Monthly Archives: May 2020

Shabbos 75 Is Astrology kosher?

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This daf is filled with so many important principles of shabbos, and touches on מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא, דבר שאין מתכוין, מתעסק, פסיק רישיה דניחא ליה the definition of מכה בפטיש and SO much else.

 I decided to follow one of the diversions the Gemora takes, in its signature fashion, and discuss the fascinating topic of מחשב תקופות ומזלות, calculating the periods of the year and the constellations. 

We start with the statement of Bar Kapra that anyone who is able to calculate the periods of the year and the constellations, תקופות ומזלות , and does not do so, is the subject of the verse “they never looked at the actions of Hashem and never saw his handiwork”  ( Yeshayahu  5).

In context, the Navi is criticizing the way the people at the time focused on materialism, wining and dining, but failed to focus on the actions and wonders of Hashem.

Many a derosho can be said about this verse and exactly what it means , but Bar Kapra is interpreting it to refer to the fact that they never studied about the wonders of the cosmos,  which he seems to see  as the greatest example of the glory of Hashem’s works and creation .

The Gemara then brings the ruling of Rabbi Yochanan that it is  a mitzva to perform these calculations , and that this is ” for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations ” referred to in the Torah ( Devarim 4/6.) 

The understanding is that whereas the other nations might not appreciate the Jewish people through other aspects of the Torah, these complex laws and calculations were something that would clearly impress them as well, and lead to Kiddush Hashem.

What exactly is this wisdom referring to?

Rashi seems to understand that this does not refer to calculations of the calendar per se, but to astrological calculations based on the zodiac which were able to predict future events, such as whether it would be a rainy year.

Rashi seems to have believed, or at least believed that Chazal believed, that the alignment of the constellations has a causative effect on the world , and that calculating and predicting these effects is not a superstitious  forbidden practise that belongs to the pagan world , but is actually a real wisdom included in Torah.

He explains that when the other nations see how much better we are at predicting these things(seemingly  through a Torah prism), they will be truly impressed.

This view, however, seems to be extremely problematic given the biblical prohibition of לא תעוננו (Vayikra 19/26;Devarim 18/1)  which Chazal (Sanhedrin 65b) understood to prohibit  calculating auspicious times. 

While it seems clear from here that Rashi doesn’t believe that this prohibition applies to calculating them using the Torah based tools of astrology, and also believes that this IS very effective , we all know that Rambam is NOT of this view .

The Rambam clearly says (A.Z. that the prohibition includes astrology and also clearly says that there is absolutely no causative power in such things. (see hilchos avoda zara 11/8-9 his famous epistle on Astrology, as well as the Moreh.) 

As such, the Rambam must understand this Gemara as talking about something completely different.

Indeed, with today’s scientific knowledge, it is hard to imagine that the nations of the world would admire us for believing in the zodiac.

As predicted, the Rambam (Yesodei haTorah 3) describes this wisdom as understanding the movement of the various spheres, in other words, the science of astronomy, which of course forms the basis of our calendar. 

This for Rambam is the ultimate form of appreciation of Hashem’s works , when one understands the complexity and sheer scale of creation at an astronomical scale , and our superior knowledge in this regard is truly a Kiddush Hashem in the eyes of the nations .

We see how a very important mitzva on this daf is understood in two completely opposite ways by two Rishonim with different approaches – according to Rashi, it is the study of the zodiac and fate, something which according to Rambam is both forbidden and utter nonsense, whereas according to Rambam, it is the science of Astronomy, something that many in the frum  world today might find equally trivial! 

Of course, it is tempting in our modern and scientific word to embrace the view of Rambam and his school and reject the view of Rashi and others.

However, we are constantly learning so much about the world, and with the advent of quantum physics, and of course the “butterfly theory, where the furthest away item or event can have immense causative power , it is not impossible that certain aspects of astrology that Rashi and Chazal seem to have recognized might be found to indeed be part of the science of creation, and not mere science fiction.

I certainly tend towards Rambam here, and it seems clear that we need to apply at least the rule of ספק דאורייתא לחומרא   but am not completely writing off that possibility. 

As usual, much more to discuss, and many more sources to examine, but that is it for today.

Shabbos 74 Are all the 3 conditions for “Boreir” really needed?

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It is well known that many earlier authorities were opposed to the codification of Jewish law  and believed that the halacha should be derived directly by the true Torah scholars of the time from the Gemora.

Among them, was the famous Maharal of Prague, who claimed (Netiv haTorah 15)  that had the Rambam and Tur been aware that people would rule straight from their codes rather than analyzing the subject themselves from the Gemara, they would not have written them, and that he would rather his students rule directly from the Gemora even if they err, than rule directly from the codes .

While it is debatable if the Rambam shared these feelings, and the Maharal does not appear to have got his way,  it is essential for young aspiring Torah scholars to get used to analysing the Gemora and Rishonim independently, without jumping to the Achronim and codes first and using them as a crutch, and so I was taught by my Rebbe , Rav Mendel Blachman שליט”א , and try to convey to my own students  .

However, we all need to know our limits, and at the end of the day, our mastery of the Shas and the analytical methods needed to derive halacha from it are so behind, that only very rare Gedolei Torah are able to practically rely on ruling direct from Gemara and Rishonim – the rest of us, and even almost all senior Talmidei-Chachamim need to limit their independent analysis to the study-hall and bow to the Shulchan Aruch and later poskim for matters of practical halacha. 

I would like to use this daf as an example of how a quick and superficial reading of the gemara might lead one to totally different conclusions than those of most or all our great Torah authorities. 

On this daf, we continue learning about various Melachos and examples of their application.

