Our Daf deals with the question when a nursing woman is permitted to eat on Yom Kippur.
Unlike a pregnant woman , one who is in the birthing process or immediate post-birth process, a woman who has recently given birth and/or is nursing is considered to be in immediate danger and is not always exempted from fasting.
In this regard, Rav Yehuda quotes Shmuel who says that as long as the womb is still considered “open”, we insist that she eats whether she says that she needs to or not. Thereafter, whether she says that she needs to eat or not, we do not feed her, the assumption being that it is no longer dangerous for her to fast.
The Gemara notes that this is only the version of his ruling that Rav Ashi taught. However, Mar Zutra had a different version of this ruling, whereby even after the womb has closed, we feed her for as long as she says that she needs to eat.
Ravina asked Mereimar which version of the ruling is to be accepted, and he told him that we follow the lenient ruling of Mar Zutra, seeing as ספק נפשות להקיל (we are lenient in case of any doubt regarding danger to life.)
At first glance, it might seem from this that Rav Ashi rejects the view that in case of doubt of danger to life, we are stringent, and do not desecrate the shabbos, and that we only desecrate shabbos in a case of certain danger.
However, it is very difficult to accept that this is indeed his view, given the well-known and universally accepted view amongst earlier authorities that in case of any real doubt of danger to life, we are always lenient.
For example, the Mishna (Yoma 83a) brings the rule of Rav Matya that if someone might have been covered by a rockfall, or might still be alive, we desecrate shabbos to free him, because ספק נפשות להקיל and the Gemara concludes that no one disputes this.
In addition, it is clear from the sugya there that even when most experts (including the patient) say that an ill person need not eat on Yom Kippur, we follow 2 who say that he does, and where the patient and doctor disagree, we always follow those who says he needs to eat.
It seems hardly likely that one of the latest and most authoritative Amoraim would rule against all of that.
It thus seems more plausible that Rav Ashi agrees in principle with the rule of ספק נפשות להקיל but holds that after the womb has closed, there is not even a doubt anymore- we can assume she is not in danger.
However, this puts this into the irreputable category of a מחלוקת מציאות (debate in a factual matter which can easily be researched)- surely both Rav Ashi and Mar Zutra were able to gather enough cases where nursing women were endangered by fasting to either both see at least some doubt or both agree that there is no real concern?
The next step in the yeshiva-style lomdus (analysis) would usually be to show how the argument is not about facts but about how the halacha relates to the facts.
We could suggest that both Rav Ashi and Mar Zutra agree that there is a small danger involved at this stage but differ as to whether this degree of danger is indeed considered a valid ספק halachically.
At the end of the day, there is always some small risk to anyone who fasts, yet nobody suggests that no one should ever fast because of this concern- it is clear from the fact that the Torah requires a regular person to fast that such risks are not only acceptable, but are meant to be taken for the sake of the Mitzva of fasting.
We have also seen the view of Rav Huna (Shabbos 121a) who disagrees with his son, Rabbah bar Rav Huna’s disapproval of those who are “pious” and do not go round killing snakes and scorpions on shabbos, because the risk is small and there is no end to how much time we can spend killing wasps and the like on shabbos.
As such, we are forced to conclude that there is a line somewhere between what is considered a reasonable though doubtful concern for saving life, for which we certainly desecrate Shabbos and other Mitzvos , and far off and never-ending concerns which are not sufficient reason to justify doing so- After all, if we took all far-fetched concerns into account, it would lead to a situation where shabbos in constantly being desecrated out of paranoia.
It is in this grey area between reasonable concern and exaggerated concern that there is room for debate- everyone has to draw the line somewhere, and just as Rabbah bar Rav Huna and Rav Huna drew it in different places, so do Rav Ashi and Mar Zutra.
Although the criteria are not necessarily the same, this trade-off has relevance to another common question, namely what level of risk is one permitted to take in the course of normal living? – one of the main springboards for this question is the sugya of דשו בו רבים on the other side of our daf, which I hope to have time to address in the future, Hashem willing.
It is also possible that given that the level of risk is in a grey area, even medical experts might have different views on the subject, and different surveys or other sets of evidence could lead one to different conclusions, something we have seen so much lately during the endless debates amongst experts in medicine, virology, epidemiology, statistics, and pretty much everything else.
