Tag Archives: Eruvin

Eruvin 26-27    Talmudic logic, rules, and אין לומדין מן הכללות

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One of the axioms drilled into every Ben-Torah from a young age is that every word in the Torah is precise- nothing is superfluous.

This same principle is applied to the words of Chazal, particularly to the words of the Mishna, which forms the basis of the תורה שבעל פה.

One of the main functions of the Gemara is to highlight the precision of the Mishnayos and make sure that apparent contradictions between mishnayos are either resolved. or attributed to different Tannaim (see for example Rashi/Bava Metzia 33a), but simply saying that the Mishna was not accurate is not usually an option.

Logical thought and deduction are one of the main methods used to interpret both the written and oral Torah, to the point that Talmud study is often thought to be one of the greatest examples of the study and application of logic.

Yet on our daf, we have a principle which seems to drive a wedge into all of this!

The opening Mishna of the new perek introduces us to the laws of עירוב חצירות , the second essential stage of making an Eruv, once valid partitions are in place.

Even though the partitions have allowed the houses and shared courtyard (or the courtyards and shared alley in the case of שתופי מבואות ) to be considered a רשות היחיד  on a Torah level, Chazal forbade transferring things from one person’s house to another’s, or to the shared courtyard or vice versa, without a symbolic action that shows that they all consider the entire area to be “like” one domain shared by everyone.

The symbolic action required is that the members of each house make available some  food which is placed in one of the houses, hence defining the entire area as “shared” in a certain way.

People attribute great importance to the place where their food is, and putting shared food in one of the houses thus has the effect of making this “shared area” into a shared place of dwelling, symbolic of the entire courtyard’s  quasi-shared nature.

Our Mishna tells us that anything can be used for this Eruv, except for water and salt.

Rashi explains that this is  because water and salt are not foods that contain sustenance (nourishment) and  thus do not contribute the required significance to the shared place.

Our natural thought would be that as usual, the Mishna’s words are very precise, and if the Mishna says that one can using anything for an Eruv other than water or salt, this must indeed be the case, and all foodstuffs other than water and salt are acceptable (The fact that ערוב חצירות  has its own rules and might require bread specifically leads many Rishonim to question Rashi’s view that the Mishna is talking about this kind of Eruv, but this is a different discussion.)

What, however, would be the case with other foodstuffs that seem to share the same limitations of water and salt?

Do we say that the Mishna’s list of exceptions is exhaustive, and that anything else is permitted, despite their apparent conceptual similarity, or do we say that the Mishna is simply giving us examples of what is to be excluded from the rule, but that other things to which the same logical arguments seems to apply might also be included?

What, for example, would be the case with certain other flavorings that have no nutritional value but are also used to enhance the flavor of other food?

Our Gemara opens with a bombshell dropped by Rabbi Yochanan: אין לומדין מן הכללות ואפילו במקום שנאמר בהם חוץ- We do not learn from “rules” even where a list of exceptions is given.

Rabbi Yochanan seems to be making the incredible claim that when Chazal state a rule without mentioning any exceptions, there could still be exceptions to that rule.

Not only that, even when Chazal list some exceptions, that list is still not necessarily exhaustive!

As such, it is possible that there are other things that may not used for an Eruv, and that water and salt were just examples.

The Rambam (Pirush haMishnayos on our mishna) states explicitly that the word “בכל”  is to be viewed as a גוזמא  (exaggeration!)  [even if it was interpreted more literally, it could clearly not mean absolutely everything, but only everything that in some way has the properties of food- a cellphone would not do the trick!]

Besides for seeming to fly in the face of our childhood education regarding the precision of every word in the Torah and Chazal, this bizarre sounding statement casts questions on the very need for such rules- after all, if rules are meant to be broken, what is the point of having them?

Our Gemara points out that this statement of Rabbi Yochanan was not made initially in reference to our Mishna, but was first said  (Kiddushin 34b) in relation to another Mishna (Kiddushin 29a), which states inter alia  that woman are exempt from all positive commandments caused by time, and obligated in all positive commandments not caused by time.

The Gemara there questions this rule, based on the fact that we know of various time-caused mitzvos, such as matza, and הקהל (the gathering at the end of the shemita year,) that woman are obligated to keep, and various mitzvos not caused by time, such as learning Torah and having children, which are not obligatory for them.

In that context, Rabbi Yochanan states his principle that one does not rely entirely on rules, and that there could be exceptions not mentioned by the Mishna.

He then uses our Mishna as a proof for the second part of his statement, that this applies even where Chazal have listed specific exceptions, which could make us think that their list of exceptions is exhaustive.

Having seen examples of this principle’s application both where no exceptions were listed by Chazal and where some exceptions are listed, let us now try and examine whether  this principle does indeed contradict those basic axioms of every word in the Torah and Chazal being measured, as well as what the role of these kind of rules are, if they cannot be relied on and we still need to consider that there might be other exceptions.

Perhaps we can answer this question buy reconsidering what the role of the rules and exceptions that Chazal choose to reveal to us indeed is.

Should their role be to spoon-feed us with precise rules and lists that are to be blindly followed without examining possibly contradictory texts or logical principles, then indeed, it is hard to explain what purpose remains once Rabbi Yochanan’s principle has effectively rendered this role null and void.

However, if the purpose of Chazal’s categorizations is to create logical groupings which we are then expected to apply to other conceptually similar cases, and also test against other authoritative texts and traditions, then the lists of exceptions has indeed performed its task well- Chazal were indeed precise with their words, the precision just does not lie in the exhaustive nature of their lists but rather in the message they are giving us from their precise choose of rules and exceptions.

The scope of Rabbi Yochanan’s principle can and must be researched further, and various Rishonim do indeed place certain limitations on it.

 It does seem to make clear that one of the major methodologies required for the study of תורה שבעל פה at least, is applying one’s own intellect and Torah database to examining the scope of all or many of the principles that Chazal teach us, and not just applying them robotically- Torah logic has its own G-d given system, based on  intelligent application by Torah scholars (and only Torah scholars) and not just the kind of Boolean logic used to program computers!

Much more to discuss on this, and other examples to bring and analyze, but that is it for today.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 24-25    The infamous קרפף, and Eruvin in resorts

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We have seen that even though on a biblical level, an area surrounded by halachically acceptable partitions is considered a רשות היחיד , and one is  liable for transferring an object from it to a רשות הרבים, various concerns made Chazal impose other criteria in order to be able to carry with such an area.

In an area greater than a בית סאתיים , the area of the courtyard of the mishkan, which was 5000 square amos, inferior partitions made of only vertical or horizontal components, are not always sufficient.

In order to carry from one adjoining רשות היחיד  to another, an עירוב חצירות  is required, a requirement that forms the main subject of the next chapter.

We also see on our daf that an area that has not been מוקף לדירה (enclosed for the sake of habitation) might also not be considered a רשות היחיד .

Examples of this are enclosures used for growing vegetables. As the purpose of the enclosure is to protect the vegetables and not to mark an area for human habitation, the area has not been מוקף לדירה  and it is not treated with the leniencies of a רשות היחיד .

In addition, if such an area is contained within an area that has been enclosed for habitation and not fenced off, it can also nullify the partitions making it forbidden to carry within the entire area.

This restriction can have a major impact on large holiday resorts, particularly those in nature reserves, whose fences enclose a large area that usually includes many such areas that are not only not  enclosed for habitation but are also not even fit for habitation- these could  include natural bush and/or jungle, large ponds or lakes, and even areas inhabited by wild animals.

Not every such גינה  or קרפף  is subject to this stringency, however.

