Tag Archives: Maseches Shabbos

Shabbos 80 Remembering the Temple and leaving the wall unplastered 

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In our Mishna, we are told that the minimum quantity of thick sand that one is liable for transporting on shabbos is the amount needed to put on top of a trowel filled with plaster (and mix with it) to strengthen it before use in building .

The Gemara suggests that this Mishna must be the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda who holds that sand indeed does strengthen plaster. ( otherwise this would not be considered something of importance to be considered a punishable act .)

This view is reflected in a Beraisa which says that one is not permitted to plaster his house, as a sign of mourning for the Temple, unless one mixes the plaster with straw or sand to make it less effective  .

Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is forbidden  even if one mixes it with sand, as sand strengthens it .

The Gemara refutes this suggestion and says that it is possible that even the Chachamim who argue with Rabbi Yehuda would accept the ruling in the Mishna, as the act of weakening the plaster is considering for its benefit so that it can be used for plastering one’s home.

It follows from this discussion that everyone agrees that there is a prohibition against plastering one’s house  even during the week without adding something to the cement that weakens it , and this prohibition was made in order to make us remember that we are in a constant state of mourning for the destroyed Temple , שיבנה במהרה וימינו .

The truth is that this prohibition is also brought in Bava Basra 60b,  and there  is a different Beraisa that is also brought  there that says that plastering the house is only permitted if one leaves a square of 1 armlength  unplastered.

We need to clarify whether this is a second condition, both of which are required , or whether anyone of the two is sufficient. A third option is that the authors of the two statements actually disagree with each other, and only one of the two conditions would work at all.

This is also part of a list of decrees that Chazal made after the destruction for the same reason , including refraining from serving one dish at a meal, putting ash on the head of a חתן (groom), leaving out a stone from women’s jewelry  , and based on Sotah 48a and Gittin 7a,  refraining from playing musical instruments (a topic for another post, Hashem willing .)

Although the custom to break a glass at a wedding might be a derivative of these customs, and there are some pious people in Yerushalayim  in particular that do indeed have unplastered squares in their homes, it does not seem to be common practise to follow all these things, and given that these are based on explicit rulings in the Talmud, this requires some serious explanation.

One possibility is that these decrees never actually caught on and were not accepted by the majority of Jews at the time, due to their being too harsh.

Although this might seem surprising, the Rambam does in fact rule (Mamrim 2/6-7) that if Chazal make a decree and it is not accepted by the majority of the people at the time, it is null and void!

He even rules further than even it appears to have caught but a later court din finds that this is not so, they may annul it, even if they of lesser stature than the court that enacted it .

However , we see  from our daf ( and the sugyas in Bava Basra and Sotah ) that this rule was discussed many years later by the Amoraim of the Gemora, and no mention is made of the possibility  that it didn’t catch on.

It is clear from the same  Rambam (Mamrim 2/2)  that once a decree was accepted , the decree remains in force and cannot be annulled ( though see Kesef Mishna there who toys with the idea that if the decree indeed was later dropped by the people because they could not  handle it, it may also be annullable- he rejects the idea mainly because of a Rashi that implies otherwise , itself an interesting point regarding his methodology .) 

Furthermore, the Rambam himself brings this rule, together with the others ( Taaniyos 5/12) and rules that it is only permitted if one leaves a square Ama unplastered – he doesn’t seem to clearly mention the heter of mixing the plaster with sand or straw ( why this is so requires an analysis  of the sugya and Rambam outside the scope of a daf post, but see the נוסעי כלים on the Rambam for a detailed discussion about this, or  preferably try work it out yourself first!)

However, he does make it clear, based on the Gemora, that if one buys a house already plastered , there is no need to remove a square Ama’s worth  of the plaster .

As most of our houses are bought already plastered, this could explain why we do not see these unplastered squares in most people’s homes.

However , it seems that if one builds a home from scratch, as people certainly do still do, one would be required to leave the square unplastered, as per the Gemara and the Rambam.

Yet many religious people do not seem to do this either, and many or all of the other decrees mentioned in the Gemara AND brought by the Rambam also do not seem to be  universal normative practise .

This is even more bizarre given that these laws are brought by the Tur and Shulchan Aruch as well( O.C 560.)

Although discussed by various Poskim, including the Chayei Adam, Mishna Berura  and the Tzitz Eliezer regarding music (15/33) , I am not aware of any halachically convincing explanation for this .

Shabbos 79 No-one is immune from financial temptation 

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On our daf, we continue dealing with the question of whether a loan document ( שטר חוב)  that has already been paid back has any residual use to the lender or not. 

This will of course impact on liability for transferring it on Shabbos .

Typically, a person who borrows money will sign a document together with witnesses which the lender will then keep as proof of the loan. 

When the borrower pays back the loan, the document could be returned to him, or destroyed , or a שובר ( type of receipt ) could be signed and given to the borrower.

Given that documents were  written on animal hides   and involved a degree of expense (paper was not cheap and readily available as it is today,)  it stands to reason that the lender might wish to keep the document to use to cover a container with, or for some other use.

Yet we see an opinion that this is forbidden, presumably even if the borrower trusts him and agrees.

One opinion goes further and says that it is forbidden even if a שובר is written !

Rashi brings a passuk in Iyov as a source for this prohibition , which says “Corruption  should not dwell in your tent .”

Without discussing the propriety of using verses in the Navi or Kesubim as basis for laws, and whether this is a דרשה גמורה or a  kind of אסמכתא, It is clear that Rashi understands that even though someone is honest, and even trusted by the other side, it is forbidden to bring oneself into financial temptation.

Financial temptation  is one of the things that no-one is immune from – ” as bribery blinds the eyes of the wise and corrupts the words of the righteous ” ( Devarim 16/19,)  and although this is far from actual bribery, the temptation to claim back a repaid loan a second time, coupled with the chances that the borrower might lose his receipt , is enough reason to forbid the lender from retaining the loan document , even though it has some permitted  financial utility to him.

It could be noted that  according to Rashi at least, this is not a concern of חשד, or that people will suspect him of corrupt intent, as there is already an accepted source in the Chumash itself for the need to avoid any suspicion, namely ” and you shall be clean with regards to Hashem and Israel ” ( Bamidbar 32/22).

