Category Archives: shabbos

Shabbos 95 Wearing make-up on Shabbos

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On the previous daf, our Mishna taught us a list of various things that Rabbi Eliezer considers to be biblically forbidden on Shabbos, and subject to the appropriate punishment, and which the Chachamim only consider to be rabbinically forbidden (שבות)

One of these things is כוחלת, painting her eye-lashes blue.

The Gemara suggests that the reason Rabbi Eliezer considers this a biblically punishable offense is because it is a form of כותב (writing.)

Rashi explains that this is because she uses the paint-stick to circle her eye like one who writes a letter with a pen.

The Gemara rejects this explanation because that is not a normal way to write and concludes at the beginning of our daf that it is because of צובע, the melacha of dyeing/painting.

It then brings a Beraita that says similarly that it is forbidden for a woman to put סרק (red coloring) on her face, because of צובע.

As the halacha usually follows the majority of Chachamim, it seems that we should rule like Chachamim that this is only a rabbinical transgression or שבות.

However, the Rambam (Shabbos 23/12) seems to rule like Rabbi Eliezer, but also like the Gemara’s first suggestion, that it is forbidden as it is like writing!

Whereas one might possibly interpret the Rambam’s wording to mean that it is considered rabbinically like writing ( a look in the Achronim shows that both interpretations are well represented) , it is still bizarre that he rules like a rejected suggestion in the Gemara.

This becomes even stranger when we see that in the previous chapter, (Shabbos 23,22), he ruled that using סרק is forbidden because it is like painting!

The Masores haShas, uncharacteristically comments on the Rambam he points to, and refers us to various Rishonim relevant to this.
Also, Rabbeinu Chananel, one of the earliest of the Rishonim (early commentators) ,actually rules explicitly like Rabbi Eliezer- his reasoning is that seeing as the Rabbis of the Gemara spend time debating his reasoning, it seems like they rule like him, and even though some say that the Halacho follows Chachamim, it makes more sense to rule like Rabbi Eliezer seeing as it is a possible אסור דאורייתא (biblical prohibition.)

Despite the above, both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 303) rule that it is forbidden because of צובע, as per the conclusion of the Gemara, and the consensus of the Achronim (see Beit Yoseif, Mishna Beruru, Aruch haShulchan etc) is that it is only rabbinically prohibited, in accordance with the view of the Chachamim.

It seems clear from the above, that using make-up or lipstick on Shabbos is a rabbinical prohibition, and as such, may clearly not be done, and this is the general consensus amongst poskim.

However, it might be that given certain social or family dynamics, a woman living in a less observant community feels that putting on make-up or lipstick is a great need, and that not doing so causes her great suffering, and perhaps even to be mocked by her less religious friends and relatives.

Even in fully observant communities, many women simply feel very uncomfortable being seen without make-up, and without a solid halachik way, might chas vesholom come to the rely on less permissible ways of putting it on .

It would seem reasonable to suggest that she should then be permitted to put it on with a שנוי ( in an unusual way), at least according to the views (see previous post) that a שבות דשבות is permitted even by a Jew for the sake of a Mitzva.

As this would be rabbinic for two separate reasons:

  • Coloring the skin is not considered real צובע, but just a שבות
  • Any melacha with a shinui is only derabonen (rabbinically forbidden)

This would be even less problematic if she uses short-term make-up that doesn’t last long, as it could also be considered דבר שאין מתקים (a melacha whose affect doesn’t last), and might never even have been included in the גזירה to start out with.

It would go we thought saying that it would have to be a texture that doesn’t involve the prohibition of ממרח (smearing ), which semi solid creams and lipsticks usually do ( here too though , if it isn’t thick enough to be ממרח דאורייתא, the שבות דשבות rule with a שנוי might also help!)

While I find my reasoning appealing, I have not found any major poseik who has made this suggestion, and in any case, these posts are not meant as halachik rulings, so anyone with a learning background who finds my suggestion convincing, should discuss it with an expert poseik.

In practise, with the development of various types of shabbos friendly makeup, and the increased sensitivity to halacha in many communities, this is probably less of an issue than it once was .

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 94 שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל – a double derabonen by a Yisroel

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Shabbos 94 שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל – a double derabonen by a Yisroel

One of the most powerful leniencies on Shabbos, is the rule of a שבות דשבות, an action which is only rabbinically prohibited for 2 different reasons.

The most common application of this applies to work done by a non-Jew on Shabbos for a Jew.

