Category Archives: shabbos

Shabbos 124-125 The reason for the laws of “Muktza”, and other “Muktza” related ideas.

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A lot of time is spent in this chapter, among other places, discussing the different categories of “Muktza” and their complex laws.
These involve mainly restrictions on moving items that are not set aside for use on shabbos, for various reasons.
Yet what exactly are the reasons for this myriad of rabbinical restrictions?

On our daf, there is a dispute between Rabbah and Rava as to which categories of items may be moved on shabbos, for different reasons.
Without going into the entire debate, Rava expresses the view that according to Chachamim, a דבר שמלאכתו להתיר (something whose main purpose is permitted on shabbos), may be moved for any reason whatsoever on shabbos, and a דבר שמלאכתו לאסור may be moved לצורך גופו ( if it is needed for a permitted purpose,) לצורך מקומו (if one needs the place that it occupies), but not מחמה לצל (for its own protection.)

Abaya challenges Rava with a Mishna (Beitza 32b) that forbids one to support a pot with a piece of fire- wood.
Firewood is a דבר שמלאכתו להתיר on Yom-Tov, yet we see that it may not be handled even for another permitted use, let alone for the sake of its place or protection!
גזרינן יום-טוב אטו שבת

After a failed first attempt at resolution, The Gemara says that firewood is different because it is a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור on shabbos.
Chazal thus forbade using it for another purpose on Yom Tov in case one comes to use it for a permitted purpose on Shabbos as well. (this in itself seems strange given that it looks like a גזירה לגזירה, but as usual, we have to leave that for another post someday.)

Even though using a דבר שמלאכתו לאסור for a permitted purpose is allowed on Shabbos as well, according to Rava, the Gemara explains that this is only the case if it has תורת כלי (the status of a useful vessel, which a plain piece of wood does not have.)
Something usually used for a forbidden melacha that does not have the status of a כלי may not be used on shabbos even for a permitted purpose.

This in itself is a big chiddush (novel idea) given that the phrases used until now have not been כלי שמלאכתו להתיר and כלי שמלאכתו לאסור but simply דבר שמלאכתו להתיר and דבר שמלאכתו לאסור.
Be that as it is, we see from here that there are times that Chazal forbade things that would ordinarily be permitted on Yom Tov, so one doesn’t come to do them on shabbos. (a phenomenon that needs clear boundaries, given that there are certainly things permitted on Yom Tov that are forbidden on shabbos.)

The Gemara questions the idea that Chazal forbade doing things on Yom Tov because of Shabbos: There is an explicit Mishna that allows one to lower fruits that have been drying out on the roof through a skylight on Yom Tov in case of rain , but not on Shabbos. (the exact issue with this requires further analysis, but it appears from Rashi to have something to do with the exertion involved in it.)

The Gemara immediately brings a counter proof that Chazal do indeed forbid things on Yom Tov because of shabbos, from another Mishna (Megillah 7b) which states that the only difference between Shabbos and Yom Tov is that on Yom Tov, melacha needed for the preparation of food is permitted. This implies that other things not needed for food on Yom-Tov, are forbidden, even if done with something that is a כלי שמלאכתו להתיר on Yom-Tov but not on shabbos.

The Gemara makes several attempts to reconcile the various texts that imply that Chazal made decrees forbidden otherwise permitted things on Yom-Tov out of concern for Shabbos.
מתוך
After an initial failed attempt, the Gemara answers that these different Mishnayot reflect the famous argument between Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai regarding the rule of מתוך.

Beis Shamai holds that even a melacha which is permitted because it is usually performed for the sake of food preparation may only be done for the sake of food, but not for other needs.

Beit Hillel holds that מתוך שהותרה לצורך הותרה נמי שלא לצורך – this means essentially that once a category of melacha is permitted because it is normally associated with food preparation, it becomes permitted for any legitimate Yom Tov need.

For example, lighting a fire is not permitted only for cooking, but also for warming the room or heating water for permitted washing (though rabbinically it may only be lit from an existing flame.)

It follows that Beis Shamai could forbid any handling of items on Yom Tov that are not for the usual purpose of the permitted melacha, namely food preparing, particularly (and perhaps only) whereas Beis Hillel would permit it.

The Mishna that forbids using firewood for another permitted purpose other than cooking thus represents the view Beis Hillel, as does the Mishna which says that the only difference between Shabbos and Yom-Tov is melachos needed for and associated with food preparation.
The Mishna that permits lowering fruit on Yom-Tov but not on Shabbos reflects the view of Beis Hillel.
The Gemara then points out that we have indeed seen that Beis Shamai is stringent about not performing a permitted biblical melacha on Yom Tov for a purpose other than food.

Yet we have not found that they are similarly stringent about the rabbinical prohibition of טלטול (merely moving/handling items in a permitted domain) to the point that he forbids moving them for a purpose other than food.
אסור מוקצה היא גזירה אטו אסור הוצאה

The Gemara concludes that seeing as טלטול itself is משום הוצאה (because of the melacha of taking something out,) Beis Shamai forbade even handling items that one is permitted to use for food, for non-food purposes.
The simple explanation of this seems to be that the entire reason for the rabbinic prohibition of handling Muktza is in order to prevent one from transferring an item he is carrying from one domain to another- in other words , a סייג (fence) or גזירה (decree) אטו הוצאה (because of the melacha of הוצאה.)
As such, anything that one is forbidden to transfer on Yom Tov or shabbos may also not be handled, except for purposes Chazal made allowances for.
As transferring firewood for anything other than food-related needs is forbidden on Yom-Tov according to Beis Shamai, it follows that handling anything other than for its normal permitted purpose is as well.
As Beis Hillel permits transferring any item for any Yom-Tov need on Yom-Tov, they also permit handling it for any purpose.
On Shabbos, when everyone agrees that transferring any item from one domain to another is forbidden, everyone also agrees that handling it is too, unless it is for a permitted purpose.
After quite a long introduction during which we learnt some other important principles, such as the requirement for a דבר שמלאכתו לאסור to be a כלי in order for it to be moved לצורך גופו ולצורך מקומו, and the rule of מתוך on Yom-Tov, we seem to finally have discovered the reason for the decree of Muktza!
This is indeed the way the Ritva understands the Gemara, and though slightly more open to interpretation, Rashi seems to take this approach as well.
שיטת הרמב”ם- The Rambam’s approach
The Rambam, however (Shabbos 24/12-13) suggests several reasons for the prohibition of moving Muktza:

  1. So that one does not handle items the way one does during the week, and land up spending shabbos moving items around.
  2. In the case of a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור, to prevent one from using it for a forbidden melacha.
  3. So that people who are unemployed and hardly do melacha during the week will also have a way of making shabbos special
    Yet the one reason the Gemara brings explicitly, the Rambam seems not to mention!
    The Raavad points this out, and in his usual way, disagrees with the Rambam and accepts the reason given in the simple meaning of our Sugya- that it is simply a decree designed to prevent the melacha of הוצאה.
    Why does the Rambam bring 3 relatively creative reasons of his own and seemingly ignore our Gemara? Did he interpret it differently to us, or does he simply have a contradictory sugya elsewhere that he considers to be more authoritative? Any feedback is welcome.

What is Melacha?

We have learnt before that although the Torah forbids performing any melacha on Shabbos, Chazal derived from the proximity of the prohibition to the work of the Mishkan that only those actions that were done in the process of the mishkan(avot melacha) and things similar to them (toladot) are including in the prohibition.
Does this mean that there are some types of melacha which remain permitted on Shabbos, or that any action that doesn’t fit into the above criteria simply isn’t considered a melacha at all?
There is much to discuss, but it does seem from the Mishna on Daf 124b, that there actions which are called “melacha” but still permitted on shabbos.
The Mishna tells us that one may handle pieces of broken vessels on Shabbos, so long as it is done מעין מלאכה , for the sake of some “melacha.”- in this case, it still has a valid purpose on shabbos, and is not considered “Muktza.”
Rabbi is stricter, and requires that it can still be used for something similar to the “melacha” it was fit for before it broke, such as using a broken pot-cover to cover something smaller- otherwise it is forbidden, (possibly as form of “Muktza” known as “nolad”- see the rest of the daf and daf 125 for the full discussion)
Either way, we see that certain actions performed on shabbos, such as using a lid to cover a pot, are indeed referred to as “melacha” even though they do not fit into the categories of forbidden “melacha”, and are clearly permitted on shabbos!
Whether this is “simply” semantics, or has greater ramifications, invites further analysis.

