Category Archives: laws of shabbos

Shabbos 148 The unhelpful rebuke and clapping hands and dancing on Shabbos

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On our daf, Rava bar Rav Chanan asks Abaya about a Mishna (Beitza 36b) that says:
 
לא מספקין ולא מטפחין ולא מרקדין ביום טוב.
One may not “mesapeik”, “metapeiach”, or dance on Yom Tov.
 
When one examines the original Mishna, one sees that these prohibitions are brought as examples of a general rule that all שבותים (rabbinical decrees relating to forbidden work) that apply on Shabbos, also apply on Yom Tov.
 
The Gemara there explains that these 3 decrees were all made because of the concern that one might come to fix כלי שיר (musical instruments) on shabbos.
 
This   would involve the biblical prohibition of מתקן כלי (fixing a vessel,) a תולדה (derivative) of the אב מלאכה (category of forbidden work) of מכה בפטיש (the final hammer blow.)
 
Whereas the meaning of the third of these actions is relatively clear ,  the Rishonim discuss what  מספק  andמטפח  are exactly- for purposes of this post, we shall go with Rashi’s definition in Beitza, that they refer to clapping hands and clapping one hands on one’s leg.
 
Both of these activities involve making sounds which accompany music, and like with  dancing, Chazal were concerned that if they were to be done on Shabbos, one would also come to fix the musical instruments they accompany should they break.
 
 Following the  principle of לא פלוג רבנן  (the Rabbis did not discriminate with their decrees,) it follows that even in situations where musical instruments are not present, seemingly harmless activities performed for the enjoyment of Shabbos and Yom-Tov, such as clapping hands or banging on the table to singing, or dancing, are forbidden.
 
Rava bar Chana’s question to Abaya concerned the fact that despite this, it seems to be common practise amongst the people to do so, yet we do not protest about it.
 
There is an obligation in the Torah of “tochacha”- rebuking one’s neighbor when he is doing something wrong (Vayikra 19/17)- so why is this not applied in this case?
 
Abaya answered that הנח להם לישראל מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין – “leave the Jewish people alone: better they should transgress unknowingly rather than transgress knowingly.”
 
From his answer, it is clear that Abaya acknowledged that public practise was indeed incorrect, but justified the failure to protest with a general rule that when it comes to things that people are unlikely to follow even after rebuke, it is better to refrain from rebuking them in the first place and let their transgression remain in the far less severe category of שוגג    (unknowing transgression.)
 
Abaya brings another example where this rule applies from the laws of Eruvin, a fitting introduction to our next exciting masechta!
 
In order to be permitted to carry within a  מבוי  )side-street or alley that is closed on 3 sides, but open on one side to a public domain(, one has to place either a לחי  (upright pole) on one side of the entrance, or a beam across its width (the precise requirements and different opinions on the matter are discussed in the first chapter of Eruvin, see Mishna on Daf 11b.)
 
Rava had ruled  that one should not sit inside this מבוי  right by the לחי  in case something one is holding falls out of one’s hands, and rolls into the public domain, in which case one might come to retrieve it and desecrate shabbos.
 
 Abaya points out that people seem to ignore this ruling, sit in such places all the time, and no one protests. He explains that this is for the same reason.
 
The Gemara points out that this rule does not only apply for rabbinical prohibitions such as the above two decrees, but also to biblical prohibitions.
 
It gives the example of תוספת יום הכפורים (adding on to the fast by starting a little before nightfall) which is a biblical requirement, is ignored by many people, yet we still do not rebuke them for it.
 
Whether this would apply also to more serious biblical prohibitions and/or those that are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, such as eating on Yom-Kippur, lighting a fire on shabbos, or eating non-kosher animals requires more analysis.
 
 On the one hand, the Gemara does not seem to make any such distinction, on the other hand, from the fact that the example given is a relatively unknown biblical law derived by Chazal from דרשות  and possibly also not of the severity of eating on Yom-Kippur itself, it could be argued that this applies only to  less severe and/or lesser known biblical transgressions.  (see Rashba, Meiri, and others who indeed state that this rule does not apply to prohibitions which are explicitly stated in the Torah, and Rema O.C. 608/2 who rules this way.)
 
 
It is fascinating that this tendency to ignore this prohibition has followed us through centuries, and it is common practise to this very day among many observant Jews to ignore this prohibition and dance, clap, and bang while singing on shabbos.
 
While this is clearly reason not to rebuke people who are so accustomed to doing this that they are not likely to listen, it is certainly not justification for  Bnei Torah who are fully aware of the prohibition to intentionally ignore it.
 
Yet, one finds that many Bnei Torah and Torah scholars have also taken on this lenient practise over the centuries, and it is thus pertinent to try and find some reasons that justify this practise in the first place.
 
Below are a few possibilities.
 
1.    There is a well-known rule that אין גוזרין גזירה על הצבור אלא אם כן רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה – Chazal did not make decrees on the community unless most of the community were able to bare it (Bava Basra 60b.)
 
What happens if Chazal made a decree, thinking that the community was able to handle it, but it later become apparent that it was too much for the community to handle and the decree never took hold?
 
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/6) rules that in such a case, the decree is null and void!
 
The Rambam goes further (Mamrim 2/7) and says that even if it appeared for a while that the decree was or might take hold, but in later generations it became clear that it had never taken hold, the decree may be annulled, even by a lesser Beis Din..
 
Although it seems from Abaya’s answer that he admitted that the decree had taken hold but simply didn’t see rebuke as being effective in this case, it is possible that in later generations it became clear that it has in fact never taken hold at all, and can thus be annulled. (I saw later that Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C. 2/100) takes a somewhat similar approach to what I suggested here, with a few differences that might answer some of the outstanding issues.)
 
 
2.    It is possible that the things that even Bnei Torah do were never in the category of the forbidden decrees in the first place.
 
For example, it seems from a parallel sugya (Eruvin 104a), that not any noise is forbidden under this decree, but only “השמעת קול של שיר” – (making sounds of singing.)
 
Rashi explains that this refers to “הנשמע כעין שיר, בנעימה ובנחת”-the kind of sounds that sound like a song, with a gently rhythm. 
 
 
 
Later in the sugya, he goes further and explains that only soft, pleasant sounds that would help someone fall asleep are forbidden, but loud noisy sounds that would wake someone up are permitted.
 
As it is doubtful that the kind of noisy clapping and banging common amongst Yeshiva Bochrim and at a Chasidic Tisch (Friday night get-together with the grand Rabbi of the sect) would help anyone fall asleep, or be considered “pleasant” to the musical ear.
 
Such clapping or banging might thus not ever have been forbidden, seeing as it would not be done at any self-respecting musical event.
 
The Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 339/9) applies a similar idea to dancing, and claims that the type of dancing commonly done by Bnei Torah while singing  on Shabbos is not in rhythm to the music, and does not fit into the decree against dancing at all- see there for more details.
 
It seems to me that the wording of Rashi  )(Beitza 30a) back this distinction , as he defines מספקין   as “hand on hand”, מטפחים as “hand on the thigh”, and מרקדין as “with the legs.”
This seems to imply that dancing involves the same kind of accompaniment to the music as clapping does, namely in tune to the music, but with the feet, rather than the hands.
 
Otherwise, it is kind of spurious for Rashi to tell us that dancing is done with the legs!
 
If it wasn’t too much of novelty for me to make on my own, I would go further and argue that Rashi holds that מרקדין  is not simply referring to dancing movements, but to the sound one makes with one’s feet while dancing in tune to the music, and the main concern is this rhythmic sound generated by the dancing, not the dancing itself.
 
3.    Tosfos (Beitza 30a) rules that this decree only applied in Talmudic times where it was common for musicians to fix their own musical instruments on the spot if they broke, but in today’s times, where we are not trained to do that, and instruments are generally taken to professionals to fix, there is no such concern, and the decree does not apply.
 
The halachik weight of the Tosfos in Ashkenazi halacha is evident by the fact that the Rema (O.C. 339/3) brings this view, yet it is difficult for several reasons, among them:
 
a.    The biblical obligation to listen to the shofar on Rosh Hashanah or wave the Lulav on  Sukkot was pushed aside by a rabbinical decree out of concern that one might carry it  in the public domain to an expert who would teach him how to perform the mitzva (Rosh haShana 29b.) This shows that Chazal were not only concerned that one would come to fix something himself, but also that one would take it to an expert to show him what to do.  If this concern  pushes aside a biblical obligation, surely it would be enough to forbid voluntary actions such as these?  Although this seems like an obvious question, the major Achronim (later authorities) who take issue with the lenient view of the Tosfos do not seem to bring this as one of their concerns- perhaps this is because we do not compare one decree of Chazal to another, and the fact that they made such a decree specifically by Shofar, Lulav, Megila and nothing else could show that they had unique considerations in those cases (it should also be noted that this decree was made by the Amora Raba, many centuries after the tannaic decree against clapping and dancing.)
b.    The Gemara says (Beitza 5a) that anything that was forbidden by the decree of a court, needs another court to permit it, even if the reason for the decree no longer applies.  Elsewhere (Megila 2a,) it goes further and says that a later court may not annul the words of an earlier court unless it is greater in both wisdom and numbers.
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/2) learns a general rule from this and other places, that once Chazal have made a decree and the decree has taken hold, a later court may not annul it, even if the reason it was made for no longer applies, unless it is greater in wisdom and size.
He goes further and rules that decree made as a  סיג  (to prevent one transgressing a biblical transgression) cannot even be annulled by a later court that is greater both in wisdom and in numbers (even in the unlikely event that one is found.)
 