In general, it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to perform a forbidden task for a Jew on Shabbos. According to most opinions, this is a rabbinical prohibition, which I hope to discuss in a later post.

However, one is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform something that is only rabbinically prohibited, for example to move something that is Muktza, or perform a forbidden melacha in an unusual way, so long as there is a great need for this, to prevent suffering, or for the sake of a Mitzva. (This too, is not straight-forward, and I hope to devote a future post to it.)

Although subject to debate in the Rishonim, this is the generally accepted halacha, and is because this is only rabbinically forbidden, for 2 different reasons:

  • אמירה לעכום (asking a non-Jew to perform forbidden work) is only rabbinically forbidden
  • The actual act being requested, is also only rabbinically forbidden.
    The generally accepted source for this, is a sugya in Eruvin 67 , which allows one to ask a non-Jew to bring hot water for a bris milah through a shared courtyard where an eruv has not been made. (See Rif and Ran Shabbos 56 for a long analysis and debate on this.)

The question is, however, whether this is limited to a rabbinical prohibition performed by a non-Jew, or whether a Jew would also be allowed in case of great need, to perform an action that is a שבות דשבות, for example moving Muktza in an unusual way, or two people turning on a light in an unusual way.

In order to answer this question, one would either need to prove that whatever Chazal’s reason for this leniency is equally applicable to a שבות דשבות performed by a Jew, or find a specific case in the Gemara where a שבות דשבות by a Jew is permitted.

On the other hand, should we find a case where a שבות דשבות by a Jew is not permitted, even for the sake of a Mitzva, great need, or suffering, one would be forced to either prove that this is an exception or a non-authoritative view, or conclude that שבות דשבות is not permitted for a Jew.

I have been trying for many years to find a concrete example of what might be an example of שבות דשבות by a Jew that is permitted, within the Gemara.

Today’s daf got me extremely excited, at least for a minute!

We are told that there was a corpse in the town of Darukra, that Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak permitted to be moved to a Carmelis (an open area that is not closed enough to be a private domain and not busy enough to be a public domain.)

This action seems to be a clear example of what we are looking for, a שבות דשבות done by a Jew!

  • It is mentioned just after we have analyzed the view of Rabbi Shimon that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (A Melacha where the usual result is not needed- another post to look forward to!) is only rabbinically forbidden. As the corpse is not needed, but merely needs to be removed, this would be one reason that this is only rabbinically forbidden.
  • It was taken to a כרמלית, which is also only Rabbinically prohibited!
    It seems that we have our case!

The trick, however, comes in how we learn the continuation of the sugya!
Rabbi Yochanan, brother of Mar son of Ravina, challenges Rav Nachman bar Yitchak on his leniency.

He says that even if one holds like Rabbi Simon that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is only rabbinically prohibited (פטור אבל אסור), that does not make it permitted!

It seems clear that the challenger does not see a difference between one שבות or a שבות דשבות if it is done by a Jew, or the question would not be relevant- it would be true that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is at least rabbinically forbidden, but Rav Nachman bar Yitchak only permitted it to be moved to a כרמלית, which is also only דרבנן, and thus permitted as a שבות דשבות.

At this stage, one might still argue that Rav Nachman bar Yitchak himself does differentiate and permits a שבות דשבות even by a Jew.

However, if that were the case, one would expect him to reply accordingly.

Instead, he replies that even his challenger would permit this case, and even if he held like Rabbi Yehuda that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is biblically forbidden (i.e. Only one שבות is involved.)

This is because of the rule that כבוד הבריות (human dignity) over-rides any rabbinical prohibition, and seeing as this was only to a כרמלית , which is only rabbinically prohibited, it was permitted.

It seems from his reply that the reason he permitted this was NOT because of a general rule that שבות דשבות is permitted for any mitzva, or great need, but because of the התיר of כבוד הבריות that applies to any שבות, even if it isn’t a שבות דשבות.

Before I give up and acknowledge that this sugya is thus not a proof that שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל is permitted, but rather could be a proof that it is not, I make one final argument:

Perhaps, Rav Nachman’s reply is not meant to deny the permissibility of שבות דשבות על-ידי ישראל , which likely is his initial motivation for his decision.

Maybe, he is merely bringing the less controversial התיר of כבוד הבריות to answer his challenger and to show that even his challenger, and even Rabbi Yehuda himself, would also have no reason to oppose his reason!
Much more to discuss, but that’s it for tonight….