Shabbos 122 and 123       When and how Muktza items may be moved

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It is known that one of the most far-reaching rabbinical decrees pertaining to Shabbos is the prohibition of picking up/carrying article which are defined as מוקצה (set apart from use on shabbos.)
Items which are appropriate and have been set aside, either specifically, or by default, for use on shabbos may be handled within a רשות היחיד (private domain.)
However, anything defined as מוקצה on shabbos may not even be handled within such an area.
There are various opinions offered as to the reason for this prohibition, but that will be left for a possible future post.
On our daf, we see a number of categories of Muktza, and a number of different reasons for moving Muktza, some of which might be permitted for some of these categories but not for others.
The three main categories that we see on this daf are as follows:
דבר שמלאכתו להתיר – A vessel normally used for an action which is permitted on Shabbos.  Although this is not really a category of Muktza per se, our daf does make reference to the stringent view of Rabbi Nechemya that even such a vessel may only be handled when needed for its permitted purpose, not when there is no such reason for doing so.
כלי שמלאכתו לאסור  – a vessel normally used for a melacha which is prohibited on Shabbos
דבר שמקפיד עליו  -something of
value one looks after extra carefully.
 (this is also referred to  as מוקצה מחמת חסרון כיס- see Shabbos 157a)

There are also a number of reasons that one might move a muktza item, each with their own set rules:
שלא לצורך כלל  – for no particular constructive reason
מחמה לצל – in order to protect it  (literally moving it from the sun into the shade)
לצורך גופו  – when one wishes to use the item itself for a permitted purpose.
לצורך מקומו – for the sake of its place- when one needs the space it is occupying for a permitted purpose  (provided that space is not defined as a בסיס לדבר האסור [base for a forbidden item], a different topic.)
The Mishna on 122b lists a number of items that may be used for various purposes on Shabbos, despite the laws of Muktza.
 
One of them is a hammer, which may be used for cracking nuts.
There is a dispute in the Gemara between Rav Yehuda and Rabbah regarding what type of hammer is referred to in the Mishna.
Rav Yehuda claims that it is referring to a hammer usually used for cracking nuts, which is a כלי שמלאכתו להתיר and thus may be used, at least for its intended permitted purpose.
Rabbah points out that our same Mishna permits using a winnowing shovel or pitchfork to pass food to a child on, and these instruments are only made and bought for performing forbidden melachot with them.
As such, Rabbah concludes that the hammer referred to in the Mishna could even be a smith’s hammer, which is clearly a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור.
We conclude from there that it is permitted to use a כלי שמלאכתו לאסור for a permitted purpose!
The Gemara a little later brings a Beraita to question this leniency.
Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai argue whether it is permitted to use an עלי (evidently a type of important vessel) to cut meat for the sake of Simchas Yom Tov.
Yet both agree that once the meat has been cut, it may no longer be used for another permitted purpose.
This seems to imply that in the absence of the special leniency of simchas Yom Tov, using something normally used for a forbidden purpose is forbidden even when one uses it for a permitted purpose, against Rabbah’s conclusion.
The Gemara answers that this instrument is different, as it is more like סיכי זיירי ומזורי (which Rashi identifies as specialist tools used by painters, or alternatively specialty weaving tools), which a person takes pains to look after and sets aside a special place to store. (see also Tosfos who quotes the Aruch’s translation(one of the most important  linguists amongst the Rishonim).
It follows that special instruments of value that a person is particular to look after and store in one place are treated as a more serious form of מוקצה and may not be used even for a permitted purpose.
The Gemara further records a debate between Rabbi Chiya bar Abaya quoting Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Shemen bar Ada regarding what type of hammer the Mishna permits one to use.
Whereas both agree that a hammer used for beating gold may be used for permitted purposes, even though it is a דבר שמלאכתו לאסור, Rabbi Yochanan is of the view that a hammer used for pounding spices (the forbidden melacha of grinding) may not be used even for  a permitted purpose, seeing as a person is particular about it.
Yet the primary source for the prohibition of using מידי דקפיד עליו (something one is particular about), can be found in the second Mishna on amud bet.
There, Rabbi Yossi tells us that any vessel may be used for a permitted purpose on shabbos, with the exception of a large saw and the peg (blade) of a plough, presumably because they are  particularly valuable or fragile items that the owner is particular to look after.
The Gemara seems to understand that Rabbi Yossi is not referring to these 2 items only, but uses them as examples of anything that fits into the category of things used for a specialised purpose that the owner takes great care with.
We thus have 3 primary sources for the stringency applied to items that one is particular with:
1.      The Beraisa where Beit Hillel agrees that an עלי many only be used until the meat has been cut, and the Gemara’s understanding that this is similar to the special painter’s tools (as explained by Rashi.)
2.      The view of Rabbi Yochanan, disputed by Rav Shemen bar Ada, that a hammer used for spices may not be used on shabbos at all.
3.      The Mishna (as interpreted by the Gemara) which permits using any vessels on shabbos except those that one is particular about.
 
At first glance, these 3 sources all seem to be saying the same thing, to the point that we need to understand
1.      Why the Gemara brought the Beraisa to query the lenient ruling of Rabbah rather than an explicit Mishna
2.      How Rav Shemen bar Ada could disagree with an explicit Beraisa AND Mishna.
 
Yet, when one looks more carefully, it appears that there are different categories of things one is particular about, and Rashi actually seems to define them differently.
There are things which one is so particular about that one usually  does not allow them to be used for anything but their intended professional purpose.- this seems to be the category discussed in the Mishna, which everyone agrees may not be used at all on Shabbos.
There are things which one might allow to be used for another purpose, but which one is careful enough to keep in a special place while not being used- This is the case discussed in the Beraisa.
Then, there are things which one might not be particular enough about to dedicate a special place for, but which one does not use for other purposesד in case they get dirty or disgusting, such as the hammer used for pounding spices (see Rashi who makes this point  and the Ritva who has a different version of the Gemara and holds that one is more particular about a gold hammer than a spice hammer.)
Perhaps, this is what Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Shemen argue about- the both agree accept the basic stringency of דבר שמקפיד עליו , but differ as to the extent of its application.
This is just an initial analysis, and a study of the Rishonim will reveal that it is not so straight forward and there are many ways to approach this, but that’s it for today….
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 121 מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא ,dangers to safety, and the foolish Chasid

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One of the most far-reaching disputes amongst the Tannaim (sages of the Mishnaic period) regarding the laws of Shabbos is regarding מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא ,literally a melacha done for a purpose other than the improvement of the object of the melacha, but usually understood by extension to refer to melacha done for a purpose other than the purpose it was done for in the work of the mishkan.
Unlike דבר שאין מתכוין, where there is no intention to perform the forbidden act at all, here the action is performed completely intentionally, but for a different purpose.
A classic example is where someone takes a dead body out of one’s domain on shabbos (Shabbos 93a)
This constitutes the forbidden melacha of הוצאה (“carrying” or transferring an item from one domain to another.)
However, in this case, the corpse in not removed because one wants it to be somewhere else, it is removed because one does NOT want it to be where it currently is.
In such a case, Rabbi Yehuda holds that he is biblically liable still, but Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt on a biblical level and has only transgressed a rabbinical prohibition.
Another classic example is someone who digs a hole in the ground (Shabbos 73b). This constitutes the melacha of חופר (ploughing), which is usually defined as making the ground more suitable for planting.
What happens, however, if a person digs a hole, not because he wants the resulting hole, but because he wants to make use of the dust or sand which he digs up?
According to Rabbi Yehuda, the purpose of the melacha makes no difference, so long as it is constructive, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon, although such an action is rabbinically forbidden, there is no biblical prohibition and one is thus exempt from the harsh biblical punishment associated with it. (note that when the hold is made inside one’s home, the Gemara opines that even Rabbi Yehuda exempts the person seeing as it is מקלקל. This seems to imply that if an action itself is destructive, even if it has a constructive purpose, one is still biblically exempt, which is rather problematic in light of the fact that some מלאכות such as making a wound, knocking down a building, or tearing are by definition destructive, but still biblically forbidden seeing as there main purpose is constructive. But this is for a different discussion (see Shabbos 31b regarding סותר על מנת לבנות במקום אחר for a possible approach)
It is generally understood (see Chagiga 10b where this is explicit) that this is another example of the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת, significant and calculated work – in this case the different purpose of the action reduces the significance or importance of the action , seeing as had it been done in the mishkan for such a purpose, it would not have been a significant part of the work performed there.