As  there was no such court in the time of the Baalei Tosfos, and there is also no mention by them of the decree being annulled,  even without the Rambam’s further stringency, it seems clear from this Talmudic rule that even if the original concern that we might come to fix musical instruments no longer places, the decree should remain in place.
 
 
Either one has to find a way to explain that despite the לא פלוג  principle, this decree never included  our modern circumstances in the first place, or one is forced to concede that the Baalei Tosfos have a different approach to the Rambam and indeed hold that decrees of Chazal can become permitted when the reason no longer applies in society at large.
 
Protagonists of the later suggestion would need to show that they apply the Talmudic principle that a later court cannot annul the words of an earlier court to something completely different to such decrees.
 
During the course of writing this up, I discovered that the Meiri (Beitza 5a) disagreed with the Rambam and holds that if the reason for the decree no longer applies, a later court may annul the decree even if it is inferior to the original one, and the requirement for the court to be greater in size and number only applies when the reason for the decree still applies!
 
Perhaps the Tosfos follow the approach of the Meiri and hold that seeing as the reason for the decree no longer applied in their time, they had the right to abolish the decree in their own courts despite their inferiority to the  courts of the Amoraim. Whether they did this explicitly (in which case it is somewhat missing from their words) or considered the common minhag together with rabbinic sanction thereof to be the equivalent of it being annulled requires further discussion, should this approach be followed (see the above quoted Igros Moshe where he makes the later suggestion.)
 
In practise, whereas many Talmidei Chachamim are indeed careful to stick to the parameters of the original decree, the Rema has brought the permissive ruling of the Tosfos, giving people permission to rely on it, and baring in mind all 3 above reasons for leniency and the fact that this is a dispute in a rabbinical prohibition, it seems that there is strong reason to permit leniency, certainly for the sake of Oneg Shabbos and Simchas Yom-Tov.
 
As everyone agrees (see O.C. 339) that clapping in a back-handed manner (with the top of one’s hand on the palm of the other hand) or banging without any rhythm at all is permitted, this is certainly a good solution for someone who wishes to satisfy all opinions, and for Sephardim who follow the rulings of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch on the subject.
 
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 148 The unhelpful rebuke and clapping hands and dancing on Shabbos
 
On our daf, Rava bar Rav Chanan asks Abaya about a Mishna (Beitza 36b) that says:
 
לא מספקין ולא מטפחין ולא מרקדין ביום טוב.
One may not “mesapeik”, “metapeiach”, or dance on Yom Tov.
 
When one examines the original Mishna, one sees that these prohibitions are brought as examples of a general rule that all שבותים (rabbinical decrees relating to forbidden work) that apply on Shabbos, also apply on Yom Tov.
 
The Gemara there explains that these 3 decrees were all made because of the concern that one might come to fix כלי שיר (musical instruments) on shabbos.
 
This   would involve the biblical prohibition of מתקן כלי (fixing a vessel,) a תולדה (derivative) of the אב מלאכה (category of forbidden work) of מכה בפטיש (the final hammer blow.)
 
Whereas the meaning of the third of these actions is relatively clear ,  the Rishonim discuss what  מספק  andמטפח  are exactly- for purposes of this post, we shall go with Rashi’s definition in Beitza, that they refer to clapping hands and clapping one hands on one’s leg.
 
Both of these activities involve making sounds which accompany music, and like with  dancing, Chazal were concerned that if they were to be done on Shabbos, one would also come to fix the musical instruments they accompany should they break.
 
 Following the  principle of לא פלוג רבנן  (the Rabbis did not discriminate with their decrees,) it follows that even in situations where musical instruments are not present, seemingly harmless activities performed for the enjoyment of Shabbos and Yom-Tov, such as clapping hands or banging on the table to singing, or dancing, are forbidden.
 
Rava bar Chana’s question to Abaya concerned the fact that despite this, it seems to be common practise amongst the people to do so, yet we do not protest about it.
 
There is an obligation in the Torah of “tochacha”- rebuking one’s neighbor when he is doing something wrong (Vayikra 19/17)- so why is this not applied in this case?
 
Abaya answered that הנח להם לישראל מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין – “leave the Jewish people alone: better they should transgress unknowingly rather than transgress knowingly.”
 
From his answer, it is clear that Abaya acknowledged that public practise was indeed incorrect, but justified the failure to protest with a general rule that when it comes to things that people are unlikely to follow even after rebuke, it is better to refrain from rebuking them in the first place and let their transgression remain in the far less severe category of שוגג    (unknowing transgression.)
 
Abaya brings another example where this rule applies from the laws of Eruvin, a fitting introduction to our next exciting masechta!
 
In order to be permitted to carry within a  מבוי  )side-street or alley that is closed on 3 sides, but open on one side to a public domain(, one has to place either a לחי  (upright pole) on one side of the entrance, or a beam across its width (the precise requirements and different opinions on the matter are discussed in the first chapter of Eruvin, see Mishna on Daf 11b.)
 
Rava had ruled  that one should not sit inside this מבוי  right by the לחי  in case something one is holding falls out of one’s hands, and rolls into the public domain, in which case one might come to retrieve it and desecrate shabbos.
 
 Abaya points out that people seem to ignore this ruling, sit in such places all the time, and no one protests. He explains that this is for the same reason.
 
The Gemara points out that this rule does not only apply for rabbinical prohibitions such as the above two decrees, but also to biblical prohibitions.
 
It gives the example of תוספת יום הכפורים (adding on to the fast by starting a little before nightfall) which is a biblical requirement, is ignored by many people, yet we still do not rebuke them for it.
 
Whether this would apply also to more serious biblical prohibitions and/or those that are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, such as eating on Yom-Kippur, lighting a fire on shabbos, or eating non-kosher animals requires more analysis.
 
 On the one hand, the Gemara does not seem to make any such distinction, on the other hand, from the fact that the example given is a relatively unknown biblical law derived by Chazal from דרשות  and possibly also not of the severity of eating on Yom-Kippur itself, it could be argued that this applies only to  less severe and/or lesser known biblical transgressions.  (see Rashba, Meiri, and others who indeed state that this rule does not apply to prohibitions which are explicitly stated in the Torah, and Rema O.C. 608/2 who rules this way.)
 
 
It is fascinating that this tendency to ignore this prohibition has followed us through centuries, and it is common practise to this very day among many observant Jews to ignore this prohibition and dance, clap, and bang while singing on shabbos.
 
While this is clearly reason not to rebuke people who are so accustomed to doing this that they are not likely to listen, it is certainly not justification for  Bnei Torah who are fully aware of the prohibition to intentionally ignore it.
 
Yet, one finds that many Bnei Torah and Torah scholars have also taken on this lenient practise over the centuries, and it is thus pertinent to try and find some reasons that justify this practise in the first place.
 
Below are a few possibilities.
 
1.    There is a well-known rule that אין גוזרין גזירה על הצבור אלא אם כן רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה – Chazal did not make decrees on the community unless most of the community were able to bare it (Bava Basra 60b.)
 
What happens if Chazal made a decree, thinking that the community was able to handle it, but it later become apparent that it was too much for the community to handle and the decree never took hold?
 
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/6) rules that in such a case, the decree is null and void!
 
The Rambam goes further (Mamrim 2/7) and says that even if it appeared for a while that the decree was or might take hold, but in later generations it became clear that it had never taken hold, the decree may be annulled, even by a lesser Beis Din..
 
Although it seems from Abaya’s answer that he admitted that the decree had taken hold but simply didn’t see rebuke as being effective in this case, it is possible that in later generations it became clear that it has in fact never taken hold at all, and can thus be annulled. (I saw later that Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C. 2/100) takes a somewhat similar approach to what I suggested here, with a few differences that might answer some of the outstanding issues.)
 
 
2.    It is possible that the things that even Bnei Torah do were never in the category of the forbidden decrees in the first place.
 
For example, it seems from a parallel sugya (Eruvin 104a), that not any noise is forbidden under this decree, but only “השמעת קול של שיר” – (making sounds of singing.)
 
Rashi explains that this refers to “הנשמע כעין שיר, בנעימה ובנחת”-the kind of sounds that sound like a song, with a gently rhythm. 
 
 
 
Later in the sugya, he goes further and explains that only soft, pleasant sounds that would help someone fall asleep are forbidden, but loud noisy sounds that would wake someone up are permitted.
 