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 93 שנים שעשו    A melacha performed by 2 people

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Shabbos 93 שנים שעשו    A melacha performed by 2 people

As mentioned yesterday, I would like to focus today on an extremely practical leniency in the laws of Shabbos- the exemption of a melacha done by 2 people.

 

This rules takes us all the way back to the beginning of the Masechta, where we learnt that in order to be forbidden biblically and liable to  a korban (or מיתה  or כרת  if done knowingly) for transferring something on Shabbos from one domain to another,  one has to both uproot the object from the one domain and put it down in the other.

 

Someone who does only one of these actions, has performed a rabbinical prohibition, not a biblical one, and is exempt from the biblically prescribed punishment.

 

A question that might have still been left open during the many daf that discussed this rule, is what the source is for this exemption!

 

One possibility is that it is simply another manifestation of the general rule that a biblically prohibited Melacha must be considered מלאכת מחשבת, an important, calculated, and significant act of work.

One could argue that if one only performed part of the action, leaving the rest for someone else to complete, one’s action is simply not מלאכת מחשבת.

 

On our daf, we face a different, though possibly related, exemption.

 

Here, two people perform a Melacha together, such as writing with the same quilt, or carrying the same item from one domain to another.

 

In this case, we are faced with 3 opinions:

-Rabbi Meir is of the view that one is liable

-Rabbi Yehuda is of the view that so long as neither of them could have managed the action on their own, they are exempt. Otherwise, they are liable.

– Rabbi Shimon is of the view that even if each of them could have managed the action on their own, they are still exempt.

 

The Gemara derives these 3 views from the passuk in Vayikra which is the basis for the requirement to bring a sin offering:

 

ואם נפש אחת תחטא בשגגה מעם הארץ בעשתה.

“and if one soul sins unknowingly from amongst the people, by doing it.”

According to Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, there 3 מעוטים (exclusions) here:

נפש  (a person in the singular)

אחת (one)

בעשותה  performing it, ie ALL of the transgression)

 

Rabbi Yehuda uses one of these to exclude the case when each of them do part of the Melacha, ie either עקירה (uprooting) or הנחה (putting down), as in the first Mishna of the Masechta.

He then uses another one to exclude a case when two people perform the entire act together, when they could have done it on their own, ie our case, when two people carried a fig outside.

The third exclusion is used by him for a different matter.

 

Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yehuda regarding the first two exclusions and uses the third as well to exclude a case when both of them could NOT have done the action on their own.

 

Rabbi Meir holds that the first 2 exclusions, i.e. נפש אחת , count as 1, not 2, and only excludes the case of 2 people doing different parts of the melacha- he uses the other exclusion (בעשותה) for  the same different matter Rabbi Yehuda derived from it.

 

It follows that both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda agree that in a case where two people perform the entire melacha together, and they could have each done it on their own, they are exempt.

The Halacha follows this majority view (see Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch on this subject), and both cases of שנים שעשו, the case where different parts of the melacha are performed by 2 different people, and our case, where an entire  melacha that could have been performed by one person is done by two people together, are exempt from the biblical punishment and are only rabbinically forbidden.

 

It also follows from our daf that both leniencies are learnt from their own unique words in the above mentioned passuk, and not just from the requirement for מלאכת מחשבת.

 

Why is it important at the end of the day whether this is derived from its own passuk, or from מלאכת מחשבת?

 

I would like to suggest two possible practical ramifications (נ”מ):

 

What happens if two people perform together another forbidden action, NOT related to shabbos, that they could have both done individually?

For example, if two people together made an idol.

If the exemption was only from מלאכת מחשבת, it would only apply to shabbos, and these two would definitely be liable.

However, if the exemption is due to the independent passuk regarding the laws of sacrifices, it has no specific relation to shabbos, and should in theory also apply to other prohibitions.

Yet despite this, I am yet to see an example of the Gemara applying this exemption to prohibitions other than shabbos.

 

Another Nafka Minah could be regarding the leniency of שבות דשבות (an action that is only rabbinical in nature for two different reasons.)

The rule is usually, regarding shabbos at least, that such an action is permitted in case of suffering, great need, or for the sake of a Mitzva (though whether this applies to an action performed by a Jew, or only to one performed by a non-Jew is in fact subject to debate.)

If this leniency  indeed applies to actions performed by a Jew as well, what happens if two people perform one action that each of them could have done on their own, in an unusual manner (שנוי)?

This action is only rabbinically prohibited for 2 reasons- it is unusual, AND 2 people have performed it instead of one.