The Mishna on daf 23a told us that so long as a קרפף is less than our now famous בית סאתיים  measurement (5000 square amos,) one is permitted to carry within it.

Although there is some debate in the Mishna as to what criteria are needed even for such an area to be permitted, the Amoraim on daf 23b rule leniently like Rabbi Akiva that this permission is not dependant on any conditions.

On our daf 24a, Rav Nachman teaches us that a קרפף larger than this which was originally not closed for purposes of habitation may be validated for such purposes with a relatively simple fix:

One makes a gap in the boundaries of more than 10 טפחים, thus invalidating them, and recloses it with the correct purpose in mind.

While this could be a solution in resorts that agree to such an act, it might only work if there are no areas larger than a בית סאתיים  that remain physically unfit for habitation- this requires further discussion but could be a lingering constraint in the way of using the properties boundary fences as valid Eruv partitions.

Another issue commonly encountered is the issue of bodies of water on the properties, such as large ponds or lakes, larger than a בית סאתיים  which are unfit for human habitation, and might even contain crocodiles, hippos, or other dangerous animals.

Our Gemara makes it clear that although a body of fresh water which is fit for drinking  does not invalidate an area that has been enclosed for habitation (as Rashi points out, there is no greater habitation-related need than water!), this does not apply if the water is not fit for its normal use, which Rashi identifies as drinking.

As such bodies of water most often do not contain water that is fit for drinking, even in the absence of dangerous animals that make it their home, they might be problematic, depending on what the halachik definition of “fit for drinking” is and how the particular body of water fits that definition.

Another interesting question is whether there are any solutions for a  קרפף  that is slightly over the 5000 square amos threshhold.

On Daf 25a, the Gemara discusses whether one can reduce its area by partitioning part of it with trees and says that this is not sufficient .

It does allow one to build a platform large and high enough to be its own רשות היחיד  inside that area, thus taking it below the threshold.

Lots more to say and discuss about קרפפים  but it almost Shabbos, so Shabbat Shalom for now!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 22-23 The sea as an Eruv revisited, Islands, and הוקף לדירה

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In an earlier post, we discussed the debate around whether the sea may be used to close off a מבוי on one side.

On the one hand, the sea is deeper than the minimum 10 טפחים required, and at least at some point, the gradient is also sufficient, and we know from elsewhere (Shabbos 100a) that a pit filled with water is viewed as if it is empty as far as its depth is concerned.

On the other hand, there is a concern that the sea (or river) banks might accumulate שירטון (rocks and sand) to the point that the required gradient is on longer there, exposing an unfenced area between the sea and the מבוי.

We also saw that there is a dispute amongst the Rishonim as to whether we take this concern into account or not.

Today, we discuss a situation where an area is enclosed by the sea on all sides.

In such a case, there might be no concern of שירטון, as the entire area, including any banks or beaches that build up, are enclosed by the sea and thus could make up one large רשות היחיד (private domain.)

On the other hand, there might be additional reason for stringency seeing as the sea is not only being used for an area that is already enclosed by regular partitions on 2 or 3 sides, and thus probably already a רשות היחיד on a biblical level, but in place of partitions on all sides altogether!

The Gemara brings the radical ruling of Rabbi Yochanan that Eretz Yisrael is considered one large רשות היחיד at least on a biblical level (his precise words can better be paraphrased that one does not become liable to biblical punishment for carrying within it)

The Gemara first suggests that this might be because of the mountains and trenches that surround it, but notes that if this was sufficient, one could argue that Bavel (Mesopotamia) should also be one big רשות החיחד, seeing as it is enclosed by the 2 great rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris.

The Gemara then goes further and argues that if a huge area surrounded by partitions is automatically considered one large רשות היחיד (as implied on Shabbos …) , one can argue that continents are all surrounded by the ocean, making them one large רשות היחיד as well, effectively rendering the biblical melacha of הוצאה null and void!

The truth is that the simple interpretation of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement seems absurd on its own, given that there are so many sources that imply that the melacha of הוצאה certainly applies on a biblical level in Eretz Yisrael, including Rabbi Yochanan’s own view that Yerushalayim would be a רשות הרבים if not for its doors being locked at night.

It is likely that the Gemara simply chose to ask further difficulties to highlight the further absurdity of this interpretation, rather than do so at this earlier stage (yet see Tosfos who deals with this issue.)

The Gemara thus concludes that Rabbi Yochanan is not referring to the whole of Eretz Yisrael, but only to the mountain passes in it.

It follows that there must be some limit regarding either the size or the nature of the area enclosed by partitions in order for it to be considered a רשות היחיד, and that neither Eretz Yisrael nor Bavel falls within whatever this limit is.

It is interesting that the Gemara did not mention the example of an island at all, which one could also have argued should be a רשות היחיד.

It could be that unlike a huge continent, the Gemara does not see this as such an absurd proposal, in which case we would need to find a cut-off point which defines the halachik parameters as to what is considered an island.

It is also possible, that the Gemara simply “went for the throat” as suggested above, choosing more extreme examples to highlight the absurdity of the idea, but an island would also clearly not qualify as a רשות היחיד .

In terms of the maximum size of a רשות הרבים, we have already seen that even a huge area can be closed off by complete partitions (as opposed to inferior partitions which have limitations at least on a rabbinical level) so basing the limit on size is far from straightforward.

Similarly, when it comes to purpose, we see here on daf 23b that large קרפפים are rabbinically disqualified from being considered a רשות היחיד, seeing as they were not closed off for the purpose of “living in,” but on a biblical level, this does not appear to be an issue either, and Rabbi Yochanan rules (Eruvin 67b) that one who throws from a רשות הרבים into such a קרפף is biblically liable- this forms the basis for the related sugya on our dapim (Eruvin 23b) as well.

The Rashba raises this issue and leaves it unresolved.

On the other hand, the Tosfos on our daf suggests that there is a difference between a partition made by people, which at least on a biblical level can enclose an area of any size, and a natural barrier, such as mountains or the sea, which is more limited even on a biblical level. The Meiri, though a little cryptic, seems to say a similar thing, differentiating between walls and “mountains and seas”

They too however, do not appear to define precisely what this limitation is- perhaps the main criteria would be whether the enclosed area is all ראוי לדירה (fit for human habitation,) which might exclude any islands which contain uninhabitable jungle, bush, desert or the like, but this needs further study.

The Ritva takes an entirely different approach, and quoting his Rebbe (probably Ramban,) claims that for any area to be considered a רשות הרבים even on a biblical level, one needs to רואה עצמו בתוך המחיצות (literally – see oneself inside the partitions.)

This phrase requires understanding, but the simple explanation seems to be that so long as one is able to see that he is inside a partitioned off area, (possibly even from a high vantage point, which could be possible even on very large properties) it is considered a רשות היחיד – if not, then it remains a רשות הרבים. (In truth, the Ritva points to his explanation of the sugya in sukkah 4b in the name of the Ramban which at face value does not appear to me to fit with this understanding, nor with the flow of the sugya here, but that’s for a more detailed study.)

This leaves open the possibility that according to this view, smaller islands would indeed be a רשות היחיד, at least on a biblical level, but means that larger properties without any line of site to the boundaries might not qualify, even if surrounded by man-made partitions!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 20-21    The פסי ביראות  , public domain, and more on rabbinical laws

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One of the main themes of this chapter is the special dispensation that Chazal gave to allow travelers to Yerushalayim for the chagim to draw water from wells for their animals.

The sides of these water-pits or wells were usually too steep for livestock to walk down to and drink, in contrast to people who were nimble enough to do so.

Seeing as the pit or well was surrounded by walls and more than 10 אמות  wide, it was defined as a private domain, and carrying the water from it to the public domain outside was thus forbidden.

To include an area around the well large enough for the animal to stand inside and drink in this private domain, Chazal made do with 4 double posts on each corner.

Each post was 6 handbreadths wide in each of its 2 perpendicular directions, forming a half square or widened L shape.

Although usually a private domain needs to be enclosed by proper partitions, with more closed space than open space, or at least a צורת הפתח, in the case of the special public mitzva of aliya laregel (going up to Yerushalayim for the festivals,) Chazal were lenient.

It seems clear from Daf 20a that this leniency is based on the fact that this method is already an acceptable form of enclosure  on a biblical level, otherwise Chazal would not be able to create such a method on their own to change the status of a רשות הרבים דאורייתא. This goes so far as to make someone who throws someone from a רשות הרבים into this enclosure liable to the biblical penalties prescribed for desecrating the Shabbos.

The implication of this is that the area around the wells is considered a fully-fledged public domain.

We have mentioned a few times already the view of Rashi (Eruvin 6a) that to be considered a public domain, a city needs to have at least 600000 people in it.

It is hard to imagine that the rural villages or city-outskirts where these wells were situated met this definition, which raises considerable difficulty with Rashi’s view.

It is possible that we are referring to the wells outside large population centers which were extremely crowded and busy, but even then, it seems a little far-fetched to imagine 600000 people frequenting them- Even during the busy period of aliya laregel, the population was unlikely to be concentrated in one such location at any time- further analysis is thus needed.

In the earlier dapim of the Masechta, we spent time  examining  the differences between biblical and rabbinical laws, and where they are found in the hierarchy.

We saw that on the one hand, we are usually stricter with biblical mitzvos, something we see all over through various halachik principles, but on the other hand, sometimes Chazal were more stringent with rabbinical laws in order to strengthen their authority.

On daf 21b, we see the incredible drasha of Rava, based on Koheles, that one should be even more careful with דברי סופרים  ( “the words of the scribes”- a term usually used for laws made after the time of Moshe, but itself requiring its own discussion) than with the words of the Torah.

This is because there is a range of positive and negative commandments in Torah, with a range of punishments, but when it comes to דברי סופרים , they are all treated equally severely to the point that העובר על דברי סופרים חייב מיתה  – one who goes against the words of the sofrim is liable to death.

Given that the maximum punishment carried out in court for one who transgresses rabbinical laws was generally מכת מרדות  (lashes for rebellion,) lower on the hierarchy of punishments than the 39 lashes given for biblical prohibitions under the correct strict conditions, this statement seems rather exaggerated, to put it mildly.

We see a similar phrase elsewhere, regarding  one who intentionally puts off saying the evening shema till after midnight, and the attack on Rabbi Tarfon by robbers while sitting to say shema was attributed to his failure to follow the authoritative ruling of Beis Hillel who hold that this is not necessary. )See also the Mishna  Sanhedrin 88b regarding Zakein Mamrei, and the Mishna in A.Z. 29b)

Furthermore, on our daf, we are told the incredible story of Rabbi Akiva who used this principle to justify his risking dehydration in captivity to use the little water he had for the rabbinical mitzva of נטילת ידים!

This extreme example might be the key to how to understand this entire concept- after all, we all know that one is only liable to given up one’s life for 3 of the worst biblical transgressions. We also know that one is often permitted to transgress rabbinical prohibitions even for curative purposes where danger to life is not involved.

This makes it virtually undisputable that this is not a normative halachik concept, but rather an idea, which might occasionally be applied halachically, but whose main purpose is to teach us the pivotal role of rabbinic law in Torah life. Specifically because of the many leniencies Chazal themselves applied to their decrees, it is necessary for them to remind us both in general and in certain specific cases how rabbinical law, routed in Torah law as it is (we will hopefully have future opportunity to discuss in what way this is the case ,) essentially stems  from the same divine authority.

Why Chazal choose to highlight this in certain cases specifically requires careful study, but we will leave that for another time.

Coming back to the issue we raised with Rashi’s view that a true public domain on a biblical level must have 600,000 people at a minimum, perhaps we can relook at the פסי ביראות  and why they need to be already validated as a partition on a biblical level.

Our assumption was that this must be because otherwise, chazal would not have the ability to treat them leniently in the case of the wells.

Perhaps, however, this assumption is not fully necessary?

There are times when Chazal do treat rabbinical laws as strictly or even more strictly than biblical ones. As we have seen above, and even times when the usual rule of אין גוזרין גזירה לגזירה   does not apply ( see גזירה שמט יעלה הים שירטון  as a possible example as well as recently on daf 20a “גזירה שמא יאמרו עירוב מועיל לבין הפסין” )

Perhaps, when it comes to something as novel as creating a new type of partition, Chazal were unwilling to do this even in an area which is only rabbinically treated like a public domain, out of concern that this would become a generally accepted type of partition even in cases they did not intend it to be relied on, maybe even in a real public domain?

This opens the possibility that the typical area around a well might indeed not be a true רשות הרבים  according to Rashi!

The problem is that Rashi himself seems to say explicitly that we are dealing with a true רשות הרבים  and true רשות היחיד-there are also numerous sugyos that imply that we are dealing with a true רשות הרבים  , including on our daf itself- I think that we might be able to work It out, but that’s is for today!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 17 The army and spiritual challenges

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We have pointed out various times during our posts how everything in Torah is related, and that very often that relationship stands out so clearly that one is absolutely awestruck.

The direct connection between our daf and this weeks parsha is certainly one such example.

The parsha opens with the highly unusual law of אשת יפת תואר, the beautiful captive girl taken in war.

In an unprecedented ruling, the Torah permits the soldier who falls for an enemy captive to begin a process whereby he will be able to marry her and even gives him permission to sleep with her once before this process begins, in order to satisfy that lust.

The explanation for this most unusual capitulation to human sexual desire on the part of the Torah is that לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע – “The Torah only spoke against the evil inclination. “

In the heat of war, the Torah understood that if a soldier was not permitted any outlet for his desires, he would carry them out anyway, and thus came up with a permitted way that allowed him to do so if necessary, while never encouraging it.

There is much to discuss about this idea, and the first question that jumps to mind is why is this extreme lust treated any differently to other extreme situations of lust?

The Torah always insists that people have free will and are responsible for their actions, no matter what the temptations, yet here, suddenly it acts completely differently.

Is the lust of a soldier at war really so much stronger than a man whose wife is a Niddah, a homosexual man who has no permitted outlet for his passions, or a single man who isn’t even permitted to masturbate to satisfy his urges, let alone carry on a sexual relationship with someone outside marriage?

Even if we argue that this is a question of פקוח נפש, given the emotional pressures that a soldier is under, we have found that a person is not permitted to practise forbidden sexual relations even to save his life (Sanhedrin 74a,) one of three great transgressions which one may not even transgress with a gun to one’s head.

In the case where the danger to his life comes from his emotional state caused by his desires, this could apply even to a non-married Jewish woman!

We see this from the case (Sanhedrin 75a) where a certain man fell so badly for a woman that he became desperately ill from desire.

The doctors opined that he would never heal unless he got to sleep with her.

The Rabbis ruled that it is better to let him die than to allow him to sleep with her, or even “talk with her from behind the fence.”

Clearly, the fact that a person gets himself into an emotional state that endangers his life does not justify illegitimate sexual behaviour.