Another classic example of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is most cases of extinguishing a flame or a fire.
We should all be familiar with the famous Mishna said every shabbos evening )Shabbos 29b,) which records the view of Rabbi Yossi that one is only liable for extinguishing a flame if he does it for the wick itself, in order to make it easier to burn .
In contrast, extinguishing a fire simply because one wants it to be dark, or because one does not want to waste the oil or blacken the lamp, is only a rabbinical prohibition.
It is important to note that the תנא קמא (first opinion) in the same Mishna holds that one is biblically liable for such an action and is only exempt if it was done to prevent actual danger.
This aligns the view of the Tana Kama with that of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yossi with Rabbi Shimon.
As it is a well known rule of psak, stated by the authoritative Amora Rabbi Yochanan, that the Halacha usually follows a סתם משנה (anonymous Mishna where no dissenting opinion is recorded,) finding such a Mishna which takes a stand on this subject could be a major factor in how we rule.
On this daf, we have at least 3 different examples of what appears to be מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא.
In the first Mishna on the daf, which is indeed a סתם משנה , we are told that it is forbidden to actively ask a non-Jew to extinguish a fire, but one does not have to stop him from doing so.
As the reason for the extinguishing the fire is clearly to save one’s property, and not for the wick, this seems to be a clear case of מלאכה שאינה צריכא לגופא.
If the author of our Mishna held that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is only a rabbinical prohibition, it seems rather harsh that he would forbidden asking a non- Jew to do this, giving the principle of שבות דשבות that we have discussed many times, which allows one to ask a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically forbidden melacha for the sake of a mitzva, great need, or distress.
There are very few greater needs than preventing one’s house from burning down chalila, and it would certainly be a severe form of distress if it did so.
One is forced to conclude that either the author of this Mishna holds that מלאכה שאינה צריכא לגופא is a biblical prohibition, or that he rejects the entire principle of שבות דשבות as stated.
Indeed, the Rambam, (Shabbos 1/7) rules like Rabbi Yehuda that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is a biblical transgression, and this Mishna might be one of his main sources for this.
In contrast, Rabbeinu Chananel, Raavad, Tosfos and many other authorities hold that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is only a rabbinical prohibition.
Accordingly, Tosfos on our daf states clearly that there is indeed no blanket permission for a שבות דשבות even for the sake of a mitzva or great need,(presumably he holds that the example we learn this leniency from in the gemara, namely bris milah, is an exception due to the fundamental uniqueness of this mitzva.)
Yet it is the view of many other authorities, as well as that of the Shulchan Aruch and Rema, that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is indeed only rabbinical, and that the leniency of שבות דשבות applies across the board, at least when the rabbinical action is performed by a non-Jew.
As such, in order to explain this Mishna, we would need to either

  1. find another equally authoritative Mishna that holds that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is only rabbinical
  2. Conclude that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is only rabbinical, it is more severe than most rabbinical prohibitions and the leniency of שבות דשבות does not apply to it.
  3. Conclude that the author of our Mishna does not consider extinguishing a fire to save property to be מלאכה שאינה צריכא לגופא, in contrast to the explicit view of Rabbi Yossi who does.
  4. Explain why Chazal where particularly strict in the case of our Mishna

In the next Mishna on the daf, we are told among other things that it is permitted to trap a scorpion on shabbos to prevent it from biting by covering it with a vessel.
However, the Mishna then states that such a case was brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and he expressed his concern that shabbos might have been desecrated unknowingly.
As it is obvious that if this was a poisonous scorpion that was likely to bite him, no one would argue that covering it was forbidden, it seems clear that we are talking about a non-toxic scorpion, and the basis of the Tana Kama’s leniency is that one does not want the scorpion, but merely to prevent it from damaging.
This makes it מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא, and given that it is only rabbinically prohibited in the first place, the Tana Kama permits it in order to prevent the pain inflict by a bite.
If this analysis is correct, we could be faced with another two Tannaim debating the status of מלאכה שאינה צריכא לגופא.

On the second side of the daf, the Amora (sage of the Talmudic period,) Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi rules that any creature that causes damage may be killed on shabbos. Rav Yosef quotes a Beraisa that mentions 5 specifically dangerous creatures (one of them being the snake of Eretz Yisroel- probably the venomous Palestinian viper that is ironically a protected species despite the danger it poises to residents.)
He derives from this that other creatures that cause damage but are not life-threatening may not be killed on shabbos, which serves to disprove the lenient ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
Rav Yosef reconciles these two statements by saying that everyone agrees that if a life-threatening creature is running towards him, poising an immediate danger, one may kill it.
In such a case, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that it is permitted to kill them due to concerns for pikuach nefesh.
When it comes to other non-life-threatening creatures that nevertheless cause damage (such as biting,) Rabbi Yehuda would forbid it but Rabbi Shimon would permit it, seeing as it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא , which according to him is only rabbinically forbidden, and thus permitted to prevent damage. (see Rashi and Tosfos though for 2 different ways of understanding the Gemara’s answer.)
We have shown how 3 different cases on our daf form essential primary material in the analysis of the law regarding מלאכה שאינה צריכא לגופא, and its scope- the actual halacha is beyond the scope of this post, but familiar to any serious student of hilchos Shabbos.
In addition to its ramifications for this principle, this sugya seems to imply that although the golden rule with matters of pikuach nefesh is that ספק נפשות להקיל, in case of doubt, one always errs on the side of caution, this rule does have certain limits and the perceived danger to life does have to be more than just the realm of the paranoid.
This is further illustrated in the continuation of the sugya.
The Gemara tells how a Tana(in this context, reader of Beraitot, not someone from the tannaic period) taught a Beraita in front of Rabbah bar Rav Huna:
“One who kills snakes and scorpions on shabbos, the spirit of the Chasidim (pious ones) is not at peace with (does not approve.)”
Rabbah bar Rav Huna retorted that if this is the case, the spirit of the sages is not at peace with those Chasidim! (seeing as they were being stringent in the laws of shabbos at the expense of concern for safety!)
This reminds of the case of the חסיד שוטה, the foolish pious person, who sees a woman drowning and refuses to save her because it is not modest to look at her (Sotah 21b.)
Yet, for an entirely different reason, Rav Huna disagrees in this case.
The Gemara accounts how he once saw someone killing a wasp on shabbos, presumably for the above reason, and rebuked him, saying “Have you finished killing them all?”
Rav Huna seems to be of the view that given that there is no end to how many insects one can spend one’s shabbos killing, and the efficacy of each act in itself is doubtful, this is outside the normal concern of pikuach nefesh and in the realm of paranoia.
Once again, it is not our mandate here to come to halachik conclusions, but the basic messages of this incident need to be internalized – On the one hand, being concerned about other prohibitions at the expense of danger to life is considered “foolish piety” and not to be tolerated. On the other hand, we need to be able to distinguish between real, albeit small, concerns for life and actions with a reasonable chance of mitigating that risk, and obsessive paranoia with little efficacy.

Shabbos 113 Tying knots on Shabbos and דבר שאין מתקים.

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On our Daf, we are told the generally accepted rule of Rabbi Yehuda that tying any knot which is not permanent is not a biblical transgression on shabbos.
We have seen this idea recently when the Mishna (Shabbos 111b) taught us that one is only liable for tying the type of knot tied by camel-drivers and sailors.
Rashi over there explained that this means that the knot has to last forever (presumably in the absence of human intervention), likes the knots tied to join the broken threads in the curtains of the mishkan.
The Gemara indeed verifies that this refers to the knot which ties a camel’s nose-ring in place permanently, so that the rope that it is driven with can be tied to the ring and untied as needed, as well as the knot tied with a rope to a ship through which ropes can be tied in to order to anchor it.
In contrast, the knots made to tie the anchor-ropes to the knot-rope or the rope to the camel’s nose-ring are not regarded as permanent knots. These are rabbinically forbidden, for reasons given later in the sugya.
On this basis, the Gemara allows tying shoelaces on shabbos under certain circumstances, and forbids them under others, and this sugya needs to be well understood before coming to any conclusions regarding doing this in practice.
Similarly, regarding the melacha of כותב (writing), the Mishna (Shabbos 104b) tells us that one is not liable if one writes with something such a fruit juice or dust that does not last.
Several questions with far-reaching ramifications needs to be addressed, among them:

  • What is the reason for this requirement?
  • Is this requirement for the effects of a melacha to be permanent, or at least long-lasting, limited to the מלאכות where it is mentioned explicitly by Chazal, like writing and tying knots, or is a general rule for all melachot of Shabbos.
  • How long does the effect of the action have to last in order for it to be considered permanent?
    One might argue that having a permanent affect is part of the general rule that an action has to be מלאכת מחשבת, significant and calculated work, and something whose affect is merely temporary is not significant enough to fall into that category.
    On the other hand, one might argue that the way these particular מלאכות were performed in the mishkan were in ways that were permanent, and we derive this rule directly from that, not from the general rule of מלאכת מחשבת. This seems to be the approach that Rashi has taken here regarding regarding tying nots.
    This approach seems logical, given that there are many מלאכות, such as plowing a furrow or baking bread, whose affects are clearly not permanent- for example a furrow is filled in by blowing dust or destroyed by rain or people who walk over it, and a loaf of bread goes rotten and inedible on its own after a few days.
    However, the Magid Mishna (Shabbos 11\15) says explicitly that this is a general rule that applies to ALL מלאכות.
    According to this, one would perhaps need to accept this as a general rule but admit that when a melacha was specifically done in the Mishkan without permanent affects , like in the above two examples, there would be an exception to this rule.
    Alternatively, one would need to limit the definition of “permanent” to the time that these two examples and other like them generally last for- perhaps a week or so (is the lechem hapanim perhaps a precedent for this?)
    In truth, even Rashi who has no need to limit the definition of permanent and clearly has not done so on the Mishna, does seem to understand that the reason why there is still a rabbinical prohibition on tying the rope to the boat or the camel’s ring is because one might leave it there “a week or two.”
    There, Rashi too seems to imply that leaving it there a week or two would be a biblical transgression, and Chazal thus forbade tying it even for a short time in case one comes to do so.
    This apparent contradiction in Rashi requires its own analysis, but we unfortunately do not have time for that now.
    The key to the question of whether the requirement for permanence, whatever it means, applies to all מלאכות, probably lies in an earlier Mishna.
    The Mishna (Shabbos 102) tells us that in order to be liable for a melacha on Shabbos, it has to be דבר המתקים, something that lasts.
    In the somewhat cryptic words words of the Mishna זה הכלל כל העושה מלאכה ומלאכתו מתקיימת בשבת חייב- This is the rule, anyone who does a melacha and his melacha endures on Shabbos, is liable.
    This is the simple meaning of the Mishna, and the way the above-cited Magid Mishna, and possibly the Rambam himself, as we shall discuss later, interprets it.
    In fact, the Yerushalmi, as quoted by the Rashba and the Ritva, also seems to have learnt it that way, as it explains that the construction of the mishkan was considered permanent seeing as it stayed in one place until the divine command to move was given, or that building for a certain period (בנין לשעה) is also considered building.
    However, the wording of the Mishna implies that if the results of the melacha last all of that shabbos, it is considered מלאכת מחשבת, and if they do not, it is not, serving both as the basis for the general exemption of a melacha whose effect is not permanent, and a broad definition of permanent to something that lasts the whole shabbos.
    This means in effect that there is no actual fixed length of time that defines permanent, as it clearly depends when on Shabbos this action is performed- it could be as long as almost 24 hours and as little as less than a minute, an unusual form of measurement to say the least.
    How does this fit in with what we learnt regarding tying knots (and probably also writing) where the examples given were actions that are truly permanent?
    One possibility is that those two melachot are exceptions, due to the specific ways they were performed in the mishkan, but the general rule is far more limited.
    This would also answer the difficulties we raised based on baking, ploughing, and the like, whose affects are not permanent in the classic sense of the world, but certainly last till at least the end of shabbos.
    It would not, however, answer how the Yerushalmi derives this from the building of the Mishkan, which certainly lasted longer than one shabbos, and was not built on shabbos at all!
    Another possibility is that there is indeed no general rule at all, and that this cryptic Mishna has a totally different meaning to what its arguably most simple reading is (certainly the way I first read it.)
    A look at Rashi, shows that he has what’s seems like a rather creative interpretation of both דבר המתקיים and בשבת an approach that is shared by a surprisingly number of other Rishonim with various variations (see for example, Ran , Bertenura on the Mishna, and even the Meiri!)
    He understands מתקיים not to refer to the time that the effect of the melacha lasts, but to the utility of the action- an action that is sometimes good enough to be left as is, and requires nothing to be added, is considered מתקיים.
    He also interprets בשבת not to refer to how long the results of the action need to endure, but rather the day that the action is done.
    This interpretation seems not only creative, but rather problematic. Firstly, the Mishna does not say the words that Rashi uses שכיוצא בו מתקים [בלא הוספה] – (note the brackets indicating a possibly questionable version of his words). Secondly, the word בשבת appears redundant, given that all the melachot we are talking about are referring to things done on shabbos!
    Furthermore, just like the מלאכות of writing and tying were only done in the Mishkan in ways that were long-lasting, it is clear that at least most were done in a way that lasts longer than 24 hours or even a week, so just like the length of the effect of the above melachot needs to be similar to that of the Mishkan, surely all actions need to as well, even if complete permanence of effect is not needed?
    Most of all though, the implication that a melacha needs to produce something which could sometimes be left as is, is rather problematic- since when where the ground herbs in the mishkan left as is? They were used for cooking the dyes. Since when does one leave threshed produce as is without further purifying it or a kneaded loaf unbaked?
    Other Rishonim, take a similar approach to the Mishna, but interpret מתקיים as something which does not need to be undone.
    According to these Rishonim, we are left without an explicit source for a general rule that a melacha which lacks a lasting effect is not biblically prohibited, and it is possible, though not definite, that this leniency is limited to the melachot it has explicitly been applied too.
    I had the gut feeling that the Rambam would learn the Mishna כפשוטו- He does not seem to comment in his פרוש המשניות , or regarding a general rule, but in my online search, I came across the דף על דף anthology who quoted the Minchas Yitchak who claims that the Rambam does precisely this.
    He points to the Rambam )Shabbos 9/13) regarding צובע, where he says that it has to be done with materials that last, but brings the wording of our Mishna in perek 7 with its general rule דבר המתקיים בשבת!
    Why the Rambam chooses to display his interpretation of the Mishna specifically there and not as a general rule, is a question in its own right- however it seems pretty clear that this is how he understands the Mishna, unless he is simply borrowing its wording and applying it to a completely different principle, which while not impossible for the Rambam, would not be our first choice.
    Now that we have seen that the Rambam and some other Rishonim do indeed learn that our Mishna is teaching us a general exemption for a melacha that lacks a lasting effect, and limited the definition of temporary to that shabbos, we need to explain why we treat the melachos of writing and tying a knot differently and require those to have a really permanent effect.
    We also need to reassess whether Rashi and those who interpret the Mishna like him agree with this principle, but simply don’t believe that it is sourced in our Mishna, whether they reject it out of hand, or whether they have a longer view of permanence required for all melachot, similar to what we see by writing and tying a knot, and therefore interpret this Mishna as referring to something completely different.
    The results of the further research required to have massive ramifications for the scope and applicability of this commonly assumed but perhaps narrower than assumed leniency!

Shabbos 110-111 Healing, castration, דבר שאין מתכוין , and קרוב לפסיק רישיה

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Our dapim continue to focus a lot on the prohibition of רפואה (healing) on shabbos.

Whereas any concern about danger to life over-rides all laws of Shabbos, the same does not apply to other ailments.

A biblical transgression may not be performed for an ill person who is not in danger, though much of the time, a rabbinical one may be.

However, when it comes to a מיחוש בעלמא (a pain or discomfort that is not severe enough to confine one to bed or affect the entire body,) , Chazal actually forbade even permitted activities, as a גזירה (decree,), intended to prevent one from coming to transgress the melacha of טוחן ( grinding.)

As most cures were (and often still are) derived from plants which were ground up and used for therapeutic purposes, there was a real concern to Chazal that taking medicine, or allowing any other curative activities, might lead to biblical shabbos transgressions.
The rule which our Mishna formulated is that anything which a person normally eats or drinks when he is healthy, may be done on shabbos, even if it has a curative affect.

The same applies to actions, such as bathing in the “good parts” of the sea, which one normally does when healthy, even when one does so for therapeutic purposes. (see back on Daf 109)

I planned a nice post on the discussion of washing and cooling off in the ocean on Shabbos (floating or swimming is a different issue) , which that sugya seems to clearly imply is fine (spoiler alert- at least for Ashkenazim, it isn’t due to a later custom), but had to leave it to a little later- hang in there!

Here, our Mishna deals with drinking a כוס של עקרין (literally a cup of roots) on shabbos. This was a potion made up of tree sap from Alexandra (see Rashi 110a.)
Our Mishna forbids it, seeing as it is used mainly as a cure for jaundice and not as a drink for healthy people.

There is however a negative side affect of this remedy- it causes sterility-causing sterility to oneself, other people, or even animals, is a biblical prohibition, whether done chemically or physically.

