabbos and that are in keeping with the sanctity of the day.
This is not an extra chumra (stringency), as many mistakenly believe, but a complete מצוה מדי סופרים (Mitzva of the prophets or later sages), that is binding on everyone, and that might also affect biblical law (possibly a גלוי מלתא as to what is included in the biblical requirement of תשבות, but that is for a different analysis!)
In addition to avoiding any business transactions or even business related talk, walking quickly in long steps or running (see previous daf), one of these requirements is that one’s shabbos clothes should not be the same as those worn during the week, and our daf brings a source in the Chumash itself that changing one’s clothes is a sign of respect from the Kohanim who needed to change their clothes between cleaning out the ashes and performing the actual offerings.
The logic given is that one should not use the same vessel he has used to mix a drink for his master to serve one’s master with.
Similarly, part of the mitzva of honoring shabbos referring to in Yeshayahu, must surely include putting on special clothes that befit the sanctity of the shabbos.
Often, I see people, children and teens in particular, who come to shul on shabbos wearing weekday clothes, such as jeans and t-shirts, and although it is clearly preferable that they come dressed that way rather than not come at all,I believe that parents and Rabbis should use common sense where appropriate to encourage those who are likely to listen to wear the appropriate formal and special attire for Shabbos.
I also often see people, once again children and teens in particular, changing out of their shabbos clothes after lunch on shabbos, and going to play sports in shorts, t-shirts, and the like.
This is a more complex issue, which involves the question of which, if any, sports are permitted or forbidden on shabbos, and whether they fit into the requirement to avoid weekday activities and focus on things appropriate for the day.
If, and only if, one is able to permit such activities as part of עונג שבת, subject to any halachik restrictions involved, are we able to deal with whether it is permitted to change into weekday clothes for such activities.
On the one hand, just like running might be permitted for youth because that is their עונג שבת (enjoyment of the day,) rather than a stressful weekday activity, perhaps wearing comfortable clothing suitable for such activities might also be.
On the other hand, it is possible that any activity that cannot be performed comfortably in shabbos clothes (other than resting or sleeping obviously) might be a weekday activity by definition!
In addition to clothes being a way of highlighting the honor of shabbos and the divine services, they are also a way of highlighting one’s honor for davening(prayer) , and the honor of the Torah , as represented by Talmidei Chachamim (Torah scholars.)
As such, Talmidei Chachamim traditionally wore special clothing, and were expected to be particularly careful not to have any dirt or stains on their clothes.
The later not only fails to show honor to the Torah they represent, but causes a terrible Chillul Hashem, and as a result, the Gemara uses the very harsh expression חייב מיתה (deserving of death) for one who does so.
This is based on the verse משניאי אהבו מוות (those who make people hate me, love death-Misheli 8/36)
As Rashi explains, when a Talmid Chacham appears dirty, it causes people to hate the Torah that he represents, and ultimately Hashem himself!
These words might seem harsh, but they certainly convey the sensitivity that a Torah society should show to cleanliness, and that a person who is looked up to by others, should highlight in himself.
This presumably applies not only to a stain, but also wearing torn or smelly clothing, or giving off bad body odor or breathe.
Although it is logical that all of us should show sensitivity to this essential value, it is clear from our sugya that the more of a Talmid Chacham one is, the more careful one needs to be.
At this point, this begs the question- how do we define a Talmid Chacham, at least as far as this rule is concerned?
Does this apply only to one of the Gedolei haDor (leading Torah sages), to anyone with a good general knowledge of all areas of Torah, or perhaps to someone with a high level of knowledge in one area of Torah, someone who serves as a community Rabbi or Torah teacher, or anyone who studies Torah daily or who is more knowledgeable than average?
On our daf, Rabbi Yochanan presents 3 definitions of a Talmid Chacham:
- A Talmid Chacham on the level that one would return lost property to him without him being requirement to produce simanim (identification signs), as long as he says that he recognizes it- Rabbi Yochanan identifies this as someone who is careful to turn over his shirt if he put it on the wrong way.
- A Talmid Chacham who is worthy of being appointed as a פרנס (leader) of the community- this is defined as someone who can be asked a halacha in any area of the Torah and is able to answer, even in less commonly studied areas like the “minor tractate” of Kallah.
- A Talmid Chacham whose labor the community is required to perform on his behalf (possibly meaning to support)- Anyone who puts asides his own concerns and focusses on the concerns of heaven.
It seems from the above definitions that the term “Talmid Chacham” is not only used to describe a person’s actual knowledge, but also his trustworthiness, reputation, and self-sacrifice for divine matters (see our earlier post on ירידת הדורות for an interesting parallel.)
When it comes to appointing someone as Rabbinic leader, the person is expected not only to have the correct character traits (which should go without saying, after all דרך ארך קדמה לתורה), but also have total knowledge of the entire corpus of Jewish law, to the point that he can answer any questions that come his way.
As the Gemara later says, in order to be a local community Rabbi, such knowledge in one מסכתא (tractate) is actually sufficient (presumably he will then have the skills to look up or refer questions in area outside his expertise) , and to be the Rosh Yeshiva (presumably of the entire country or nation), such knowledge of the entire Torah is required, as per Rabbi Yochanan’s definition.
However, there are other traits that make the title of Talmid Chacham appropriate for someone:
When it comes to trusting his honesty as a Talmid Chacham is supposed to be trusted, the fact that he has the reputation of an honest and generally well-learned figure is sufficient. (the later requirement being my own assumption, as it is unlikely than any honest person would be referred to as a Talmid Chacham without any minimum level of Torah wisdom/knowledge)
When it comes to giving him the support needed to carry on his holy work, his level of learning and reputation is less of a factor, and his motivation and self-sacrifice is what counts the most.