It might be possible to distinguish between the two cases in a few ways, among them:

  1. The reason given by the Gemara why such a harsh ruling was given even in the case of un unmarried Jewish girl (who was not even a Niddah) was either because of פגם משפחה (damage done to the girl and her family) or שלא יהו בנות ישראל פרוצות בעריות (so the daughters of Israel would not be engaged in sexual immorality. )

The former reason focusses on the individual girl and her family whereas the later focusses on societal needs – The good of society takes precedence than the good of this individual, as we need to uphold a moral society at all times.

The case in our parsha is different given that the girl is an enemy captive, and neither of those two concerns apply, at least on a technical legal level.

The fact that the soldier is away from society also lessens the impact on society.

  1. In the case mentioned in Sanhedrin, the threat to the person’s life came from his lust itself. We cannot allow our girls to become the “medicine” for every person who is unable to control himself. In the case of the solder, the danger is from the war, the lust simply increases that danger, and the permission given by the Torah simply removes that extra danger allowing him to focus on the prime directive of survival and most important, victory for the nation as a whole.

Despite the above, given the extreme stringency with which the Torah usually treats these matters, there is little doubt that the situation of war should be treated as the exception rather than the rule, and however we try our best to understand it, it is likely that it cannot be applied to any other situations and אין בו אלא חדושו .

On our daf, we see that this is not the only allowance made for people at war.

Our Mishna tells us that there are 4 areas in which Chazal were lenient went it comes to soldiers in an army camp:

  1. They may collect wood from anywhere, even if it does not belong to them.
  2. They are exempt from washing hands before eating bread.
  3. They are permitted to eat דמאי (produce bought from an ignorant person who might not have taken tithes.
  4. They are exempt from putting aside an ערוב חצירות (though they still need basic מחיצות in order to carry within a designated area.

With the exception of the first which involves the biblical prohibition of stealing (probably permitted through the rule of הפקר בית דין הפקר,) these are all rabbinical laws that are waived, but the facts that such allowances were made also makes it clear how much of a need Chazal saw to allow soldiers to focus on the sacred task at hand of achieving victory without having to allocate too much energy to other things that were not practical at the time.

In an even larger concession, the Gemara (Chullin 17a) says that during the wars to conquer the land, the soldiers were permitted to eat forbidden foods if they are hungry, even pig!

What all these things have in common is that the Torah and Chazal have waived certain very important halachik requirements in order to allow soldier to focus on the battle and not use all their energies battling hunger, the evil inclination, or circumstance.

In the context of all of these things, it seems that the although the Torah only spoke against the evil inclination in the case of the captive girl, this is not because the Torah allows people to sin “legally” in order that they not come to sin “illegally,” but because of the unusual situation soldiers face in war where survival and victory has to be their only goal and the Torah therefore chooses not to make them spend their energy fighting their evil inclination in almost certain losing battles.

One of the major objections raised by many in the Torah world against religious youth going to the Israel army involves the spiritual dangers that they face there, given that much of the army is irreligious.

One of the strongest arguments against this comes from the many extreme allowances that the Torah itself makes for those at war, to the point of permitting some very serious transgressions- what it does not do is in any way discourage soldiers from going to fight, whether the war is obligatory or voluntary in nature.

If this is the case in situations where religious life is not possible, how much more so, we could argue, should it be in a Jewish army where so many allowances are made for religious soldiers, such as kosher food, Shabbos observance, and even time to pray and study.

On the other hand, one could counter that there is a difference between leaving one’s own camp to go into battle or to enemy territory, where the religious threat is from the outside, and being in a Jewish camp where the religious temptations come from the inside, from one’s own side.

The former is more likely to be a temporary setback, whereas the chance of long-term assimilation into secular society poised by being part of an irreligious unit is on a completely different level.

One can argue back and forth on this issue, but one thing that we see for sure on our daf is that certain leniencies were applied by Chazal even INSIDE our own camp.

The army certainly does not seem like a place for imposing extra stringencies above the basic requirements of the law, and even certain laws themselves, namely the 4 mentioned in our Mishna, are pushed aside even while in the מחנה itself.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 15-16 More on Eruv principles, dispute, and הלכה למשה מסיני

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Our two daf contain pivotal sugyos regarding the laws of partitions and Eruvin.

One of them is a famous dispute between Abaya and Rava regarding a לחי העומד מאליו (a post that was already there prior to it being designated for use in closing off a מבוי.

The classic example is if a part of the one wall sticks out at a 90-degree angle to the wall, forming an effective post.

So long as he had in mind the day before that it should be used as a post for the Eruv, Abaya is of the view that it is acceptable.

On the other hand, Rava is of the view that seeing as it was not placed there specifically to serve as an Eruv pole, it is invalid.

After much back and forth, the Gemara brings a proof that Rav held like the lenient opinion of Abaya, which seems to be conclusive in allowing us to rule in his favor.

It is interesting that although we have a general rule that whenever Abaya and Rava disagree, we follow the ruling of Rava, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 22b ) gives an acronym יעל קגם for 6 cases where we follow Abaya, and Rashi identifies our case, לחי העומד מאליו as one of them.

We should note that at least in the case of our sugya, as well as the sugya quoted above, this is because the Gemara was able to find strong evidence in his favor.

We mentioned in our previous post that the Rambam (Mamrim 1/3) is of the view that things mentioned explicitly in the Torah or passed on orally to Moshe at Sinai are not subject to מחלוקת (debate,) and debates are only find regarding laws based on Chazal’s interpretations of the former through the rules of interpretation or rabbinical decrees and the like.

He also said (ibid 1/4) that even such debates were always settled eventually by the בית דין הגדול (great court or “Sanhedrin” of 71 ordained judges,) and once they were settled, there was no room for halachik debate.

In contrast, once the great court ceased to function, new debates remained essentially unsettled and each sage was free to follow and teach his own view to his students, who would typically follow their Rabbi- the default rule for undecided debates was to be stringent in biblical matters and lenient in rabbinical ones. (Mamrim 1/5)

In reality, this has not been the case, and in Amoraic Bavel where the much-weakened Sanhedrin back in Tiberius had little power, as well as after it ceased to function altogether, later Amoraim have come to conclusions regarding disputes which have thereafter also been regarded as binding.

There have even been rules of thumb formulated, such as following Rav over Shmuel, Rabbi Yochanan over Rav or Shmuel, and Rava over Abaya etc.

The Rambam himself (introduction to M.T.) explains the dictum of רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה (Bava Metzia 86a) as meaning that the later Amoraim, Ravina and Rav Ashi, who sealed the Talmud Bavli, essentially had the authority of בית דין הגדול for the last time in history, given that their rulings spread and were accepted by the Jewish people as a whole and all or most of its sages.

Although there is much to discuss and analyse here, it seems clear that a simple understanding of the earlier-quoted Rambam that makes authoritative dispute resolution entirely dependant on בית דין הגדול itself is not sufficient.

In another pivotal dispute, רב פפא, and רב הונא בריה דר’יהושע debate whether פרוץ כעומד (open area equivalent to closed area) is acceptable to consider a side as partitioned off or not.

The general rule is that when מחיצות (partitions) are used to close off a רשות היחיד, gaps of up to 10 אמות are permitted, and considered to be an acceptable פתח (opening) rather than a פירצה (gap)

However, there is an additional requirement recorded in the Mishna on 15b, that there may not be more open space than closed space (in the absence of a צורת הפתח in which case it is more complex.)

The Gemara on this Mishna opens with the above-mentioned debate regarding whether it is sufficient if the closed area is equal to the open area, or whether it needs to be MORE than the open area.

The Gemara seems to understand that the requirement that most of the partition not be open is a הלכה למשה מסיני (law given orally to Moshe at Sinai and passed on via tradition.)- (the precise term used here is “אגמריה רחמנא למשה” which seems pretty self-explanatory!)

It then understands the dispute to be a question of the nature of this הל”מ.

Was it a requirement not to allow most of the partition to be open, or was it a requirement requiring most of the partition to be closed?

Much debate follows onto daf 16 until in a major curveball, the halacha is resolved according to the lenient view, but this seems to be an explicit example of a dispute regarding something passed on explicitly to Moshe at Sinai, a counter-example to the Rambam’s hypothesis limiting such debate to matters involving the rules of interpretation or rabbinic decrees.

Once again, it seems that a simple explanation of the Rambam might not seem feasible and more analysis is required!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 14 Science and Torah- Matters of PI

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Recent years have brought some extremely “vibrant” and often downright hostile discussions about the correct approach to apparent contradictions between the Torah, Chazal and modern scientific knowledge.

This applies across the board from astronomy, medicine, geography, physics, mathematics, and through archeology, even to history.

There are those like my good friend, the famous “Zoo Rabbi,” Rabbi Nathan Slifkin, who after his books touching on the subject were banned by various Chareidi authorities, has made it a major part of his life’s work to restore the popularity of “Rationalist Judaism.”

This, loosely speaking, encompasses the approach of many of the Geonim, the Rambam, and many other great early authorities that statements made by Chazal which appear to conflict with nature and science are not to be taken literally, and that when Chazal express their views on scientific matters, they are basing themselves on the accepted science of the time, and not on neo-prophetic revelation.

In contrast, Rabbi Moshe Meiselman, a renowned Chareidi Rosh Yeshiva who also has an academic background, has written his own work “Torah, Chazal, and Science” with the primary intention of both condemning and refuting this view, as well as attempting to prove that even the oft-quote protagonists amongst the Rishonim have been misunderstood.

In all humility, in a series of shiurim of my own on Agada, and a Hebrew analysis that I am still working on, I have brought numerous sources, including the introduction to the Talmud attributed to Rabbeinu Shmuel haNagid (printed at the back of most traditional versions of Masechta brachos,) which explicitly say that Agada is not comparable to halacha in its divine source and authority, but rather consists of Chazal’s own interpretations of the pesukim.

I also brought the words of the Ran (drasha 5) in his Derashos that seem to say the exact opposite and define anyone who does not believe that every word of Chazal’s Agadot are sourced at Sinai as a heretic.

As complex and sometimes aggressive this debate tends to be, it is exponentially more problematic when Chazal’s apparently out of date scientific knowledge forms the basis for practical halachik rulings.

In such cases, agreeing to disagree is not even an option, as huge areas of halacha are affected and a practical decision must made. What in one view invalidates a Sukkah or an Eruv, for example, can be essential to making it valid in the other. What renders a fish permitted according to one view, might render it forbidden according to another.

The above applies both ways, but although some authorities do indeed take into account discrepancies between modern scientific knowledge and that which Chazal were presumed to have, it is virtually always when it results in a stringency and not in a leniency.

It is not my intention to take sides in this longstanding and critical debate, but rather, as is my way in general, to examine the relevant sugyas on their own merit, together with the way the Rishonim interpret them, and see what we can learn from them

In our mishna, we are told that the minimum width of the pole used to “close” the open side of a מבוי is 1 handbreadth.

If the pole is round, we are to view it as if it is square and go by the width of its diameter.

As directly measuring the diameter of a solid cylinder is tricky, the Mishna advises us to measure its circumference, something far more practical and rely on a universal ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter to calculate the diameter.

The ratio given by the Mishna is the number three, according to the formula:

“כל שיש בהקיפו שלשה טפחים יש בו רוחב טפח”

“any (circle) whose circumference is 3 handbreadths has a diameter of one handbreadth.

As such, it follows that so long as the circumference of the round pole is at least 3 tefachim, we can assume that the diameter meets the minimum width of 1 tefach (handbreadth).

The same principle is employed (Sukkah 7b) to measure the diameter of a circular Sukkah to ensure it meets the minimum width of 4 amos. In the same sugya, the square-root of 2 is also assumed to be 1.4.

Every student of basic mathematics is immediately faced with the fact that the Mishna’s ration of 3 to 1 appears extremely inaccurate.

The universal ration between the circumference and diameter of any circle is of course the constant pi, a little more than 3.14, which has been known for some time already to be an irrational number.

Tosfos on our daf is so bothered by this apparent contradiction that after pointing out that it seems that our Gemara understood our Mishna’s ratio of 3 to be precise, based on the continuation of the sugya and another sugya in Bava Basra, he notes that this requires further investigation, since the mathematical experts hold that 3 is certainly not the precise ratio.

One should note that Tosfos leaves this question unanswered- he does not suggest explicitly that either Chazal or the contemporary mathematicians were wrong!

In contrast, both the Rambam and Tosfos haRosh on this Mishna are adamant that the Mishna is simply giving an estimation, and each have their own approaches as to why and how this is acceptable.

Whereas this approach certainly seems more logical, we obviously need to learn the sugya and its parallel sugyas properly to see if this fits into the flow of the Gemara.

Please join me on this exciting journey:

The Gemara opens its analysis on this part of the Mishna towards the bottom of the first side of today’s daf.

It asks the simple question: מנא הני מילי – from where are these words?

The very fact that the Gemara is looking for a verse to prove a mathematical reality that should be known to all is itself indicative of something deeper at work.

The Gemara answers that we derive this from the description of the circular ים (lit “sea” but probably referring to a water feature)) that Shlomo haMelech made, which had a diameter of 10 amos and a circumference of 30.

By describing the precise measurements of this circular feature, the passuk seems to be telling us that the ration of a circle’s circumference to its diameter is 3.

Once again, the fact that a verse is brought to teach us a simple mathematical fact seems very strange.

This question is strengthened by the fact that the ancient Greeks were very familiar with the concept of PI, and although they could not measure it precisely (though they might have suspected it was an irrational number,) it seems from my research that they certainly knew that it was more than 3, and could approximate it to at least 2 decimal points as around 3.14 .

It is hardly likely that Chazal, who took their mathematics very seriously, were unaware of this common knowledge of their time.

The Gemara then asks how we account for the width of the rim itself, which needs to be added to the actual diameter before working out the ratio with the circumference.

The Gemara responds that the possuk also tells us that the rim was extremely narrow (and thus negligible in the calculations.)

Seemingly unsatisfied by the assumption that the passuk was even nominally inaccurate in its workings, the Gemara points out that however narrow the rim was, it still would widen the exterior diameter slightly and effectively change the ratio accordingly.

The Gemara concludes that the circumference of 3 tefachim mentioned in the passuk was also measured from the inside, excluding the rim.

By now, it seems blatantly obvious that Chazal seem to take this measurement extremely precisely, and Tosfos’ observations to this affect are more than understandable.

It is harder to understand the Rambam’s approach, where he claims that any fraction that cannot be accurately measured is rounded off by Chazal.

If this is true, why were Chazal so bothered by the fact that the passuk could be doing exactly the same thing?

The Tosfos haRosh goes further and interprets the flow of the Gemara entirely differently in a way that he feels backs up his claim that we are dealing with approximations.

He understands that the Gemara’s original question, “from where are these words” is not referring to the precise value of PI but rather to the very rule that it is permissible to rely on approximations.

He understands that this leniency is sourced from the very passuk that described the properties of the circle in a way that is clearly an approximation, and quite a large one at that.

He does not say how large an approximation is needed, not under which circumstances it becomes acceptable- it could be that he agrees with Rambam who limits this to an irrational number, but is also possible that he would hold the same for other improper fractions that are hard to work with.