Rather, the passuk in Iyov is revealing to us that even if a person would not be suspected of wrong doing , he is not allowed to bring himself to any temptation to be corrupt .

It can be illustrated from various sugyas that the need to stay away from any financial temptation, or even the slightest financial suspicion,  applies to the greatest of people- in fact, the greater one is, the more squeaky clean one is expected to be.

In Brachos 5b , we are told how Rav Huna had 400 barrels of wine turn to vinegar. 

When his colleagues came to visit him, they told him to look into his affairs to see what he might have done to deserve it (important to note that this is not the way one should normally talk to people who are suffering and it might be a transgression of the prohibition of אונאת דברים – see Bava Metzia 58b)

After some give and take , he asked them if they heard anything negative about him, and they replied that they had heard that he did not pay his sharecropper his share in the yield.

Rav Huna replied that the sharecropper  stole more than the value of his share already, so he had no claim .

They replied that despite this, when one steals from a thief, one tastes the taste of theft ( see Rashi there.)

He then agreed to pay the sharecropper and the vinegar became wine again ( or was sold for the price of wine.)

The message seems to be that even though Rav Huna was within his legal rights , after all , the law is that  one is permitted to take  back what is his himself without going to court ( see Bava Kama 27b  re עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה ), someone of his level certainly has to be completely above any chance of suspicion – the mere fact that people suspected him of wrong doing was reason for him to lose a fortune of money . 

There is another law which prohibits lending money without witnesses, as one could be causing the borrower to sin by defaulting on the loan (  Bava Metzia 75b.) 

The Gemara tells a story where Ravina  asked if that even applies to someone who lends him money, given that he is honest and would never default. 

He was told that it applies even more so to him, as he is extra busy and could “forget.”

Although some of these cases refer to suspicion and some to temptation or even forgetfulness, all of them show that no matter how great one is, one cannot rely  on his greatness to take even the smallest chance of financial impropriety or suspicion.

If only we could live up to even part of these high expectations!

Shabbos 78   What is considered שכיח (common)   and its role in halacha 

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(I have indulged  the common English  translation here for שכיח but obviously much meaning is often lost in translation and it would be more correct to at least use the hebrew equivalent that Chazal use, namely “מצוי” ) 

Our Gemara has been spending a lot of effort in determining the minimum quantity of various things that one would need to transport on shabbos in order to be subject to the relevant penalties.

The general rule that has been established so far is that we identify the minimum amount that is useful for its required purpose and that becomes the cut-off point. 

What happens, however, if something has a common use that requires a certain quantity, but also a less common, or uncommon use that requires a lesser quantity ?

Do we go by the higher quantity that is required for its common use , or are we stringent and go by the lower quantity required for the less  common or uncommon one?

As an example, water is used for many purposes – it is used for drinking , washing, cleaning or soothing wounds, cooking , and much more .

Drinking water is clearly a more common use than using it for a wound , given that people need to drink multiple times a day, but hopefully are not wounded that often  .

Abaya formulates a rule whereby whenever an item has a common and an uncommon use , the common use is the one that counts .

Therefore , even though both wine and milk can be used for healing, for which smaller quantities are sufficient , we go by the quality required for having a meaningful drink, namely a reviis ( or a quarter reviis for wine that needs to be diluted as discussed earlier.)

However, when an item has 2 common uses, we go by the smaller of the 2 quantities.

 ( he does not state whether they need to be equally common however , and whether common is an objective or relative term is an important discussion I hope to be able to address another time, and at least touch on here.)

As a result , when it comes to honey which is commonly used both for healing and eating, we go by the smaller amount  that is useful for putting on a wound .

However, Abayas rule is challenged by our Mishna, which says that the minimum quantity of water is the amount one used for eye ointment, significantly less than the amount used for a significant drink.

It is clear to all that drinking is a much more common usage of water than spreading eye ointment !

Abaya answers by limiting the scope of our Mishna to people in the Galil, who were poor, and would never use wine or milk for wounds.

For them, using water for a wound is thus also considered common, and the lower amount needed for that is what counts as far as shabbos is concerned .

Rava also seems to accept Abaya’s rule, but gives an alternative answer, whereby the scope of the Mishna is not limited but applies to everyone.

His reasoning is that seeing as according to Shmuel, wine and milk can cause long term harm to the eye when used in ointment and water does not, people prefer water for such purposes, and thus healing is also considered a common use of water .

How though do we define “שכיח” or “common” regarding this and other halachot?

Firstly, it is important to clarify that whereas we are indulging the use of the English word common as a translation for the Aramaic “שכיח” , what is important for the sugya is not the Oxford definition of the English word, but the halachik definition of the original Aramaic  word.

It is well known that one of the main criteria Chazal use to decide whether to make a decree against a certain action A in case it leads to a biblically prohibited action B, is how   common this forbidden result in fact is.

It should  also be known to any student of Bava Kama that the amount of liability  one has for damages done by one’s animal depends on how common (מצוי) , the damage is, and thus how much one was expected to guard it .

When it comes to entering dangerous situations , we also know from various sugyos ( for example Pesachim 8)  that when damage is common, a person may not rely on being protected by the Mitzva that he is performing. 

In addition, the requirement to check whether something is not kosher or not ( like checking a slaughtered animal  in various vital organs to see it does not bare signs of being critically injured before slaughter  ( a טריפה), is dependent on how common such injuries are ( see Rashi, Chullin 12a) , as is the requirement to check for bugs in fruit and vegetables ( see Rashba  on same sugya though he admits Rashi disagrees ) – the generally accepted rule there is that a “common” minority or “מעוט המצוי” of problematic  cases is enough to require checking, at a rabbinical level, even though biblically, a majority is required. 

It is not certain that the same definition of “common” would apply to all the above situations, but it certainly would be nice to find more rather than less consistency in the usage of the term – unfortunately I am unable to provide this right now .

However, let us at least try to define the term as much as possible within the scope of our current daf and sugya .

There are two major possibilities that stand out:

1. Common is defined by the person, or people who use the item.  If people  commonly  or perhaps most commonly use an item for purpose A, then even if they also use it for purpose B, we go by A and not B.