There is a family of 3 melachos, all involved in production of materials for the Mishkan, and all performed in the production of bread, that all involve some form of separation or selection.

In fact, they are so similar, that the Gemora asks why they are counted as 3 separate categories of melachos, rather than 1.

These melachot are:

Zoreh- winnowing – exposing the threshed grain to the wind in a winnowing fork to allow the wind to remove the lighter unwanted material that is mixed with it.

Borer- removing unwanted material that remains after winnowing with the hand (see Rashi) or an instrument.

Merakeid- sifting the flour once it has been ground to remove any remaining bran or other unwanted material.

The Gemara explains that even though these 3 melachos are similar, because they are all separate and essential stages in the production process for the Mishkan, they get counted as separate melachos.

It follows that the main prohibition of Boreir seems to be removing “psoles” (waste material) from “ochel” (wanted material).

But what happens if one has 2 types of edible foods in front of him, and he wants to separate the one to eat and the other for another time?

Our Gemora brings a Beraita which says that this is also considered boreir (the logic probably being that the food which one does not want is considered to be the “psoles” relative to that which he does want.)

The Beraita is rather cryptic though, and reads as follows:

“If one has in front of one different types of food, he may select some and eat, and select some and leave over, but he shouldn’t select, and if he selected, he is liable to a sin offering.”

It is clear to the Gemora from the long winded and seemingly contradictory wording of the Beraisa, that we are dealing with different types of selection- the Amoraim argue as to what the distinction is though:

1.       Ullah distinguishes between selecting for use on the same day, which is permitted, and selecting for use on a later day, which is forbidden and subject to a korban.

2.       Rav Chisda rejects the possibility that a melacha can be permitted just because it is for use on the same day, and instead distinguished between selecting less than the minimum amount one can be held liable for, which is permitted, and selecting more than that amount, which is forbidden.

3.       Rav Yoseif rejects the possibility that it would be permitted to select less than the minimum amount, and instead makes a three-way distinction between

a.       selecting with one’s hand, which is permitted

b.        selecting with a vessel that is not a typical vessel used for selection, like a funnel or a plate), which is forbidden rabbinically but not biblically as it is considered “backhanded” (see yesterday’s post on Shinui)

c.        selection with a vessel typically used for selection, like a sifter or sieve, which is biblically prohibited and subject to a korban if done beshogeig.

4.       Rav Hamnuna rejects this distinction, not in principle, but based on  it not fitting the wording of the beraisa, and instead distinguishes between removing  what one wants from what one does not want, which is permitted (according to Rashi, because it is not the normal  way of selecting), and removing what one does not want from what one wants (psoles mitoch haochel), which is forbidden.

5.       Abaya rejects this distinction too, also not in principle, but because it does not fit the wording of the Beraisa, and instead distinguishes between selecting for immediate use, which is permitted, and selecting for later use, even on the same day, which is forbidden.

Rashi once again explains that separating for immediate use is not the usual way of separation (possibly because the whole sorting process in the mishkan and bread production is meant to precede the grinding process, and not the act of eating.

Rava accepts the ruling of Abaya, and given his seniority and the rule of following the later authority, it is likely that the halacha will be that way too.

It seems, however , that whereas the first two leniencies, separating for the same day but later use, and separating less than the minimum amount that requires a korban, were rejected out of hand, the  next two were not rejected for reasons of halachik opinion, but simply because they do not fit the text of the Beraisa well enough to be considered a valid interpretation thereof (another fascinating subject for discussion.)

It therefore could well be, that everyone would agree that separating with one’s hand, or separating what one wants from what one does not want, are also permitted, seeing as they are not the usual way of separating things, they are just not what the permissive view in  the Beraisa was referring too.

It could also be that once there is no source in the Beraisa for permitting those two things, they too are forbidden, at least rabbinically (like doing a melacha with a shinui usually is ), and only selecting for immediate use is permitted.

At a minimum, the simple flow of the Gemora seems to indicated that selecting for immediate use is permitted however ones wants, whether with the hand or a special vessel, or whether one selects what one wants from what one does not want, or vice versa.

Yet anyone who is familiar with Shulchan Aruch and the later poskim )O.C. 319 1-2), has seen that it is generally accepted that for boreir to be permitted, ALL 3 of these conditions are required:

1.       it must be selecting what one wants from what one does not want

2.       it must be with the hand and not a special instrument

3.       it must be for immediate use

   How did we get from our sugya which seems to be far more lenient and only require the third condition, or perhaps even ANY one of the three conditions, to this ruling which requires ALL three?

Is this perhaps some kind of later chumra and not the simple reading of the Gemora? 

A closer look shows that we see this stringent ruling already as early as Rabbeinu Chananel on the daf, and the Tosfos too derive this ruling from various contradictions within this sugya (see the next case  brought in the sugya) and from other sugyas.

Have a look there, and enjoy, and let us be careful not to jump to conclusions! 

Shabbos 73 Shinui (doing forbidden melacha in an unusual manner)

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Shabbos 73 Shinui (doing forbidden melacha in an unusual manner)

This is a very packed daf content wise, starting with more examples of actions lacking full intent, moving to perhaps the most central Mishna in the Masechta containing the list of all 39 forbidden categories of melacha (“work”) on Shabbos , and carrying on with more detailed discussions of the first few of these categories, as well as various other exemptions from liability.

Among the later, we see one of many references in the Maseches and Shas as a whole to melacha done כלאחר יד (in a backhanded, or unusual manner), for which one is not biblically liable to the relevant punishment. (perek 10 Mishna 3 actually lists many examples regarding the melacha of הוצאה )

It is no easy task to get a clear definition of when the manner a melacha is carried out in is defined as backhanded or unusual, but some clues can be gathered from the word used to categorize them, namely כלאחר יד  ( backhanded .)