What remains is to understand how both the Rosh and the Rambam would explain the continuation of the sugya which certainly seems to be require precision rather than approximation.

Furthermore, even if we are able to reinterpret the rest of the flow of the sugya in a way that fits with this, or to distinguish between the approximations that are permitted and the one’s the Gemara adamantly seems to reject, we are faced with a very strong difficulty from another related sugya (Bava Basra 14b)

There, the Gemara describes how in addition to the tablets, a sefer Torah was also placed in the ark that rested in the holy of holies.

Based on the view that the circumference of a Torah needs to be 6 handbreadths, the Gemara uses our ratio to show how the 2 tefach wide Torah could fit into the 2 empty tefachim that remained in the Ark after the tablets where placed therein.

The Gemara then notes that an item with a precise width of 2 cannot fit into a precise space of 2 (presumably due to friction.)

It therefore concludes that the Torah was rolled in a way that was not precisely round (the last part was folded on top of the “cylinder”), and the width therefore was less than a third of its circumference.

It seems clear once again that the Gemara is assuming the value of PI to be precisely 3- after all, if it were more than three, a circumference of 6 would produce a width of less than 2 which would easily fit in the remaining space.

Hopefully to be continued

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 12-13 Tolerance, the origins of dispute, and “”אלו ואלו

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In the Mishna on 12b, there is a 3-way dispute between Beis Shamai, Beis Hillel, and Rabbi Eliezer, regarding what is required to mark the open fourth side of a מבוי closed on the other 3 sides.

Whereas we have been working until now under the correct assumption that the lenient view requiring only one post on either side is authoritative, we see that though this is the view of Beis Hillel, Beis Shamai require a post and a beam, and Rabbi Eliezer requires 2 posts, one on each side.

In an early post )Shabbos 130b), we discussed the way Rabbi Eliezer was referred to by the Gemara there as a שמותי , a term that the Yerushalmi quoted in the second explanation in Rashi there, as well as in Tosfos, understood to mean that he belonged to Beis Shamai.

However, as we also know )Avos 2/9) that Rabbi Eliezer was one of the greatest students of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai, who received his tradition from both Hillel and Shamai, it is very possible that he had influence from the scions of both houses.

In this Mishna, it seems that Rabbi Eliezer was neither bound completely to either Beis Hillel or Beis Shamai, but fiercely independent.

This is somehow despite the fact that he took such pride in the fact that he never said anything that he never heard from his Rabbi (Sukkah 28a.)

This can be explained by the fact that his tradition came directly from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai who learnt from both Hillel and Shamai, as mentioned above, and thus sometimes was in line with Beis Shamai and sometimes with Beis Hillel.

It can also be that what he meant was not that he heard every precise ruling from his Rebbe, but that he always followed the methodology he learnt from his Rebbe, no matter what conclusion it led to, thus ironically adding to his independence in the realm of practical halacha.

It is a common experience that independents, despite often being revered on both sides of the aisle, usually struggle for acceptance on either side.

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer was both great and confident enough to have his feet in both worlds, but still able to interpret the Torah and rule according to his own view, even taking a separate stand from both strong “councils of sages.”

Even for the usually tolerant members of Beit Hillel, despite his having learnt from some of their teachers, he was never “Beis Hillel” enough, but a “שמותי”

This independence and consequent lack of acceptance came to a head in the case of the stove of Achnai (Bava Metzia 59b), where his refusal to accept the majority opinion of all the other sages resulted in his virtually unprecedented excommunication, which according to the first explanation in the above-quoted Rashi, was the reason for his being called a שמותי”” , from the word “שמתא” (excommunication.)

The truth is that lacking the safety in numbers that members of both main parties tend to have, independents often suffer the most, and are treated more harshly by members of the dominant party than members of the opposition are treated, even if their ideologies are somewhere in-between.

Whereas Rabbi Eliezer’s independence was virtually stamped out by his colleagues, who burnt all the things that he had declared pure, Beis Hillel are lauded towards the end of daf 13b for their respectful attitude to the views of Beis Shamai, not only quoting their views, but even mentioning them before their own, as illustrated in a Mishna in Sukkah brought by our Gemara.

My beloved son, Noam, asked me the other night, while learning mishnayos Shabbos together, why Beis Shamai are mentioned first so often in Mishnayos even though Beis Hillel are more authoritative.

I answered that this could very well be a reflection of this tolerant attitude first illustrated in the Mishna in sukkah quoted by our Gemara, which Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, a direct descendant of Hillel, carried on when he compiled the Mishna.

This tolerance of the other side, is given in our Gemara as the reason that the view of Beis Hillel became normatively accepted over that of Beis Shamai- In order for one’s view to be accepted, it seems important that one is open-minded, respectful, and confident enough to hear, consider, and even quote dissenting views. This shows that this view was acquired after fully considering all sides and without automatically putting down the other side and is thus a view worthy of acceptance.

Our Gemara points out that this preference given to Beis Hillel was not because the rulings of Shamai were not legitimate, but rather for the above reason- objectively speaking, “אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים”-“these and those are the words of the living G-d!”

It might seem logically impossible that two seemingly contradictory views can both be considered objectively part of the divine Torah, but this seems to be precisely what the Gemara is saying.

The Torah is the word of the “living G-d” and thus constantly branching off into different explanations and possibilities.

So long as different views are all based on the “מסורה”, that living chain of transmission that goes back to Moshe at Sinai, it is not so much the actual conclusion that makes them legitimate, but the way that was achieved.

Not every alternative view has halachik legitimacy- only those that can be justified based on previous stages in the tradition.

Both Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai were required to back their views up with pessukim in the Torah, or oral traditions dating back to Moshe at Sinai, and the same applies to those that come after them.

It is not tolerance alone that gave Beis Hillel their authority, as reading this sugya in isolation might imply. In other places, their authority is derived on their greater numbers and on the “voice from heaven” )see Eruvin 7a for example) that proclaimed that the halacha is like them.

In fact, in the earlier sugya in this masechta, it seems that before this voice from heaven, one was permitted to choose which one of these great schools of Torah to follows, and that according to those who did not consider a voice from heaven to be authoritative, such as none other than Rabbi Yehoshua himself, this was permitted even after this voice from heaven, despite the other factors in Beis Hillel’s favor!

We have explained the idea of “אלו ואלו” with the understanding that in matters subject to debate, there is no objectively true answer, but both sides are legitimate “Torah”- the superiority of Beis Hillel is only practical, and as a result of the traits they possess, their superior numbers, and the voice from heaven.

Yet the Rambam appears to limit this idea significantly.

According to him (Mamrim 1/4), matters mentioned explicitly in the Torah or received orally through tradition tracing back to Moshe’s revelation at Sinai are never subject to debate.

Only matters that are derived though Chazal’s use of the rules for interpreting the Torah, can be subject to debate.

Even the later, were subject to the final ruling of the great court, so long as that court was still functioning, and debate was only legitimate until such a ruling was given.

Once it ceased to function, such matters that had not yet been resolved became subject to debate again.

Given that many or most of the disputes between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel occurred at a time when the great court was still functioning, it follows that these disputes were subject to a final ruling by that court.

It is those rulings, according to the Rambam, not the tolerance of Beis Hillel or the voice from heaven, that were authoritative.

This fits well with the view that the main reason for their greater authority was their superior numbers, which would have allowed them to dominate the great court they were part of.

How the Rambam would explain the other reasons given for their authority, is subject to further analysis- it is possible, that as might often be his way, he simply regarded one source to be more authoritative in keeping with other accepted rules of halacha, and rules accordingly.