As a result, the Gemara questions how this could be allowed even on a weekday, and replies that it is only forbidden when one’s intention is to cause sterility, but if one has a different intention, and the sterility happens automatically, it is allowed.

A proof is brought from Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling that one who wishes to neuter a rooster, should cut its crown off, and the neutering will happen on its own.
The Gemara responds that the case of the rooster is different, as it is not actually made infertile physically or chemically- its “pride” is simply taken away and it loses it motivation to mate.
In our case, however, even though the intention is to heal the jaundice, the side-effect is actual chemical castration, and that is forbidden.

The Gemara then proceeds with other attempts to explain why taking this potion is permitted, by limiting it to people who are already infertile , a woman who has no duty to procreate, or as a last resort, an infertile woman.

I would like to focus on the first stage of this discussion and see how it relates to the well-known leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין.
This is one of the most important principles of melacha on shabbos, but unlike most of the leniencies based on the requirement for מלאכת מחשבת calculated or significant work) on shabbos, this one applies to other prohibitions as well.

The most often quoted example is the ruling of Rabbi Shimon that a person is permitted to drag a bed, chair, or bench along the ground on shabbos in order to move it, and does not have to be concerned that he will dig a groove in the ground while doing do, so long as that is not his intention.

According to Rabbi Shimon, there is no need to refrain from a permitted activity because of the concern that it might be accompanied by a forbidden secondary activity, so long as one’s intention is for the permitted activity.

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees (the precise source for this disagreement is the subject of another discussion) and holds that’s even if one only intends to perform the permitted action, one still has to be concerned about an unintended forbidden consequence.

The leading Amora Rav rules like Rabbi Yehuda, and his colleague, Shmuel, rules like Rabbi Shimon and is permissive.
In various places, the Gemara quotes this case as one of the 3 times where the later Amora, Rabbah, rules like Shmuel rather than Rav, and this therefore became the accepted halacha throughout the Shas- דבר שאין מתכוין מותר.

One important qualification, however, is that the secondary forbidden action we are concerned about should not be inevitable – the term given for this is פסיק רישיה ולא ימות – cutting off a chickens head for one’s child to use as a ball, without the intent to kill it.

Seeing as killing the chicken is an inevitable result of the action of cutting off its head, the action is forbidden, even if that is not his intention.

One of the sources for this distinction is on our daf 111a-b , where Rav tells us that we follow Rabbi Shimon regarding permission to anoint oneself with the very exclusive rose-oil on shabbos, because כל בני ישראל בני מלכים הם – all Jews are princes, and it is thus considered normal to use such things even for non-curative purposes.

The Gemara then questions how Rav can say that we hold like Rabbi Shimon, when he clearly rules in another case in the laws of Shabbos against Rabbi Shimon (why he needs to consistently follow Rabbi Shimon in all cases is not clear from the Gemara, and is the subject of much discussion in the Rishonim.)

The question at hand is whether one may tighten a cloth that is tied around a barrel of wine to prevent leakage, seeing as there is a concern of squeezing out the wine from the cloth (also a topic of much debate regarding what precisely the problem with that would be.)

This seems to be a classic case of דבר שאין מתכוין – the intention is to plug the leak, not to squeeze out the wine.
However, Rav is quoted as forbidding this, which seems to show that he does not hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding דבר שאין מתכוין.

The Gemara attempts to answer this by pointing out that this is actually an example of פסיק רישיה- squeezing our the wine is an inevitable result of tightening the cloth, and Abaya and Rava have pointed out that even Rabbi Shimon would agree that it is forbidden!

While the Gemara rejects this solution seeing as we know that Rav in fact does not agree with Rabbi Shimon’s leniency regarding דבר שאין מתכוין, we remain with the universally accepted distinction that even though דבר שאין מתכוין is permitted, פסיק רישיה is not.

Now back to Daf 110, the כוס של עקרין , and another possible distinction regarding דבר שאין מתכוין.

It is clear from the conclusion of the Gemara that for a fertile male, drinking this potion is forbidden even during the week, due to the prohibition of סרוס (castration.)

The question is why? Surely this is a classic example of דבר שאין מתכוין- the intention is to treat the jaundice, not to cause infertility!
Tosfos quotes Rav Achai Gaon who is so bothered by this question, that he claims that even though Rabbi Shimon holds that דבר שאין מתכון is permitted in all or at least most prohibitions, not only regarding shabbos melacha, we only follow him on shabbos, not in other matters!

There are numerous places in the shas where it is clear that Rabbi Shimon permits דבר שאין מתכוין in other areas of halacha, among them
-permitting a Nazir to scratch his hair without being concerned it might be detached (Nazir 42a)

  • allowing people selling שעטנז ( mixtures of wool and linen) to wear them for show, even though they might benefit from their warmth and transgress the prohibition of wearing שעטנז
    שעטנז (Kilayim 9/5) –[see my Hebrew article for an analysis as to what the precise prohibition is and why wearing it for show is allowed.]
    -performing a bris on a leprous infant, despite the concern that he might cut the נגע off together with the foreskin, transgressing the prohibition of removing a leprous lesion. )Shabbos 133a)
  • letting blood from a בכור בהמה (first born animal) without being concerned he might cause a blemish, which is forbidden. )Bechoros 33b )

As there is no clear claim anywhere in the shas that the Amoraim’s acceptance of Rabbi Shimon’s leniency is limited to the laws of Shabbos, the claim of Rav Achai Gaon is rather radical, and the Tosfos rejects it out of hand, as does the consensus of halachik opinion.

Tosfos actually brings proofs from some of the other sugyos that the Amoraim clearly rule like Rabbi Shimon in all areas of halacha regarding the leniency of דבר שאין מתכוין.

The question remains, however, if that is the case, why is drinking this כוס של עקרין forbidden even during the week, at least for fertile males?

Tosfos suggests that this is because this is actually a case of פסיק רישיה – the resulting infertility is inevitable, and that is why all the Amoraim and Tannaim would agree it is forbidden.

We cannot simply end there, however.
After all, surely Rav Achai Gaon was aware that פסיק רישיה is forbidden?
We also have to try to explain what Rav Achai Gaon would do with all the proofs that the Tosfos brought from the other areas of halacha.

We do not have time in this post for the later, but as far as the former goes, it is unlikely that two Rishonim would debate an easily verifiable medical fact such as whether infertility is an inevitable result of drinking a כוס של עקרין .

A more “lomdish” approach would be to suggest that they agree as to how likely this side-effect is, but debate how inevitable the prohibited action has to be in order to make the permitted action forbidden.

How inevitable you might ask? Surely inevitable means precisely that?

As is often the case with halachik definitions, this is not so simple though- there is some discussion amongst the Rishonim as to the permissibility of something that is קרוב לפסיק רישיה- almost inevitable but not completely, and we shall hopefully discuss in more in later posts.

In fact, a different Tosfos points out that our אב לכולם- the case of dragging the bench, is actually almost inevitable, and the novelty of that particular sugya is that even such a case is permitted.

Perhaps Rav Achai Gaon also makes no distinction between דבר שאין מתכוין and ספק פסיק רישיה whereas our Tosfos (in this case Rabbeinu Yitchak) considers ספק פסיק רישיה to be forbidden like פסיק רישיה ?

Or perhaps we can simply argue that the ingredients used forכוס של עקרין , which grew naturally In Egypt, were simply not available in Geonic Babylonia or medieval France, and the כוס של עקירן was simply not available to either Rav Achai or the Ri, making this a factual argument that is not easily resolved by observation or research, and thus a valid debate in how to understand the sugya?

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 105 and 106 מקלקל, anger management, and discipling the family.