As it is doubtful that the kind of noisy clapping and banging common amongst Yeshiva Bochrim and at a Chasidic Tisch (Friday night get-together with the grand Rabbi of the sect) would help anyone fall asleep, or be considered “pleasant” to the musical ear.
 
Such clapping or banging might thus not ever have been forbidden, seeing as it would not be done at any self-respecting musical event.
 
The Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 339/9) applies a similar idea to dancing, and claims that the type of dancing commonly done by Bnei Torah while singing  on Shabbos is not in rhythm to the music, and does not fit into the decree against dancing at all- see there for more details.
 
It seems to me that the wording of Rashi  )(Beitza 30a) back this distinction , as he defines מספקין   as “hand on hand”, מטפחים as “hand on the thigh”, and מרקדין as “with the legs.”
This seems to imply that dancing involves the same kind of accompaniment to the music as clapping does, namely in tune to the music, but with the feet, rather than the hands.
 
Otherwise, it is kind of spurious for Rashi to tell us that dancing is done with the legs!
 
If it wasn’t too much of novelty for me to make on my own, I would go further and argue that Rashi holds that מרקדין  is not simply referring to dancing movements, but to the sound one makes with one’s feet while dancing in tune to the music, and the main concern is this rhythmic sound generated by the dancing, not the dancing itself.
 
3.    Tosfos (Beitza 30a) rules that this decree only applied in Talmudic times where it was common for musicians to fix their own musical instruments on the spot if they broke, but in today’s times, where we are not trained to do that, and instruments are generally taken to professionals to fix, there is no such concern, and the decree does not apply.
 
The halachik weight of the Tosfos in Ashkenazi halacha is evident by the fact that the Rema (O.C. 339/3) brings this view, yet it is difficult for several reasons, among them:
 
a.    The biblical obligation to listen to the shofar on Rosh Hashanah or wave the Lulav on  Sukkot was pushed aside by a rabbinical decree out of concern that one might carry it  in the public domain to an expert who would teach him how to perform the mitzva (Rosh haShana 29b.) This shows that Chazal were not only concerned that one would come to fix something himself, but also that one would take it to an expert to show him what to do.  If this concern  pushes aside a biblical obligation, surely it would be enough to forbid voluntary actions such as these?  Although this seems like an obvious question, the major Achronim (later authorities) who take issue with the lenient view of the Tosfos do not seem to bring this as one of their concerns- perhaps this is because we do not compare one decree of Chazal to another, and the fact that they made such a decree specifically by Shofar, Lulav, Megila and nothing else could show that they had unique considerations in those cases (it should also be noted that this decree was made by the Amora Raba, many centuries after the tannaic decree against clapping and dancing.)
b.    The Gemara says (Beitza 5a) that anything that was forbidden by the decree of a court, needs another court to permit it, even if the reason for the decree no longer applies.  Elsewhere (Megila 2a,) it goes further and says that a later court may not annul the words of an earlier court unless it is greater in both wisdom and numbers.
The Rambam (Mamrim 2/2) learns a general rule from this and other places, that once Chazal have made a decree and the decree has taken hold, a later court may not annul it, even if the reason it was made for no longer applies, unless it is greater in wisdom and size.
He goes further and rules that decree made as a  סיג  (to prevent one transgressing a biblical transgression) cannot even be annulled by a later court that is greater both in wisdom and in numbers (even in the unlikely event that one is found.)
 
As  there was no such court in the time of the Baalei Tosfos, and there is also no mention by them of the decree being annulled,  even without the Rambam’s further stringency, it seems clear from this Talmudic rule that even if the original concern that we might come to fix musical instruments no longer places, the decree should remain in place.
 
 
Either one has to find a way to explain that despite the לא פלוג  principle, this decree never included  our modern circumstances in the first place, or one is forced to concede that the Baalei Tosfos have a different approach to the Rambam and indeed hold that decrees of Chazal can become permitted when the reason no longer applies in society at large.
 
Protagonists of the later suggestion would need to show that they apply the Talmudic principle that a later court cannot annul the words of an earlier court to something completely different to such decrees.
 
During the course of writing this up, I discovered that the Meiri (Beitza 5a) disagreed with the Rambam and holds that if the reason for the decree no longer applies, a later court may annul the decree even if it is inferior to the original one, and the requirement for the court to be greater in size and number only applies when the reason for the decree still applies!
 
Perhaps the Tosfos follow the approach of the Meiri and hold that seeing as the reason for the decree no longer applied in their time, they had the right to abolish the decree in their own courts despite their inferiority to the  courts of the Amoraim. Whether they did this explicitly (in which case it is somewhat missing from their words) or considered the common minhag together with rabbinic sanction thereof to be the equivalent of it being annulled requires further discussion, should this approach be followed (see the above quoted Igros Moshe where he makes the later suggestion.)
 
In practise, whereas many Talmidei Chachamim are indeed careful to stick to the parameters of the original decree, the Rema has brought the permissive ruling of the Tosfos, giving people permission to rely on it, and baring in mind all 3 above reasons for leniency and the fact that this is a dispute in a rabbinical prohibition, it seems that there is strong reason to permit leniency, certainly for the sake of Oneg Shabbos and Simchas Yom-Tov.
 
As everyone agrees (see O.C. 339) that clapping in a back-handed manner (with the top of one’s hand on the palm of the other hand) or banging without any rhythm at all is permitted, this is certainly a good solution for someone who wishes to satisfy all opinions, and for Sephardim who follow the rulings of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch on the subject.
 
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 147 Bathing, swimming, and showering on Shabbos

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The Mishna teaches that if someone washes on shabbos in a cave filled with water or in the hot-springs of Tiberius , he may not carry the towel home ( even where there is no prohibition of carrying) , in case he comes to squeeze it the water out of it .

Even if he used many towels and they are thus not so wet, it is still forbidden.

On the other hand, if there are many people who did so, they may carry the towel/towels back, even if they all shared one towel and it is soaking wet.

This is because they will likely remind one another not to squeeze out the wet towel.

We recall that there are two מלאכות that can be involved in squeezing liquids out of solids on Shabbos:

  1. When one intends to use the squeezed out liquid, the prohibition of דש, threshing is often involved , though it is only deorayso for grapes, olives, or possibly other things that are mainly squeezed for the liquids absorbed in them.
  2. When the liquid is absorbed into an absorbent item like a fabric, and the liquid is one that indeed has a cleaning affect ( such as water,) the melacha of מלבן ( whitening or laundering ) applies, even if the liquid goes to waste.

As the water squeezed out of the towel goes to waste, and it is not clear that the melacha of threshing would even be applied to a towel, it is mainly the later melacha of מלבן that we appear to be concerned with.

We also recall that Chazal )Shabbos 40a) forbade washing or immersing one’s whole body in hot water, even if it was heated before shabbos, but permitted it in cold water or in naturally heated springs such as the חמי טבריה ( the hot springs of Tiberias. )

We saw that Chazal )Shabbos 109b) considered washing in the sea on Shabbos perfectly acceptable but forbade floating or swimming ( without one’s feet on the ground) in case one would come to build a raft)Shabbos 40b/Beitza 36a.).

We saw that this prohibition applied not only to the sea or rivers, but also to a pool, even in a private domain, if it did not have a barrier or rim around it ( such as a simple pond or hole in the ground- Shabbos 40b)

Our Gemara deduces from the wording of the Mishna that discussed one who has already entered hot water, rather than permitting one to do so, that in the first place, one may not do so ( though see Tosfos based on the earlier sugya that washing in חמי טבריה are permitted even לכתחילה! )

However, it infers similarly that pouring water over one’s entire body is permitted in the first place, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon who only forbade entering a warm body of water, not pouring such water over one’s body.

Two other opinions are then brought, the Tana Kama who holds that even pouring cold water over ones entire body is forbidden, and Rabbi Yehuda who holds that one may pour cold water over one’s whole body, but not hot water.

Based on the above sugyos alone, we would conclude that

  1. Immersing one’s body in hot water, even if heated before shabbos, is forbidden rabbinically. This would include taking a hot bath, even if the water was heated before shabbos.
  2. Washing or Immersing in cold water or in hot springs is permitted, so long as one does not carry the wet towel back on his own inside an eruv or outside an eruv even with others.
  3. Standing in the sea to cool off or wash is permitted so long as one does not lift one’s feet off the ground, float, or swim.
  4. Swimming in a home pool with a rim is permitted by Talmudic law.

All the above would apply only if one is naked or wearing a plastic or non-absorbent bathing-suite (less absorbent types of nylon bathing-suits might fit into this category, but this is for a different post) – otherwise the concerns of actually laundering the garment or coming to squeeze it out afterwards could also apply.

In practise, given all the halachik complications, Ashkenazi poskim from the Magein Avraham (O.C. 326/8) to the Aruch haShulchan (O.C. 326/9), Mishna Berura(O.C. 326/21), and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Even haEzer 2/13) have consistently backed up the longstanding Ashkenazi custom, already quoted in earlier sources such as the Trumos hadeshen (255) not to enter bodies of water at all on shabbos, either for washing or swimming.