It is also possible that it is precisely that tolerance and extra willingness to engage in respectful debate that swung the majority of the Sanhedrin, including the “independents” towards their side, and that the “voice from heaven” was the מכה בפטיש (final blow) that brought them to this decision.

This also explains the harsh treatment meted out to Rabbi Eliezer by the members of Beis Hillel.

According to the Rambam above, even matters that were subject to dispute, were eventually concluded by the Sanhedrin while it functioned , and thereafter, no-one had the authority to act to the contrary.

Their opinions were still recorded out of respect, but they were now out of the realm of accepted halacha.

They might still have theoretical value in the study-halls, and even be considered “the words of the living G-d,” but the option for anyone to rule accordingly was now closed.

It follows that in post Sanhedrin times, debate in practical halacha is possible once again, and there is no threat of excommunication for those who follow their own or other minority views, but only in matters that had not already been decided by the Sanhedrin, and in matters that fit the Rambam’s strict criteria for debate.

If so, given that the Talmud itself was sealed by Ravina and Rav Ashi long after the Sanhedrin had ceased to function, how do we explain the universally accepted binding authority given to it by all followers of the מסורות?

We will have to leave this for a difference discussion, but a good place to start is the introduction of the Rambam himself to the Mishna Torah, the great masterwork we just quoted from.

Does everyone agree with the Rambam’s strict criteria regarding which matters are subject to debate, and does the huge collection of debates scattered throughout the Mishna and the Gemara back up this very strong claim? This too, will need to be left for a later discussion.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shmuli Phillips Ari Kahn Johnny Solomon

Eruvin 11 Eruv principles- צורת הפתח and מן הצד

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One of the most important halachik constructs in the laws of Eruvin and מחיצות (partitions) in general is the idea of a צורת הפתח, the “form of an entrance.”

Although an area needs to be closed on 4 sides to be treated like a רשות היחיד (private domain) as far as permitting carrying there-in is concerned, this does not mean that all 4 sides need to be completely closed.

We have already seen in the first Mishna that the open fourth side of a מבוי can be marked symbolically with either a pole or a beam, so long as it is less than ten אמות wide.

The Mishna also taught us that if it has a צורת הפתח , the form of an entrance, it is fine even if it is more than 10 אמות wide.

It has been made clear that the “pole or beam” solution only works for a מבוי, with its strict criteria, but not for חצירות (courtyards) or other enclosures, which require either פסים (boards of at least 4 handbreadths wide) on one or more corners, or a צורת הפתח, which works even if the open fourth side is even wider than 10 אמות.

We see on today’s daf that a צורת הפתח can work to close openings of more than 10 אמות width even on the other mainly closed sides of an enclosure, and according to some opinions, can even serve as complete partitions on all 4 sides!

It is clear from the above that this is an extremely powerful tool, and today I would like to highlight a few of the rules relating to it, that are discussed on this daf.

A צורת הפתח is defined on our daf as “קנה מכאן וקנה מכאן וקנה על גביהן”- A reed on each side and a reed on top of them.

It seems from the wording that even though this is a more complex structure than simply a pole or a beam, a strong entity such as a pole or beam is not needed for this, and a reed or other symbolic item is sufficient, though of course this needs to be further clarified- our daf contains some discussion regarding the required properties of the horizontal and vertical components as well.

Whereas a gap of less than 10 אמות in a mainly solid partition is defined by default as a valid פתח (entrance) and does not invalidate the partition, a gap of more than is considered by default to be a פרצה (break) that needs to be “redefined” as an entrance by a physical structure baring some resemblance to the posts and lintel of an official entrance-way. This is achieved by the צורת הפתח under discussion.

One important requirement relating to a צורת הפתח is Rav Chisda’s ruling that the vertical component that goes from one side to the other needs to be above the two vertical components , not connected to its sides. Although there is some give and take on our daf regarding how universally accepted this limitation is as well as its scope, the conclusion does seem to be that this restriction certainly applies on as far as Shabbos law is concerned for openings of more than 10 אמות wide.

Whether it needs to physically touch the two vertical “reeds” or can be suspended directly above them by other structures (such as telephone or electricity wires and poles) is a different issue and subject to debate later on the daf.

Rav Chisda’s rule makes constructing an Eruv using the צורת הפתח model rather challenging, as balancing a reed or string on top of two other reeds, or even solid posts, is far harder than tying it to both sides.

Despite this, constructing a צורת הפתח , either permanently for city Eruvin or temporarily at a holiday resort, is usually more practical than constructing actual partitions, and is the preferred method most of the time.

One important question is whether the disqualification of “מן הצד” refers only to when the horizontal component of the צורת הפתח is attached at a lower level than the top of the vertical poles, but if it is tied to the sides right at the top of the vertical components, it is still considered to be “at the top.”

Some justification for this distinction could be that so long as the horizontal component is tied to the top of the vertical ones, the structure still resembles a regular entrance in some way, and the observer cannot easily tell the difference.

Rashi explains the phrase “מן הצד” as follows:

“שמתח הזמורה מזה לזה באמצעיתו ולא על ראשיהן”- he stretched the horizontal component (in this case a branch) from one vertical component to another in the middle of the verticals and not at their heads.”

Although admittedly ambiguous, this seems to indicate that at least according to Rashi, the main concern of מן הצד is if the horizontal component is tied somewhere between the top and bottom of the verticals (in the middle), and not right at the top, leaving the door open for permitting it to be tied to the “top” of their sides.

However, this does not seem to be the way the Rashba interpreted Rashi’s words:

“ומן הצד היינו שלא מתח הזמורה למעלה בראש הקונדיסין אלא באמצע הקונדסין ועל גבן היינו על גבן ממש”

“From the side means that he never stretched the branch above at the head of the poles but rather in the middle of the poles, and “on top of them” means precisely “on top.”

The emphasis of “precisely on top” seems to be clearly excluding the option of tying it to the top of the sides and insisting on it being literally “on top.”

The phrase “ in the middle” would refer to tying it anywhere along the height of the vertical component, as opposed to literally placing it “on top.”

When one looks at other Rishonim on this topic, one sees various other explanations of what מן הצד means, that could cause both leniencies and stringencies regarding when a צורת הפתח works, but for our purposes, I will just add that the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 362/11) accepts Rashi’s basic understanding of מן הצד but does not discuss which understanding of Rashi is correct.

None other than the ט”ז himself, one of the most important commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, understands Rashi in the more lenient way and allows the upper rope or string to be tied right at the top of the sides of the vertical reeds or poles. The Mishna Berura, however, notes that most Achronim disagree with him and accept the more stringent interpretation of Rashi, which we pointed out seems to be the way the Rashba understood him.

As such, while general practise is not to accept this leniency and to require the horizontal component to be literally on top or above the verticals, in difficult circumstances where this is not possible, the more lenient interpretation of Rashi accepted by the ט”ז might be acceptable, given that we are usually dealing with areas that are not considered a public domain on a biblical level.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Eruvin 9 and 10 Eruv principles- לבוד and פס ארבע

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One of the most important rules regarding מחיצות (partitions) is the principle of לבוד.

The Gemara (Eruvin 4b) told us that this rule is הלכה למשה מסיני (see post on that daf.)

It states that any gap in partitions less than 3 טפחים in width is considered as if it is closed.

This has major ramifications both in the laws of Eruvin and of Sukkah.

It is necessary, however, to formulate exactly what the precise mechanism and scope of this rule is.