Seeing as the laws we have discussed regarding being clean and presentable are based on preventing Chillul Hashem and thus dependent very much on the person’s reputation, it seems logical that the appropriate definition for the purposes of this law would be anyone with the reputation of being a Torah personality, such that one would trust his honesty in monetary matters.
As such, it is possible that in today’s time, anyone who is a Ben Torah- someone whose life-center is the study and application of Torah regardless of what trade or profession he follows, might well be in the spotlight of the majority who unfortunately do not yet fit into this category.
In a world where the majority of Jews are not yet observant unfortunately, this argument could possibly be applied to ALL “frum” (religiously observant) people.
As such, anyone in this category needs to be particularly concerned about how he presents him/her self, and of course even more so, about how he/she behaves!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 113 Tying knots on Shabbos and דבר שאין מתקים.
On our Daf, we are told the generally accepted rule of Rabbi Yehuda that tying any knot which is not permanent is not a biblical transgression on shabbos.
We have seen this idea recently when the Mishna (Shabbos 111b) taught us that one is only liable for tying the type of knot tied by camel-drivers and sailors.
Rashi over there explained that this means that the knot has to last forever (presumably in the absence of human intervention), likes the knots tied to join the broken threads in the curtains of the mishkan.
The Gemara indeed verifies that this refers to the knot which ties a camel’s nose-ring in place permanently, so that the rope that it is driven with can be tied to the ring and untied as needed, as well as the knot tied with a rope to a ship through which ropes can be tied in to order to anchor it.
In contrast, the knots made to tie the anchor-ropes to the knot-rope or the rope to the camel’s nose-ring are not regarded as permanent knots. These are rabbinically forbidden, for reasons given later in the sugya.
On this basis, the Gemara allows tying shoelaces on shabbos under certain circumstances, and forbids them under others, and this sugya needs to be well understood before coming to any conclusions regarding doing this in practice.
Similarly, regarding the melacha of כותב (writing), the Mishna (Shabbos 104b) tells us that one is not liable if one writes with something such a fruit juice or dust that does not last.
Several questions with far-reaching ramifications needs to be addressed, among them:
- What is the reason for this requirement?
- Is this requirement for the effects of a melacha to be permanent, or at least long-lasting, limited to the מלאכות where it is mentioned explicitly by Chazal, like writing and tying knots, or is a general rule for all melachot of Shabbos.
- How long does the effect of the action have to last in order for it to be considered permanent?
One might argue that having a permanent affect is part of the general rule that an action has to be מלאכת מחשבת, significant and calculated work, and something whose affect is merely temporary is not significant enough to fall into that category.
On the other hand, one might argue that the way these particular מלאכות were performed in the mishkan were in ways that were permanent, and we derive this rule directly from that, not from the general rule of מלאכת מחשבת. This seems to be the approach that Rashi has taken here regarding regarding tying nots.
This approach seems logical, given that there are many מלאכות, such as plowing a furrow or baking bread, whose affects are clearly not permanent- for example a furrow is filled in by blowing dust or destroyed by rain or people who walk over it, and a loaf of bread goes rotten and inedible on its own after a few days.
However, the Magid Mishna (Shabbos 11\15) says explicitly that this is a general rule that applies to ALL מלאכות.
According to this, one would perhaps need to accept this as a general rule but admit that when a melacha was specifically done in the Mishkan without permanent affects , like in the above two examples, there would be an exception to this rule.
Alternatively, one would need to limit the definition of “permanent” to the time that these two examples and other like them generally last for- perhaps a week or so (is the lechem hapanim perhaps a precedent for this?)
In truth, even Rashi who has no need to limit the definition of permanent and clearly has not done so on the Mishna, does seem to understand that the reason why there is still a rabbinical prohibition on tying the rope to the boat or the camel’s ring is because one might leave it there “a week or two.”
There, Rashi too seems to imply that leaving it there a week or two would be a biblical transgression, and Chazal thus forbade tying it even for a short time in case one comes to do so.
This apparent contradiction in Rashi requires its own analysis, but we unfortunately do not have time for that now.
The key to the question of whether the requirement for permanence, whatever it means, applies to all מלאכות, probably lies in an earlier Mishna.
The Mishna (Shabbos 102) tells us that in order to be liable for a melacha on Shabbos, it has to be דבר המתקים, something that lasts.
In the somewhat cryptic words words of the Mishna זה הכלל כל העושה מלאכה ומלאכתו מתקיימת בשבת חייב- This is the rule, anyone who does a melacha and his melacha endures on Shabbos, is liable.
This is the simple meaning of the Mishna, and the way the above-cited Magid Mishna, and possibly the Rambam himself, as we shall discuss later, interprets it.
In fact, the Yerushalmi, as quoted by the Rashba and the Ritva, also seems to have learnt it that way, as it explains that the construction of the mishkan was considered permanent seeing as it stayed in one place until the divine command to move was given, or that building for a certain period (בנין לשעה) is also considered building.
However, the wording of the Mishna implies that if the results of the melacha last all of that shabbos, it is considered מלאכת מחשבת, and if they do not, it is not, serving both as the basis for the general exemption of a melacha whose effect is not permanent, and a broad definition of permanent to something that lasts the whole shabbos.
This means in effect that there is no actual fixed length of time that defines permanent, as it clearly depends when on Shabbos this action is performed- it could be as long as almost 24 hours and as little as less than a minute, an unusual form of measurement to say the least.
How does this fit in with what we learnt regarding tying knots (and probably also writing) where the examples given were actions that are truly permanent?
One possibility is that those two melachot are exceptions, due to the specific ways they were performed in the mishkan, but the general rule is far more limited.
This would also answer the difficulties we raised based on baking, ploughing, and the like, whose affects are not permanent in the classic sense of the world, but certainly last till at least the end of shabbos.
It would not, however, answer how the Yerushalmi derives this from the building of the Mishkan, which certainly lasted longer than one shabbos, and was not built on shabbos at all!
Another possibility is that there is indeed no general rule at all, and that this cryptic Mishna has a totally different meaning to what its arguably most simple reading is (certainly the way I first read it.)
A look at Rashi, shows that he has what’s seems like a rather creative interpretation of both דבר המתקיים and בשבת an approach that is shared by a surprisingly number of other Rishonim with various variations (see for example, Ran , Bertenura on the Mishna, and even the Meiri!)
He understands מתקיים not to refer to the time that the effect of the melacha lasts, but to the utility of the action- an action that is sometimes good enough to be left as is, and requires nothing to be added, is considered מתקיים.
He also interprets בשבת not to refer to how long the results of the action need to endure, but rather the day that the action is done.
This interpretation seems not only creative, but rather problematic. Firstly, the Mishna does not say the words that Rashi uses שכיוצא בו מתקים [בלא הוספה] – (note the brackets indicating a possibly questionable version of his words). Secondly, the word בשבת appears redundant, given that all the melachot we are talking about are referring to things done on shabbos!
Furthermore, just like the מלאכות of writing and tying were only done in the Mishkan in ways that were long-lasting, it is clear that at least most were done in a way that lasts longer than 24 hours or even a week, so just like the length of the effect of the above melachot needs to be similar to that of the Mishkan, surely all actions need to as well, even if complete permanence of effect is not needed?
Most of all though, the implication that a melacha needs to produce something which could sometimes be left as is, is rather problematic- since when where the ground herbs in the mishkan left as is? They were used for cooking the dyes. Since when does one leave threshed produce as is without further purifying it or a kneaded loaf unbaked?
Other Rishonim, take a similar approach to the Mishna, but interpret מתקיים as something which does not need to be undone.
According to these Rishonim, we are left without an explicit source for a general rule that a melacha which lacks a lasting effect is not biblically prohibited, and it is possible, though not definite, that this leniency is limited to the melachot it has explicitly been applied too.
I had the gut feeling that the Rambam would learn the Mishna כפשוטו- He does not seem to comment in his פרוש המשניות , or regarding a general rule, but in my online search, I came across the דף על דף anthology who quoted the Minchas Yitchak who claims that the Rambam does precisely this.
He points to the Rambam )Shabbos 9/13) regarding צובע, where he says that it has to be done with materials that last, but brings the wording of our Mishna in perek 7 with its general rule דבר המתקיים בשבת!
Why the Rambam chooses to display his interpretation of the Mishna specifically there and not as a general rule, is a question in its own right- however it seems pretty clear that this is how he understands the Mishna, unless he is simply borrowing its wording and applying it to a completely different principle, which while not impossible for the Rambam, would not be our first choice.
Now that we have seen that the Rambam and some other Rishonim do indeed learn that our Mishna is teaching us a general exemption for a melacha that lacks a lasting effect, and limited the definition of temporary to that shabbos, we need to explain why we treat the melachos of writing and tying a knot differently and require those to have a really permanent effect.
We also need to reassess whether Rashi and those who interpret the Mishna like him agree with this principle, but simply don’t believe that it is sourced in our Mishna, whether they reject it out of hand, or whether they have a longer view of permanence required for all melachot, similar to what we see by writing and tying a knot, and therefore interpret this Mishna as referring to something completely different.
The results of the further research required to have massive ramifications for the scope and applicability of this commonly assumed but perhaps narrower than assumed leniency!
Shabbos 112 Yeridas hadoros (the drop in the generations)
On this Daf, we encounter a fascinating narrative where the sage Chizkiya asks his student, the famous Rabbi Yochanan , a complex question regarding the laws of impurity, and is so impressed with the answer he gives that he exclaims: “This is no man” (but rather an angel, according to Rashi’s explanation.)
A different version of this event is then brought where he exclaims: “THIS is a man.” (ie a real man.)
It appears that there could be a major disagreement between the 2 versions of what Chizkiya said regarding whether an outstanding Torah scholar is to be considered the sign of a truly great man, or an angelic quality, virtually out of reach of a mere human being.
The latter is supported by the well-known statement of Chazal (Bava Metzia 59b) that “לא בשמיים היא “- it is not in heaven. The Torah in supposed to be interpreted, and applied by human beings who have reached the highest levels they can as human beings, NOT by angels, and a voice from heaven is usually not admissible when it comes to halachik rulings.
This is further backed up the exhortation of Hillel (Avos 2\5) that in a place where there is no “man”, one should try to be a man!
However, the continuation of the Gemara does seems to leave both approaches as equally viable options.
It brings the famous statement of Rabbi Zeira in the name of Rava bar Zimuna that אם ראשונים בני מלאכים אנו בני אנשים ואם ראשונים בני אנשים אנו כחמורים… -if the early authorities are like angels, we are human beings, and if they are like human beings, we are like donkeys….
One cannot escape the fact that this statement is brought here in order to refer back to the two different versions of Chizkiya’s statement, and does not only consider both options, but sees the relationship between humans and angels as similar to that between donkeys and humans.