2. Common is defined by the purpose  the item serves .

If the purpose is  commonly or possibly  most commonly served by item A, then even if it is also sometimes served by item B, item A’s minimum required quantity is tied to that purpose , even if it has another equally, or possible more common purpose with a higher required amount .

A Nafka Minah would perhaps  be in our case, the case of water , (as well in the case of honey mentioned in this sugya, but I leave that to you to consider .)

If the first definition is used, then the important factor will be what water  is commonly used for. 

However , if the second definition  is used , then the  relevant factor will be whether water is a commonly used item for the purpose that the least amount of it is required for , namely eye ointment .

It seems more likely to me  from the answers of Abaya and Rava, and this is indeed how Rashi seems to learn, that  the second definition is what counts .

Even the people of the Galil, according to Abaya, and all people according to Rava , clearly use water more often for drinking than for wounds .

Yet the fact that when ointment is required for a wound, water is the item of choice and a commonly ( perhaps most commonly ) used item, ointment is considered a common use of water regarding our rule, and the smaller quantity required for it is what counts !

( p.s. The door is not necessarily closed on the first option, assuming that “common” has some objective rather than relative definition, which does not fit water being used for ointment in the הוה אמינא   but does in the מסקנה . Any suggestions are very welcome )

Shabbos 77/ Parshas Bamidbar Machlokes in metzius and the size of an olive

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It is a generally accepted rule in the world of “lomdos” (analytical learning)  that even where a dispute amongst Chazal appears to be about facts [can a child father a child or not ,is one example of many (Sanhedrin 69a) as is דם מפקיד פקיד או מחבר מחבר ( Kesubos 5b) ] , if it is something that can be readily checked, we attempt to show that the argument is really based on something other than just superficial facts ( is someone who has matured to the point that he can father a child still considered a child, or is דם perceived halachically as if it is מפקיד פקיד or מחובר מיחבר , for possible, if not problematic examples )

When the dispute is about facts that cannot be easily verified by observation , like some historic arguments ( like how old biblical figures were at certain times ) or unobservable phenomena , there is no need to do this, as the dispute can simply be explained as being based on different interpretations of the evidence or pessukim.

On this daf, we learn the chiddush of Rabbi Nosson that whilst the minimum quantity of wine required to transgress the melacha of carrying is a reviis, if the wine is conjealed to the point that it is more solid than liquid, the minimum measure of a kezayis  applies instead. 

The Gemora understands that this is because when a reviis of wine congeals, it shrinks to a kezayis.

Rav Yoseif then suggests that this view is the same as that expressed by Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the blood of an animal that dies without halachik slaughter (a neveila)

A kezayis of flesh from a neveila can make someone impure, but what about liquid blood?

Beis Shamai holds that blood of a neveila is considered like the flesh and does not cause impurity, whereas Beis Hillel holds that it does.

Rabbi Yossi holds that even Beit Hillel require at least a reviis of blood to make someone impure, because if a reviis of blood were to congeal, it would shrink to a kezayis.

Rav Yoseif understands from this that both Rabbi Nosson and Rabbi Yossi agree that a reviis of liquid is the equivalent of a kezayis of solids.

However- Abaya questions this assumption, and suggests that on the contrary, they may in fact totally disagree.

He points out something that students of physics should recognize, namely the fact that not ALL liquids are equal (nor are all solids.)

Blood as a liquid is much thicker than wine as a liquid, and therefore it does not have to congeal as much to become solid.

It therefore follows that if a reviis of wine is required to produce a kezayis of congealed wine, less than a reviis of blood is required to produce a kezayis of congealed blood.

and if a reviis of blood is indeed required to produce a kezayis of congealed blood, then MORE than a reviis of wine is required to produce a kezayis of congealed wine.

If so, it follows that the amount of liquid blood and wine respectively that are required to produce a kezayis of the congealed equivalent is actually a matter of dispute between Rabbi Nosson and Rabbi Yossi!

This appears to be a classic example of a machlokes metzius (factual dispute) that should be easily checked out by experimentation, rather than debated.

We also need to explain what Rav Yoseif himself was thinking- surely he was not unaware of the basic fact that blood is thicker than wine?

I think that one can perhaps explain Rav Yoseif’s view by way of the important principle that Halachic rules are very often NOT based on precise facts, measurements, or statistics, but rather on fixed approximations based on perceptions.

When it comes to working out the required dimensions of a round Sukkah (Sukkah  7b) or of a round beam on top of an eruv (Eiruvin 13b), the Mishna simply applies a round ratio of 3 to 1 between the circumference of a circle and its diameter, substantially less than even a reasonable estimation of pi, which at the time of Chazal was historically already known to about 2 decimal places. (see also Bava Basra 14b)

Whereas Tosfos in Eruvin are bothered by this discrepancy, and seem to understand that the Mishna and certainly the accompanying sugya are taking the ratio of 3 to be precise, the Tosfos haRosh there actually suggests that Chazal are intentionally imprecise, based on precedent from the passuk describing the pool that Shlomo built.

We see from there that in at least some areas of halacha, the Torah does not require precise measures that fit absolute scientific reality, but rather simply estimations that Chazal taught us, which are perceptibly close to the real measurement but simple enough to apply across the board.

This principle is actually applied  by the Chazon Ish in very novel ways to issues relating to the dateline (subject of 2 previous posts) , whereby he allows it to follow the coastline and deviate somewhat from the 90 degrees he claims is its absolute geographic position.

Perhaps, Rav Yoseif believes that the relationship between solid and liquid measurements is also an example of a case where the Torah allows for an estimation, and we are not required to make allowances for the precise density of the liquid or the solid.

Similarly, perhaps Abaya holds that either there is simply no justification for applying such estimations in this case, or that the variance in density and resulting solid size is too high to be comparable to the pi analogy.

Perhaps a similar idea can be used to explain the machlokes that Abaya sees in Rabbi Nathan and Rabbi Yossi’s rulings, in that they are not debating the facts- both agree that neither a reviis of wine or blood is the precise equivalent of a kezayis of their congealed version.

Or perhaps the reviis to kezayis ratio is only true of some hypothetical congealable liquid with a density somewhere between that of wine and blood, and the dispute is on which side of the line to estimate?