Rav Ovadia Yosef and his son, Rav Yitchak, the current Sephardi Chief Rabbi (see Yalkut Yosef Shabbos 2 siman 301/1-7), admit that there is no specific halacha or Sephardi custom that forbids swimming or washing in a private swimming pool on shabbos, but for some reason, are hesitant to allow it in practise.

Having a cold shower is a different story, and seems to be permitted- however, because of the small possibility that this minhag even includes pouring cold water over one’s entire body , Rav Moshe (O.C. 4 74/75) only permitted it in practise if one is suffering discomfort from the heat.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha

Shabbos 143-144 Squeezing lemons on Shabbos

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Our Mishna (143b) tells us that it is forbidden to squeeze fruit on shabbos in order to remove their juice, and that if the juice flows out on its own, it is forbidden to drink it.

Rashi explains that the prohibition of squeezing fruit for its juice falls under the melacha of דש (threshing.) Just like threshing involves extracting the edible grain from the inedible kernel, so squeezing fruit involves extracting the drinkable juice from the undrinkable (though edible) fruit.

It is important to note that not all squeezing is forbidden under this melacha, some forms of squeezing are forbidden under the melacha of מלבן (whitening or laundering,) seeing as squeezing water out of wet clothes is part of the laundry process, and other types might be permitted, at least biblically.

As a rule, when one needs the “new” product derived from the extraction, the action falls under the prohibition of threshing, either biblically or rabbinically.

Rabbi Yehuda is more lenient and rules that so long as the fruit were intended for eating and not for juicing, the juice that comes out on its own may be consumed.

The reason for the prohibition against drinking the juices that flowed out of the fruit on their own is in order that one doesn’t come to squeeze the fruit himself, which could be an אסור דאורייתא (biblical transgression.)

As one is less likely to come to juice a fruit which he intended for eating in its solid state, this concern is significantly lower in such cases, which is why Rabbi Yehuda is lenient.

The Gemara concludes that this debate is limited to one of 3 categories of fruit:

  1. The most stringent category is זיתים ורימונים (olives and grapes.)

As these are usually grown and intended for their juices (the oil and the wine,) considered as one of the 7 liquids regarding the laws of impurity, and given special status in the Torah in various places , they are most similar to threshing wheat which is usually grown and intended for the edible grain (There is much discussion amongst the Rishonim and poskim as to which of these factors is primary.)

They thus fall under the biblical melacha and even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that if the oil or grape-juice flows out on its own on shabbos, it is forbidden to drink it.

  1. The middle category is תותים ורימונים (strawberries and pomegranates,) which are usually eaten, but also commonly squeezed for their juice.

As the original fruit has a perfectly usual use to start off with, this is not the same as threshing the less usable unthreshed grain and might thus only be rabbinically forbidden. This is where the Tana Kama and Rabbi Yehuda argue regarding the juice that comes out on its own.

  1. The third category is שאר פירות (other fruits), which are almost always not used for their juice. Not only do the Chachamim agree with Rabbi Yehuda that the juice that comes out by itself is permitted, even squeezing them lechatchila (in the first place) could be permitted!

The Gemara brings a Beraisa which gives some examples of fruit that fit into the category , namely בפגעין ובפרישין ובעוזרדין(identified by some as plumbs, quinces, and sorb-apples [acc themerkava.com]) and that explicitly rules that it is permitted to squeeze them on shabbos . The Gemara understands that this is because they are לאו בני סחיטה נינהו (not fit or meant for squeezing.)

There are some essential questions that need to be discussed regarding the above 3 categories:

  1. Are the examples given here meant דוקא (specifically,) or are they are simply examples of each of these 3 categories?
  2. If they are simply examples, are the members of these categories cast in stone by the Torah and/or Chazal, or dependant on their usage in each time and place?
  3. Does the term לאו בני סחיטה נינהו mean that they are not meant for squeezing at all, or that their juice is not usually fit for most people to drink?
  4. If the juice of a particular fruit is not meant or fit for most people to drink as is, but is meant or fit for drinking when mixed with other drinks or diluted with water, is the fruit considered fit for juicing and thus in the first or second category, or does it still belong in the third permitted category?

From the actual wording of the Gemara, defining the first category as “olives and grapes,” the second as “strawberries and pomegranates,” and the third as “other fruit,”

It seems that the first two categories could be specifically limited to the two species mentioned in each category, and that other fruit fall into the “other fruit” category by default.

However, it makes little sense that fruit which are usually or often squeezed for their juice should be exempt from the prohibition of squeezing, just because they have not been listed explicitly in the first two categories.

Whereas the Torah itself accords oil and wine special status, and this might be the primary reason for squeezing them being biblically forbidden, the examples brought for the middle category hardly seem to be unique- there are plenty of fruit that are both commonly eaten whole and squeezed for their juice, such as apples, oranges, mangoes and more, certainly in our time.

One very important נפקא מינה (practical ramification) of this analysis would be squeezing lemons in order to add their juice into tea, water, or other drinks, or even to drink “neat” if a person is unusual enough to enjoy doing so.

The commonly accepted halacha, as stated in Shulchan Aruch )O.C. 320/6), was that lemons fall into the third category, and squeezing them is thus permitted, possibly even into an empty container, and even more so directly into another liquid, which he records in Bet Yoseif as being the custom in Egypt while making lemonade.

This indeed remained the opinion of the Aruch haShulchan in relatively recent times.

Yet other later poskim, such as the Mishna Berura, have noted that in today’s times, lemons are grown on mass for their juice and squeezed by the barrel- as such they question whether they truly belong in the third category today.

However, an argument can be made that even if we accept that even the first category is neither unique to olives and grapes, nor cast in stone, but differs according to time and place, lemons might still fit into the third category that are not meant or fit for squeezing.

This is because even though are very often squeezed into juice, the resulting product is not fit for the average person to drink on its own, due to its acidity, and is only really used to add flavor to other drinks or foods.

This is very different to the threshed product which can be and is commonly eaten raw, and thus not included in the biblical melacha, or even in the rabbinical one.

This argument is made explicitly by the Beit Yoseif in the same siman to justify the Egyptian practise of squeezing lemons for lemonade on shabbos and as mentioned above, it is clearly endorsed by the Aruch haShulchan.

Although it seems that the more common practise in Ashkenazi circles today is to be stringent, there is certainly what to rely on for those Ashkenazim who are lenient as well as for Sephardim.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 122 and 123       When and how Muktza items may be moved

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It is known that one of the most far-reaching rabbinical decrees pertaining to Shabbos is the prohibition of picking up/carrying article which are defined as מוקצה (set apart from use on shabbos.)
Items which are appropriate and have been set aside, either specifically, or by default, for use on shabbos may be handled within a רשות היחיד (private domain.)
However, anything defined as מוקצה on shabbos may not even be handled within such an area.
There are various opinions offered as to the reason for this prohibition, but that will be left for a possible future post.
On our daf, we see a number of categories of Muktza, and a number of different reasons for moving Muktza, some of which might be permitted for some of these categories but not for others.
The three main categories that we see on this daf are as follows:
דבר שמלאכתו להתיר – A vessel normally used for an action which is permitted on Shabbos.  Although this is not really a category of Muktza per se, our daf does make reference to the stringent view of Rabbi Nechemya that even such a vessel may only be handled when needed for its permitted purpose, not when there is no such reason for doing so.
כלי שמלאכתו לאסור  – a vessel normally used for a melacha which is prohibited on Shabbos
דבר שמקפיד עליו  -something of
value one looks after extra carefully.
 (this is also referred to  as מוקצה מחמת חסרון כיס- see Shabbos 157a)

There are also a number of reasons that one might move a muktza item, each with their own set rules:
שלא לצורך כלל  – for no particular constructive reason
מחמה לצל – in order to protect it  (literally moving it from the sun into the shade)
לצורך גופו  – when one wishes to use the item itself for a permitted purpose.
לצורך מקומו – for the sake of its place- when one needs the space it is occupying for a permitted purpose  (provided that space is not defined as a בסיס לדבר האסור [base for a forbidden item], a different topic.)
The Mishna on 122b lists a number of items that may be used for various purposes on Shabbos, despite the laws of Muktza.
 