As such, there is also room to say that Rav Ashi and Rav Zutra do indeed differ enough regarding the facts, and not just regarding where statistically the halachik red line is drawn.
Many of us, myself included, are often frustrated or annoyed at the amount of seemingly ridiculous halachik questions going around regarding pikuach nefesh- after all, we have always been taught this rule of ספק נפשות להקיל – in other words, if you have any doubt, just assume its pikuach nefesh and act accordingly.
Although in situations when one does not the time to ask questions and wait for answers before acting, this dictum remains the golden rule, we have seen from the above that there is indeed a grey area or very fine line between real concerns and halachically insignificant ones, and there is thus still certainly room for some give and take on the subject, when, and only when, there is no immediate urgency to act- תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך!
A few daf ago, we discussed the idea of amulets and the apparent protective powers attributed to them by Chazal.
We noted that this seems to contradict the general mitzva of תמים תהיה עם אלוקיך, a commandment to pray and seek salvation only directly through Hashem himself, and not by means of magic or other supernatural means.
We also noted that it seems to go against the serious prohibition of saying pesukim to heal a wound or other ailment , as mentioned in the last perek of Sanhedrin.
In a related sugya in Shvuos 15b, we are told that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi used to say certain pesukim before going to bed at night (apparently to protect him.) The Gemara asks how he could do this, seeing that one is not allowed to use words of Torah to heal, and answers that although healing is forbidden, using them as preemptive protection is permitted.
This could explain why using amulets with pesukim in them is permitted for protection, if there is reason to believe that they work.
The Rambam also allows this, despite his belief that there is no power in such things, possibly as he sees psychological benefit for those who do believe in them, or because he believes the requirement that it be an amulet that has proven itself 3 times reduces the group of amulets that may be worn to a null set.
On this daf, we are told, amongst other seemingly bizarre incantations, that Rabbi Yochanan advise someone with a severe type of fever to follow the following procedure:
- Take a blade made entirely of iron and find a thorn bush.
- Mark the thorn bush by tying a strand of hair around it.
- On the first day, cut a notch in the bush with the blade and say the verse “and an angel of Hashem appeared to him” (the verse in Shmos 3 describing Hashem’s first revelation to Moshe in the burning Bush)
- On the second day, cut another notch, and say the passuk ” and Moshe said, I shall turn aside and see.” (all these pesukim are in the same episode)
- On the third day, cut another notch, and say the passuk “and Hashem saw that he had turned around to look “
Rav Acha then suggested to Rav Ash (generations later) that he should say on the last day the passuk “and he said, do not approach”, indicating that the fever should leave him alone.
It then continues to describe what should happen when the fever leaves him (which is apparently achieved by the previous steps.)
Without going into the issue of symbolism in these kind of sugyos ( the continuation of the sugya does indeed indicate that the symbolism is used to teach a vital lesson in humility) , it is clear that this seems to contradict what we have learn that it is certainly forbidden to use pesukim as cures.
There are several approaches to resolving this in the Rishonim, among them
- Tosfos and the Rosh take the approach that if a danger to like is involved, like a severe fever, even healing is allowed , as all sins other than 3 are permitted to save a life .
This answer is difficult in that it assumes that such an action indeed can save a life, otherwise what is the heter of pikuach nefesh? No one would suggest that its permitted to break shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh to make a treatment that is known not to work!
While it is possible that these Rishonim indeed take the approach that such things do work, but are simply forbidden, this would not work for the Rambam’s approach!
- The Meiri, who generally takes a similar “rationalist” approach to the Rambam , takes the view that the prohibition does not apply when other actions are taken for the cure and the pesukim just accompany them, perhaps because he sees them as simply a form of prayer in such a context, something the Rambam indeed says regarding using pesukim for protection, but notably not regarding saving life .
- It could be possible, that as seems to be the way of the Rambam, he simply does not regard this sugya as authoritative given that it contradicts the axiomatic sugyos on the subject, and simply chooses to leave it out of the halacha . This takes us into a long and controversial subject, which is out of the scope of this post.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.