One thing we seem to see  for sure from this daf at least, is that there is a direct relationship between the side of a kezayis and  that of a reviis, and if one follows a certain view as to the size of the kezayis, one should certainly follow the same view in regards to the size of a reviis!

in this parsha, we are told that 20 is the determining age for maturity regarding being counted in a census, going to the army, etc.

We also know from numerous sources (among them a few daf ahead in our Masechta), that it is also the also the determining age for liability to punishment in the hands of heaven.

We know from the Torah sheBaal Peh that when it comes to many other matters, including the obligation to perform mitzvos and liability to punishment in Beis Din, the cut-off age is 13.

Although it is clear and obvious that there is a huge variation in maturity amongst different 20 year olds, and different 13 years olds, we see here clearly that at least to some extent, halacha is not determined by precise objective factors, but by fixed estimations- the same argument can be applied to most halachik measurements.

However, unlike what we saw regarding pi and perhaps the other examples we mentioned, the actual age or measurement provided by the Torah here appears to be absolute- a minor who is one minute younger than 13 will be exempt , and one 13 or older will be liable.

A young man 1 day younger than 20 will be exempt from the army, and one day later will be recruited.

I suggest that wherever it is simply and straightforward to make a fixed precise measure, this is indeed what the Torah does, but when it is impossible (like in the case of pi) or extremely difficult for people to use  a precise fixed measure, an estimated fixed measure is provided instead.

so much to say still, but shabbos beckons- please share your thoughts either way.

Shabbat Shalom and Yom Yerushalayim Sameach

Shabbos 76 Diluting wine used for a blessing 

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On our daf, we discuss the minimum amount of something one needs to transfer on shabbos in order to be liable to punishment.

The  previous Mishna taught us a general rule that something needs to be in a useful quantity  ( worth putting away or כשר להצניע ) in order to cause liability, which fits in well with the concept in general of מלאכת מחשבת , although it should be noted that prohibitions generally come with a minimum שעור    (measurement) that causes liability , not just shabbos prohibitions and these measures are derived from verses and/or oral tradition (הלכה למשה מסיני  עירובין ד.)

It should also be noted that although one is not liable to the prescribed punishment for a transgression that involves less than the minimum amount, we hold that it is still  biblically forbidden to perform such  a transgression  with less than the minimum measurement(חצי שעור אסור מן התורה ) 

When it comes to transferring wine on shabbos, the minimum amount the Mishna requires to be liable to punishment is “the amount required to mix a cup with.”

Wine was generally very potent and thus diluted before use, and the amount required to mix with water to make up one drinkable cup of wine was considered useful or important enough to make one liable for carrying it.

But what size cup are we dealing with?

The Gemara brings a Beraisa which says that it is referring to a minimum size כוס של ברכה , the cup used for  ברכת המזון (the blessings after a bread meal.)

Seeing that after dilution, the cup needs to contain a reviis of the mixed product (etween 86 and 150 ml depending on which opinion is followed ), a quarter of a reviis is sufficient for this .

Not only was it normal to dilute wine before drinking, but Rava was off the opinion that if the wine was not diluted properly , it is not considered wine at all.

This requirement is also the view of Rabbi Eliezer expressed in a Beraisa in שלושה שאכלו  (Brachos 50a)

Yet near the end of the same perek  (Brachos 52a ), we are told  by Rabbi Yochanan that the כוס של ברכה  has a number of requirements, one of them being that it should be “חי ” ( live or undiluted)

How do we reconcile that with our Gemora which clearly says that the wine not only should be diluted 3 to 1, but needs to be?

One possibility, brought by Rashi there, and quoted by Tosfos on our daf, is that the wine only needs to be undiluted when poured into the cup, but after that, it can and should be dilute.

The weakness of this answer is that the word “חי” is now not referring to the cup at the time of the blessing, but only at the time it is poured.  We would then need to prove that it is already considered a כוס של ברכה  from the time of pouring ( and what if he poured it for something else, diluted it, and then decided to use it for כוס של ברכה? The כוס של ברכה  cannot be פגום  (blemished) but being poured for the sake of כוס של ברכה doesn’t appear to be one of the requirements listed in Brachos …) 

An alternative answer brought by Tosfos is that “חי” means partially diluted as opposed to fully diluted, not completely “neat.” Tosfos brings an example of such usage from the law of the בן סורר ומורה (rebellious son), who is only liable if he drinks a certain quality of undiluted wine, yet it is taken there to mean partially diluted.

The initial ברכת הזמון is thus said on a only partially diluted cup which qualifies as חי, after which it is further diluted in the correct quantity.

Yet another answer brought by Tosfos from the sages of Narbonne, is that “חי” in this context does not mean “undiluted ” but rather whole or complete, in a similar way that eating an ant whole ( as opposed to crushed up) is referring to as חי , in the context of דין בריה ( the rule that one is liable for eating a complete forbidden creature even if it is smaller than the usual required quantity for liability ( a kezayis)

What is interesting is that in all 3 answers, Tosfos  seems to take  Rava’s requirement  that the כוס של ברכה be diluted at 25% wine and 75% water as authoritative in all situations , and leaves the Beraisa in Brachos about it needing to be חי subject to interpretation and limitation.

What should we do today? How much stronger was their wine really compared to ours, and how does that affect the halocho?

It seems logical that a weak 6% alcohol wine certainly does not require diluting, but what about a strong wine with 14% alcohol?

Even if their wine contained as much as 28% alcohol, more like our whiskies, 14% should then surely require at least 50% dilution?

Is it even possible to have wine that is 56% alcohol?  Does it depend only on alcohol percentage but also on age?

and who would really want to ruin a good merlot by diluting it?

Shabbos 75 Is Astrology kosher?

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This daf is filled with so many important principles of shabbos, and touches on מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא, דבר שאין מתכוין, מתעסק, פסיק רישיה דניחא ליה the definition of מכה בפטיש and SO much else.

 I decided to follow one of the diversions the Gemora takes, in its signature fashion, and discuss the fascinating topic of מחשב תקופות ומזלות, calculating the periods of the year and the constellations. 

We start with the statement of Bar Kapra that anyone who is able to calculate the periods of the year and the constellations, תקופות ומזלות , and does not do so, is the subject of the verse “they never looked at the actions of Hashem and never saw his handiwork”  ( Yeshayahu  5).

In context, the Navi is criticizing the way the people at the time focused on materialism, wining and dining, but failed to focus on the actions and wonders of Hashem.

Many a derosho can be said about this verse and exactly what it means , but Bar Kapra is interpreting it to refer to the fact that they never studied about the wonders of the cosmos,  which he seems to see  as the greatest example of the glory of Hashem’s works and creation .

The Gemara then brings the ruling of Rabbi Yochanan that it is  a mitzva to perform these calculations , and that this is ” for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations ” referred to in the Torah ( Devarim 4/6.) 

The understanding is that whereas the other nations might not appreciate the Jewish people through other aspects of the Torah, these complex laws and calculations were something that would clearly impress them as well, and lead to Kiddush Hashem.

What exactly is this wisdom referring to?

Rashi seems to understand that this does not refer to calculations of the calendar per se, but to astrological calculations based on the zodiac which were able to predict future events, such as whether it would be a rainy year.

Rashi seems to have believed, or at least believed that Chazal believed, that the alignment of the constellations has a causative effect on the world , and that calculating and predicting these effects is not a superstitious  forbidden practise that belongs to the pagan world , but is actually a real wisdom included in Torah.

He explains that when the other nations see how much better we are at predicting these things(seemingly  through a Torah prism), they will be truly impressed.

This view, however, seems to be extremely problematic given the biblical prohibition of לא תעוננו (Vayikra 19/26;Devarim 18/1)  which Chazal (Sanhedrin 65b) understood to prohibit  calculating auspicious times. 

While it seems clear from here that Rashi doesn’t believe that this prohibition applies to calculating them using the Torah based tools of astrology, and also believes that this IS very effective , we all know that Rambam is NOT of this view .

The Rambam clearly says (A.Z. that the prohibition includes astrology and also clearly says that there is absolutely no causative power in such things. (see hilchos avoda zara 11/8-9 his famous epistle on Astrology, as well as the Moreh.) 

As such, the Rambam must understand this Gemara as talking about something completely different.

Indeed, with today’s scientific knowledge, it is hard to imagine that the nations of the world would admire us for believing in the zodiac.

As predicted, the Rambam (Yesodei haTorah 3) describes this wisdom as understanding the movement of the various spheres, in other words, the science of astronomy, which of course forms the basis of our calendar. 

This for Rambam is the ultimate form of appreciation of Hashem’s works , when one understands the complexity and sheer scale of creation at an astronomical scale , and our superior knowledge in this regard is truly a Kiddush Hashem in the eyes of the nations .

We see how a very important mitzva on this daf is understood in two completely opposite ways by two Rishonim with different approaches – according to Rashi, it is the study of the zodiac and fate, something which according to Rambam is both forbidden and utter nonsense, whereas according to Rambam, it is the science of Astronomy, something that many in the frum  world today might find equally trivial! 

Of course, it is tempting in our modern and scientific word to embrace the view of Rambam and his school and reject the view of Rashi and others.

However, we are constantly learning so much about the world, and with the advent of quantum physics, and of course the “butterfly theory, where the furthest away item or event can have immense causative power , it is not impossible that certain aspects of astrology that Rashi and Chazal seem to have recognized might be found to indeed be part of the science of creation, and not mere science fiction.

I certainly tend towards Rambam here, and it seems clear that we need to apply at least the rule of ספק דאורייתא לחומרא   but am not completely writing off that possibility. 

As usual, much more to discuss, and many more sources to examine, but that is it for today.

Shabbos 74 Are all the 3 conditions for “Boreir” really needed?

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It is well known that many earlier authorities were opposed to the codification of Jewish law  and believed that the halacha should be derived directly by the true Torah scholars of the time from the Gemora.

Among them, was the famous Maharal of Prague, who claimed (Netiv haTorah 15)  that had the Rambam and Tur been aware that people would rule straight from their codes rather than analyzing the subject themselves from the Gemara, they would not have written them, and that he would rather his students rule directly from the Gemora even if they err, than rule directly from the codes .

While it is debatable if the Rambam shared these feelings, and the Maharal does not appear to have got his way,  it is essential for young aspiring Torah scholars to get used to analysing the Gemora and Rishonim independently, without jumping to the Achronim and codes first and using them as a crutch, and so I was taught by my Rebbe , Rav Mendel Blachman שליט”א , and try to convey to my own students  .

However, we all need to know our limits, and at the end of the day, our mastery of the Shas and the analytical methods needed to derive halacha from it are so behind, that only very rare Gedolei Torah are able to practically rely on ruling direct from Gemara and Rishonim – the rest of us, and even almost all senior Talmidei-Chachamim need to limit their independent analysis to the study-hall and bow to the Shulchan Aruch and later poskim for matters of practical halacha. 

I would like to use this daf as an example of how a quick and superficial reading of the gemara might lead one to totally different conclusions than those of most or all our great Torah authorities. 

On this daf, we continue learning about various Melachos and examples of their application.

There is a family of 3 melachos, all involved in production of materials for the Mishkan, and all performed in the production of bread, that all involve some form of separation or selection.

In fact, they are so similar, that the Gemora asks why they are counted as 3 separate categories of melachos, rather than 1.

These melachot are:

Zoreh- winnowing – exposing the threshed grain to the wind in a winnowing fork to allow the wind to remove the lighter unwanted material that is mixed with it.

Borer- removing unwanted material that remains after winnowing with the hand (see Rashi) or an instrument.

Merakeid- sifting the flour once it has been ground to remove any remaining bran or other unwanted material.

The Gemara explains that even though these 3 melachos are similar, because they are all separate and essential stages in the production process for the Mishkan, they get counted as separate melachos.

It follows that the main prohibition of Boreir seems to be removing “psoles” (waste material) from “ochel” (wanted material).

But what happens if one has 2 types of edible foods in front of him, and he wants to separate the one to eat and the other for another time?

Our Gemora brings a Beraita which says that this is also considered boreir (the logic probably being that the food which one does not want is considered to be the “psoles” relative to that which he does want.)

The Beraita is rather cryptic though, and reads as follows:

“If one has in front of one different types of food, he may select some and eat, and select some and leave over, but he shouldn’t select, and if he selected, he is liable to a sin offering.”