One of them is a hammer, which may be used for cracking nuts.
There is a dispute in the Gemara between Rav Yehuda and Rabbah regarding what type of hammer is referred to in the Mishna.
Rav Yehuda claims that it is referring to a hammer usually used for cracking nuts, which is a כלי שמלאכתו להתיר and thus may be used, at least for its intended permitted purpose.
Rabbah points out that our same Mishna permits using a winnowing shovel or pitchfork to pass food to a child on, and these instruments are only made and bought for performing forbidden melachot with them.
As such, Rabbah concludes that the hammer referred to in the Mishna could even be a smith’s hammer, which is clearly a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור.
We conclude from there that it is permitted to use a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור for a permitted purpose!
The Gemara a little later brings a Beraita to question this leniency.
Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai argue whether it is permitted to use an עלי (evidently a type of important vessel) to cut meat for the sake of Simchas Yom Tov.
Yet both agree that once the meat has been cut, it may no longer be used for another permitted purpose.
This seems to imply that in the absence of the special leniency of simchas Yom Tov, using something normally used for a forbidden purpose is forbidden even when one uses it for a permitted purpose, against Rabbah’s conclusion.
The Gemara answers that this instrument is different, as it is more like סיכי זיירי ומזורי (which Rashi identifies as specialist tools used by painters, or alternatively specialty weaving tools), which a person takes pains to look after and sets aside a special place to store. (see also Tosfos who quotes the Aruch’s translation(one of the most important  linguists amongst the Rishonim).
It follows that special instruments of value that a person is particular to look after and store in one place are treated as a more serious form of מוקצה and may not be used even for a permitted purpose.
The Gemara further records a debate between Rabbi Chiya bar Abaya quoting Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Shemen bar Ada regarding what type of hammer the Mishna permits one to use.
Whereas both agree that a hammer used for beating gold may be used for permitted purposes, even though it is a דבר שמלאכתו לאסור, Rabbi Yochanan is of the view that a hammer used for pounding spices (the forbidden melacha of grinding) may not be used even for  a permitted purpose, seeing as a person is particular about it.
Yet the primary source for the prohibition of using מידי דקפיד עליו (something one is particular about), can be found in the second Mishna on amud bet.
There, Rabbi Yossi tells us that any vessel may be used for a permitted purpose on shabbos, with the exception of a large saw and the peg (blade) of a plough, presumably because they are  particularly valuable or fragile items that the owner is particular to look after.
The Gemara seems to understand that Rabbi Yossi is not referring to these 2 items only, but uses them as examples of anything that fits into the category of things used for a specialised purpose that the owner takes great care with.
We thus have 3 primary sources for the stringency applied to items that one is particular with:
1.      The Beraisa where Beit Hillel agrees that an עלי many only be used until the meat has been cut, and the Gemara’s understanding that this is similar to the special painter’s tools (as explained by Rashi.)
2.      The view of Rabbi Yochanan, disputed by Rav Shemen bar Ada, that a hammer used for spices may not be used on shabbos at all.
3.      The Mishna (as interpreted by the Gemara) which permits using any vessels on shabbos except those that one is particular about.
 
At first glance, these 3 sources all seem to be saying the same thing, to the point that we need to understand
1.      Why the Gemara brought the Beraisa to query the lenient ruling of Rabbah rather than an explicit Mishna
2.      How Rav Shemen bar Ada could disagree with an explicit Beraisa AND Mishna.
 
Yet, when one looks more carefully, it appears that there are different categories of things one is particular about, and Rashi actually seems to define them differently.
There are things which one is so particular about that one usually  does not allow them to be used for anything but their intended professional purpose.- this seems to be the category discussed in the Mishna, which everyone agrees may not be used at all on Shabbos.
There are things which one might allow to be used for another purpose, but which one is careful enough to keep in a special place while not being used- This is the case discussed in the Beraisa.
Then, there are things which one might not be particular enough about to dedicate a special place for, but which one does not use for other purposesד in case they get dirty or disgusting, such as the hammer used for pounding spices (see Rashi who makes this point  and the Ritva who has a different version of the Gemara and holds that one is more particular about a gold hammer than a spice hammer.)
Perhaps, this is what Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Shemen argue about- the both agree accept the basic stringency of דבר שמקפיד עליו , but differ as to the extent of its application.
This is just an initial analysis, and a study of the Rishonim will reveal that it is not so straight forward and there are many ways to approach this, but that’s it for today….
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 117 and 118 Shalosh Seudot, Melava Malka, and relying on others for support

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Our Mishna tells us that should a fire break out in one’s home chalila, it is permitted to save food from a fire that is sufficient for 3 shabbos meals.

This applies if the fire breaks out before dinner on Friday night, otherwise one is only permitted so save enough for the remaining meals on Shabbos.

It should be pointed out that it was normative in Talmudic times to have only 2 meals a day, one in the morning, and one in the evening, and thus having a third meal on shabbos stuck out as a special act of honoring the shabbos.

This might be the reason why this meal, which should technically be called סעודה שלישית (the third meal), is traditionally referred to simply as שלוש סעודות (three meals.)- It is through this meal that it is apparent that all 3 meals are done in honor of shabbos, and not just to satisfy one’s needs.

In our day, when we eat 3 meals a day in any case, how is this result achieved without having 4 meals?
As it is usually forbidden to eat before davening, one generally does not have breakfast, so we are still left with only 3 meals.

Perhaps this is the reason for the custom to have a Kiddush after davening at shul, in lieu of breakfast, so סעודה שלישית is truly an extra meal.

However, if we treat the third meal as a form of early supper as we often do, we are effectively just replacing our Saturday night dinner with an early one (which in summer can be quite late indeed.)

Perhaps this is a halachik reason for the custom to have a Melava Malka (extra meal to escort the Shabbos on her way ) after shabbos as well, so that it is clear that סעודה שלישית is being eaten just for the sake of shabbos?

Yet, as nice as the above ideas sound, we need to investigate whether

there is really an obligation to have one more meal than usual on shabbos, as a fulfilment of the general Mitzva of honoring and enjoying the Shabbos day

OR whether perhaps there is simply a technical obligation to have 3 halachic meals on Shabbos, regardless of circumstance, based on its own independent source, whether or not one eats more meals than one does during the week in practice.

This question could have special application when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, and bread or Matza is not permitted after midday.

Some have the custom to daven early, wash for Kiddush early as breakfast, and then count lunch as the third meal.

Some communities or Yeshivot also have the custom every week to wash for Kiddush straight after davening, have a light non-meat meal, and then have a heavier meat meal in the afternoon for the third meal.

If there is a requirement that the meal needs to specifically be for shabbos, simply replacing breakfast is probably not sufficient.
On the other hand, if all that is required is to fulfill the technical Mitzva of eating 3 meals on shabbos, then one has clearly done so.

A third possibility is that one can fulfill the basic Mitzva just by fulfilling the technical requirement, but that it is a מצוה מין המובחר (higher level of performing the Mitzva) to make sure that one actually has a meal one would not normally eat during the week.

A further look at our sugya shows that the requirement to eat 3 meals on shabbos is derived according to Rabbi Yochanan from the repetition of the word יום ( day) 3 times , in the passuk containing the instruction to eat מן (Manna) gathered the day before shabbos on shabbos.

The passuk reads (Shmos 16/25):
וַיֹּ֤אמֶר מֹשֶׁה֙ אִכְלֻ֣הוּ הַיּ֔וֹם כִּֽי־שַׁבָּ֥ת הַיּ֖וֹם לַיקֹוָ֑ק הַיּ֕וֹם לֹ֥א תִמְצָאֻ֖הוּ בַּשָּׂדֶֽה:
(“and Moshe said, eat it today, for today is Shabbos for Hashem, today you will not find it in the field.”)

A Beraita is brought showing the view of the Chachamim that one is required to eat 3 meals on shabbos, but also cites the view of Rabbi Chidka that one is required to eat FOUR meals on shabbos.
Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Chidka’s view is based on the same passuk, but given that the requirement is based on the word היום (the day), 3 meals in the day are required, in addition to the one held at night!

The Gemara challenges both views with a Mishna which says that someone who has enough food for 14 meals (one week) is not considered poor enough to collect money from the קופה (charity collection).

If one really needs to have 3 or 4 meals on shabbos, surely the cutoff point should be 15 or 16 meals, not only 14?

The Gemara explains that according to Chachamim, we can simply tell him to have his Saturday night dinner while it is still shabbos and fulfill the Mitzva of שלוש סעודות that way.

This seems to imply that one is not required to have a special Melava Malka meal on Saturday night and that one can fulfill the mitzva of 3 meals on shabbos even if one simply has an early supper, strengthening the possibility that the 3 meals is an objective requirement and there is no obligation for the meal to be specifically for shabbos.

One could counter, however, that all that we see from here is that the requirement to have a meal specifically for shabbos is not מעכב (holding back) the fulfillment of the mitzva, and thus not enough of an obligation that we are required give him charity money for it. It could still be an obligatory part of the mitzva under normal circumstances, or at least a הדור מצוה (better way of doing the Mitzva.)

The Gemara then goes a step further and suggests that according to Rabbi Chidka, we could tell him to have his Friday daytime meal at night once shabbos is in, thus fulfilling one’s Friday evening obligation with his regular Friday dinner and still leaving 2 meals for Shabbos plus his Saturday night meal for the fourth shabbos meal. This possibility is rejected out of hand, seeing as it is not reasonable to expect him to fast all day on Erev Shabbos.