It is clear from this that angelic qualities are considered by our sugya to be superior to human one’s in this regard, but the only debate is as to how we are to be view the qualities of those before us and what Hizkiya considered Rabbi Yochanan’s level to be.
There is much to discuss about it, but one thing that is clear from this sugya is that the later Amoraim considered the scholars of the earlier generations to be far superior in their Torah scholarship to those in their generation.
This is so axiomatic throughout the Shas that entire sugyas are based on ensuring that Amoraim statements do not contradict the statements of the Tannaim before them.
It is necessary, however, to define what precisely this superiority is based on, as well as its scope.
We need to investigate whether this superiority based on the assumption that the quality of quantity of their knowledge and/or reasoning was better, the fact that their divine inspiration and guidance was better, their superiority in righteousness, or their being closer in history to the Sinaitic tradition?
Although Amoraim generally could not or would not argue with Tannaim, its is common for later Tannaim to disagree with earlier Tannaim or for later Amoraim to disagree with earlier Amoraim.
In fact, in a dispute between later Amoraim and earlier Amoraim, we ironically apply the rule of הלכתא כבתראי – the law is like the later authority! (see however Rosh, Bava Metzia 57 who opines that this rule only applies from Abaya and Rava onwards and not before, against the Rif who seems not to differentiate.)
How does this fit in with the idea of אם ראשונים כמלאכים?
In a fascinating case (Brachos 20), Rav Papa asks Abaya why it is that the earlier generations merited to experience miracles, and their generation did not.
He points out that it cannot be because they knew more Torah, as Rav Yehuda’s generation (notably second generation Amoraim) were focused on the part of the Talmud that focusses on damages, and they were focused on all 6 sections of the Talmud.
It also could not be that they understood it better, as Rav Yehuda expressed great difficulty with a certain Mishna while they were able to expand on it with ease.
Yet Rav Yehuda only needed to remove his shoe for rain to come, and their generation could daven all day and nothing happened!
Abaya responded that Rav Yehuda’s generation sacrificed themselves to sanctify Hashem’s name (did risky things in order to preserve the honor of the Torah) and their generation did not.
It seems from here that the superiority of the earlier generations lies NOT in their breadth of knowledge, nor in their greater analytical ability, but rather in their מסירות נפש (self-sacrifice.)
This contrasts greatly with the view expressed by Rabbi Zeira on our daf which seems to put it down to greater analytical ability.
It should also be noted that BOTH of these examples are brought by later Amoraim in reference to earlier ones (whether Rabbi Zeira comparing his generation of scholars to those of Rabbi Yochanan or Abaya comparing his to that of Rav Yehuda.)
Perhaps one answer lies in a radical Rambam (Mamrim 2/1 ) which states that even though when it comes to גזירות made by Chazal, a later Beis Din cannot annul the ruling of an earlier one unless it is greater than them in wisdom and numbers (see Megilla 2a), this does not apply to things that Chazal derives from the Torah itself via the logical rules of interpretation (יג עקרים ).
The Kesef Mishna is extremely bothered by this Rambam, given that we have a rule throughout the Shas that an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna in anything!
However, a reading of the Rambam’s introduction to the Mishna Torah reveals that he too agrees with this rule, and holds that nobody after the sealing of the Talmud can argue with the ruling of the Talmud either.
This is indeed the answer given by the Kesef Mishna, without reference to the above introduction.
However, his reasoning has nothing to do with the superiority of these different groups of sages in their learning, but rather is explained by the fact that the ruling of the Mishna and later the Gemara were accepted by the entire Jewish people and the leading scholars of the time, and thus had the status of a ruling of the great Sanhedrin.
However, within one period, such as amongst the Tannaim , amongst the Amoraim, or amongst the post-Talmudic sages, there is no such restriction, other than the general rule regarding decrees only being annullable by a greater and more numerous Beis Din.
In case one might argue that such is impossible, as each generation is weaker than the previous one, the Rambam ( Mamrim 2/2) makes it clear that it is certainly possible, even if one cannot get a larger court than that of 71 judges, should there be more Torah scholars who support them.
It is clear from the above that the Rambam has a very limited view of ירידת הדורות and does not subscribe any halachik weight to the statement of Rabbi Zeira on our daf.
It is possible that he views the case in Brachos which attributes the superiority of the earlier generations to their greater מסירות נפש, as the more authoritative of the two, but sees neither case as forbidding disagreement per say with the earlier generations, the only exception being Amoraim disagreeing with Tannaim and post Talmudic authorities disagreeing with Amoraim, for entirely different reasons as mentioned above.
Whether the view of the Rambam is accepted by other authorities and whether this indeed is his view required further study, but in the context of a daf post, this should serve as a basis for opening the discussion.
Shabbos 110-111 Healing, castration, דבר שאין מתכוין , and קרוב לפסיק רישיה
Our dapim continue to focus a lot on the prohibition of רפואה (healing) on shabbos.
Whereas any concern about danger to life over-rides all laws of Shabbos, the same does not apply to other ailments.
A biblical transgression may not be performed for an ill person who is not in danger, though much of the time, a rabbinical one may be.
However, when it comes to a מיחוש בעלמא (a pain or discomfort that is not severe enough to confine one to bed or affect the entire body,) , Chazal actually forbade even permitted activities, as a גזירה (decree,), intended to prevent one from coming to transgress the melacha of טוחן ( grinding.)
As most cures were (and often still are) derived from plants which were ground up and used for therapeutic purposes, there was a real concern to Chazal that taking medicine, or allowing any other curative activities, might lead to biblical shabbos transgressions.
The rule which our Mishna formulated is that anything which a person normally eats or drinks when he is healthy, may be done on shabbos, even if it has a curative affect.
The same applies to actions, such as bathing in the “good parts” of the sea, which one normally does when healthy, even when one does so for therapeutic purposes. (see back on Daf 109)
I planned a nice post on the discussion of washing and cooling off in the ocean on Shabbos (floating or swimming is a different issue) , which that sugya seems to clearly imply is fine (spoiler alert- at least for Ashkenazim, it isn’t due to a later custom), but had to leave it to a little later- hang in there!
Here, our Mishna deals with drinking a כוס של עקרין (literally a cup of roots) on shabbos. This was a potion made up of tree sap from Alexandra (see Rashi 110a.)
Our Mishna forbids it, seeing as it is used mainly as a cure for jaundice and not as a drink for healthy people.
There is however a negative side affect of this remedy- it causes sterility-causing sterility to oneself, other people, or even animals, is a biblical prohibition, whether done chemically or physically.
As a result, the Gemara questions how this could be allowed even on a weekday, and replies that it is only forbidden when one’s intention is to cause sterility, but if one has a different intention, and the sterility happens automatically, it is allowed.
A proof is brought from Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling that one who wishes to neuter a rooster, should cut its crown off, and the neutering will happen on its own.
The Gemara responds that the case of the rooster is different, as it is not actually made infertile physically or chemically- its “pride” is simply taken away and it loses it motivation to mate.
In our case, however, even though the intention is to heal the jaundice, the side-effect is actual chemical castration, and that is forbidden.
The Gemara then proceeds with other attempts to explain why taking this potion is permitted, by limiting it to people who are already infertile , a woman who has no duty to procreate, or as a last resort, an infertile woman.
I would like to focus on the first stage of this discussion and see how it relates to the well-known leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין.
This is one of the most important principles of melacha on shabbos, but unlike most of the leniencies based on the requirement for מלאכת מחשבת calculated or significant work) on shabbos, this one applies to other prohibitions as well.
The most often quoted example is the ruling of Rabbi Shimon that a person is permitted to drag a bed, chair, or bench along the ground on shabbos in order to move it, and does not have to be concerned that he will dig a groove in the ground while doing do, so long as that is not his intention.
According to Rabbi Shimon, there is no need to refrain from a permitted activity because of the concern that it might be accompanied by a forbidden secondary activity, so long as one’s intention is for the permitted activity.
Rabbi Yehuda disagrees (the precise source for this disagreement is the subject of another discussion) and holds that’s even if one only intends to perform the permitted action, one still has to be concerned about an unintended forbidden consequence.
The leading Amora Rav rules like Rabbi Yehuda, and his colleague, Shmuel, rules like Rabbi Shimon and is permissive.
In various places, the Gemara quotes this case as one of the 3 times where the later Amora, Rabbah, rules like Shmuel rather than Rav, and this therefore became the accepted halacha throughout the Shas- דבר שאין מתכוין מותר.
One important qualification, however, is that the secondary forbidden action we are concerned about should not be inevitable – the term given for this is פסיק רישיה ולא ימות – cutting off a chickens head for one’s child to use as a ball, without the intent to kill it.
Seeing as killing the chicken is an inevitable result of the action of cutting off its head, the action is forbidden, even if that is not his intention.
One of the sources for this distinction is on our daf 111a-b , where Rav tells us that we follow Rabbi Shimon regarding permission to anoint oneself with the very exclusive rose-oil on shabbos, because כל בני ישראל בני מלכים הם – all Jews are princes, and it is thus considered normal to use such things even for non-curative purposes.
The Gemara then questions how Rav can say that we hold like Rabbi Shimon, when he clearly rules in another case in the laws of Shabbos against Rabbi Shimon (why he needs to consistently follow Rabbi Shimon in all cases is not clear from the Gemara, and is the subject of much discussion in the Rishonim.)
The question at hand is whether one may tighten a cloth that is tied around a barrel of wine to prevent leakage, seeing as there is a concern of squeezing out the wine from the cloth (also a topic of much debate regarding what precisely the problem with that would be.)
This seems to be a classic case of דבר שאין מתכוין – the intention is to plug the leak, not to squeeze out the wine.
However, Rav is quoted as forbidding this, which seems to show that he does not hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding דבר שאין מתכוין.
The Gemara attempts to answer this by pointing out that this is actually an example of פסיק רישיה- squeezing our the wine is an inevitable result of tightening the cloth, and Abaya and Rava have pointed out that even Rabbi Shimon would agree that it is forbidden!
While the Gemara rejects this solution seeing as we know that Rav in fact does not agree with Rabbi Shimon’s leniency regarding דבר שאין מתכוין, we remain with the universally accepted distinction that even though דבר שאין מתכוין is permitted, פסיק רישיה is not.
Now back to Daf 110, the כוס של עקרין , and another possible distinction regarding דבר שאין מתכוין.
It is clear from the conclusion of the Gemara that for a fertile male, drinking this potion is forbidden even during the week, due to the prohibition of סרוס (castration.)
The question is why? Surely this is a classic example of דבר שאין מתכוין- the intention is to treat the jaundice, not to cause infertility!
Tosfos quotes Rav Achai Gaon who is so bothered by this question, that he claims that even though Rabbi Shimon holds that דבר שאין מתכון is permitted in all or at least most prohibitions, not only regarding shabbos melacha, we only follow him on shabbos, not in other matters!
There are numerous places in the shas where it is clear that Rabbi Shimon permits דבר שאין מתכוין in other areas of halacha, among them
-permitting a Nazir to scratch his hair without being concerned it might be detached (Nazir 42a)
- allowing people selling שעטנז ( mixtures of wool and linen) to wear them for show, even though they might benefit from their warmth and transgress the prohibition of wearing שעטנז
שעטנז (Kilayim 9/5) –[see my Hebrew article for an analysis as to what the precise prohibition is and why wearing it for show is allowed.]
-performing a bris on a leprous infant, despite the concern that he might cut the נגע off together with the foreskin, transgressing the prohibition of removing a leprous lesion. )Shabbos 133a) - letting blood from a בכור בהמה (first born animal) without being concerned he might cause a blemish, which is forbidden. )Bechoros 33b )
As there is no clear claim anywhere in the shas that the Amoraim’s acceptance of Rabbi Shimon’s leniency is limited to the laws of Shabbos, the claim of Rav Achai Gaon is rather radical, and the Tosfos rejects it out of hand, as does the consensus of halachik opinion.
Tosfos actually brings proofs from some of the other sugyos that the Amoraim clearly rule like Rabbi Shimon in all areas of halacha regarding the leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין.
The question remains, however, if that is the case, why is drinking this כוס של עקרין forbidden even during the week, at least for fertile males?
Tosfos suggests that this is because this is actually a case of פסיק רישיה – the resulting infertility is inevitable, and that is why all the Amoraim and Tannaim would agree it is forbidden.
We cannot simply end there, however.
After all, surely Rav Achai Gaon was aware that פסיק רישיה is forbidden?
We also have to try to explain what Rav Achai Gaon would do with all the proofs that the Tosfos brought from the other areas of halacha.
We do not have time in this post for the later, but as far as the former goes, it is unlikely that two Rishonim would debate an easily verifiable medical fact such as whether infertility is an inevitable result of drinking a כוס של עקרין .
A more “lomdish” approach would be to suggest that they agree as to how likely this side-effect is, but debate how inevitable the prohibited action has to be in order to make the permitted action forbidden.
How inevitable you might ask? Surely inevitable means precisely that?
As is often the case with halachik definitions, this is not so simple though- there is some discussion amongst the Rishonim as to the permissibility of something that is קרוב לפסיק רישיה- almost inevitable but not completely, and we shall hopefully discuss in more in later posts.
In fact, a different Tosfos points out that our אב לכולם- the case of dragging the bench, is actually almost inevitable, and the novelty of that particular sugya is that even such a case is permitted.
Perhaps Rav Achai Gaon also makes no distinction between דבר שאין מתכוין and ספק פסיק רישיה whereas our Tosfos (in this case Rabbeinu Yitchak) considers ספק פסיק רישיה to be forbidden like פסיק רישיה ?
Or perhaps we can simply argue that the ingredients used forכוס של עקרין , which grew naturally In Egypt, were simply not available in Geonic Babylonia or medieval France, and the כוס של עקירן was simply not available to either Rav Achai or the Ri, making this a factual argument that is not easily resolved by observation or research, and thus a valid debate in how to understand the sugya?
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 108-109 Matters of hygiene, wasting semen, and cutting off hands
At the end of our daf, a Beraisa is brought quoting Rabbi Muna in the name of Rabbi Yehuda.
Amongst other things, Rabbi Yehuda is quoted as saying someone who touches his eye, nostrils, ears, mouth, sexual organ, an open vein (from bloodletting) or anal opening should have his hand chopped off.
The first question to ask is why Rabbi Yehuda takes this so seriously??!
It is immediately apparent that these are all examples of places where infection can easily enter the body, and it seems logical that this has something to do with the seriousness with which Chazal took hygiene.
Whereas Rashi explains that this is because the רוח רעה (the evil spirit) that is on the hands before washing in the morning , whatever that means, could damage these places, there is no need, at least in the context of this sugya, to assume that this is something supernatural- it could simply be invisible physical micro-organisms (a broader treatment of the usage of this term and that of מזיקין ושדים [harmful forces and demons] might reveals issues with such an interpretation, but that’s for another discussion.)
What is clear from Rashi is that this harsh statement is limited to before one has washed one’s hands.
It is not clear whether this ruling is meant to be taken literally- usually such statements are not, the rule of עין תחת עין (an eye for an eye) being the אב לכולם ( father of all such non literal punishments), and the frequency of such actions would also make it somewhat impractical, but we HAVE seen cases of such penalties literally being carried out!
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 58b) discusses a person who likes to hit people habitually.
Various opinions are given as to how to handle such a person, and Rav Huna opines that his hand should be chopped off, basing himself on the passuk (verse) וזרוע רימה תשבר (and a violent hand will be broken- Iyov 38/15.)
The Gemara proceeds to tell us that Rav Huna carried this out in practice with someone, and most of the Rishonim (early commentators) understand that he did this literally (note the Meiri who suggests that it might have been a monetary payment equivalent to the value of his hand!)
There is a debate between Rashi and Tosfos in that sugya as to what halachik basis Rav Huna had for such an action.
Rashi explains that this was an application of the courts right to impose a meta halachik punishment not actually mandated by the Torah, in order to stop a current danger to society (Sanhedrin 46a)- the passuk brought would thus be only an אסמכתא (in short, a relatively weak basis in the pesukim for what remains a non-biblical law- though this definition is subject to a discussion in its own right.)
This fits in with the rule we have discussed before (Bava Kama 2b) that we do not derive Torah laws from the rest of the Tanach.
Tosfos and Tosfos haRosh both suggest, based on another sugya (Niddah 13b) that Rav Huna held that this was actually the Torah law.
Although they admit that this is problematic in view of the principle cited above, an examination of at least part of the cited sugya in Niddah is now in place.
The Mishna (Niddah 13a) makes the cryptic statement that the more a woman checks herself with her hand to see that she is not a Niddah(menstruant), the more praiseworthy she is. In contrast, a man who does this to see that he is not impure, should have his hand cut off.
The Gemara asks why this is so serious, and answers that it is because it could cause someone to spill his seed in vain, which Chazal viewed as a serious prohibition.
The Gemara (Niddah 13b) asks whether this statement is meant to convey an actual law (דינא תנן) or a curse (לטותא תנן)
The Gemara then brings Rav Huna’s ruling regarding our bully as an example where such language is actually a law, not just a curse.
Although they admit the difficulty poised by the rule of דברי תורה מדברי קבלה לא ילפינן, Tosfos and Tosfos haRosh both argue that this wording implies that according to Rav Huna, this is an actual law, at least in the case of the bully, not an example of an extra judicial punishment by the court.
Now that we have mentioned this sugya, we can return to our sugya and ask why the prohibition of touching one’s sexual organ is grouped together with all the other body parts which should not be touched for health reasons- surely the reason mentioned in Niddah puts it in its own category?
One could argue that health is treated more stringently than prohibition (חמירא סכנתא מאיסורא ) , and that in our sugya which is dealing with touching body cavities WITHOUT washing hands first, this reason was given priority.
However, it needs to be noted that some rather extreme measures were suggested by various Tannaim to avoid the prohibition of wasting seed .
These include seemingly crazy suggestions such as leaving a thorn in one’s flesh, or urinating without holding one’s sexual ,(please discuss this with a serious and down to earth Talmid Chacham before putting into practice- they are usually not be taken at face value) it is hard to say that simple hygiene which so many people are lax about would be more important to Rabbi Yehuda than this consideration.
Perhaps this concern is what pushes Rashi to say that in his opinion, the prohibition of touching one’s sexual organ on our daf is not because of רוח רעה, but because of the concern for spilling semen in vain.
Other Rishonim who hold like Rashi’s initial suggestion might not rule like these extreme opinions- there is indeed some debate amongst Chazal around them, but that requires further analysis.
There is much to discuss on all these topics, and we shall have further opportunity to do this, Hashem willing, but I believe that in the context of the above discussion, a number of things can be argued:
- Whether the concern of Rabbi Yehuda was because of some sort of supernatural dangerous force or simple hygiene, it is clear that washing one’s hands before touching parts of the body that are conduits for infection is to be taken extremely seriously.
- Although extremely harsh and barbaric punishments such as cutting off people’s hands are certainly not meant to be the norm, Chazal were certainly open to any methods necessary to save society from chaos and anarchy.
- There is much to discuss regarding the nature, scope, and reasons for the prohibition of intentionally spilling seed in vain.
For example, is the desire on the part of a married couple for non vaginal sex, a single male’s overpowering desire to masturbate occasionally for sexual release, fertility testing and treatment, or sex with a condom when needed , really considered spilling seed “in vain?”
Some Rishonim |(See Tosfos, Yevamos 34b and Rambam, introduction to 7’th chapter of Mishnayos Sanhedrin for example) certainly appear to limit the scope of the severe prohibition somewhat (for a future analysis, Hashem willing.)
However, it seems clear from this sugya (at least according to Rashi) and the sugya in Niddah, as well as other sources which we should get to discuss soon, Hashem willing, that even basic needs such as urinating , thorn removal, and checking oneself might be affected by concern for this prohibition ( at least according to certain Tannaim), a point raised by Rav Moshe Feinstein zt’l in a Teshuva )Even haEzer 1/63.)
This does seem to prove that the definition of “in vain” and its severity is somewhat broader than what some interpret the above Rishonim to mean.
One could attempt to counter Rav Moshe’s proof, and I have a possible idea of how to do so, but who wants to take on Rav Moshe….
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 107 Spontaneous generation – can Chazal be wrong?
One of the biggest controversies to ever hit the modern religious world revolved around the banning of the books of Rabbi Nathan Slifkin, also known as the “Zoo Rabbi.”
At the time a loyal, though perhaps somewhat naive graduate of the mainstream Chareidi (“Ultra-Orthodox”) “Midrash Shmuel” Yeshiva, he had written some fascinating books on animals in the Tanach and Talmud as well as the often related subject of Science and Torah.
The young and talented Rabbi was totally unprepared for the tsunami of condemnation and eventual book-banning that was to be unleashed on him from some of the most senior Talmidei Chachamim (Torah scholars) in the Chareidi world- some of the main alleged crimes : suggesting that Chazal (our sages) sometimes erred on scientific matters as well as that the age of the universe and the story of creation did not need to be taken literally.
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It is important to note that these suggestions were not his own, but were based on earlier authorities, among them some leading Rishonim and Achronim.
One of the leading Yeshiva Heads in the Israeli Anglo Chareidi world, haRav haGaon Moshe Meiselman wrote a very large almost encyclopedic book, “Torah, Chazal, and Science” in order to refute these ideas and support the condemnations, and article upon article has been written since refuting and counter-refuting the bans.
An entire movement to restore the “Rationalist Judaism” approach of the Rambam and others that this ban seemed to have condemned together with the books was started by Rav Slifkin, and many old ghosts in the centuries of debate on the subject have been reawakened, for better or for worse .
I am generally in favor of giving the benefit of the doubt to anything an expert Talmid Chacham says, even if I disagree personally, and as Bnei Torah, we are obligated to try our best to understand the words of all Gedolei Yisroel ( great Torah scholars of Israel)
As such, and given that the subject and its many ramifications held a lot of personal interest to me as well, I spent a lot of time back then collecting information on the subject and trying to make some sense of it myself, in the way I received from own Rabbis, namely by starting with the primary sources themselves .
I do not wish to take a stand one way or another in this forum regarding who was right, but one thing I am pretty certain of after my own studies is that we are dealing with two very different legitimate approaches amongst the earlier authorities, which while perhaps not as binary as some believe, are certainly extremely difficult if not impossible to reconcile.
I also do not believe that this debate has anything to do with whether Chazal could be wrong or not.
It is clear and undebatable that Chazal could theoretically make mistakes- even the greatest humans can!
The masechta of Horayos and its related pessukim in Vayikra deals specifically with members of the great Sanhedrin, the greatest of the great, making mistakes.
Even Moshe Rabbeinu, whose level of prophecy was qualitatively and quantitatively in a different league to all prophets- פה אל פה אדבר בו – made mistakes, for which he was ultimately denied his life’s dream of entering Eretz Yisroel.
The debate seems to be more over how to relate to an apparent conflict between our observed reality, as described by science, and reality as Chazal describe it.
Whereas those described as “rationalists” would tend to take observed science as a given and assume that Chazal simply were not privy to these observations, those who subscribe to the principle that everything that Chazal said was guided by some form of divine inspiration or assistance, would tend to assume that our scientific observations are simply based on faulty science or powers of observation and Chazal always get the benefit of the doubt .
On our daf, we are thrown right in the deep end, with the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Chachamim whether can is liable for killing lice on shabbos.
Killing a living creature is generally forbidden under the melacha if נטילת נשמה (taking a life,) which falls under the category of שוחט, (slaughtering).
Why then should there be a distinction between lice like creatures and other living creatures?
Rav Yoseif concludes that this is because of the general rule that a forbidden shabbos melacha must resemble what was done in the work of the Mishkan.
Rabbi Eliezer holds that being a living, mortal creature is itself enough of a similarity to the rams that were slaughtered for their skins to be used in the mishkan, to be include
d.
The Chachamim, on the other hand, hold that the similarity has to be more precise- it has to be a living creature that reproduces, just
like the rams in the mishkan.
The Gemara explains that seeing as lice do not reproduce, the Chachomim do not include them in the prohibition.
Before we proceed, we really should try understand why the ability to reproduce should be so significant that it puts creatures that do not do so in a totally different category to those that do. Why is this function any more significant than being able to run or fly or swim or produce live young?
It seems that the reproductive function is not just any other function of the body, but according to Chachamim part of the essential definition of what a living species is about.
A species without that function is thus although still technically a living creature, qualitatively an entirely different type of creation and cannot be compared to the rams of the mishkan.
Given that in modern biology, one of the main definitions of life is the ability to reproduce, at least on the cellular level, this seems even more fascinating.
One should note that this requirement applies to the species as a whole- there is no suggestion here that an animal or person who as an individual is not able to reproduce is considered any less “living ” than one who can.
Anyone who has read the sugya until here must surely be bothered immediately by the assumption of the Gemara that lice do not reproduce.
Firstly, anyone with children know what an issue it is to get rid of lice, how their eggs(nits) are particularly resistant to removal, and how they certainly reproduce from one louse to enough to literally crawl all over one’s hair
Secondly, any junior biology student knows that all living species reproduce.
How could Chazal possibly say something which every school child today knows is completely incorrect?
Furthermore, even if we accept the “rationalist” claim that much of modern science was not known to Chazal and that they based their claims and halachik decisions on the science of time, surely anyone was able to notice the nits that almost always accompanied hair lice and that they eventually hatched into lice ?
Rav Slifkin and many others have gone to great lengths to point out, however, that this claim was not unique to Chazal, but was in fact the commonly accepted view amongst scientists, philosophers, and the masses until very recently in history, when Louis Pasteur proved that even microorganisms do not generate spontaneously but have to be able to be generated by “parents” of their own type .
Not only lice, but certain worms, and even rodents were believed to generate spontaneously from sand, sweat, air, or rotting food, and the connection between nits and lice, as incredible as it sounds, does not yet seem to have been made .
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, or any tradition to the contrary, why would Chazal not have made this assumption, the same way that they seem to have assumed that a flat circular earth was the center of a spherical universe and the sun and stars moved around it?
The continuation of the sugya, however, makes it clear that Rav Yosef’s student, Abaya did indeed question this almost universally accepted assumption that lies did not reproduce, and made the connection, at least in passing, between nits and lice.
It also seems he did this not based on their own observations, which do not seem to have been any superior in this regards to that of conventional wisdom, but based on an earlier statement of Chazal (the Amora Rav in Avoda Zara 3b) which implies that lice do in fact hatch from eggs!
At this stage, it seems, at least on a superficial reading, that chazal had correct biologically information which was not known to contemporary science and questioned the science of their times based on that.
However, the Gemara seems unwilling to concede that contemporary science was wrong, and instead interprets the earlier as referring not to lice eggs, but to an entirely different species, called the eggs of lice.
Are we seeing later Amoraim themselves resorting to a forced interpretation of an earlier authoritative statement in order not to contradict the contemporary science of their time?
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