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The Mishna on 105b discusses the melacha of קורע (tearing).
The biblical prohibition applies to tearing something for constructive purposes, such as tearing threads in an imperfect garment to sow it up again correctly. (Tearing toilet paper might fit into this category but is a subject of its own.)
However, our Mishna tells us that if this is done out of anger, mourning for a relative, or for any destructive purpose, one is exempt, and has only transgressed a rabbinical transgression.
Our sugya debates the question of whether tearing something out of mourning or in anger is considered a constructive act or not.
Simply using our own logic, there seems to be logic on both sides – on the one hand, one is not making the torn item into anything that can be used for a constructive purpose as a result.
On the other hand, there might be a constructive result from the action itself, in that one fulfills one’s obligation to tear one’s clothes to mourn a relative, as well as one’s psychological need to grieve.
Similarly, tearing something out of anger might fulfil a constructive purpose, such as calming oneself down.
It appears from our Mishna that it is not considered constructive.
However, the Gemara brings a Beraita which is of the opinion that one is liable for such actions, indicating that they are halachically considered constructive.
The Gemara concludes that if one tears a garment for a relative that one is liable to tear for, the action is considered constructive because one has discharged his obligation by this action.
However, if one tears for a relative that one has no obligation to tear for, the action is not considered constructive, seeing as he has discharged no obligation by so doing.
The Gemara adds that the same applies to anyone that it is a mitzva, even if not an absolute obligation, to tear one’s clothes for, such as a חכם (scholar) or an איש כשר (righteous man)
How the above two are defined halachically requires further discussion of course.
The exclusion of a relative one is not obligated to tear for seems to make it clear that emotional therapeutic value is not enough to be considered a constructive act on its own, without actually fulfilling a mitzva.
However, we are still face with a contradiction between our Mishna and the Beraisa regarding tearing something in anger.
One would think that based on the law regards relatives, we have already settled the fact that tearing simply for emotional or therapeutic benefit is not considered a constructive action as far as liability on shabbos in concerned, and is still considered מקלקל.
Why then does the author of the Beraisa hold that one is indeed liable for this, in contrast to the author of the Mishna who holds that one is not?
At first, the Gemara tries to explain that this dispute is not actually based on whether it is מקלקל or not, but rather on whether one is liable for מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא.
The Mishna which exempts someone who tears out of anger is not doing so because of מקלקל, but rather because it reflects the view of Rabbi Shimon who holds that one is exempt for מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא , a melacha done for a constructive purpose but for one other than its usual purpose as derived from the Mishkan, the classic example being digging a hole because he wants the dust, rather than the hole itself( see Shabbos 73b.)
Here he has no need for the torn garment itself, but rather for the emotional relief or indulgence of his anger he feels from tearing it, making it classic מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא.
According to this suggestion, The Beraisa which says that one is liable for this simply reflects the view of Rabbi Yehuda that one is liable for מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא.
(We should note at this point that should this suggestion be accepted, we would have a סתם משנה (anonymous Mishna) that is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, which all things being equal, would be a very strong reason for the poskim to rule like him- but that’s for another time!)
The issue with this suggestion is that it totally ignores the exemption of מקלקל, which certainly seems to apply
i. based on logical analysis
ii. based on the previous conclusion that emotional benefit is not considered a constructive purpose regarding melacha
iii. Based on the wording of the Mishna which seems to base the exemption on מקלקל explicitly. ( one would then have to say that מקלקל mentioned in the Mishna is a totally new exemption, not the reason for the previous too exemptions and others like it, which while not illegal, certainly doesn’t seem to be the simple reading of the Mishna.)
The Gemara rejects this suggestion based on the fact that Rabbi Yehuda himself does not disagree with the exemption of מקלקל, which clearly seems to apply here.
It then suggests that perhaps the Beraisa that says one is liable for tearing something out of anger actually holds that tearing out of anger is constructive, in that it appeases his יצר (inclination).
This is a full 180 degree turn in which the Gemara acknowledges that at least according to the Beraisa, emotional therapeutic benefit might actually be considered constructive regarding melacha (it is possible to learn that even our Mishna would acknowledge that but exempts it due to מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא , but once we have found an acceptable way to reconcile the two views without reference to this debate, particularly as the Mishna does seem to given the reason for the exemption as מקלקל, it seems more likely that the Mishna would disagree simply on the point as to whether emotional benefit is constructive, and holds that it is not, which is reflected by the fact that its exempts one who tears out of mourning as well.)
The Gemara doesn’t seem so bothered by the suggestion that emotional benefit might be considered constructive in general ( to the point that we would then need to explain the difference between the emotional benefit of indulging or discharging one’s anger which one is liable for and that of fulfilling one’s need to grieve which is exempt even according to the Beraisa in the absence of a mitzva.)
Yet it rejects that suggestion that tearing out of anger might be constructive flat out for a different reason- indulging one’s anger is NEVER constructive .
It brings the very strong statement of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri that a person who tears or breaks something out of anger is considered like one who has worshipped idols -The way of the יצר הרע (evil inclination) is first to make you indulge your anger by destroying something and then to make you do other sins.
Rav Avin goes further and interprets the verse “לא יהיה בך אל זר “ (“there shall not be in you a strange god” -Tehillim 81/10) as referring to the evil inclination within everyone.
Indulging one’s evil inclination in the hope that it will go away afterwards is not viewed as a constructive action, rather as a catastrophic form of מקלקל.
This concept in also seen regarding the inclination for sexual relations.
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 107a) relates how David heMelech requested a test from Hashem, so he could also be regarded on par with the אבות (the three forefathers), and mentioned in the first blessing of the עמידה (silent standing prayer.)
It relates that Hashem agreed to this, and even warned him that the test would involve a woman.
David haMelech though that he would indulge his sexual drive in a permitted way that day by sleeping with all his wives, so by the time the test came, it would be worn out.
However, this was of no help. And he failed the test of Batsheva miserably.
The Gemara explains that he forgot the simply rule that אבר קטן יש באדם משביעו רעב
מרעיבו צמא ( a man has a small organ, if he starves it, it is satisfied, but if he indulges it, it is hungry.)
Hence engaging in too much sexual indulgence, even in a permitted way, is not constructive at all, and rather than getting tired of it eventually, simply leads to a person being addicted and chronically obsessed with it.
Now to return to our sugya- so under what circumstances could tearing something in anger be considered constructive and liable, as per the ruling of the Beraita?
The Gemara concludes with something that could seem very shocking in our modern, liberal world: performing certain actions that appear to be out of anger in order to instill fear in the members of one’s household, not out of uncontrolled anger indulgence, are indeed constructive and one would be liable for them on shabbos.
The Gemara gives some examples, but we will have to leave that to further discussion- please don’t copy any of those actions without getting suitable practical rabbinic AND legal advice!
(p.s. Another unresolved issue regarding מקלקל is seeing that injuring a person is basically always destructive (as well as being a prohibition outright,) how could one ever be liable for wounding a person on shabbos, something we know from various places that one is certainly liable for? The discussion on 106a resolved around this.
Our long-standing discussion about whether a שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל is permitted or not might also find some precedent in our Mishna, as it does indeed seem to be a case of both מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא and מקלקל, which according to Rabbi Shimon should actually be a שבות דשבות! Lots to say on this, but its late…)
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)

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Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)

One of the most difficult categories of forbidden work on Shabbos must be the melacha of מכה בפטיש, literally “striking with a hammer.”

After all, when a hammer is used constructively, it will usually be used as part of other forbidden categories of work, such a building, and when it used to destroy things with no positive intention, it will usually be מקלקל (a destructive action,) which is only rabbinically prohibited .

Yet this is indeed list in the Mishna (Shabbos 73a) as one of the 39 categories of work forbidden on shabbos, and it is essential to understand what it is.

The Mishna on our daf lists this melacho as one of those which has no minimum quantity required for liability.

Rashi gives both a general rule and an example of this melacha.

He gives the example of the hammer blow given to a stone by those who hew stones, after it has been cut out of the rock but not completely detached .

The stone is then hit with a hammer which causes it to detach and fall from the rock surface.

This is the final stage in the act of hewing a stone, and Rashi then tells us the general rule that the final stage of any melacha makes up the melacha of מכה בפטיש . He told us this rule back on daf 73a as well.

In truth though, numerous difficulties can be raised with both the rule and the example.

Firstly, as Tosfos points out, a forbidden category of melacha needs to involve an action performed in the work of the mishkan, and no quarry work was involved in that at all ( there were no stones in the mishkan, and constructing an altar from hewn stone was actually forbidden- note also how the Aron, Menorah, and Shulchan were all made of one single piece of beaten gold, and NOT of anything that had been cut into parts and then joined together !)

Secondly, if מכה בפטיש is the final stage of any מלאכה, surely it is already included in that מלאכה itself , and why should it get its own category? Does that mean that any melacha done from start to finish would incur two punishments , one for that particularly מלאכה , and one for completing it ? If so, one would expect that to be discussed .

However, this definition of מכה בפטיש does not originate with Rashi, but actually goes back to the Talmud itself (Shabbos 75b) where Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira both tell us that anything that involves completing a מלאכה is מכה בפטיש.

Tosfos appropriately does not disagree with the rule cited by Rashi, but chooses rather an example that did take place in the work of the mishkan , namely the final hammer blow given to strenghen the vessels of the mishkan once they were ready .

Does this melacha perhaps apply to the final act in a creative process even if that process does not involve a forbidden melacha ?

If so , where do we see such an example – after all, if it is a creative act of work that wasn’t in the mishkan, it will usually be included in the toladot of that melacha .