Let us suggest two possibilities for now:

  1. A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is not considered a gap at all, under any circumstances
  2. A gap that is less than 3 טפחים wide is still considered a gap, but it is the type of gap that is negligible enough to be ignored regarding certain מצוות.

If the first, objective definition is used, then it is irrelevant whether the gap’s effect is significant in practise or not, it simply does not count as a gap but is considered closed.

In contrast, according to the second formulation, there could be certain situations where such a gap is not negligible, and we do not disregard it.

In practise, it seems impossible to claim that such a gap has no noticeable effect on the partitions. It certainly lets in air from the outside, as well as insects and many smaller or medium sized animals that can get through the space. It also allows people to see inside, certainly no small thing.

As such, if the purpose of the partitions was meant to protect against the elements, keep small animals out, or create visual privacy, this rule seems highly illogical.

If, on the other hand, the purpose of the partitions is to demarcate the boundaries of a private domain, or keep larger animals out, then it makes sense that so long as the partitions are dominant and gaps are negligible, the partitions should still be valid.

At the bottom of the previous daf, the Gemara discussed a case where the beam is placed on two pegs protruding outwards from the public facing side of the existing walls of the מבוי.

As such, the beam is not on top of the מבוי, but the internal length of the beam is in contact with the walls.

Rav Chisda rules that the law depends on an earlier dispute we saw regarding the way in which the beam acts as a partition.

According to the opinion that normally permits one to carry underneath the beam, because we view the outside edge of the beam as the partition (as if it continues downwards to the ground,) this beam will be invalid, seeing as the outer edge is not in contact with the walls. Even though the beam might be only a טפח wide, and the gap between the outer edge and the walls should thus be viewed as “closed” due to the principle of לבוד, Rashi explains that seeing as this is not a real partition (but just a conceptual halachik construct) the leniency of לבוד does not apply.

According to the view that it is forbidden to carry underneath the beam because the inner edge of the beam forms the imaginary partition, in this case it will be permitted, seeing as the inner edge of the beam is in direct contact with the walls.

At this point, we already see that the rule of לבוד is not absolute but is limited to certain cases. After all, if it was absolute and a gap of less than 3 is never considered a gap at all, then it should apply even where the mechitzah is not real but only a halachik construct.

Rava holds that even according to the view that the imaginary partition is formed by the inner edge of the beam, this beam is not valid, seeing as it is not physically on top of the מבוי itself, something he requires.

Rav Ada bar Ahava objects on the basis of a beraisa that rules that if the beam is משוכה or תלויה less than 3 טפחים (or 4 טפחים acc רשב”ג) from the walls of the מבוי, it is sufficient due to the rule ofלבוד .

He understands that משוכה refers to when the beam is not directly over the מבוי but placed on pegs protruding outwards, as in the case we have been discussing.

He understands תלויה as referring to a case when the beam is suspended directly over the מבוי, but not directly over the walls of the מבוי- instead, it is supported by a reed placed in the middle of the opening and does reach the actual walls.

If the former assumption is correct, we see that there is no requirement for the beam to be physically on top of the מבוי, as claimed by Rava, and there also seems to be no limitation in the rule of לבוד that precludes it from being applied to another halachik construct such as an “imaginary” partition.

The Gemara answers that both the term משוכה and תלויה could be referring to a case when the beam is supported by a reed and doesn’t reach the wall but is still suspended directly over the מבוי.

The former term refers to a beam that reaches the walls of the מבוי on one side, whereas the later term refers to a beam that doesn’t not reach the walls on either side.

In both cases, the rule of לבוד makes it as if the beam reaches the walls.

However, in a case where the beam itself is not directly over the מבוי, לבוד does not help.

The Gemara explains that both these cases are needed, as we might have thought that the rule of לבוד can only be applied once, on one side, but not twice.

Once again, we see that the rule of לבוד is not a blanket rule, but has its limits- in this case, the Beraisa teaches us that both cases are within its limits, but if it did not have some limits, this would unnecessary.

Rav Ashi fails to see a significant distinction between applying the rule of לבוד on one side or on both sides, but says the Beraisa is referring to one case where the beam is both משוכה AND תלויה- thus removed both horizontally and vertically from the walls of the מבוי . In such a case, the rule of לבוד renders the horizonal gap ineffective and the rule of חבוט ( a different halachik construct whereby we view the edge of the beam as if it continues downwards till the walls) closes the vertical gap .

There is much to discuss regarding why the rule of לבוד isn’t used also for the vertical gap, and why the rule of חבוט is limited to only 3 טפחים, and Tosfos and other Rishonim go into this further, but for our purposes, the Gemara explains it was not a foregone conclusion that the rule of לבוד can be used in combination with another halachik construct like חבוט, and we needed the Beraisa to tell us that it can be.

We see from here also that the rule of לבוד was not seen as absolute by default but can have its limitations. To what extent the Beraisa has taught that that these limitations are not as great as we might have thought, or whether it has taught us that there are no limitations at all and that the rule of לבוד is indeed absolute, is still open for further analysis.

The rule of לבוד is applied once again at the bottom of 9b, in a discussion that flows over onto our new daf.

Here, we have been dealing with a case where a smaller courtyard opens on one side into a larger courtyard.

The walls that close the extra length of the outer courtyard can be seen from the larger courtyard, and the larger courtyard is thus not considered completely open on one side.

Seeing as the gap between the smaller and larger courtyard is less than 10 טפחים, it is considered as a valid entrance and the larger courtyard is considered sufficiently enclosed to carry inside it.

In contrast, the gap between the two courtyards forms the entire fourth side of the smaller courtyard, and as it is completely open, even a gap of less than 10 טפחים wide needs to be closed somehow.

Yet Rabbah bar Rav Huna has already concluded that נראה מבחוץ ושוה מבפנים (where the לחי used to close the fourth side of the מבוי can be seen from outside but not from inside) is permitted. Seeing as when viewed from the outside, the opening does not appear to take up the entire side, the smaller courtyard should also be fine as is.

The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case where the sidewalls of the smaller courtyard extend into the larger courtyard, blocking the excess width of the shared wall from being seen from “outside” (the part of the larger courtyard that is opposite the smaller one.)

The Gemara asks that seeing as we are dealing with a larger courtyard that is no more than 1 Amah wider than the smaller one, there should be less than 3 טפחים between the side walls of the larger courtyard and those of the smaller one, and the rule of לבוד should effectively close this gap, making the whole area permitted.

It answers that we are dealing with a case where the smaller courtyard is not placed symmetrically in the middle of the larger one, but rather with a gap of 2 טפחים between its sidewalls and those of the larger courtyard on one side and 4 on the other.

Even though the rule of לבוד applies on the one side, it does not apply on the other, and according to the view of Rebbe who requires a courtyard completely open on one side to be marked on BOTH sides, the opening is still a problem.

This takes us into new territory entirely.

Until now, we have dealt with a מבוי that is closed on three sides but completely open on one side. מדרבנן it is forbidden to carry inside it until a post is placed on either side or a beam from one side to the other.

We already saw earlier that this does not apply to any area enclosed on 3 sides, but just to any area that has the very specific properties of a מבוי :

  1. At least 2 courtyards (with 2 houses each) opening to it
  2. Its length (2 closed sides) is greater than its width (one open and closed side.)

Today we see that a courtyard, which does not meet these qualifications, is treated more strictly, and according to Rebbe, needs to be partly closed on both ends of the open area, even if it is less than 10 אמות wide (if it is more, this might not even be sufficient.)

This has major ramifications for private front-yards and gardens, which we started discussing earlier in our post on daf 5, and I hope to be able to focus on this more as the discussion comes up in the Gemara.