Pesachim 37-38 Must the matza you eat on seder night belong to you?

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

There is a well-known dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Chachamim regarding מעשר שני  (the second tithe that is supposed to be eaten in Jerusalem.)

Rabbi Akiva holds that this tithe is ממון גבוה  (the property of Hashem, so to speak) which the owners have the right to eat under certain conditions.

The Chachamim hold, in contrast, that it is ממון בעלים, the property of the owners, albeit with certain restrictions that apply to where it may be eaten.

At the bottom of daf 37b, Rav Asi lists 3 ramifications of this debate:

  1. A loaf of maaser sheini –  according to Rabbi Meir, חלה  need not be separated, whereas according to Chachamim, it must be.
  2. Matza of maaser sheini- according to Rabbi Meir, one may not fulfil one’s obligation with it on pesach night, whereas according to the Chachamim, one may.
  3. An esrog of maaser sheini- according to Rabbi Meir, one may not fulfil one’s obligation on the first day of sukkot with it, whereas according to Chachamim, one may.

The implication of Rav Asi’s words are that both Rabbi Meir and Chachamim agree that one needs to own the matza one uses on pesach night, just like with esrog and the dough which challah is separated from, the only debate is to whether a person is the owner of his maaser sheini or not.

Rav Papa immediately questions this ruling :

When it comes to the obligation of  separating challah, the passuk specifically refers to “עריסותיכם”  (your loaves), and regarding estrog (and the other 4 species) it specifically says “ולקחתם לכם”  (and you shall take for yourselves)- yet we do not see any such requirement regarding מצה!

Rava answers that we learnt his requirement from a   גזירה שוה  (comparison based on similar usage of language.)

Both מצה  and the dough which requires challah to be taken are referred to as  “לחם”  (bread) and both thus have to belong to the person.

Given that this is derived from one of the 13 principles used to interpret the Torah, it would seem that this is a biblical requirement without which one might not fulfil his obligation.

The Gemara then brings a beraisa to support the ruling of Rav Asi:

This beraisa says explicitly that maaser sheini is exempt from challah according to Rabbi Meir and liable to challah according to Chachamim.

The wording of the beraisa is so similar to Rav Asi’s first law that the Gemara wonders what is being taught by this.

It answers that the Amora meant to bring this beraisa as a support for ALL 3 rulings of Rav Asi- This is not a foregone conclusion for  we might have thought that Rav Asi’s נפקא מינה (practical ramification) was limited to challah where the word “עריסותיכם” is mentioned twice , but that when it comes to matza and esrog, even Rabbi Meir would agree that one can use maaser sheini, despite the גזירה שוה  and word “לכם”.

The obvious difficulty with this suggestion is that it does not seem to make sense ממה נפשך (whatever you say.)

If maaser sheini is ממון בעלים, then it  belongs to the owner of the produce and all 3 should be valid.

If on the other hand it is ממון גבוה, it does NOT belong to him and the fact that the requirement for ownership is mentioned once and not twice doesn’t change that!

Anticipating this issue, Rashi explains that we might have thought that the single mention of the requirement for ownership is coming to exclude a stolen or borrowed item, not מעשר שני  which one is at least permitted to eat , and that only in the case of challah (and possibly מצה  via ג”ש  but this is another subtlety in the text that requires study) where it is mentioned twice, is מעשר שני  also excluded.

The essence of Rashi’s explanation is that there are two different levels of lack of ownership:

  1. In the case of something that one has stolen or borrowed, one is not permitted to eat the item but must return it (one who is שואל  (borrows) an item is permitted to make use of it as is but not to eat or destroy it.) 

It is thus considered completely detached from him ownership-wise .

  1. In the case of מעשר שני , even Rabbi Meir agrees that although it is not one’s property, one is permitted to eat it. This gives a person a certain level of ownership in it, which we might have thought would be enough for the mitzva of esrog (and possible matza.)