Although it is clear from other sugyas that performing such melacha is still rabbinically prohibited ,this still has HUGE practical ramifications, as it is  clear that such actions  can be permitted in certain cases,  such as צער ( distress) even if not life threatening  ( see Kasubos 60a re goat milk) ,and it could also be permitted sometimes  if the action itself is already only rabbinically prohibited  ( שבות דשבות ) ,AND it is a case of great need or for the sake of a mitzva ( whether shvus deshvus is permitted for any mitzva even by Jew as opposed to in the context of אמירה לעכום is yet another fascinating discussion for a later post, Hashem willing .

From the phrase itself, It seems that if one does an action usually performed with the front of one’s hand with the back of one’s hand, that is the prototype for an unusual action .

One still needs to analyse whether this is simply due to it being a significantly DIFFERENT way of doing the action as opposed to the usual way, or whether it is because it is a clumsy and inefficient way of doing it- One Nafka Minah could be wearing a key on an armband , which is certainly unusual but not at all clumsy or inefficient! ( it is true that the reason things are done in a certain way is usually because it is the more efficient and easier way to do it, but there are also other factors, such as fashion , cost , and personal taste which could come into play .

However, to get a clearer picture of what types of שנוי  ( change) in the manner of the action qualify the action as backhanded, it is necessary  to examine the different cases around shas, many of which are in this masechta, and some of which we have already covered this cycle – we can’t do that all in the context of this post, but we can try start !

It will also be necessary to examine the sources for this rule, if possible, and see what definition makes most sense based on that source.

We have already learned that a woman normally wears a ring without a signet and a man wears one with a signet ( see daf 62a),  and that those are the respective types of ring that are considered a garment for each of them and thus permitted to wear in the public domain on shabbos.

We also learnt that if a man goes out beshogeig (unknowingly) with a ring without a signet or a woman goes out with a ring with a signet, he or she is liable to a korban .

The Gemara there asked why he or she is liable, seeing that wearing something is not the normal way to transport it, and it should thus be considered a backhanded melacha.

It answers that seeing as it is normal sometimes for them to take it out on behalf of their spouse to put in a safe house , and when they do so, they wear it, it is not considered to be an unusual way of transporting it, and seeing as it is not considered a valid garment or decoration for them, they are liable .

We see from there that wearing something rather than carrying it in one’s hand could theoretically be considered an unusual way of transporting  something, even though it is not an inefficient or clumsy way of doing so, like performing an action with the back of one’s hand is- the only “but” ( which is a big but) is that it can’t be something that its normal even sometimes to transport by wearing.

Now back to our daf – Rav Papa rules that if one throws a clod of dirt at a palm-tree beshoheig  and it detaches a date from the branches, one is liable to bring 2 korbanos(sacrifice), one for uprooting ( harvesting ) and one for mefareik( according to Rashi, a form of threshing [another long complex discussion ] .

In contrast, Rav Ashi (who is usually the final word), rules that he is not liable at all, as this is neither the normal way of picking something or of threshing it.

Does this mean that Rav Papa holds that doing a melacha in a backhanded manner makes one liable, or does he simply mean that it is not considered an unusual way?

As the former is unlikely, given that the exemption of כלאחר יד appears to be a generally accepted one in the shas, perhaps one can suggest that the machlokes(dispute)  is based on our chakira(analysis)  regarding the definition of “backhanded.”)

Perhaps Rav Papa holds that seeing as this is not necessarily an inefficient  or clumsy way of getting the date to fall, and in fact might be easier in some cases than using other methods ( certainly for one with good aim), it is not considered כלאחר יד .

And Rav Ashi holds that seeing as it is indeed unusual, that is sufficient to make it considered significantly backhanded and thus be exempt.

Any other ideas?

And given that in practise we learn most of these exemptions from the requirement of מלאכת מחשבת in the mishkan (or do we?), does this analysis work?

Shabbos 72 “Misaseik” and bugs in fruit

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Shabbos 72 “Misaseik” and bugs in fruit

If one eats a fruit and accidently lands up swallowing a bug , should one worry that he has transgressed up to 5 prohibitions, or so long as he checked them first according to halachik requirements , may one be relatively relaxed?

Our perek has spent significant time dealing with the requirement to bring a korban afte00r breaking shabbos beshogeig – when one intends to do the forbidden action but has forgotten that it was shabbos or that the action was forbidden on shabbos .

Today, we are introduced to a different principle, namely that of Misaseik.

Although the difference may seem subtle, classic Misaseik is usually understood as a form of unintentional transgression where one intended to do something permitted and landed up doing something forbidden.

At least regarding the laws of shabbos , Misaseik is treated more leniently than shogeig, and no korban is required – at worst, it is an unpunishable transgression, at best, it isn’t viewed as a transgression at all, similar to oneis ( an action completely beyond someone’s control and totally unavoidable).

An example given on our daf is if a person intended to lift up something from the ground that is not attached to the ground, like a knife which he dropped (an example given by Rashi.)

Instead, he lands up lifting and detaching something attached to the ground, thus inadvertently performing the forbidden melacha of kotzeir (reaping.)

As he never intended to perform an act of cutting at all, everyone agrees that he is exempt, and this is derived in Maseches Kerisos, probably the main sugya on the subject, from the phrase in Vayikra וחטא בה- he needs to sin with the intended action in order to be liable to bring a korban .

In a possible extension of this concept, the Gemara brings a debate between Abaya and Rava regarding what happens if he intended to cut something detached from the ground and landed up cutting something attached.

The subtle difference here is that he intended to perform the action of cutting, not just lifting, and he did indeed perform such an action- the lack of intention here does not relate to the מעשה ( the action) but to the חפצא ( the item the action is performed on.)

In such a case, Abaya maintains that one is liable, as in a regular case of shogeig, whereas Rava holds that one is still exempt, as a form of מתעסק.

There is a further debate between Rashi and Tosfos as to what precise case Abaya and Rava are arguing about.

Rashi seems to maintain that we are dealing with a case when he intended to cut an item that is not attached, but his hand slipped and landed up cutting a different item, which was attached ( see his commentary on the parallel sugyos in Sanhedrin and Kerisos.)

However if he merely was unaware that the item he intended to cut was attached, and later found out that it was attached after tearing it, he could be liable to bring a korban הואיל ונעשית מחשבתו ( seeing as his intended action was performed on its intended object.)

Tosfos, on the other hand, seems to maintains that everyone agrees than in the former case, he will be exempt, and holds that the argument is specifically in a case where he succeeded in tearing the precise item he thought was detached, and then realised that it actually was attached .

The halacha, as usual, is like Rava, and even if one intended to cut, so long as one intended to cut something permitted, he is exempt.

Whether we follow Rashi or Tosfos might be dependent on how we interpret a rather cryptic Rambam and later sources, but that’s for another time.

Our Gemara makes it clear that shabbos is more lenient than other prohibitions when it comes to מתעסק, and in the sugya in Kerisos, Shmuel says explicitly that misaseik is exempt on Shabbos, because of the general requirement of מלאכת מחשבת – a melocho must be significant in order to be subject to punishment on shabbos – any lack in the intention is enough thus to exempt someone .

On the other hand, if one intends to eat permitted fats (שומן) and lands up eating forbidden fats (חלב), one is liable, seeing as one derived benefit from it.

What is unclear from the sugya is what happens with other sins performed unintentionally, but without benefit.

On the one hand, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת does not apply, but on the other hand, the benefit factor is missing to make him liable.

Tosfos on our daf seems to understand that the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is only needed to exempt a third form of מתעסק – if one intends to detach something that is attached and lands up detaching a different attached item.

In this case, he had full intention to sin, but because his action was applied to an object other than the intended one, his thoughts were not fully carried out, and he is exempt due to the lack of מלאכת מחשבת .

On the other hand, if he intended to apply an action to a permitted item and applied it to a forbidden item, the regular exemption of וחטא בה פרט למתעסק applies ( an unintentional sin is excluded from the obligation to bring a korban)

The only time when one would then be liable would be if one derived benefit from the sin, like eating forbidden fats.

It follows that the exemption of מתעסק when there was no intention to sin at all applies not only to shabbos but to other prohibitions as well, so long as one does not benefit from them.

Now for the crunch- if one intends to eat a fruit that is not normally infested , or that one has done one’s reasonable best to check and appears clean, and lands up eating a bug which he isn’t aware of –

It seems to follow that so long as one never got benefit from eating the bug ( as most of us would clearly not), then this is no worse than misaseik and one would be exempt even from a korban ( or the equivalent prayer and repentance.)

Indeed, as Rav Eitam Henkin הי”ד pointed out in his work לכם יהיה לאוכלה, there are various poskim including the Rogotchover Gaon and Rav Shlomo Zalman who suggest or even rule that this might indeed be a case of מתעסק.

Others take issue with it, and in a more analytical Hebrew analysis on the subject , I have discussed the pros and and cons of applying the exemption of מתעסק to unintentionally eating bugs in insects, and point out that it could be tied to the argument between Abaya and Rava as well as that of Rashi and Tosfos.

I also argue there that according to some Rishonim, it could actually fall under the even more lenient category of דבר שאין מתכוין.

Suffice to say that without minimizing the requirement as coded in Shulchan Aruch to check vegetables that are commonly infested before eating them, the common fear-based argument that not doing so is worse than eating non-kosher, given that some bugs involve 5 different prohibitions, could clearly be exaggerated given that one’s intention is not to eat any bugs.

If one saw a bug, he clearly would remove it , all he intends is to eat the very kosher fruit , and he clearly does not benefit from the bugs either – on the contrary he finds them disgusting ( at least in our culture…)

Of course, the usual disclaimer is that we are simply learning and exploring the concepts together – I do not rule very much, so before deciding on your policy in this matter, discuss with a serious Torah scholar who is well versed in these issues as well as the actual facts on the ground.

Shabbos 71 getting dragged along and the date-line revisited 

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Shabbos 71 getting dragged along and the date-line revisited

On this daf, we are introduced to the fascinating concept of גרירה, or dragging.

This is a fairly good literal translation of the word, as we have already seen the famous view of Shmuel, who rules like Rabbi Shimon that גורר אדם מיטה כסא וספסל ובלבד שלו יתכוין לעשות חריץ – a person may drag a bed, chair, or bench on shabbos along the ground, so long as he doesn’t intend to dig a ditch ( even though there it is very likely that it will happen.)

This is the famous rule of דבר שאינו מתכון מותר – one may perform a permitted activity even though it might be accompanied by an unintended forbidden activity, so long as the resulting forbidden activity is not inevitable.

 

But our daf is not about דבר שאינו מתכוין, although we shall hopefully have many more opportunities to discuss this wide-ranging rule.

Today, we learn that one sin can be “dragged” by another one and atoned for together with it through the same sacrifice , even if that first sin itself was actually only  atoned for with the same sacrifice of a different sin .

A person forgets that it is shabbos and does two forbidden melachos, reaping and grinding for example.

According to our most recent Mishna, as both these melachos were performed under the same ommision (forgetting it was shabbos,), one sacrifice korban atones for both.

However, in this curveball of a case, before one realizes that he broke shabbos, he remembers it is shabbos but forgets that these two melachos are forbidden on shabbos and then repeats the same 2 melachos.

Under normal circumstances, the later act would require 2 sacrifices, as per our Mishna, one for each melacha.

However, because he never really became aware of the first 2 transgressions before he performed the next 2, the two acts of reaping are tied to each other as 2 of the  same melacha performed under one omission, and only require one sacrifice .

The same applies to the two acts of grinding.

As such, if one sets aside a korban as soon as one becomes aware of the earlier 2 sins, that korban covers both the initial act of reaping and the initial act of grinding.

When he then becomes aware of the later 2 sins, there is no need to bring another 2, or even 1, korban for them

Because

  1. The first korban covered the first act of reaping and pulls the second act of reaping along with it. (seeing as both were done without becoming aware of the sin in between)
  2. As it also covered the first act of grinding, it pulls the second of grinding with it 2, for the same reason.

Thus all 4 transgressions are covered by 1 korban, instead of the 3 korbanot we would have expected.

Things then get more complex, with further extensions of the גרירה concept, and my shabbos rest just wasn’t the same today due to the complexity of this daf ( if you also found today’s daf rather taxing on the mind , you have company !)

The lomdus in this sugya is rather particular-partly based on pesukim- and hard to apply literally to other areas of halocho.

However, I was initially quite excited as it reminded me of a particularly leniency of the Chazon Ish regarding the dateline, known as HIS chiddush of גרירה.

As mentioned in a recent post, the Chazon Ish is of the opinion that the halachik dateline should be 90 degrees east of Jerusalem and everywhere to the east of that should be behind one day and keep shabbos on Sunday.

However, this poses  a major problem as unlike the agreed international dateline, as well as the halachik dateline of Rav Tucazinsky  זצ”ל which passes through the Pacific  Ocean, this dateline passes through China and Australia, meaning that 2 people could literally stand on different sides of the line, within less than shiur  Corona  ( 2 metres) of each other, and it could be shabbos for one and a weekday for another .

This could even happen in the middle of the same city or theoretically, the same shul!

Due to the irrationality  of such a situation, the Chazon Ish applies  a tremendous chiddush and rules that if  even part of a body of land( a continent ) is in the same date zone as Jerusalem, the entire body of land is “dragged” after it and follows the same date as Jerusalem.

I was hoping over shabbos to find that this logical ruling could perhaps be based on today’s daf’s precedent , but became convinced that there is absolutely no comparison in the lomdus or the application of the versus, and that the usage of this term is simply borrowed.

So I almost decided to cancel this post, but thought it would be nice to share the thought process anyway and see if anyone can either confirm my rejection of this as a possible proof or reinvigorate it ( I have not yet  seen in the actual writings of the Chazon Ish on this subject any attempt to link the two but I have admittedly not been through all of it carefully .)

At the end of the day , “It is Torah, and I need to learn”, and as “One Mitzva pulls along another” (Avos 4/2) , this post  will hopefully lead to some greater clarity on the various complex issues raised herein.

Shabbos 70 and Parashas Behar Killing financially and emotionally 

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Shabbos 70 and Parashas Behar

Killing financially and emotionally

Our Mishna taught us that if a person remembers it is shabbos but forgot that various melachos(categories of work)  are forbidden on shabbos, and did them all, he is liable to bring a separate korban for each of them.

On our daf, the Gemara brings various sources for this ruling.

One of the sources brought is the passuk מחלליה מות יומת (one who desecrated it shall surely die.)

As we already know from another verse that one who intentionally breaks shabbos ( with warning and witnesses in the time of Sanhedrin) is   חייב מיתה (liable to capital punishment,) the Gemora deduces that this must be referring to shogeig (an unknowing transgression) , and that the doubling of the word מות in מות יומת mean that one can get many “deaths”  if one transgresses multiple categories of work.

The Gemora then says an amazing thing:

As there is clearly no death penalty for shogeig, this must refer to him being “killed with money”- in other words, financially hurt by the cost of the many sacrifices he needs to bring.

The frightening message of this Gemara is that it is possible to “kill” someone by hurting him financially- destroying a person’s financial position in a certain sense is like killing him.

We see a similar concept in the Midrash (Pirkei d Rabbi Eliezer 40, brought in Rashi Shmos 4/19), where one who has lost his financial assets is considered as one who has died.

We also   could possibly  see this idea in the well-known law that if a wealthy person loses his money, there is a mitzva of charity ( within ones means obviously and the 20% max) to maintain him at the standards he is used to!

Although this is clearly not a total equivalence- on the contrary, we “kill” him with money , and not with capital punishment, there is no heter to hurt or kill someone who has lost his money as if he was dead, and he can certainly count in a minyan etc.,-  the message is loud and clear: There is an element of murder in causing financial loss, and even more so total financial ruin.

In this week’s parsha, we learn about the prohibition of אונאה- overcharging or underpaying someone for land or other things ( this only applies if the victim is not aware that the agreed price is significantly above or below the market price.)

It also prohibits אונאת דברים – cheating or hurting someone with words.

This includes causing emotional harm to someone by insulting him, reminding him of bad elements of his past, etc, as well as giving him bad financial advice (literally cheating him with words.)

At the worst level, emotional harm is also considered a form of murder, as per the well-known rule that one who publicly shames his friends is considered as if he has killed him (Bava Metzia 58b.)

We see how careful we need to be to avoid causing people financial or emotional harm, and that one who does so, could be considered in a certain way as belonging to the worst category of people- those who spill the blood of man .

Shabbat 69 The Date- line Controversy  Does one keep Shabbos on Sunday in New Zealand?

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One of the more complex halachik problems in the modern world of globe-trotting (which will hopefully be possible again soon), is the question of how to count the days of the week, including shabbat, while changing time zones.

Due to the circular nature of the world, it was decided in relatively modern times by the nations of the world to fix a date line 180 degrees east of Greenwich, England , given that at the time , the British Empire was the centre of the world politically and logistically .

This avoids the problem of continually losing an hour as one moves east while gaining one as one moves west, to the point that two people travelling to a point from 2 different directions on the circular world would meet each other on 2 different days respectively .

If that were the case,  the same day and place could then be Thursday for the person who travelled west from England to say, Japan, and Friday for one who travelled  Eastwards, which would be unmanageable , to put it mildly.

Not to mention the issues each country would have in choosing whether its Thursday or Friday!

Once a dateline is set, when its midnight beginning of Friday on the Western side of the dateline , somewhere in the Pacific, its only midnight beginning Thursday on the other side, and a day is jumped as you cross the line, but at least everywhere else has a fixed date.

However, it is nothing more than a fictional line which theoretically could have been placed anywhere – it was placed in the middle of the Pacific intentionally to avoid the inconvenience of people on the  land  border changing days as they cross all the time , and in order to avoid islands along the 180 degree lines, the line was actually moved in certain places!

In fact, At least one island nation in the Pacific has actually switched before from one side to the other, for economically and logistically convenient factors!

When it comes to Shabbat, chagim, and other halachik  questions, we are faced with a major riddle – on the one hand, if the Torah does not recognise the concept of a dateline , than the day Shabbos falls will depend on which direction each jew reached a different time zone from, and for one Jew in a certain time zone, it could be Sunday, and for a different one, still shabbos .

Due to the absurdity of such a situation, most Poskim have recognised the fact that having a halachik dateline must be built into the halachik system, and some have even found hints at it in talmudic and medieval sources.

The problem is that assuming that we recognise the concept of a dateline, the fact that the British and their subjects decided with other countries to place the baseline at Greenwich and the dateline 180 degrees in either direction from it, with a few deviations, does not necessarily give this arbitrary dateline halachik weight.

The halachik dateline could thus be in a totally different place than the accepted international dateline , which would mean that some people would actually need to keep shabbos on Friday or Sunday according to the local calendar .

This would be inconvenient, but for something as weighty as shabbos, convenience is unlikely to be a factor – after all, unlike the chagim which are dependent on the date of the month , which in turn is dependent on the day that we declare Rosh Chinese ( in the past based on the new moon sightings and now on the calendar), shabbos is fixed from the 7 days of creations by tradition and can never change .

In addition, the days of the month and yom tov could only be changed with the official process of עבור declaring a leap year or leap month, a complex process which required a qualified court, as well as being in Israel in most cases – it could not simply be done based on what the local government recognizes as the correct day or date.

In fact, the most obvious place to set the baseline is where the Torah considers to be the centre of the world, namely Jerusalem, which would put the dateline far to the East of the international date line, if we follow the 180 degree system .

This is where some Poskim, including Rav Yechiel Michel Tucazinsky zt’l, leading poseik of Jerusalem in the mid twentieth century למנינם, put the dateline – he actually wrote an entire book on the subject!

According to this , Australia , New Zealand, and Japan keep shabbos the same time as the locals, being on our side of the dateline, but people in Hawaii, on the other side, do not, and would need to keep shabbos on the local Friday .

The problem is that some Poskim, such as the Chazon Ish, based on the Baal haMaor’s explanation of a cryptic Gemara in Rosh Hashana  ( maybe a future post when we get there ), hold that the dateline should be only 90 degrees East of Jerusalem, putting at least most of Australia on our side of the line, but New Zealand and Japan on the other side .( the Chazon Ish applies a rule called גרירה whereby a continent or island is never split and follows the time zone that most of it is in , saving Australians at lot of hassle- interestingly the late Rav of Netanya, Rav David Shlush  zt’l, and great poseik in his own right, in his own lengthy work on the subject, disagrees and holds that a body of land may indeed be split in two.)

That would mean that New Zealand and Japan would be on the other side of the line and need to keep shabbos on Sunday!

Although many poskim come out that one may keep shabbos on the day the locals consider Saturday in both Hawai and New Zealand/Japan, many people are stringent and keep shabbos and chagim on both days, or at least refrain from biblically prohibited work on one of the two days in addition to keeping a full shabbos on the other .

Is this necessary, or just an unnecessary stringency, and what does it have to do with today’s daf (or not ?)

We are taught in a Beraita on this daf that one who is travelling through the desert and has lost track of the days of the week, should count 6 days from the time he realises this, and keep shabbos on the seventh .

This seems at first to indicate that if one is unsure when shabbos really should be, it is sufficient to follow one’s own 7 day cycle and keep one shabbos a week, even if it’s not on the accurate halachik day that others keep it on.

Although one could dispute this based on the well  known rules of chazal that  unlike yom tov, shabbos is fixed in stone and never changes based on people, as we discussed above , it seems at this stage of the sugya that so long as a person has his own fixed 7 day cycle, it’s OK to keep just one day as shabbos and treat the other days as regular days, seeing as he is unable to ascertain when the real shabbos is.

It could be argued that if this is the case, then even more so when an entire community is unsure of which day shabbos should be , given all the debates above, that it could be treated in a similar way and they could choose to follow the seven day cycle they have always followed locally , with visitors doing the same.

Of course, the comparison could be disputed, but the Gemara throws a major curveball at this in any case.

Rava rules that contrary to what we would think from a simple reading of the Beraita, this is not a blanket permit to do any forbidden work on the other 6 days .

Each of the 7 days is actually treated as if it could be shabbos, and most work is forbidden.

The only work that is permitted is that which is needed for his essential livelihood, which is considered pikuach nefesh (see Rashi who explicitly mentions this consideration)

Then in order to distinguish one day from the other in order that one shouldn’t forget about shabbos, the Gemora concludes that every 7 days, one should say Kiddush and Havdala, and that was the intention of the Beraita .

There is so much lomdus in the various movements in this piece, way out of the scope of this post, but it thus seems from the conclusion of the Gemara that this particular sugya would not be of major use in allowing  for our proposed leniency re the dateline .

One might thus indeed need to avoid at least biblically forbidden work on both days when in these regions that are subject to dispute!

Much more to say, but a nice way to whet one’s appetite for the subject , if it doesn’t give you too much of a headache- I find it makes me dizzy and I am certainly quite far from reaching a conclusion on my own on this issue.

Just to end with something from a current Gadol that I  have merited  to have some connection to-  I asked Rav Asher Weiss Shelita  in person once what he held regarding the dateline question.

His initial answer to me was that he holds that the ikar (most important argument ) is to do what the locals do.

I then pressed him a bit and asked if that means that he would himself do biblically prohibited melacha in New Zealand on the local Sunday – he smiled at me and send that he wasn’t sure!

Shabbos 68 “Tinok Shenishba” -Does a newly religious person need to repent for earlier transgressions?

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On today’s daf, we are introduced to some basic concepts regarding the forbidden categories of work on shabbos.

One rule is that a person who unknowingly describes shabbos is liable to bring a special sacrifice to atone for this unwilling transgression. This type of transgression is called shogeig (שוגג), as opposed to a knowing and intentional transgression which is called meizid  ( מזיד) .

Since the destruction of the second temple where sacrifices are no longer offered, it follows that one is still required to  repent and pray for forgiveness for such aveirot , as prayer comes in place of sacrifices (ונשלמה פרים שפתינו)

However, not every type of unwilling transgression is defined as “shogeig” and requires a sacrifice.

To be defined as “shogeig” regarding the laws of shabbos, a person has to have intended to do the actual forbidden action but simply

  1. Have forgotten that work is forbidden on shabbos
  2. Have forgotten it was shabbos
  3. Have forgotten that the specific category of work is forbidden on shabbos .

If one did a  forbidden melacha ( work category)  completely unintentionally , not though an act of forgetfulness, like if he was forced to do so by someone else or did it by accident, it is called ones (אונס), a transgression performed under duress, and one is exempt from the Korban.

In such circumstances, we generally tend to view such actions as not tied to him at all and the action is not considered a sin at all- thus repentance might not be needed at all ( I say might as there are different categories of אונס and מתעסק and some opinions hold that some of them might still be considered a מעשה עבירה even if one is exempt from a sacrifice .)

One fascinating debate on this daf is the status of a “tinok  shenishba”- someone who was captured by non-Jewish captors as a child and was raised as a non-Jew, without being aware of his obligations as a Jew and without the belief required to carry them out. (Another fascinating case with the same law is the גר שנתגיר בין הנכרים which could make an interesting post in and of itself …)

Are his actions  considered to be “shogeig” ie intentional but unknowing , and liable to the relevant sacrifices when he becomes aware of his Jewishness and embraces it, or are they considered to be more like “ones”, done under duress, and thus exempt completely from a sacrifice, and probably the equivalent prayer and repentance in the absence of one?

The leading Amoraim (sages of the Gemara )  of Bavel ( Babylon) , Rav and Shmuel, are of the opinion that such a person has the status of a “shogeig” and needs to bring a korban when he becomes Jewish observant, and the leading Amoraim of Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, hold that he has the law of an “ones” and is  exempt ( there is a debate between Rashi and Tosfos as to the precise reason or source for this exemption, which might have some practical ramifications, but I will leave this for further discussion)

It can be argued that a person who was brought up Jewish but unobservant is similar to the “tinok shenishba” of our daf, in that he too grew up without awareness of his religious obligations or at least without the necessary belief system to appreciate their importance, and is thus subject to the same dispute.

As the law usually follows Rabbi Yochanan (and so rules the Rambam, Mamrim 3/3), it would follow that they would then likely be exempt from the sacrifice and from the equivalent prayer and repentance required in its place.

We find precedent for extending the rule of the captive child to such a person in the Rambam’s ruling regarding heretics (Mamrim 3/3.)

Whereas the original heretic who gives up on Jewish belief is treated in halacha appropriately, the Rambam says that their children and descendants, who know no better, are to be treated as the captive child, and thus not held responsible for their unknowing transgressions  prior to their religious arousal.

He applies this rule specifically to the karaim (karaites), a powerful sect in his time who accepted only the written Torah but denied the oral Torah .

The equivalent of the karaim’s descendants today would probably be the descendants of the original reform or secularist Jews , who due to their lack of religious upbringing, know no better , and thus according to Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and the Rambam and other poskim after them, might  not be liable to a korban nor the equivalent tefilla and repentance in our day and age, for their transgressions up until the time that they chose to become observant.

My father שליט”א always likes to point out, on this basis , that the term  “Baalei Teshuva” (penitents) , commonly applied to newly religious people, is actually inaccurate, and should be reserved for people who intentionally sinned or left the path of Torah, and then returned.

Rather, people who grew up irreligious and became religious later   are really in the category of “Tinok Shenishba.”

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 67 Pesukim as charms revisited 

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A few daf ago, we discussed the idea of amulets and the apparent protective powers attributed to them by Chazal.

We noted that this seems to contradict the general mitzva of תמים תהיה עם אלוקיך, a commandment to pray and seek salvation only directly through Hashem himself, and not by means of magic or other supernatural means.

We also noted that it seems to go against the serious prohibition of saying pesukim to heal a wound or other ailment , as mentioned in the last perek of Sanhedrin.

In a related sugya in Shvuos 15b, we are told that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi used to say certain pesukim before going to bed at night (apparently to protect him.)  The Gemara asks how he could do this, seeing that one is not allowed to use words of Torah to heal, and answers that although healing is forbidden, using them as preemptive protection is permitted.

This could explain why using amulets with pesukim in them is permitted for protection, if there is reason to believe that they work.

The Rambam  also allows this, despite his belief that there is no power in such things,  possibly as he sees psychological benefit for those who do believe in them, or because he believes the requirement that it be an amulet that has proven itself 3 times reduces the group of amulets that may be worn to a null set.

On this daf, we are told, amongst other seemingly bizarre incantations, that Rabbi Yochanan advise someone with a severe type of fever to follow the following procedure:

  1. Take a blade made entirely of iron and find a thorn bush.
  2. Mark the thorn bush by tying a strand of hair around it.
  3. On the first day, cut a notch in the bush with the blade and say the verse “and an angel of Hashem appeared to him” (the verse  in Shmos 3 describing Hashem’s first revelation to Moshe in the burning Bush)
  4. On the second day, cut another notch, and say the passuk ” and Moshe said, I shall turn aside and see.” (all these pesukim are in the same episode)
  5. On the third day, cut another notch, and say the passuk “and Hashem saw that he had turned around to look “

Rav Acha then suggested to Rav Ash (generations later) that he should say on the last day the passuk “and he said, do not approach”, indicating that the fever should leave him alone.

It then continues to describe what should happen when the fever leaves him (which is apparently achieved by the previous steps.)

Without going into the issue of symbolism in these kind of sugyos ( the continuation of the sugya does indeed indicate that the symbolism is used to teach a vital lesson in humility)  , it is clear that this seems to contradict what we have learn that it is certainly forbidden to use pesukim as cures.

There are several approaches to resolving this in the Rishonim, among them

  1. Tosfos and the Rosh take the approach that if a danger to like is involved, like a severe fever, even healing is allowed , as all sins other than 3 are permitted to save a life .

This answer is difficult in that it assumes that such an action indeed can save a life, otherwise what is  the heter of pikuach nefesh? No one would suggest that its permitted to break shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh to make a treatment that is known not to work!

While it is possible that these Rishonim indeed take the approach that such things do work, but are simply forbidden, this would not work for the Rambam’s approach!

  1. The Meiri, who generally takes a similar “rationalist” approach to the Rambam , takes the view that the prohibition does not apply when other actions are taken for the cure and the pesukim just accompany them, perhaps because he sees them as simply a form of prayer in such a context, something the Rambam indeed says regarding using pesukim for protection, but notably not regarding saving life .
  2. It could be   possible, that as seems to be the way of the Rambam, he simply does not regard this sugya as authoritative given that it contradicts the axiomatic  sugyos on the subject, and simply chooses to leave it out of the halacha . This takes us into a long and controversial subject, which is out of the scope of this post.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 66 Adopted parents 

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On this Daf, we learn several things that the leading Amora, Abaya, was told by his mother.

The truth is, however, that according to the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b,) Abaya never got to know his biological mother , as she passed away tragically during his birth.

To add to his suffering, his father had  also passed away before he was born, so he never met him either – he was orphaned of both parents from birth .

As such, the Gemora there explains that when he refers to things he heard from his mother, he is referring to his foster mother.

His foster mother was no ordinary lady, but the wife of his teacher and leading Amora, Rabbah bar Nachmani himself , who had adopted the child who would eventually become one of his two star students ( see Rashi in Gittin 34b “והלכתא” )

The fact that he referred to her as his mother, seems to indicate that at least in certain respects , he considered a foster  mother to be like a biological mother , and thus the laws of honoring parents that prohibit mentioning one’s parent by name would apply to her too, at least in spirit, if not in actual law.

Whether this is because he held that actual halachik status is given to a foster parent, or whether he simply did it out of courtesy, is not plainly evident.

There are multiple practical ramifications of this question, that could affect, for example

  1. Whether the mitzva of having children is fulfilled through adoption,
  2. Whether the mitzva of honoring parents applies to foster  parents,
  3. Whether one gets the death penalty for hitting a foster parent.
  4. Whether the laws of inheritance apply to foster  children.
  5. Whether one may marry the daughter or son of a foster parent.
  6. Whether there is a prohibition of yichud with an adopted child.
  7. May one be called to the Torah using his foster father’s name, and could it be used in a marriage document,

In looking for further evidence that an adopted child is treated as a biological child, at least in certain respects, we encounter an almost explicit Gemara in Sanhedrin 19b.

The Gemara points out that the 5 sons of Shaul’s daughter, Meirav,  are referred to in Shmuel  2/21 as the daughters of Michal, his other daughter .

It explains that even though Meirav gave birth to them, Michal raised them, and they were thus referred to as HER sons.

The Gemara derives from this, and a few other examples from Tanakh, that if one raises an orphan in his home, the Torah considers it as if he gave birth to him!

Together with the example of Abaya on our daf, this seems to be very strong proof that at least as far as naming is concerned, a foster parent or child is, or at least can be, treated like a biological one.

Of course,  there is much more work to do before conclusions can be reached either way- in practice, as with most complex issues,  each one of these questions must be researched separately and discussed with a serious Talmid-Chacham holding in all relevant sugyos – as a spoiler,  it seems that for most issues of halachic status, the consensus of poskim is not to treat adopted children as biological children, and the “as if”  כאלו comparison in Sanhedrin , like many like it, is not meant to be taken precisely in the halachic sense.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.