The key might lie in a Yerushalmi often quoted by our teacher, haGaon haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א ( various teshuvos on electricity in מנחת אשר חלק 1 וחלק 3 for example )

The Yerushalmi (Shabbos perek 7/ halocha 2) accounts that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish spent 3 and a half years studying the matter of 39 melachos.

They found 39 Tolados ( derivatives) of each melacha.

Whatever melacha they were able to fit into one of those, they included in one of those .

Those that they could not include in one of those were included in מכה בפטיש .

It seems clear from this Yerushalmi that there exists NO melacha that is not forbidden on shabbos.

Every possible melacha, however it is defined, either falls under one of the 39 categories, their derivatives , or the מלאכה of מכה בפטיש.

Rav Weiss himself suggests the relatively radical idea that for this reason, any activation of an electric circuit fits under the prohibition of מכה בפטיש .

Although the Bavli gave a different definition, namely גמר מלאכה, and the rule is that one does not follow the Yerushalmi when it contradicts the Bavli, he contends that it is possible that the Bavli did not mean to exclude these “left out” melachot from מכה בפטיש but simply to also include the completion of any melacha .

However, as he himself is fully aware, many poskim before him rejected this possibility, and were most likely fully aware of this Yerushalmi.

Far from me with my barely existent understanding of the subject to argue, but those who do not follow this view regarding electricity have all these Poskim to rely on ( of course, electricity remains forbidden for numerous possible other reasons given, but there could be many נ”מ)

Perhaps what the Yerushalmi really means is that COMPLETING any melacha, even one that doesn’t fit into the forbidden categories, is still forbidden because of מכה בפטיש .

However it follows from this classification that unlike other melachot, some of which one could transgress just by doing some or most thereof ( even if one is sometimes exempt due to “בעשותה” ) , one would have to actually complete the goal of these “left out” melachot in order to transgress.

If one learns this way, there is no disagreement between the bavli and the Yerushalmi at all- מכה בפטיש indeed includes all “left all” melachos , but only the completion of them.

In fact, it is also stated in the same halacha on the Yerushalmi that גמר מלאכה is מכה בפטיש,

Admittedly, this might not be the simplest reading of the Yerushalmi, but it allows for a simpler reading of the Bavli and also avoids the need to say that the Bavli and Yerushalmi have such a basic difference in understanding the melacha, one that the Rishonim do not seem to mention at all ( though see the Rambam , for example in Pirush haMishnayos to perek 7 which Rav Osher suggests as a support for his words .)

Of course , we would now have to test all the examples given in the gemara of this melacha, as well as those on our daf that Rav and Shmuel argue about, before we can really see if this thesis can stand its ground .

We would also need to define exactly what מלאכה is , and what kind of גמר מלאכה is meant by the Gemara- is it the completion of any melacha, just the completion of a כלי, or just the completion of a מלאכה not already included in the 39.

Lots of work to do, but its late …

Shabbos 100 Relative versus objective movement

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Shabbos 100 Relative versus objective movement

On this daf, we have a number of interesting discussions that touch on physics and make an impact on the laws of shabbos.

One of the recurring themes in this Masechta is that in order to transgress the biblical prohibitions of transferring an item from one domain to another, one has to both lift it up from one domain and put it down at rest in the other.

If the item never comes to rest in the forbidden domain, one will generally only have transgressed a rabbinical prohibition at a maximum. (One exception is the rule of קלוטה כמי שהונחה דמי according to some opinions in the Gemara.)

We are told that if one draws water from one domain and puts it down in another on top of water (such as in a river or pond) , even though the water actually mixes and flows with the other water and never “rests”, its is considered to have rested, as this is the way of water.

Rashi adds that if one were to pickup or splash water from a body of water, it would similarly be considered uprooting it, even though it was never really at rest.

Water by its nature is constantly moving (unless absorbed by a solid) and that is halachically considered its natural state of rest!

In contrast, if one picks up a solid item such as a nut from one domain and puts it down in another domain on top of water, so that it flows on the surface of the water, and never rests, one is exempt from the biblical prohibition, as the solid never comes to its natural state of rest, which is a state of stillness.

Rava then asks an interesting related question:

What would happen if our famous nut is picked up from one domain and placed inside a container floating down a stream of water in another domain?

The item is at rest in the vessel, but the basket is moving with the water.
Is this considered to be an act of הנחה (putting to rest) the nut, seeing as it is stationary relative to the container it is in, or is it considered not to be at rest, seeing as it is inside a moving container?

By Rashi’s extension, we could then also ask whether lifting up the item is considered an act of uprooting, seeing as the item is in its natural state of stillness within the vessel, or whether it considered as if it always was moving, seeing as it was inside a moving vessel!

The Gemara leaves this question unresolved.

What exactly is the uncertainly of the Gemora?

It seems clear that the doubt concerns whether an item’s halachik state of rest or movement is defined in absolute terms, or relative to the surface it is dependent on for support.

On the one hand, it seems that this status must be relative- after all, all items and beings at “rest” on the surface of the Earth, are essentially only at rest relative to the Earth- in more “objective” terms, they are all moving at an incredible speed around the Earth’s axis as well as around the sun!

Yet halacha considers such items or people to be fully at rest.

However, if one takes a closer look, there is another possible reason why this is so.

Perhaps in general, halacha defines “at rest” as objectively “at rest”, unless the items’ natural state is to be in constant movement, like water.
Seeing as the natural state of anything on the surface of this planet is to be moving with the planet, that too is considered its natural state of rest.

However, it is not the natural state of a nut to be inside a vessel floating down the river- perhaps in such a case, we go by an item’s objective state, and thus do not consider it to be still but rather moving!

To formulate this in more formal Brisker format:
Is the reason why an item at rest on the surface of the Earth is halachically considered to be “at rest” because
i. Halacha goes by relative state, not objective state, and relative to the Earth, it is indeed at rest, just like a nut inside a container floating down a river is at rest relative to container it is in.
ii. Halacha usually goes by objective state, but just like water’s natural state of rest is a state of movement, so to any terrestrial item’s natural state of rest is one of moving with the sun.

The Nafka Minah (practical difference) would be that now infamous nut inside the container:
If option 1 is correct, then the nut will indeed be considered to be at rest, even though the container it is in is moving.
If, on the other hand, option 2 is correct, the nut will be considered to be moving and NOT at rest, unlike a terrestrial item that moves with the earth.

The next question of the Gemara is about two liquids with different densities on top of one another, such as oil and wine.

Is this considered like a solid on top of a liquid, or a liquid on top of a liquid.
There is no time left for this fascinating issue today, but it raises a very interesting question:

What happens when water of one density is transferred to a body of water of different density in a different domain?

Sound Impossible? Then you obviously haven’t been to the “Meeting of the waters” in Brazil!
But I leave that for further discussion- hint: color….

One other curveball- I have assumed in this analysis that Chazal were aware/believed that the Earth revolves around its orbit and/or around the sun. Is this a fair assumption, or way off track?

Shabbos 99 Defining the public domain, and the great Eruv controversy

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Shabbos 99 Defining the public domain, and the great Eruv controversy

In the first chapter (Shabbos 6a), we were introduced to the 4 רשויות (domains) of Shabbos, roughly as follows:

  1. רשות היחד
    (private domain)- an area at least 4 טפחים (hand-breadths) wide that is either raised at least 10אמות (arm-lengths) above the ground, surrounded by partitions of that height, or sunken into the ground at that depth.
  2. רשות הרבים
  • large and busy thoroughfares and markets, and מבואות (quieter side streets) that open to them
  1. כרמלית
    ( some examples given there are the sea, open valleys and a כרמלית proper, but this is generally understood to mean a place that is too open to be a private domain and too quite to be a public domain.
  2. מקום פטור
    an exempt area.

We are also told that transferring an item from a private domain to a public domain, vice-versa, or 4 Amos within a public domain is a biblical offense.
On the other hand, transferring an item from either a private or public domain to a Carmelis or vice-versa, or transferring an item 4 Amos within a Carmelis, is only a rabbinical prohibition.

Although obviously we treat rabbinical prohibitions very seriously, we have mentioned numerous times that there are still certain leniencies with them that do not apply to biblical prohibitions, one of them being the idea of a שבות דשבות , an action that is only rabbinically prohibited for two separate reasons.

Such things, are permitted for the sake of Mitzva, great need, or to prevent suffering, at least when done by a non-Jew, and according to some opinions, even when done by a Jew (see earlier posts on שבות דשבות)

An example could be asking a non-Jew to carry or transfer something in, into or from a Carmelis, or according to the more lenient views, by a Jew in an unusual way in or into a Carmelis.

Pulling a pram with a child that is able to walk on his own inside a Carmelis could also be such an example, due to the rule of חי נושא את עצמו (a living person carries himself), perhaps to be discussed in another post.

Another important distinction would be in the case of a ספק (doubt) if an action is forbidden or not – the golden rule being that in doubt regarding a biblical rule, we need to err on the side of stringency, but when it comes to a biblical rule, we may be lenient out of doubt.

Perhaps the most important distinction between a רשות הרבים and a כרמלית is in the laws of Eruvin, which largely rely on the fact that the Eruv is made in an area in which it is only rabbinically forbidden to carry, such as a Carmelis, and not a רשות הרבים, where making an Eruv is far more problematic.

As such, accurately being able to tell the difference between a רשות הרבים and a כרמלית is essential and makes a major impact on daily shabbos life.

As usual, the main factors we consider in this distinction, are the properties of the דגלי מדבר (the biblical encampment of Israel), which are the basis for the מלאכה of הוצאה being performed in the work of the Mishkan, and thus qualifying as a forbidden category of work.

3 of the most commonly accepted distinctions between the two, are as follows:

  1. A רשות הרבים needs to be at least 16 Amos wide, like the space in which the wagons passed (5 for each wagon, 5 for the space between them plus one extra for the Levi, as per our daf!)
  2. A רשות הרבים must be open, not even covered at the top by a roof, as per the camp of Israel.
  3. A רשות הרבים needs to have at least 600,000 people, like the population in the camp of Israel.

The first condition, namely the minimum width, is universally accepted, and based on an explicit statement on our daf, as well as in a Mishna (Bava Basra 99b), which according to Rashi, has its source in the reasoning mentioned on our daf.

The second condition has actually been the matter of debate on the previous daf, but seems to be the consensus of the poskim.

In contrast, the third condition has been and remains the subject of MUCH controversy.
On the one hand, there is NO specific source for this requirement in the Gemara.
It is only in some of the (mainly) Ashkenazi Rishonim (early commentators) that we see this requirement.
Although this could be a logical extension of the comparison to the biblical encampment, as mentioned above, as Rashi explicitly says (Rashi, Eruvin 6a) , it actually seems to be contradicted by our daf, which tells us that the ground underneath the wagons was considered a רשות הרבים – it is kind of hard to imagine 600000 people fitting into that space!
It is also a rather difficult suggestion, given that there were only 600000 men in the biblical camp, but far more people when women and children are included- as such, if we going for this rule, lets go even further and make the minimum number far higher! (see Tosfos Eruvin 6a who brings and resolves these difficulties.)

As such, the (mainly) Sephardi Rishonim, such as the Rambam (Shabbos 14/1), Ramban, and others (see Beit Yosef 345 for a list) , do not mention this requirement at all, and it remains a major debate to this day (see Shulchan Aruch 345/7 who brings both opinions, the more lenient one only as a יש אומרים (secondary opinion.)

In practice, mainstream Ashkenazi practice is to treat cities, or even neighborhoods within cities, that do not have at least 600000 people , as a כרמלית , and to allow regular simple Eruvin in such places (see for example Taz O.C. 345/6) , though there are certainly some Ashkenazim who, like many of their Sephardi brethren, are stringent.

For more, see for example Aruch haShulchan 345/14 for a lengthy treatment on this controversy in the Ashkenazi world, and compare Birkei Yosef with Yalkut Yosef on the same siman regarding what normative Sephardi practice should be.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 96 הוצאה – the inferior מלאכה that rules the roost. 

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If you would ask any semicha student which of the מלאכות ( forbidden categories of shabbos work) are the most complex, my bet would be that it would be a tough choice between בשול ( cooking ) and הוצאה (transferring.)

If that student  had extended his usual semicha studies to include  ערובין , it would become a no brainer- הוצאה would definitely scoop the prize .

This is the only one of the מלאכות that takes up virtually an entire masechta ( Eruvin) , as well as at least 4 full chapters of Shabbos.

It is also one of the only 2 מלאכות ( I stand to be corrected ) that gets it own source:

  • the מלאכה of הבערה ( lighting a fire) is specifically mentioned  (Shmos  35/3) – לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת  ( You may not kindle a fire in any of your dwelling places on the Sabbath day .)
    Chazal debate why it is singled out and their are 2 major approaches to this (הבערה ללאו יצאת או הבערה לחלק יצאת)  , but thats  not for this post.
  • Our Gemara asks where the source is that הוצאה is forbidden on shabbos, and brings a passuk ויעבירו קול במחנה  (Shmos 36/6) , an instruction to stop bringing ( transferring) things for the Mishkan. 

Given that we are already aware from various sugyos that we have studied that the source for all the מלאכות is the verse “You shall not do any מלאכה ” and the  proximity of the verse that discusses Shabbos to the one that discusses the משכן (sanctuary) , teaches us that the מלאכות referred to in the prohibition are those that were done in the work of the משכן.

In our very Mishna, this same idea is applied to the מלאכה of הוצאה to explain why passing something from one private domain to another through a public domain is forbidden yet throwing is not, according to Chachamim ( Rabbi Akiva of course disagrees and forbids throwing as well- welcome to הזורק! )

In chapter 4 of our  Masechta (Shabbos 49b) , it also specifically mentioned that both הוצאה   ( literally taking out ) and  its תולדה ( derivative )  הכנסה ( bringing in ) , are derived from what was done in the Mishkan.

As such, the question screaming out at us is why do we need a separate passuk to teach us the prohibition of הוצאה and its תולדות of הכנסה, זריקה, etc , when it was  already one of the 39 מלאכות done in the Mishkan and is indeed derived from there too!

Tosfos on the first daf of the Masechta ( Shabbos 2a ” פשט” ) , deals with this  question at length, and focuses on the idea that הוצאה is a מלאכה גרועה ( inferior מלאכה ).

This seems to be because unlike most מלאכות where an actual physical change ( usually an improvement) is made in the object the מלאכה is applied to,  transferring an item from one domain to another does not have any physical affect at all- it remains the same item as it was before.

Tosfos points out that it is so questionable whether this should even qualify as a מלאכה  that transferring from one adjoining  private domain to another is completely permitted on a biblical level while transferring from a private domain to a public domain is forbidden, despite their similarity in terms of the action done!

The question that still bothers Tosfos though, is the converse .

If we already know that הוצאה is forbidden from a separate  verse despite it being a מלאכה גרועה , then why does our Mishna and other sugyos have to show that it was done in the Mishkan ?

He answers with the radical idea that had we not been able to show that הוצאה was indeed one of the מלאכות in the Mishkan, we would have learnt from the passuk that explicitly forbids it that ANY melacha like action, (perhaps even a weak one like הוצאה) , is forbidden on shabbos, even if it was NOT done in the Mishkan !

We thus need a separate passuk to teach us that even though it is a מלאכה גרועה, it is still included in the prohibition with its sister melachot that were done in the Mishkan, but we need the fact that it was in fact done in the Mishkan to save the famous rule that only מלאכות done in the Mishkan are in fact forbidden !

It thus comes as a leniency rather than a stringency  as we thought .

But what would we have done with the דרשה that derives the forbidden מלאכות from the משכן due to proximity of verses ?

Tosfos suggests that this would have simply been used  to teach us something else , perhaps a fascinating statement about how he views the world of דרשות in general , but thats for another time perhaps …

Lets take a minute go consider how far-reaching this suggestion is- The golden rule that we always take for granted about the connection between the Mishkan and Shabbos would have come tumbling down in a moment had Chazal not shown that this “inferior Melacha” was also done on the Mishkan!

There is another, philosophical lesson, I would like to learn from this .

What seems to us like the weakest of Melacho, one that has NO physical impact on the item at all, to the point that it needs its own unique prohibition, has become the Melacha which our Masechta opened up with, that occupies 2 of the longest and most complex chapters of the Masechta, and also gets its own entire Masechta virtually to itself !

Despite the emphasis placed on the laws of לשון הרע ( gossip) and אונאת דברים (offending people ), in practise , we  still often tend to harbour  the mistaken belief that ” sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never harm me .”
So long as one doesn’t actually physically hurt a person, it is OK to hurt him emotionally, after all emotions cannot be seen or measured !

Yet the message of this מלאכה is precisely the opposite. 

If a constructive action that involves no physical improvement to an item can not only be considered מלאכת מחשבת , a significant form of work, but even dominate all the other מלאכות in the time spent studying it , how much more so should we focus on the significance of non physical damage that appears to be less significant, but in fact, can be as damaging , or even more so, than physical actions, , as we know from the innocent  lives that have been utterly ruined by lashon harah.