It is clear to the Gemora from the long winded and seemingly contradictory wording of the Beraisa, that we are dealing with different types of selection- the Amoraim argue as to what the distinction is though:

1.       Ullah distinguishes between selecting for use on the same day, which is permitted, and selecting for use on a later day, which is forbidden and subject to a korban.

2.       Rav Chisda rejects the possibility that a melacha can be permitted just because it is for use on the same day, and instead distinguished between selecting less than the minimum amount one can be held liable for, which is permitted, and selecting more than that amount, which is forbidden.

3.       Rav Yoseif rejects the possibility that it would be permitted to select less than the minimum amount, and instead makes a three-way distinction between

a.       selecting with one’s hand, which is permitted

b.        selecting with a vessel that is not a typical vessel used for selection, like a funnel or a plate), which is forbidden rabbinically but not biblically as it is considered “backhanded” (see yesterday’s post on Shinui)

c.        selection with a vessel typically used for selection, like a sifter or sieve, which is biblically prohibited and subject to a korban if done beshogeig.

4.       Rav Hamnuna rejects this distinction, not in principle, but based on  it not fitting the wording of the beraisa, and instead distinguishes between removing  what one wants from what one does not want, which is permitted (according to Rashi, because it is not the normal  way of selecting), and removing what one does not want from what one wants (psoles mitoch haochel), which is forbidden.

5.       Abaya rejects this distinction too, also not in principle, but because it does not fit the wording of the Beraisa, and instead distinguishes between selecting for immediate use, which is permitted, and selecting for later use, even on the same day, which is forbidden.

Rashi once again explains that separating for immediate use is not the usual way of separation (possibly because the whole sorting process in the mishkan and bread production is meant to precede the grinding process, and not the act of eating.

Rava accepts the ruling of Abaya, and given his seniority and the rule of following the later authority, it is likely that the halacha will be that way too.

It seems, however , that whereas the first two leniencies, separating for the same day but later use, and separating less than the minimum amount that requires a korban, were rejected out of hand, the  next two were not rejected for reasons of halachik opinion, but simply because they do not fit the text of the Beraisa well enough to be considered a valid interpretation thereof (another fascinating subject for discussion.)

It therefore could well be, that everyone would agree that separating with one’s hand, or separating what one wants from what one does not want, are also permitted, seeing as they are not the usual way of separating things, they are just not what the permissive view in  the Beraisa was referring too.

It could also be that once there is no source in the Beraisa for permitting those two things, they too are forbidden, at least rabbinically (like doing a melacha with a shinui usually is ), and only selecting for immediate use is permitted.

At a minimum, the simple flow of the Gemora seems to indicated that selecting for immediate use is permitted however ones wants, whether with the hand or a special vessel, or whether one selects what one wants from what one does not want, or vice versa.

Yet anyone who is familiar with Shulchan Aruch and the later poskim )O.C. 319 1-2), has seen that it is generally accepted that for boreir to be permitted, ALL 3 of these conditions are required:

1.       it must be selecting what one wants from what one does not want

2.       it must be with the hand and not a special instrument

3.       it must be for immediate use

   How did we get from our sugya which seems to be far more lenient and only require the third condition, or perhaps even ANY one of the three conditions, to this ruling which requires ALL three?

Is this perhaps some kind of later chumra and not the simple reading of the Gemora? 

A closer look shows that we see this stringent ruling already as early as Rabbeinu Chananel on the daf, and the Tosfos too derive this ruling from various contradictions within this sugya (see the next case  brought in the sugya) and from other sugyas.

Have a look there, and enjoy, and let us be careful not to jump to conclusions! 

Shabbos 73 Shinui (doing forbidden melacha in an unusual manner)

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Shabbos 73 Shinui (doing forbidden melacha in an unusual manner)

This is a very packed daf content wise, starting with more examples of actions lacking full intent, moving to perhaps the most central Mishna in the Masechta containing the list of all 39 forbidden categories of melacha (“work”) on Shabbos , and carrying on with more detailed discussions of the first few of these categories, as well as various other exemptions from liability.

Among the later, we see one of many references in the Maseches and Shas as a whole to melacha done כלאחר יד (in a backhanded, or unusual manner), for which one is not biblically liable to the relevant punishment. (perek 10 Mishna 3 actually lists many examples regarding the melacha of הוצאה )

It is no easy task to get a clear definition of when the manner a melacha is carried out in is defined as backhanded or unusual, but some clues can be gathered from the word used to categorize them, namely כלאחר יד  ( backhanded .)

Although it is clear from other sugyas that performing such melacha is still rabbinically prohibited ,this still has HUGE practical ramifications, as it is  clear that such actions  can be permitted in certain cases,  such as צער ( distress) even if not life threatening  ( see Kasubos 60a re goat milk) ,and it could also be permitted sometimes  if the action itself is already only rabbinically prohibited  ( שבות דשבות ) ,AND it is a case of great need or for the sake of a mitzva ( whether shvus deshvus is permitted for any mitzva even by Jew as opposed to in the context of אמירה לעכום is yet another fascinating discussion for a later post, Hashem willing .

From the phrase itself, It seems that if one does an action usually performed with the front of one’s hand with the back of one’s hand, that is the prototype for an unusual action .

One still needs to analyse whether this is simply due to it being a significantly DIFFERENT way of doing the action as opposed to the usual way, or whether it is because it is a clumsy and inefficient way of doing it- One Nafka Minah could be wearing a key on an armband , which is certainly unusual but not at all clumsy or inefficient! ( it is true that the reason things are done in a certain way is usually because it is the more efficient and easier way to do it, but there are also other factors, such as fashion , cost , and personal taste which could come into play .

However, to get a clearer picture of what types of שנוי  ( change) in the manner of the action qualify the action as backhanded, it is necessary  to examine the different cases around shas, many of which are in this masechta, and some of which we have already covered this cycle – we can’t do that all in the context of this post, but we can try start !

It will also be necessary to examine the sources for this rule, if possible, and see what definition makes most sense based on that source.

We have already learned that a woman normally wears a ring without a signet and a man wears one with a signet ( see daf 62a),  and that those are the respective types of ring that are considered a garment for each of them and thus permitted to wear in the public domain on shabbos.

