The Opening Mishna of our new perek lists the various מלאכות that form part of the process of the קרבן פסח that override Shabbos.
These include slaughtering it, sprinkling its blood, מחוי קרביו (cleaning the insides), and burning its fat, but not roasting it or rinsing the insides-Rashi explains that the later two can done after dark on Pesach night itself and thus do not override the shabbos laws.
Furthermore, the Tana Kama rules that הרכבתו (carry it on one’s shoulders), bringing it from outside the techum, or cutting a יבולת (wart) off it may not be done on shabbos.
Rabbi Eliezer, however, attempts to learn by way of קל וחומר that if מלאכה דאורייתא is pushed aside by the קרבן פסח , surely a שבות should be.
Rashi explains the view of the Tanna Kama, later expressed by Rabbi Akiva, that although these are all only שבותים (rabbinical prohibitions- see inside for why,) they could have been done before shabbos and are thus not permitted, an explanation Rabbi Akiva himself gives after some back and forth which itself requires further analysis.
It should be noted that although we have indeed seen places where a שבות is treated more stringently than a מצוה דאורייתא in order that people should not make light of it (see my post of Eruvin 2 for sources and some discussion), neither Rabbi Eliezer nor Rabbi Akiva appear to apply this argument to our discussion.
This seems consistent with what appears to be the default principle that biblical prohibitions are to be treated more seriously than rabbinical ones, in the absence of Chazal ruling to the contrary, something which itself is subject to much discussion and analysis.
The Gemara on daf 66 opens by relating how the בני בתירה had forgotten the rule that the קרבן פסח pushes aside the laws of shabbos, as per the above Mishna.
Hillel then proceeded to prove it to them by way of גזירה שוה based on the word “במועדו” which is used both by the תמיד and the פסח- just like the תמיד pushes aside the laws of shabbos, so does קרבן פסח.
He then adds that this can also be derived by means of a קל וחומר- if a regular תמיד which does not cause one who fails to bring it to be liable to כרת overrides shabbos, surely the קרבן פסח whose neglect brings about כרת should do so.
The Gemara asks how we know that the תמיד itself may be offered on shabbos, and concludes that we learn this from the passuk “עולת שבת בשבתו על עולת התמיד ונסכה”( “ The burnt-offering of Shabbos on its Shabbos, in addition to the regular burnt-offering” – Bamidbar 28/10), which clearly implies that the regular burnt-offering (תמיד) is offered even on Shabbos.
The Gemara then ask how Hillel could base himself on the קל וחומר when the logical argument is flawed- the תמיד is תדיר (regular) and is also a burnt offering, the holiest type of sacrifice which is completely burnt whereas the קרבן פסח is only once a year and is eaten by the owners!
Although the קרבן פסח is taken more seriously regarding punishment, the תמיד is taken more seriously in other ways and the former can thus not be said to be objectively more important than the later.
It answers that the קל וחומר was actually argued first, and when the בני בתירה countered its logic as per the above argument, he then presented the גזירה שוה.
Unlike a קל וחומר argument, which any sage could make based on his own logic but could also be countered by another sage’s logic, a גזירה שוה is based not on logic (at least alone) but on מסורת (tradition.)
A sage may not simply derive anything he wishes from a גזירה שוה, but may only apply a גזירה שוה which he has received from his teacher as part of the oral tradition (see Rashi ד”ה “וכי מאחר” for his precise explanation of this rule, which we shall hopefully be able to revisit in a later post.)
This limitation also gives it an advantage, in that a countering logical argument cannot push It aside.
The Gemara explains that despite this advantage, Hillel initially preferred to use the קל וחומר argument , seeing as his contemporaries could retort that they not received this גזירה שוה by way of tradition like he had- only once the קל וחומר failed, did he resort to the גזירה שוה.
Although the Mishna clearly holds like Hillel, it remains unclear if and how he was able to convince the בני בתירה of this, given that they had countered the logic in the קל וחומר and also did not have the גזירה שוה as part of their tradition.
Are we to learn from this event that even if a certain sage has not received a גזירה שוה from his Rabbi, once another sage has revealed a גזירה שוה to them from his מסורות, they are also to accept it?
If so, why was Hillel initially reluctant to use this גזירה שוה?
On the other hand, if those sages are not required to accept a גזירה שוה revealed by a colleague, of what help was the גזירה שוה in advancing Hillel’s argument at the end?
The Gemara on daf 66b returns to discussing the relative weight of a שבות as compared to aמלאכה דאורייתא and asks whether a melacha may be performed כלאחר יד (in a back-handed or unusual manner) for the sake of a mitzva.
The specific case discussed is what happens if one forgot to bring the knife needed for the שחיטה before Shabbos, seeing as this is not one of the things one is permitted to do on shabbos for the sake of the קרבן.
On the previous amud, we learnt that Hillel and his teachers, Shmaya and Avtalyon, had permitted sticking the knife required for the שחיטה in the wool or hair of the animal so that it is carried by the animal and not by a person.
The Gemara queries this for various reasons, among them the fact that it is biblically forbidden to perform an action which causes one’s animal to carry something for him on shabbos (מחמר).
It answers that this is מחמר כלאחר יד , an unusual way of getting an animal to carry something,and Rashi explains that this is because a lamb is not usually used for carrying things (like a donkey or camel are.)
The Gemara counters that מחמר כלאחר יד is still forbidden on a rabbinical level, and answers that this is precisely the question that had been asked of Hillel.
As its wording seems rather cryptic, I choose to quote the original Aramaic:
דבר שיש לו התיר מין התורה ודבר שבות עומד לפניו לעקרו כלאחר יד במקום מצוה מאי?
Something which is permitted on a biblical level and a rabbinical prohibition stands in its way- may one up-route it in a back-handed manner for the sake of a mitzva?
Although the precise wording seems to be referring to performing a שבות in a backhanded manner, closer to what we often referred to in halacha as a שבות דשבות לדבר מצוה, the comparison drawn to our case seems to be referring to performing a מלאכה דאורייתא with a שנוי for the sake of a mitzva, which would be a far more drastic leniency.
The answer he gave, as quoted on the previous amud was in the affirmative – הנח להם לישראל אם לא נביאים הם בני נביאים הם!
May one derive from here that any שבות may be performed for the sake of the mitzva?
It seems clear from the Mishna (according to Rabbi Akiva) that it certainly may not, even for the sake of a קרבן פסח, at least if it could have been done before Yom-Tov.
As such, this leniency needs to be applied less broadly, perhaps specifically to the שבות of כלאחר יד .
Rashi (ד”ה שיש לו התיר) , explicitly notes this distinction and explains that doing something כלאחר יד is less severe than other שבותים, seeing as it is (relatively) uncommon (Chazal usually only make their decrees in cases that are common!)
In contrast, the Tosfos do not appear to make this distinction, and query how this could be permitted, seeing that it is clear from the Mishna that even a שבות may not be done for the sake of the mitzva of korban pesach if it could have been performed before Yom-Tov.
Whereas Rashi’s distinction would render their query rather mute, the Tosfos suggest a different distinction, namely between a שבות performed by a Jew and one performed by his animal- only the later is permitted for the sake of a mitzva-a distinction that appears to fit less into the actual wording of the question asked to Hillel, where no mention of an animal is made.
There could be a major נפקא מינה (practical ramification) between these two distinctions:
According to Rashi, it seems to follow that ANY melacha may be performed כלאחר יד/ with a שנוי for the sake of a mitzva but no other שבות is permitted (except perhaps in the case of a שבות דשבות.)
In contrast , according to Tosfos, it seems like ANY שבות might be performed by one’s animal for the sake of a mitzva, but not even כלאחר יד is permitted by a Jew himself even for such a purpose.
Although this seems the most precise conclusion, given that the Gemara mentions “for the sake of a mitzva” in general and does not limit its version of the question asked to Hillel to the case at hand, it is also possible that both Rashi and Tosfos would limit their respective interpretations of this leniency to a mitzva of the stature of קרבן פסח, however that is defined, which sometimes pushes aside even severe biblical restrictions such the laws of shabbos, and not any other mitzva!
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.