The Gemara then comes out with an idea that in today’s age of entitlement sounds truly unbelievable.
It says that both Chachamim and Rabbi Chidka follow the view of Rabbi Akiva that a person should rather make his shabbos like a weekday (regarding the food he eats) than take help from other people!

Rashi understands this to not only replace the suggestion that he eat his Friday meal on Friday night, but also the suggestion that he eat his Saturday meal early.

Instead, the Gemara understands that the obligation to eat 3 meals on shabbos (according to Chachamim) or 4 meals (according to Rabbi Chidka) only applies to one who has enough of his own money for them.

However, one who cannot afford 3 or 4 meals on shabbos should rather have only 2, just like on a weekday, rather than be a burden on others.

It follows that the Beraisa that talks about the criteria for charity has nothing to do with the requirements for a regular person to have 3 or 4 meals dedicated meals for shabbos, seeing as a person who needs charity should miss this mitzva rather than take charity!

We should note that this is despite the fact that missing the third meal on shabbos is considered so serious by Chazal that it is called עשה שבתך חול, making one’s shabbos into a weekday, clearly a strong admonishment against those who treat this meal lightly.
Without this special meal, the shabbos meal schedule is similar to during the week, and that is called “making one’s shabbos into a weekday!”

Although not a water-tight proof, this strong wording seems to support the view that it is not sufficient just to technically perform the obligation derived from the passuk to have three meals- the extra meal has to be noticeably in addition to the number of meals one has during the week.

As such, it indeed seems preferable that in today’s time, one should indeed be particular to have both Kiddush and Melava Malka, in order to make sure that his סעודה שלישית is not simply in place of breakfast or Saturday dinner.

However, this proof is not water-tight, and at the end of the day, the obligation to have a third meal is independently based by Chazal on a different passuk to the one from which we derive the obligation of honoring the shabbos.

As such, one could probably be lenient on Erev Pesach given that it is שעת הדחק (unusually difficult circumstances), and fulfill one’s second meal with a “breakfast Kiddush” and third meal with an early lunch, if none of the other suggested solutions are appropriate.

It would however seem preferable for shuls and yeshivos not to make a regular practice of it on regular Shabbatot in order to make sure that the third meal is indeed noticeable as something one would not eat during the week- one certainly gains an element of the Mitzva of honoring the shabbos that way, even if it is not an intrinsic part or even an embellishment of the Mitzva of the three meals.

Perhaps those Rabbis and Rashei Yeshiva who do advocate the kiddush/lunch model hold that there is no such requirement whatsoever for there to be quantitively more meals on shabbos than during the week but there is rather simply a technical requirement to eat 3 meals on shabbos, regardless of how many one eats during the week.
Or perhaps, they hold that so long as the extra meal is qualitatively better than it would be during the week, as a lavish Kiddush/lunch could be compared to a regular breakfast, that is sufficient to make it noticeably for shabbos.

In any case, two undebatable messages from this discussion is that

  1. The third Shabbos meal is in some ways the most important of the shabbos meals, and not to be taken lightly
  2. One is supposed to do one’s best to avoid being a burden on the community, and whereas one is permitted to take charity when one really needs it for one’s basic needs, even a mitzva like the third shabbos meal, which is SO intrinsic to the honor of Shabbos is NOT enough of a reason to do so .

(p.s. the 4 cups of wine on Pesach is indeed an exception due to the addition aspect of publicizing the mitzva- see Ran on our sugya who makes this distinction.)

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 115-116 Saving Holy scrolls, amulets, and the Torah of a heretic

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On Daf 115b, we are told that even though it is permitted to save holy scrolls from a fire on Shabbos (understood by the Gemara as moving them to somewhere which only involves a rabbinic transgression), blessings and amulets, even if they contain scriptural verses with Hashem’s name, are not included in this leniency, and must be left to burn.
One possible reason for this is that they simply do not have the necessary level of holiness warranted to transgress shabbos for, albeit on a rabbinical level.
This could be backed up by the parallel sugya (Shabbos 61a) which proves that even they are not holy enough to warrant shabbos transgression, they certainly do require burial if damaged, and leaves open the possibility that one might even be forbidden to take them into the toilet.
Another possible, though, is that there is actually something wrong with these things and/or the person who wrote them, and although the earlier sugya would require a rather creative reading in order to justify such an interpretation, there is certainly much evidence pointing in this direction as well.
Rashi, as an example of a verse written in such amulets, gives the example of כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצריים לא אשים עליך (all the illnesses that I placed on Egypt, I shall not place on you- Shmos 15/26 ), an apparent סגולה (charm) against illness.
Yet we cannot ignore the fact that this is the very example used by the Mishna (Sanhedrin 90a) which, if chanted to cure a wound, renders the chanter part of the unenviable group of people who have no share in the world to come!
Although the Gemara there, and elsewhere (see earlier post on the subject) limits the scope of these harsh words to one who spits in the process, it is clear from the parallel sugya (Shvuos 15b) that using words of Torah to cure people is still completely forbidden, even if it doesn’t always warrant such a harsh punishment.
Furthermore, the Rambam (Avodah Zara 11/12) appears to ignore the opinion in the Gemara that limits its scope to one who spits, and rules that chanting pessukim for healing purposes is not only completely forbidden under the prohibition of superstitious practices, but also a form of כפירה (denial of the Torah…) in that he turns words of the Torah, which are supposed to be medicine for the soul, into medicine for the body… (See Kesef Mishna who deals with this at length.)
Perhaps it is this kind of amulet or “blessing scroll) which is being referred to here, and that should be allowed to be burned, given that the writer showed almost heretical beliefs, as did the wearer?
In truth, on daf 116a, we are told similar things about a Sefer Torah written by a מין (heretic)
In a truly shocking statement, the Gemara tells us that a Sefer Torah written by a heretic is not be saved on Shabbos, and should be allowed to burn, together with its pessukim and divine names.
In fact, Rabbi Tarfon goes a step further and declares that should such a Torah come into his hands, he would physically burn it himself!
In discussing how it is possible to allow the name of Hashem to be destroyed, against the biblical prohibition of לא תעשון כן לשם אלוקיכם (do not do so [what you do to idolatry] to Hashem your G-d [Devarim 32/33 ], the Gemara replies that we learn this using a קל וחומר (fortiori) from the case of the סוטה (woman suspected of being unfaithful.
Just like the parchment with Hashem’s name on it is erased in order to make peace between man and wife (i.e. prove her innocence), so it can surely be erased due to the impact that the writers heresy has on the relationship between the Jewish people and our father in Heaven (by showing that we are faithful to him and reject a Torah written by one who is not,)
There is SO much to analysis here, so many nuances in the text, but one issue that needs to be stressed immediately is the need to define what a “heretic” is- it is clear from this sugya (and Rashi’s explanation of it) that this does not refer to anyone who practices idolatry, but only to someone who has experienced the truth of belief in Hashem and his Torah and intentionally rejected it- a very rare, if not non-existent phenomena in our times.
Yet even still, It is hard to imagine that a scroll that is physically identical to the Torah we all live by, and contains the same names of Hashem, can be allowed to burn, or even intentionally burnt, simply because of the heretical beliefs of the person who wrote them.
It seems, at least from here, that the notion of “accept the truth wherever it comes from,” which seems to be the simple meaning of the Mishnaic dictum איזהו חכם הלומד מכל אדם (Who is wise, one who learns from every man,” ]Avos 4/1] is rejected by Chazal, at least in this case.
Whatever happened to the idea that דברי תורה אינם מקבלים טומאה (words of Torah do not become impure?), the basis for the accepted view of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira that a baal keri does not have to go to mikva before learning Torah or davening (Brachos 22a and Chullin 136b), but also used by the Rambam to permit even a Nidah to touch a Torah? (Tefillin ,Mezuzah,veSefer Torah 10/8)
This rules implies that a Torah cannot be impurified by virtue of an impure person touching it, so why should a person of impure views (heresy) invalidate a Torah simply by being the one to write it?
In addition, how do we explain the words and actions of Rabbi Meir, who continued to learn from his Rebbe, Elisha ben Abuya, now known as אחר ( someone else) , after he became a heretic, On the basis that he removes the dirty peel and eats the clean fruit on the inside. (Chagiga 15b)
How do we explain the way the Rambam so often quoted Aristotle in matters that he agreed with him on, using similar arguments, if the words of a heretic are to be burnt?
The late Chief Rabbi Dr Hertz of the British empire, in his famous Chumash which was arguably the most used English translation in the pre-Artscroll days, makes use of this dictum and even quotes friendly Christian bible scholars in his commentary when he feels what they say is appropriate, something he admittedly received much criticism for, particularly with the rise of the Artscroll generation, but also by senior Talmidei Chachamim.
In fact I recall this very debate as a teen growing up in Johannesburg, where the Hertz Chumash was the gold standard for English translations in the traditional Orthodox Shul’s of Johannesburg, and was used all the time by my father שליט”א at home and many other leading Rabbis in the community.
My high School Rebbe, Rav Eliezer Chrysler, שליט”א, is one of those Talmidei Chachamim who truly made a long-lasting impression on me in many great ways, even if we have not always agreed on ideological matters.
He is a man who displays one of the greatest examples of Ahavas Torah (love of Torah) I have ever seen, to the point that he used to give his daily Yomi class to a tiny group of dedicated people at a time when daf Yomi was not exactly well known in South Africa ( I was not one of those committed people, unfortunately.)
There were times when no-one showed up for the shiur, but he nevertheless continued as usual, literally giving the shiur into the tape recorder!
Rabbi Chrysler comes from the English Chareidi Gateshead school, as unsurprisingly, used to often discourage us from using the Hertz Chumash, due to his quoting the explanations of “heretics,” a view that I myself took on for at least a large part of my youth, and still certainly take into account, but which is arguable, given the very limited definition of a “heretic” referred to earlier on. (it could be that it was bothered more by the idea that the commentaries were of non-Jewish origin than necessarily written by heretics, based on the dictumחכמה בגויים תאמין תורה גויים אל תאמין [Eicha Rabbah 2/13])
Yet in another twist and turn in this fascinating discussion, when it comes to learning Torah from someone who is not a good role-model, Chazal take an even stronger stand and rule that “If your Rabbi appears to you to be similar to an angel, then learn from him, otherwise do not learn from him.” (Chagiga 15b)- This is indeed the difficulty the Gemara there raises with Rabbi Meir’s actions!