We also learnt that if a man goes out beshogeig (unknowingly) with a ring without a signet or a woman goes out with a ring with a signet, he or she is liable to a korban .

The Gemara there asked why he or she is liable, seeing that wearing something is not the normal way to transport it, and it should thus be considered a backhanded melacha.

It answers that seeing as it is normal sometimes for them to take it out on behalf of their spouse to put in a safe house , and when they do so, they wear it, it is not considered to be an unusual way of transporting it, and seeing as it is not considered a valid garment or decoration for them, they are liable .

We see from there that wearing something rather than carrying it in one’s hand could theoretically be considered an unusual way of transporting  something, even though it is not an inefficient or clumsy way of doing so, like performing an action with the back of one’s hand is- the only “but” ( which is a big but) is that it can’t be something that its normal even sometimes to transport by wearing.

Now back to our daf – Rav Papa rules that if one throws a clod of dirt at a palm-tree beshoheig  and it detaches a date from the branches, one is liable to bring 2 korbanos(sacrifice), one for uprooting ( harvesting ) and one for mefareik( according to Rashi, a form of threshing [another long complex discussion ] .

In contrast, Rav Ashi (who is usually the final word), rules that he is not liable at all, as this is neither the normal way of picking something or of threshing it.

Does this mean that Rav Papa holds that doing a melacha in a backhanded manner makes one liable, or does he simply mean that it is not considered an unusual way?

As the former is unlikely, given that the exemption of כלאחר יד appears to be a generally accepted one in the shas, perhaps one can suggest that the machlokes(dispute)  is based on our chakira(analysis)  regarding the definition of “backhanded.”)

Perhaps Rav Papa holds that seeing as this is not necessarily an inefficient  or clumsy way of getting the date to fall, and in fact might be easier in some cases than using other methods ( certainly for one with good aim), it is not considered כלאחר יד .

And Rav Ashi holds that seeing as it is indeed unusual, that is sufficient to make it considered significantly backhanded and thus be exempt.

Any other ideas?

And given that in practise we learn most of these exemptions from the requirement of מלאכת מחשבת in the mishkan (or do we?), does this analysis work?

Shabbos 72 “Misaseik” and bugs in fruit

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Shabbos 72 “Misaseik” and bugs in fruit

If one eats a fruit and accidently lands up swallowing a bug , should one worry that he has transgressed up to 5 prohibitions, or so long as he checked them first according to halachik requirements , may one be relatively relaxed?

Our perek has spent significant time dealing with the requirement to bring a korban afte00r breaking shabbos beshogeig – when one intends to do the forbidden action but has forgotten that it was shabbos or that the action was forbidden on shabbos .

Today, we are introduced to a different principle, namely that of Misaseik.

Although the difference may seem subtle, classic Misaseik is usually understood as a form of unintentional transgression where one intended to do something permitted and landed up doing something forbidden.

At least regarding the laws of shabbos , Misaseik is treated more leniently than shogeig, and no korban is required – at worst, it is an unpunishable transgression, at best, it isn’t viewed as a transgression at all, similar to oneis ( an action completely beyond someone’s control and totally unavoidable).

An example given on our daf is if a person intended to lift up something from the ground that is not attached to the ground, like a knife which he dropped (an example given by Rashi.)

Instead, he lands up lifting and detaching something attached to the ground, thus inadvertently performing the forbidden melacha of kotzeir (reaping.)

As he never intended to perform an act of cutting at all, everyone agrees that he is exempt, and this is derived in Maseches Kerisos, probably the main sugya on the subject, from the phrase in Vayikra וחטא בה- he needs to sin with the intended action in order to be liable to bring a korban .

In a possible extension of this concept, the Gemara brings a debate between Abaya and Rava regarding what happens if he intended to cut something detached from the ground and landed up cutting something attached.

The subtle difference here is that he intended to perform the action of cutting, not just lifting, and he did indeed perform such an action- the lack of intention here does not relate to the מעשה ( the action) but to the חפצא ( the item the action is performed on.)

In such a case, Abaya maintains that one is liable, as in a regular case of shogeig, whereas Rava holds that one is still exempt, as a form of מתעסק.

There is a further debate between Rashi and Tosfos as to what precise case Abaya and Rava are arguing about.

Rashi seems to maintain that we are dealing with a case when he intended to cut an item that is not attached, but his hand slipped and landed up cutting a different item, which was attached ( see his commentary on the parallel sugyos in Sanhedrin and Kerisos.)

However if he merely was unaware that the item he intended to cut was attached, and later found out that it was attached after tearing it, he could be liable to bring a korban הואיל ונעשית מחשבתו ( seeing as his intended action was performed on its intended object.)

Tosfos, on the other hand, seems to maintains that everyone agrees than in the former case, he will be exempt, and holds that the argument is specifically in a case where he succeeded in tearing the precise item he thought was detached, and then realised that it actually was attached .

The halacha, as usual, is like Rava, and even if one intended to cut, so long as one intended to cut something permitted, he is exempt.

Whether we follow Rashi or Tosfos might be dependent on how we interpret a rather cryptic Rambam and later sources, but that’s for another time.

Our Gemara makes it clear that shabbos is more lenient than other prohibitions when it comes to מתעסק, and in the sugya in Kerisos, Shmuel says explicitly that misaseik is exempt on Shabbos, because of the general requirement of מלאכת מחשבת – a melocho must be significant in order to be subject to punishment on shabbos – any lack in the intention is enough thus to exempt someone .

On the other hand, if one intends to eat permitted fats (שומן) and lands up eating forbidden fats (חלב), one is liable, seeing as one derived benefit from it.

What is unclear from the sugya is what happens with other sins performed unintentionally, but without benefit.

On the one hand, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת does not apply, but on the other hand, the benefit factor is missing to make him liable.

Tosfos on our daf seems to understand that the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is only needed to exempt a third form of מתעסק – if one intends to detach something that is attached and lands up detaching a different attached item.

In this case, he had full intention to sin, but because his action was applied to an object other than the intended one, his thoughts were not fully carried out, and he is exempt due to the lack of מלאכת מחשבת .

On the other hand, if he intended to apply an action to a permitted item and applied it to a forbidden item, the regular exemption of וחטא בה פרט למתעסק applies ( an unintentional sin is excluded from the obligation to bring a korban)

The only time when one would then be liable would be if one derived benefit from the sin, like eating forbidden fats.

It follows that the exemption of מתעסק when there was no intention to sin at all applies not only to shabbos but to other prohibitions as well, so long as one does not benefit from them.

Now for the crunch- if one intends to eat a fruit that is not normally infested , or that one has done one’s reasonable best to check and appears clean, and lands up eating a bug which he isn’t aware of –

It seems to follow that so long as one never got benefit from eating the bug ( as most of us would clearly not), then this is no worse than misaseik and one would be exempt even from a korban ( or the equivalent prayer and repentance.)

Indeed, as Rav Eitam Henkin הי”ד pointed out in his work לכם יהיה לאוכלה, there are various poskim including the Rogotchover Gaon and Rav Shlomo Zalman who suggest or even rule that this might indeed be a case of מתעסק.

Others take issue with it, and in a more analytical Hebrew analysis on the subject , I have discussed the pros and and cons of applying the exemption of מתעסק to unintentionally eating bugs in insects, and point out that it could be tied to the argument between Abaya and Rava as well as that of Rashi and Tosfos.

I also argue there that according to some Rishonim, it could actually fall under the even more lenient category of דבר שאין מתכוין.

Suffice to say that without minimizing the requirement as coded in Shulchan Aruch to check vegetables that are commonly infested before eating them, the common fear-based argument that not doing so is worse than eating non-kosher, given that some bugs involve 5 different prohibitions, could clearly be exaggerated given that one’s intention is not to eat any bugs.

If one saw a bug, he clearly would remove it , all he intends is to eat the very kosher fruit , and he clearly does not benefit from the bugs either – on the contrary he finds them disgusting ( at least in our culture…)

Of course, the usual disclaimer is that we are simply learning and exploring the concepts together – I do not rule very much, so before deciding on your policy in this matter, discuss with a serious Torah scholar who is well versed in these issues as well as the actual facts on the ground.

Shabbos 71 getting dragged along and the date-line revisited 

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Shabbos 71 getting dragged along and the date-line revisited

On this daf, we are introduced to the fascinating concept of גרירה, or dragging.

This is a fairly good literal translation of the word, as we have already seen the famous view of Shmuel, who rules like Rabbi Shimon that גורר אדם מיטה כסא וספסל ובלבד שלו יתכוין לעשות חריץ – a person may drag a bed, chair, or bench on shabbos along the ground, so long as he doesn’t intend to dig a ditch ( even though there it is very likely that it will happen.)

This is the famous rule of דבר שאינו מתכון מותר – one may perform a permitted activity even though it might be accompanied by an unintended forbidden activity, so long as the resulting forbidden activity is not inevitable.

 

But our daf is not about דבר שאינו מתכוין, although we shall hopefully have many more opportunities to discuss this wide-ranging rule.

Today, we learn that one sin can be “dragged” by another one and atoned for together with it through the same sacrifice , even if that first sin itself was actually only  atoned for with the same sacrifice of a different sin .

A person forgets that it is shabbos and does two forbidden melachos, reaping and grinding for example.

According to our most recent Mishna, as both these melachos were performed under the same ommision (forgetting it was shabbos,), one sacrifice korban atones for both.

However, in this curveball of a case, before one realizes that he broke shabbos, he remembers it is shabbos but forgets that these two melachos are forbidden on shabbos and then repeats the same 2 melachos.

Under normal circumstances, the later act would require 2 sacrifices, as per our Mishna, one for each melacha.

However, because he never really became aware of the first 2 transgressions before he performed the next 2, the two acts of reaping are tied to each other as 2 of the  same melacha performed under one omission, and only require one sacrifice .

The same applies to the two acts of grinding.

As such, if one sets aside a korban as soon as one becomes aware of the earlier 2 sins, that korban covers both the initial act of reaping and the initial act of grinding.

When he then becomes aware of the later 2 sins, there is no need to bring another 2, or even 1, korban for them

Because

  1. The first korban covered the first act of reaping and pulls the second act of reaping along with it. (seeing as both were done without becoming aware of the sin in between)
  2. As it also covered the first act of grinding, it pulls the second of grinding with it 2, for the same reason.

Thus all 4 transgressions are covered by 1 korban, instead of the 3 korbanot we would have expected.

Things then get more complex, with further extensions of the גרירה concept, and my shabbos rest just wasn’t the same today due to the complexity of this daf ( if you also found today’s daf rather taxing on the mind , you have company !)

The lomdus in this sugya is rather particular-partly based on pesukim- and hard to apply literally to other areas of halocho.

However, I was initially quite excited as it reminded me of a particularly leniency of the Chazon Ish regarding the dateline, known as HIS chiddush of גרירה.

As mentioned in a recent post, the Chazon Ish is of the opinion that the halachik dateline should be 90 degrees east of Jerusalem and everywhere to the east of that should be behind one day and keep shabbos on Sunday.

However, this poses  a major problem as unlike the agreed international dateline, as well as the halachik dateline of Rav Tucazinsky  זצ”ל which passes through the Pacific  Ocean, this dateline passes through China and Australia, meaning that 2 people could literally stand on different sides of the line, within less than shiur  Corona  ( 2 metres) of each other, and it could be shabbos for one and a weekday for another .

This could even happen in the middle of the same city or theoretically, the same shul!

Due to the irrationality  of such a situation, the Chazon Ish applies  a tremendous chiddush and rules that if  even part of a body of land( a continent ) is in the same date zone as Jerusalem, the entire body of land is “dragged” after it and follows the same date as Jerusalem.

I was hoping over shabbos to find that this logical ruling could perhaps be based on today’s daf’s precedent , but became convinced that there is absolutely no comparison in the lomdus or the application of the versus, and that the usage of this term is simply borrowed.

So I almost decided to cancel this post, but thought it would be nice to share the thought process anyway and see if anyone can either confirm my rejection of this as a possible proof or reinvigorate it ( I have not yet  seen in the actual writings of the Chazon Ish on this subject any attempt to link the two but I have admittedly not been through all of it carefully .)

At the end of the day , “It is Torah, and I need to learn”, and as “One Mitzva pulls along another” (Avos 4/2) , this post  will hopefully lead to some greater clarity on the various complex issues raised herein.