The fact that the Gemara brought the Beraisa as a proof for all 3 rulings of Rav Asi, however, shows that there it holds that there is no distinction in practise, and that all 3 mitzvos require full ownership. (see in contrast Sukkah 35a where Rabbi Chiya bar Aba indeed holds that permission to eat the esrog is enough to make it fit for the mitzva!)

If we have read the sugya correctly, it seems to follow that just like the esrog has to belong to the person using it for the mitzva on the first day of sukkos, so also the matza has to belong to the person eating it for the mitzva on the first night of Pesach!

Not only would stolen matza not do the trick, but neither would borrowed matza!

This could have various ramifications:

  1. If many people put their matza in the same oven to bake, it would be necessary to ensure that everyone gets his own matza back, or at least make some form of valid transaction among one another that transfers ownership of each matza to whomever gets it back from the oven.  We have indeed seen a similar idea regarding lulavim left in shul over shabbos. (Sukkah  42b)
  2. If one borrows matza from one’s neighbor, one might need to take full ownership of it before using it for the mitzva.
  3. If one eats at someone’s else’s home and eats from HIS matzos, one might need to ensure that the owner legally (either implicitly or explicitly ) gives the matza to him as a gift before eating it, something that does not appear to be widespread practise.

The Tosfos seem to take the requirement for matza to belong to the eater seriously enough that they ask why the Gemara earlier brought other reasons for invalidating מצה של טבל  (matza that has not been tithed.)- it should be unsuitable simply because it does not fully belong to the eater! (see Tosfos on 38a for the two different answers he gives.)

Yet the Rambam (Chametz uMatza 6/  7 ),  while ruling that stolen matza may not be used,  groups it together with other things that one is not permitted to eat, such as טבל  and  מעשר ראשון from which תרומת מעשר  has not been separated.

He rules that anything which one does not say ברכת המזון ( grace after meals) for due to the act of eating it having been a sin, may not be used for matza, but that anything on which one does say it may indeed be used.  

It seems clear that the Rambam is only concerned about the aveira aspect and not the lack of ownership.

This reason is also backed by the Yerushalmi  (quoted by the Rosh and others) that specifically brings this reason.

Consistent with the above, the Rambam also allows one to use maaser sheini for matza, despite the fact he rules like Rabbi Meir that maaser sheini is ממון גבוה ! (Maaser Sheini 3/24)

The simple explanation of this Rambam seems to be that he does not rule like Rav Asi who requires the matza to belong to the eater, but followers the Yerushalmi that simply requires it to be something that one is halachically permitted to eat, due to the concern of מצוה הבאה בעבירה.

As normal practise is to follow the Bavli in a dispute with the Yerushalmi, this is unusual, but not entirely unprecedented for the Rambam, and in this case, it could be because Rav Asi’s ruling is subject to dispute by Rabbi Chiya bar Aba in the parallel sugya (Sukkah 35a.)

As such, the Rambam might hold that so longer as the person eating matza has permission from the owner to do so, and no sin is being committed by so doing, he fulfills his obligation, irrespective of whether he has full ownership of it or not.

In the case of the multiple people who put their matza in the oven and receive different matzos back, the fact that people implicitly give permission to others to eat their matza in exchange for them reciprocating might be sufficient according to the Rambam to remove any concern of מצוה הבאה בעבירה  even if ownership itself is not transferred, and the same would apply to borrowed matza.

On the other hand, according to Tosfot and other Rishonim who seem to see Rav Asi’s ruling as authoritative (see מהר”ם חלואה  who specifically rules this way regarding someone else’s matza) it seems that explicitly having in mind to transfer ownership might be required.

When it comes to eating matza given out by one’s host, it is necessary to determine what the halachik status of the host’s action is:

  1. He could be giving it as a complete gift to the guest
  2. He could simply be giving permission to the guest to eat HIS food without giving him ownership over it. This certainly seems to be the situation at a simcha buffet where one is permitted to eat whatever one wishes but may not take anything home with him, even once put on his plate.

If the former is correct, one would have to deal with the prohibition against acquiring things on   shabbos or Yom-Tov, but if a solution were found for this issue, one would fulfill one’s obligation according to all opinions.

However, if the second option his correct, then whereas according to the Rambam, permission to eat the matza might indeed be enough, according to the opinions that require complete ownership, one would need to ensure that he acquires the matza legally, assuming this is in fact possible on Yom-Tov.

When it comes to matza which one has borrowed from a neighbor, it seems that just like one may not use a borrowed esrog or lulav for the mitzva on sukkos, one may not used borrowed matza for the mitzva on pesach either.

However, the consensus of the poskim (Taz O.C. 454/4 , Mishna Berura 454/16) seems to be to follow the reasoning of the Ritva (Sukkah 35a)  who claims that borrowing matza is intrinsically different to borrowing an esrog.

When one borrows a consumable item like matza, the lender knows that the borrower is going to eat it and will not be returning the very same piece of matza that he received.

This  gives the transaction the status of a הלואה  (monetary loan,) where we apply the rule of מלוה להוצאה נתנה (a loan Is given to be spent.)

Unlike when one borrows an item for use and eventual return, borrowed money (or in this case food) automatically became the property of the  לוה (borrower) and a debt is created whereby the borrower owes the lender the equivalent amount.

In short, while there is reasoning to allow one to fulfill one’s obligation with one host’s matza, given that we are dealing with a biblical obligation, one would do well to consider all the above issues and it might indeed be preferable to bring one’s own matza with or make a valid transaction on the matza one is going to eat before Yom-Tov.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Pesachim 35- Rice and other kitniyos on Pesach

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

There are many topics that I would have loved to address on this daf, including the issues of קטניות  on Pesach,  of מצה עשירה  (matza made with eggs or fruit-juice), and the general halachik principle of אין אסור חל על אסור (one prohibition does not fall on top of another.)

However, due to time constraints, I have settled on a preliminary analysis of the former, namely the basis for the Ashkenazi custom to avoid eating species that are similar to grains on Pesach, known as קטניות .

The Mishna lists different species that can be used for making matza, namely the 5 grains: wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. (I have given the generally accepted translations though the Gemara and mefarshim of course do spend some time discussing their precise identity.)

The Gemara infers from this that אורז ודוחן   (according to many views, rice and millet), may not be used for matza, and explains that this is because the mitzva of eating matza is compared to the prohibition of eating chametz, and thus only species that can become chametz can be made into matza.

Seeing as אורז ודוחן  cannot become chametz, but rather rot when left to ferment, they may thus not be used for matza.

The Gemara notes that the Mishna’s view is clearly against that of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri who holds that אורז ודוחן  are considered a form of grain and one is liable to כרת  for eating them in their chametz form.

The Gemara’s source for this view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri is a Beraisa that reports forbidding these two species because they are קרוב להחמיץ   (close to becoming chametz.)

The Gemara was unsure whether he means that they become real chametz very quickly, or that they become close to chametz but not real chametz, in other words, become chametz on a rabbinical level.

It clarifies that he meant that it becomes real chametz on a biblical level, quickly, based on another Beraisa where he is quoted as saying that one who eats it in its chametz state is liable to כרת  – obviously, one would not be liable to כרת  for a rabbinical prohibition.

We are left with a clear debate between the chachamim and Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri regarding whether אורז ודוחן  can become chametz on a biblical level or not and, based on that, whether they may be used for matza or not.

As it is somewhat improbable that they would be debating the existence of a physical phenomena (מחלוקת מציאות ), something which is easily assessed by observation , it is more likely that they are debating what the very definition of chametz is, something which requires further analysis.

Given that there is a סתם משנה  (anonymous Mishna containing no debate) against Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, it seems likely at this point that the halacha will rule against him in any case, and that אורז ודוחן  neither become chametz (at least on a biblical level) nor may be used for matza.

Several observations and clarifications are required,   among them:

  1. From the fact that the Gemara even entertained the possibility that these two species would be suitable for matza, if not for the comparison in the passuk, there must some significant property that they share with the 5 grains which would make them suitable in theory for matza. After all, there is no need to prove that matza may not be made from carrots or cucumbers. The existence of such a property is even more evident from the fact that Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri considers them to be fully fledged grains.
  2. Though I have intentionally avoided doing so till now, we need to identify precisely which species אורז ודוחן  refer to.
  3. We need to verify whether the two categories mentioned in the Mishna and Gemara, namely
  4. the 5 grains which may be used for matza and are subject to the prohibition of chametz
  5. אורז ודוחן  which may not be used for matza and are not subjection to the prohibition of chametz

are exhaustive, or whether there are other species that fit into them as well, due to their sharing common properties, after all, אין לומדין מן הכללות  (we do not rely entirely on rules of psak-see post on Eruvin 26.)

  1. We need to ascertain whether according to Chachamim, אורז ודוחן  are not subject to the prohibition of chametz at all, or whether they might still be subject to rabbinical prohibition, due to whatever common property we have identified that they share with the 5 grains.

IF

  1. the property that we are searching for serves as a common denominator between the 5 grains and kitniyos
  2. אורז ודוחן are indeed kitniyos
  3. The above species are only examples of kitniyos, but the same law applies to all members of this class.
  4. We can show that the Chachamim agree that this class are still subject to a rabbinical prohibition

THEN we will have discovered Talmudic grounds for the Ashkenazi custom to avoid kitniyos on Pesach, at least once there is reason to suspect they have become “chametz” on a rabbinical level (חמץ נוקשה).

In the absence of any of the above, it would appear that this custom has no Talmudic precedent from this sugya.

Furthermore, should we conclude

  1. that the Chachamim hold that  there is not even a rabbinical  prohibition

AND

  1.   point ii above  is correct, and אורז ודוחן  are indeed קטניות, it would actually run contrary to the explicit conclusion of the Talmud.

One who takes the time to investigate the various Rishonim on this sugya, as well as the parallel sugya and Rishonim on it (Brachos 37a), will see that there is much discussion and debate regarding all the above, and that this sugya plays more of a role than many would think not only in the lenient custom of the Sephardim, but also the stringent one of the Ashkenazim, though the trend in the classical sources certainly seems to provide more support for the permissive view.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 30-31 Chametz after Pesach Part 2 – חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l, whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

In the previous post, we noted that the Gemara seems to be leaning towards following Rabbi Shimon’s view, that the prohibition of benefitting after Pesach  from Chametz that was owned by a Jew over Pesach is only rabbinical in nature and is essentially a קנס  (fine) for transgressing the biblical prohibition of owning chametz on Pesach  (.בל יראה ובל ימצא)

We also noted that seeing that this is a fine, there is a strong argument that it should only apply to chametz that a Jew intentionally, or negligently owned on Pesach, but not for chametz that he owned unknowingly (שוגג)  or against his will (אונס).

However, there are indeed times when Chazal imposed a fine even for unknowing neglect  (see for example  Shabbos  38a)  regarding one who cooked on shabbos unintentionally) and it is certainly still possible that they did so in the case of chametz unknowingly or unintentionally owned by a Jew on Pesach too.

It certainly seems logical that if a Jew failed to find some chametz during the search but performed בטול, thus avoiding the prohibition of בל יראה ובל ימצא  completely, that the chametz should not be forbidden after Pesach, and this certainly seems to be backed up by the wording of the Mishna and Rabbi Shimon that specifically refers to בל יראה  being the reason for the prohibition.

Yet, we noted that the Rambam  rules that even chametz that was in a Jew’s possession on Pesach unknowingly or against his will is forbidden after Pesach for perpetuity, and that many Rishonim extend this prohibition even to when בטול  has been done!

The Rosh, though himself opining that if בטול  had been done, the chametz should be permitted, notes that this is subject to a dispute in the Yerushalmi )Perek 2, halacha 2) where Reish Lakish permits chametz that one declared הפקר (ownerless) before Pesach and Rabbi Yochanan forbids it as we are concerned people will be מערים  (act deceitfully) and claim they declared chametz ownerless before Pesach when they did not do so.

Assuming that the Bavli does not disagree with the Yerushalmi, it would follow based on the general rule that Rabbi Yochanan’s rulings are more authoritative than those of Reish Lakish, that we should follow Rabbi Yochanan and forbid even chametz that one was מבטל  before Pesach despite the fact that one never transgressed the prohibition of בל יראה ובל ימצא!

Nevertheless, this stringency seems to be absent from the Rambam, and some Rishonim (such as the Ramban, Ritva and Ran) attempt to prove from the Bavli itself, on our daf, that the prohibition applies even if one unwillingly owned chametz on pesach, or perhaps even if one did בטול!

The Mishna on 30b tells us that if a non-Jews lends money to a Jew using the Jew’s chametz as surety, the chametz is permitted after Pesach.

Conversely, if a Jew lends money to a non-Jew using the non-Jew’s Chametz as surety, the chametz is forbidden after Pesach.

The Gemara clarifies that this refers to a case where the lender kept the chametz in his possession as surety, the borrower failed to pay on time, and the chametz thus automatically went into the ownership of the lender.

So long as the original stipulation was that in case of failure to pay on time, the surety would become the property of the lender retroactively from the time of the loan, the chametz is then seen as to have belonged to the lender over Pesach, and if the lender is not Jewish, the Jew will be permitted to derive benefit from it after Pesach.

What would happen if there was no such stipulation? The Chametz would then still have belonged to the Jew over Pesach and would thus be forbidden to him even after Pesach.

The implication is that this is the case even if the Jew wanted to repay the money and reclaim the chametz to destroy before Pesach, but did not have the money to do so, in which case he would have owned the chametz on Pesach due to factors beyond his control.

It is this sugya that the Magid Mishna (on above quoted Rambam) brings as the source for the Rambam’s stringency, though we should note that the implication of this sugya is that this would also be the case even if he performed בטול –  otherwise  it would not be beyond his control as he could simply perform בטול on it and avoid the prohibition entirely- yet the Rambam makes no mention of going this far.

Yet it is a sugya later on daf  31b that many Rishonim (see Ramban, Ritva, and Ran) bring to prove that the Chametz of a Jew that was not disposed of correctly over Pesach is forbidden after Pesach, even if the failure to do so was unknowing  (שוגג) or unintentional (אונס) , and even if בטול  was done and he did nor transgress anything at all.

The Gemara brings a Beraisa which discussed a shop owned by a Jew and whose merchandise is also owned by a Jew, but whose workers are non-Jewish.

According to the version of the Gemara we have, as well as that of Rashi, if Chametz is found in the shop after Pesach, its is forbidden, as we assume that it was part of the inventory that had not been disposed of correctly before Pesach and did not belong to the worker.

Conversely, if the shop and inventory belong to a non-Jew and the workers are Jewish, chametz found there after Pesach is permitted as we assume that it is part of the inventory and does not belong to the Jewish workers.

However, Rabbeinu Chananel has a different version of the Gemara, quoted by the above mentioned Rishonim, that permitted the chametz in the first case and forbade it in the second, always assuming that the chametz belonged to the workers and not to the owner of the shop or the inventory!

The Ramban explains that because the worker probably  dropped the chametz before Pesach and is probably unaware where he dropped it (or he would have gone back to remove it,) he must have been מתיאש  (given up hope) of getting it back, which essentially makes it ownerless, as if he actively nullified it.

Yet, the chametz is still forbidden, which proves that even if בטול  was performed and the prohibition of בל יראה  was not transgressed, the chametz is still forbidden after Pesach. The Ran adds, probably based on the above-quoted Yerushalmi,  that this is to prevent people from being מערים   (sneaky) and declaring it ownerless after Pesach.

The above proof, however, seems to assume that יאוש ,בטול and הפקר  work in similar ways and that a lost item that one has despaired of has the status of הפקר, or at least of something that one has nullified, something anyone who has studied the earlier sugyas of בטול  and the sugyas of יאוש  in אלו מציאות  know is not to be taken for granted.

If anything, יאוש  seems to be a weaker form of detachment  that הפקר, in that it only works if the lost item came into the hands of the founder AFTER the owner had despaired of it (see Tosfos, B.K.  66a   who makes that point. )

As such, according to this view of יאוש,  the fact that chametz is still subject to the prohibition of חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח  after יאוש  cannot serve as a proof that it is still subject to that prohibition after בטול, particularly if one holds that בטול  includes a declaration of הפקר  within it.

Given that

  1. the Rambam makes no mention of חמץ  after בטול
  2.  the proof brought by the Ramban and the Ran do not work with the version of the Gemara in front of us, which is also that of Rashi, Rav Hai Gaon, and the  preferred girsa of the Meiri.
  3. The proof does not work  with the view of the Tosfos regarding יאוש
  4. The Rosh himself says that there should be no prohibition if בטול  has been done
  5. The Rif makes no mention of this case at all, and it appears that neither does the Rambam

It seems to me that the view of the Yerushalmi , the Ramban, and the Ran is not accepted by most Rishonim, and  that particularly as we hold like Rabbi Shimon that חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח  is מדרבנן, there should be little reason to be stringent, at least in  theory.

Yet, the  Tur (O.C. 448), and Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 448/5) rule stringently even if בטול  was done,  and most Achronim (see for example M.B. there ) appear to concur, while suggesting that one could possibly be lenient if one performed the check properly, was unaware of the chametz and also did בטול.

This could be because the Mechaber follows his explanation of the Rambam in Kesef Mishna, which as we pointed out, seems to indicate that he is stringent even if בטול  was done, despite not having said so explicitly.

In case of great need, further guidance should be sought.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Pesachim 28-29 Chametz after Pesach – חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Benzion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt’l ( Rabbi Ben Isaacson of blessed memory), whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do.

We are already aware that it is forbidden to eat, derive benefit from, or own Chametz during Pesach itself, and that this prohibition extends forwards to the afternoon of Pesach eve, from midday onwards.

The Mishna on Daf 28a tells us that whereas chametz that belonged to a non-Jew on Pesach(literally that Pesach “passed over” ) may be benefitted from by a Jew after Pesach, chametz that belonged to a Jew on Pesach may not, because the passuk says “ולא יראה לך”- chametz shall not be seen by you, which we have learnt is a source for the twin prohibition of seeing and owning chametz on Pesach (see post on Pesachim 5-7.)

We are immediately struck by the need to explain how the prohibition against seeing and owning chametz on Pesach is connected to the Mishna’s חדוש  (novelty) that chametz owned by a Jew on Pesach remains forbidden after Pesach, and two possibilities spring to mind:

  1. Chazal learnt from the passuk that this biblical prohibition extends beyond Pesach itself.
  2. Chazal forbade such chametz after pesach on a rabbinical level due to the biblical prohibition of owning it on Pesach itself, as some form of fine.

Besides for the obvious differences in how biblical and rabbinical prohibitions are treated when it comes to doubts and other difficult situations, a few POSSIBLE practical ramifications of the above analysis could be whether chametz that a Jew was unaware was in his possession on Pesach (שוגג)  should be subject to the prohibition.

If the biblical prohibition on Chametz in a Jew’s possession on pesach simply extends to after Pesach, it would seem irrelevant whether the Jew intentionally kept the chametz in his possession or did so mistakenly.

However, if it is a rabbinical fine, it is possible, though not by any means certain, that Chazal did not extend the fine for an unintentional transgression, particularly if he performed the search and destroy operation to the best of his ability.

It is also possible though that Chazal wanted  a person to be so careful that they extended this fine even to an unintentional lapse, perhaps even if he did בטול  and thus never even transgressed the biblical prohibition of owning chametz at all!

In contrast, if it is simple an extension of the biblical prohibition, it does not seem likely that it would apply to someone who performed בטול  and thus never transgressed the biblical prohibition at all, but on the other hand, it would probably apply to one who transgressed the prohibition unintentionally.

The Gemara opens its discussion on this Mishna by attempting to identify whose view, amongst 3 Tannaim who debate the subject in a Beraisa, is reflected in this Mishna.

It brings a Beraisa which lists 3 opinions:

  1. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is biblically forbidden for  Jew to eat or benefit from chametz
  2. Before Pesach  (from midday on Erev Pesach)
  3. During Pesach and one who does so is subject to כרת.
  4. That a Jew owned on Pesach, even after Pesach
  • Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no biblical prohibition against chametz either on Erev Pesach or after Pesach
  • Rabbi Yossi haGalili holds that even on Pesach, the prohibition is limited to eating (and owning) chametz and not to benefitting from it.

The Gemara notes that our Mishna does not appear to reflect the view of any of these 3 authorities because

  1. Rabbi Yehuda does not appear to differentiate between chametz of a Jew and that of a non-Jew, learning the 3 prohibited periods from the three times the prohibition of chametz is mentioned.
  2. Rabbi Shimon does not appear to forbid chametz after Pesach at all
  3. Rabbi Yosi holds that even during Pesach, the prohibition is only to eat chametz and not to benefit from it.

The Gemara brings two approaches two reconciling the Mishna with at least one of these opinions:

  1. Rav Acha bar Yaakov says that the Mishna does indeed reflect the view of Rabbi Yehuda, but that Rabbi Yehuda compares the prohibition of benefitting from chametz to that of seeing chametz, which we already know does not apply to chametz of a non-Jew. According to this, we would need to say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no biblical prohibition of benefitting or perhaps even eating chametz of  non-Jew even during Pesach, which would be an enormous חדוש (see Rashi.)
  2. Avoiding the need for such a חדוש  in the words of Rabbi Yehuda (who initially appeared to be more stringent that his colleagues), Rava says that the Mishna reflects the view of Rabbi Shimon, and that the prohibition of benefitting from chametz owned by a Jew over Pesach, AFTER Pesach, is a rabbinical fine for owning it on Pesach , following the second explanation we suggested earlier of the passuk the Mishna brings- the passuk thus being the reason but not the actual source for the prohibition.

The Gemara proves that Rav Acha bar Yaakov changed his mind and m,m accepted Rava’s explanation.

As such, we now have a סתם משנה  supporting Rabbi Shimon who holds that there is no biblical prohibition of chametz  before or after Pesach at all and that the prohibition of benefitting from chametz owned on a Jew over Pesach AFTER Pesach is only a rabbinical fine.

It follows, based on an earlier analysis, that in case of a ספק  or other situation where rabbinical prohibitions do not apply, we should perhaps be lenient, and that in situations where a person tried his best to get rid of his chametz and unintentionally left some over, there MIGHT be no need for such a fine and the chametz might be permitted.

Yet, the Rambam rules (Chametz uMatza 1/8,9)  seemingly like Rabbi Yehuda, that Chametz is biblically forbidden from midday on Erev Pesach and  that even if one mistakenly left chametz in his possession, or even if he did so due to matters beyond his control, it is still forbidden after Pesach (Chametz uMatza 1/4 .)

Whereas his former his ruling is subject to debate amongst Rishonim (see for example Raavad there) the consensus of the Rishonim seems to follow his later ruling (see Ramban, Ritva, Rosh, Ran etc) and go even further by forbidden it even if he did בטול  but failed to get rid of it.

The basis of these rulings is the subject of much discussion, and we shall return to it in the coming daf, Hashem willing.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.