It is unlikely that this requirement for a Torah teacher to be a perfect role model in all ways can be taken literally, at least on a pragmatic level, and in case, people are not supposed to be angels as evidence by the famous rule of לא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת (the Torah was not given to angels.)
In fact, in a seemingly contradictory statement, Chazal tell us that if you have seen a Talmid Chacham who has sinned at night ]Brachos 19a] (probably a reference to sins in the sexual realm, such as forbidden sexual acts, or wasting of seed ) , do not think badly about during the day, as he has probably done Teshuva.
This shows clearly that we do not expect Talmidei Chachamim to be sin free like angels, but rather to not only accept their teshuva, but to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume they have done Teshuva, rather than make them prove their angelic qualities. (It seems obvious that this does not apply to one who is a danger to others, or one who refuses to acknowledge his errors and has clearly NOT done teshuva.)
Yet at a bare minimum, the statement quoted earlier can be seen to giving a very message as to how students can and should demand the highest standards of example-setting from their teachers.
Perhaps, the answer lies in the type of flawed individual we are dealing with.
To sin is human, and even great people sin. They are to be held to account and liable to repent, but not rejected once they have done so.
However, when a person shows intrinsic negative character traits, it is a completely different matter.
One’s teacher might indeed be forgiven for sins, particular those that do not harm other people, but he certainly must be expected to show almost angelic character traits- after all, דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה (polite behavior comes before Torah.)
The classic heretic of our Gemara is completely rejected not because of his sins, or even his worship of idols, but because he shown the worst possible character traits possible- a lack of הכרת הטוב and rejection of what he knows to be true.
His sin is so severe because, to paraphrase the pessukim quoted by the Gemara, he has seen the truth of Hashem and his Torah, but deliberately thrown it behind the door, out of the way.
Such a person cannot be a Rebbe, nor can his Torah be saved, and his Torah is in fact so tainted that Rabbi Tarfon would have physically burnt it himself.
As the Neviim ,various statements of Chazal, and of course the Rambam among others have stressed so many times (think for example of the Midrash which describe the blood pouring out of the curtain when the enemy entered the Temple), holy items and practices are not magical charms- they only holy because they serve as a way of improving our relationship with Hashem- when they fail to do this, they are as good as burnt already.
In contrast, it can be argued that someone who has sinned by using words of Torah to heal, but who has good intent and certainly has not rejected Hashem and his Torah, should not be in the category of a heretic to the point that we would physically burn his amulets, and Rabbi Tarfon certainly did not make any suggestion that amulets should be burnt- their products do not have the necessary level of holiness to override the shabbos, but they if damaged, they certainly should still be treated with respect and buried.
One must of course, still take into account Rambam’s harsh words which indeed do seem to equate using Torah to heal with heresy- perhaps he would hold that abusing the truth of Torah which a person has experience for physical gain (particularly when money is made from them ) is also a sign of bad character traits which deserve the most severe of sanction.
Yet the truth is that as pointed out in earlier posts, the Rambam himself follows the Gemara in allowing amulets from proven experts to be worn on shabbos for at least for protection, probably for psychological reasons, and it is doubtful that he would condemn one who writes them to help someone, even on a psychological level, as a heretic.
As such, I tend towards preferring our earlier suggestion, that the reasons for allowing amulets to burn are completely different from the reasons for allowing the Torah of a bona fide heretic to burn, or even physically burning it.

I also suggest that we should differentiate between a person who sins like all people do, even perhaps with a degree of heresy, but afterwards repents or at least comes from a sincere place, and someone whose flawed character traits lead him to deny the Torah he believes in, for the sake of his own convenience.
Let us recall that according to Chazal, the Jewish people never worshipped idolatry because they believed in it, but rather in order to permit forbidden sexual relationships to themselves )Sanhedrin 63b)- although this is sometimes quoted as a relative positive, according to what we have said, it might actually be a negative- they experienced the truth of Torah , had absolutely no intellectually honest way of rejecting it, and knew that idolatry was meaningless, yet threw their beliefs behind the door in order to be able to live a lifestyle antithetical to Torah values.
Perhaps, this is why Rabbi Meir was able to still see the good in his Rebbe and learn the good things from him- Elisha ben Abuya was probably not the classic heretic of flawed character described here who knew the truth but conveniently and/or intentionally buried it.
He was more likely a very sensitive and great individual who lost his faith due to very traumatic experiences he encountered. His peels had become dirty, but he was clean and sweet on the inside!
This can be backed up by the case which is blamed for his heresy- the boy who climbed up to the roof on his father’s intructions to perform the Mitzva of שלוח הקן (sending away the mother-bird), which together with honoring parents is a specific mitzva for which long life is promised, and fell off the tree and died.
This might be somewhat comparable to the holocaust survivor who was simply unable to come to terms with the horrors he saw and how they could reflect the promises made by the Torah, particularly given the facts that the pious and religious Jews of Eastern Europe were amongst those most affected.
This heresy is incorrect and not to be encouraged, but it is also not to be condemned in the same way- it is a heresy that stems from a beautiful and sensitive character, and such people are still redeemable, still role models in other areas and worthy of learning from, and ultimately to be drawn close, not pushed away.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 114 Shabbos clothes, The definition of a Talmid Chacham and Chillul Hashem

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Our daf continues to discuss the Mitzva of having special clothes for Shabbos, based on the famous Pesukim (Yeshayahu 58), read as the Haftarah for Yom Kippur.

These Pessukim teach us that just like Hashem is not just interested in the technical aspects of the sacrifices, but is even more concerned about the concept behind them, the “spirit of the sacrifices” so to speak, so also when it comes to Shabbat, it is not only the technical specifications about whether something is considered a forbidden melacha that are important, but also the special sanctity of the day- the “spirit of shabbos, “ so to speak.

As such, we are required not only to refrain from biblical forbidden melacha on shabbos and their rabbinically related prohibitions, but also to refrain from things that are associated with the vibe of the weekday (עובדין דחול) and to engage in activities that are special for shabbos and that are in keeping with the sanctity of the day.

This is not an extra chumra (stringency), as many mistakenly believe, but a complete מצוה מדי סופרים (Mitzva of the prophets or later sages), that is binding on everyone, and that might also affect biblical law (possibly a גלוי מלתא as to what is included in the biblical requirement of תשבות, but that is for a different analysis!)

In addition to avoiding any business transactions or even business related talk, walking quickly in long steps or running (see previous daf), one of these requirements is that one’s shabbos clothes should not be the same as those worn during the week, and our daf brings a source in the Chumash itself that changing one’s clothes is a sign of respect from the Kohanim who needed to change their clothes between cleaning out the ashes and performing the actual offerings.

The logic given is that one should not use the same vessel he has used to mix a drink for his master to serve one’s master with.
Similarly, part of the mitzva of honoring shabbos referring to in Yeshayahu, must surely include putting on special clothes that befit the sanctity of the shabbos.

Often, I see people, children and teens in particular, who come to shul on shabbos wearing weekday clothes, such as jeans and t-shirts, and although it is clearly preferable that they come dressed that way rather than not come at all,I believe that parents and Rabbis should use common sense where appropriate to encourage those who are likely to listen to wear the appropriate formal and special attire for Shabbos.

I also often see people, once again children and teens in particular, changing out of their shabbos clothes after lunch on shabbos, and going to play sports in shorts, t-shirts, and the like.

This is a more complex issue, which involves the question of which, if any, sports are permitted or forbidden on shabbos, and whether they fit into the requirement to avoid weekday activities and focus on things appropriate for the day.

If, and only if, one is able to permit such activities as part of עונג שבת, subject to any halachik restrictions involved, are we able to deal with whether it is permitted to change into weekday clothes for such activities.

On the one hand, just like running might be permitted for youth because that is their עונג שבת (enjoyment of the day,) rather than a stressful weekday activity, perhaps wearing comfortable clothing suitable for such activities might also be.

On the other hand, it is possible that any activity that cannot be performed comfortably in shabbos clothes (other than resting or sleeping obviously) might be a weekday activity by definition!

In addition to clothes being a way of highlighting the honor of shabbos and the divine services, they are also a way of highlighting one’s honor for davening(prayer) , and the honor of the Torah , as represented by Talmidei Chachamim (Torah scholars.)

As such, Talmidei Chachamim traditionally wore special clothing, and were expected to be particularly careful not to have any dirt or stains on their clothes.

The later not only fails to show honor to the Torah they represent, but causes a terrible Chillul Hashem, and as a result, the Gemara uses the very harsh expression חייב מיתה (deserving of death) for one who does so.

This is based on the verse משניאי אהבו מוות (those who make people hate me, love death-Misheli 8/36)
As Rashi explains, when a Talmid Chacham appears dirty, it causes people to hate the Torah that he represents, and ultimately Hashem himself!

These words might seem harsh, but they certainly convey the sensitivity that a Torah society should show to cleanliness, and that a person who is looked up to by others, should highlight in himself.
This presumably applies not only to a stain, but also wearing torn or smelly clothing, or giving off bad body odor or breathe.

Although it is logical that all of us should show sensitivity to this essential value, it is clear from our sugya that the more of a Talmid Chacham one is, the more careful one needs to be.
At this point, this begs the question- how do we define a Talmid Chacham, at least as far as this rule is concerned?

Does this apply only to one of the Gedolei haDor (leading Torah sages), to anyone with a good general knowledge of all areas of Torah, or perhaps to someone with a high level of knowledge in one area of Torah, someone who serves as a community Rabbi or Torah teacher, or anyone who studies Torah daily or who is more knowledgeable than average?

On our daf, Rabbi Yochanan presents 3 definitions of a Talmid Chacham:

  1. A Talmid Chacham on the level that one would return lost property to him without him being requirement to produce simanim (identification signs), as long as he says that he recognizes it- Rabbi Yochanan identifies this as someone who is careful to turn over his shirt if he put it on the wrong way.
  2. A Talmid Chacham who is worthy of being appointed as a פרנס (leader) of the community- this is defined as someone who can be asked a halacha in any area of the Torah and is able to answer, even in less commonly studied areas like the “minor tractate” of Kallah.
  3. A Talmid Chacham whose labor the community is required to perform on his behalf (possibly meaning to support)- Anyone who puts asides his own concerns and focusses on the concerns of heaven.

It seems from the above definitions that the term “Talmid Chacham” is not only used to describe a person’s actual knowledge, but also his trustworthiness, reputation, and self-sacrifice for divine matters (see our earlier post on ירידת הדורות for an interesting parallel.)

When it comes to appointing someone as Rabbinic leader, the person is expected not only to have the correct character traits (which should go without saying, after all דרך ארך קדמה לתורה), but also have total knowledge of the entire corpus of Jewish law, to the point that he can answer any questions that come his way.

As the Gemara later says, in order to be a local community Rabbi, such knowledge in one מסכתא (tractate) is actually sufficient (presumably he will then have the skills to look up or refer questions in area outside his expertise) , and to be the Rosh Yeshiva (presumably of the entire country or nation), such knowledge of the entire Torah is required, as per Rabbi Yochanan’s definition.

However, there are other traits that make the title of Talmid Chacham appropriate for someone:

When it comes to trusting his honesty as a Talmid Chacham is supposed to be trusted, the fact that he has the reputation of an honest and generally well-learned figure is sufficient. (the later requirement being my own assumption, as it is unlikely than any honest person would be referred to as a Talmid Chacham without any minimum level of Torah wisdom/knowledge)

When it comes to giving him the support needed to carry on his holy work, his level of learning and reputation is less of a factor, and his motivation and self-sacrifice is what counts the most.
Seeing as the laws we have discussed regarding being clean and presentable are based on preventing Chillul Hashem and thus dependent very much on the person’s reputation, it seems logical that the appropriate definition for the purposes of this law would be anyone with the reputation of being a Torah personality, such that one would trust his honesty in monetary matters.

As such, it is possible that in today’s time, anyone who is a Ben Torah- someone whose life-center is the study and application of Torah regardless of what trade or profession he follows, might well be in the spotlight of the majority who unfortunately do not yet fit into this category.

In a world where the majority of Jews are not yet observant unfortunately, this argument could possibly be applied to ALL “frum” (religiously observant) people.

As such, anyone in this category needs to be particularly concerned about how he presents him/her self, and of course even more so, about how he/she behaves!

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 95 Wearing make-up on Shabbos

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On the previous daf, our Mishna taught us a list of various things that Rabbi Eliezer considers to be biblically forbidden on Shabbos, and subject to the appropriate punishment, and which the Chachamim only consider to be rabbinically forbidden (שבות)

One of these things is כוחלת, painting her eye-lashes blue.

The Gemara suggests that the reason Rabbi Eliezer considers this a biblically punishable offense is because it is a form of כותב (writing.)

Rashi explains that this is because she uses the paint-stick to circle her eye like one who writes a letter with a pen.

The Gemara rejects this explanation because that is not a normal way to write and concludes at the beginning of our daf that it is because of צובע, the melacha of dyeing/painting.

It then brings a Beraita that says similarly that it is forbidden for a woman to put סרק (red coloring) on her face, because of צובע.

As the halacha usually follows the majority of Chachamim, it seems that we should rule like Chachamim that this is only a rabbinical transgression or שבות.

However, the Rambam (Shabbos 23/12) seems to rule like Rabbi Eliezer, but also like the Gemara’s first suggestion, that it is forbidden as it is like writing!

Whereas one might possibly interpret the Rambam’s wording to mean that it is considered rabbinically like writing ( a look in the Achronim shows that both interpretations are well represented) , it is still bizarre that he rules like a rejected suggestion in the Gemara.

This becomes even stranger when we see that in the previous chapter, (Shabbos 23,22), he ruled that using סרק is forbidden because it is like painting!

The Masores haShas, uncharacteristically comments on the Rambam he points to, and refers us to various Rishonim relevant to this.
Also, Rabbeinu Chananel, one of the earliest of the Rishonim (early commentators) ,actually rules explicitly like Rabbi Eliezer- his reasoning is that seeing as the Rabbis of the Gemara spend time debating his reasoning, it seems like they rule like him, and even though some say that the Halacho follows Chachamim, it makes more sense to rule like Rabbi Eliezer seeing as it is a possible אסור דאורייתא (biblical prohibition.)

Despite the above, both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 303) rule that it is forbidden because of צובע, as per the conclusion of the Gemara, and the consensus of the Achronim (see Beit Yoseif, Mishna Beruru, Aruch haShulchan etc) is that it is only rabbinically prohibited, in accordance with the view of the Chachamim.

It seems clear from the above, that using make-up or lipstick on Shabbos is a rabbinical prohibition, and as such, may clearly not be done, and this is the general consensus amongst poskim.

However, it might be that given certain social or family dynamics, a woman living in a less observant community feels that putting on make-up or lipstick is a great need, and that not doing so causes her great suffering, and perhaps even to be mocked by her less religious friends and relatives.

Even in fully observant communities, many women simply feel very uncomfortable being seen without make-up, and without a solid halachik way, might chas vesholom come to the rely on less permissible ways of putting it on .

It would seem reasonable to suggest that she should then be permitted to put it on with a שנוי ( in an unusual way), at least according to the views (see previous post) that a שבות דשבות is permitted even by a Jew for the sake of a Mitzva.

As this would be rabbinic for two separate reasons:

  • Coloring the skin is not considered real צובע, but just a שבות
  • Any melacha with a shinui is only derabonen (rabbinically forbidden)

This would be even less problematic if she uses short-term make-up that doesn’t last long, as it could also be considered דבר שאין מתקים (a melacha whose affect doesn’t last), and might never even have been included in the גזירה to start out with.

It would go we thought saying that it would have to be a texture that doesn’t involve the prohibition of ממרח (smearing ), which semi solid creams and lipsticks usually do ( here too though , if it isn’t thick enough to be ממרח דאורייתא, the שבות דשבות rule with a שנוי might also help!)

While I find my reasoning appealing, I have not found any major poseik who has made this suggestion, and in any case, these posts are not meant as halachik rulings, so anyone with a learning background who finds my suggestion convincing, should discuss it with an expert poseik.

In practise, with the development of various types of shabbos friendly makeup, and the increased sensitivity to halacha in many communities, this is probably less of an issue than it once was .

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.