However, if the leniency of שנים שעשו, is also, like שנוי, derived from the requirement of  מלאכת מחשבת , one could argue that this is not really a שבות דשבות , but all part of the same one exemption, namely מלאכת מחשבת!

(I did put this possibility to haGaon Moreinu haRav Osher Weiss Shelita, and his gut feel was that it would still be called a שבות דשבות, but there is certainly what to explore here.)

 

If, on the other hand, as we have proven, the leniency of שנים שעשו comes from a completely different context than that of שנוי  and other Mishkan\Meleches Machsheves related leniencies, our case would clearly be an example of  a שבות דשבות , and according to those who permit this even when done by a Jew for the sake of Mitzva, great need, or to avoid suffering, this should certainly be permitted!

Shabbos 92 מתעסק and unintentional melacha revisited

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This Daf is packed with examples of some of the most important principles of Melocho on Shabbos, mainly based on the idea that in order to be biblically forbidden and punishable, an act has to be considered מלאכת מחשבת (a significant, important, or calculated act of work.)

Among them, are the idea that a melacha done in a significantly unusual way (שנוי) is exempt from punishment, as is the rule of two people performing a melacha that could be done by one person ( more on that tomorrow , Hashem willing .)

We have discussed before the concept of מתעסק, where someone who does not have full intention to perform the forbidden act might be exempt .

This, unlike many of the exemptions of מלאכת מחשבת, is derived ( כריתות יט.) from a specific מעוט ( exclusion) in the verse that obligates one to bring a קרבן חטאת for performing a serious transgression unknowingly – “וחטא בה פרט למתעסק” . ( interestingly enough, so is שנים שעשו, right here on the daf)

Yet , despite having its own source, the Gemara in numerous places also states that המסעסק בשבת פטור מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה המתעסק בחלבים ועריות חיב שכן נהנה – one who performs a melacha on shabbos without intention is exempt, as the Torah only forbade calculated melacha, but if one eats forbidden fats or sleeps with someone forbidden to him unintentionally, he is liable , as he has derived pleasure from it .

This seems to imply that מתעסק is yet another exemption of מלאכת מחשבת , and not an independent exemption based on its own source .

One can ask further that if the only reason מסעסק is liable by forbidden fats and עריות is because of the pleasure he gets ( a subject for analysis in its own right), then it should apply in ALL areas of halacha where pleasure is not a factor, not only on shabbos , so what is the relevance to מלאכת מחשבת , which is only an exemption on shabbos? ( see Rashi there who asks the question and takes a different approach to what I suggest below, which is more constant perhaps with other Rishonim here , for reasons outside the scope of this post, but that need to be fully studied to get an understanding of this concept.)

It stands to reason that there probably two different kinds of מתעסק or intentional melacha , one category that is exempt in all areas of halacha other than where הנאה ( pleasure) is involved , and one that is only exempt on shabbos .

For example , the classical case of מתעסק where one intends to pick up something detached from the ground and landed up picking up something connected to the ground ( see earlier post on perek 7) , is similar to intending to eating permitted fat and landing up eating forbidden fat, which would be exempt if not for the fact that he derived benefit.

It follows that there is no need for the concept of מלאכת מחשבת to exempt this, as it is covered under the blanket exemption learnt from its own source, which applies in theory to all areas of halacha.

But there is another kind of מתעסק , which we see in the main sugya in כריתות, as well as on our daf today !

This involves a case where one intends to do something that is forbidden, but lands up performing the same forbidden action on a different חפצא ( object ) than intended , or in a different manner (צורה) than intended .

One example subject to debate in the sugya in כריתות is when one intends to light or extinguish a certain candle and lands up lighting or extinguishing a different one .

In other areas of halocho, if one would intend to , for example, bow down to one idol. , and landed up bowing down to another , it is very possible that one would still be liable, seeing as one intended to do the same forbidden action, and there is no exclusion from וחטא בה .

However, on shabbos, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is so strong, that it requires a complete fulfillment of נתקים מחשבתו, (his intentions were fully fulfilled .)

Any deviation from this could be a reason for exemption, due to this broader form of מתעסק.

A far -reaching application on this rule is found in a Mishna on our daf!

If one intends to carry something in front of him, and lands up carrying it behind him, even though there is no lack of intent ( מתעסק) in the מעשה ( action), or even in the חפצא ( object of the action), but merely in the צורה ( manner or form of the action), one is exempt!

Rashi explains that this is a form of לא נתקיימה מחשבתו ( his intentions were not fully fulfilled ) which in turn is a form of מתעסק!

[ These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha ]