On our daf, we are told an incredible idea about the letters in the aleph bet (alphabet)
The 5 letters that change form at the end of a word (מנפצך) were not always like that!
The open form of the letters used at the beginning and in the middle of words were actually a newer innovation of the נביאים prophets! (Rashi points out that in a parallel sugya (Megillah 2b), the claim is that the closed form at the end of the word was the later addition- see there for how he resolves this.)
It is the closed form of the letters that we only use at the end which were actually the original, and the prophets for some reason introduced the open form everywhere except at the end of the word!
The Gemara takes major issue with this statement, calling on the passuk ” אלה המצוות” (“THESE are the laws” – Devarim 36/13 )which teaches us that only the commandments given to Moshe at Sinai were valid and from then on, no prophet could innovate anything else- אין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר .
The Gemara replies that both forms actually existed already, the prophets simply decided which form to use at the end of the word and which form to use in the rest of the world.
That too is rejected, seeing as even such a decision would be considered an innovation, which prophets may not make.
The Gemara finally concludes that both forms of the letter as well as where they were to be used were indeed given over to Moshe, but they were forgotten, and the Nevi’im (prophets) reestablished them.
In a different sugya, even the reading of the Megila , a Mitzva instituted by the prophets Mordechai and Esther, was subject to scrutiny by Chazal (Megila 14a) , and they pointed out that none of the Nevi’im added to anything in the Torah except in this case, due to a קל וחומר (fortiori logical argument) that they found.
From our daf, however, we see that this rule doesn’t only apply to introducing new Mitzvos, but also applies to changing the form of the Hebrew letters, or even deciding when each form should be used!
As similar concept is found in the beginning of Bava Kama (2b) , where the Gemara tries to derive that נגיחה (goring) must be done with the horns of an ox to be considered נגיחה , from a Passuk in Navi (Melachim I 22/11.)
The wicked king of Israel, Achav, has convinced the righteous king of Yehuda, Yehoshafat, to go to war with Aram to claim back Ramot Gilad, which they had occupied.
All the false and/or idolatrous prophets tell Achav exactly what he wants to hear, namely that he will succeed, but Yehoshafat insists that he look for a surviving true prophet of Hashem from whom to seek council.
Meanwhile, one of these “yes men”, Tzidkiya ben Kenaanah, takes two large metal horns and told Achav and the people that they would use these horns to “gore” the enemy into submission
The true navi, Michayahu, in contrast, predicts that the war will be a disaster and advice them to stay home.
For this, he is imprisoned by Achav’s men, and the two kings lead their troops into battle together.
(We see similar treatment of our great prophets who refuse to give people the false sense of comfort that they want and speak truth to power, in many places in Tanach, one of the most famous being the horrendous incarceration of Yirmiyah but the last king of Yehuda, Tzidkiya, for similarly breaking ranks with all the false prophets and advising surrender to the approaching Babylonians.)
Back to the horns of Tzidkiya, Chazal derive from here that the word יגח ( yigach), refers to injuring with the horns.
However, another source from the Chumash is also given for this, and the Gemara explains that this is because one might counter that דברי תורה מדברי קבלה לא ילפינן – one may not derive words of the Torah from the words of Kabbalah (the term used by Chazal for prophecy, but that’s another discussion!)
In the end, the Gemara still accepts this proof, seeing as we are not deriving any laws per se, but simple learning the meaning of a word (גלוי מלתא) which is acceptable.
Here, we were not attempting to derive new mitzvas from the Neviim, but simply some details of the laws mentioned in the Torah through a גזירה שוה ( Masoretic comparison based on similar language) – namely that the damages that the Torah is referring to need to be by the horns of the ox ,in order for the relevant laws to apply.
Yet even this is not considered valid, and the only thing that we can actually apply from the words of the Nevi’im to Torah matters is shedding light on the meaning of words used in the Torah- this is not through a גזירה שוה but simply a גלוי מילתא.
However, it does not take much to see that this cannot be so straight forward as it looks.
So many new laws of Shabbos, including the mitzvas of honoring and enjoying shabbos (כבוד ועונג שבת ) as well as the prohibition of עובדין דחול ( weekday activities that are not melacha but inappropriate for shabbos) are derived from the famous speech of Yeshayahu, which we read as the haftarah from Yom Kippur (Yeshayahu 58/13.)
In addition, Chazal tell us )Shabbos 24b) that Shlomo haMelech instituted נטילת ידים (washing hand before eating bread)and Eruvin, mentions many decrees made by various biblical figures, and of course, made so made so many decrees of their own!
Even the Mitzva of Chanukah, instituted by Chazal long after the period of prophecy, is accepted, due to the biblical injunction to follow the Torah leadership and prohibition against going against it (Shabbos 23a).
Why could the same not apply to a relatively simple matter of the shape of the letters, or learning how נגיחה is done?
Perhaps the key lies in the famous words of the Rambam (Mamrim 2/9), where he asks how it is possible for Chazal to make decrees against things the Torah does not forbid, when there is a prohibition to add or subtract from the Torah.
He notes that the prohibition of adding to the Torah applies to making new laws and making out as if they are biblical laws.
However, so long as they are clear that they are rabbinical laws, there is no issue, and on the contrary, it is part of their mandate (probably from the passuk לא תסור and ושמרתם את משמרתי.)
The same argument might be applicable not only to the decrees the Rambam mentions, but also to entirely new rabbinical mitzvas, though one would want to explain why the Rambam fails to mention this.
The case we see on our daf is not a new rabbinical mitzva or decree, but an actual change in the biblical laws as to how to write a sefer-Torah and other holy scrolls.
Similarly, the case in Bava Kama is not a new rabbinical form of liability for damages, but a derivation by גזירה שוה of the details of biblical laws, from verses in the prophets.
In truth though, even without having thoroughly examined each sugya where the idea of אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר is mentione, I see a major issue with using this approach- the case of Megillah has no pretensions of being a biblical Mitzva, but is a מצוה מדברי סופרים ( a commandment initiated by the prophets or sages.)
If so, why was a קל וחומר argument needed in order for Mordechai and Esther to initiate it?
Surely it should have been permitted without such an argument for the same reason as Chanukah was!
Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)
Shabbos 102 The evasive מכה בפטיש (hammer-blow)
One of the most difficult categories of forbidden work on Shabbos must be the melacha of מכה בפטיש, literally “striking with a hammer.”
After all, when a hammer is used constructively, it will usually be used as part of other forbidden categories of work, such a building, and when it used to destroy things with no positive intention, it will usually be מקלקל (a destructive action,) which is only rabbinically prohibited .
Yet this is indeed list in the Mishna (Shabbos 73a) as one of the 39 categories of work forbidden on shabbos, and it is essential to understand what it is.
The Mishna on our daf lists this melacho as one of those which has no minimum quantity required for liability.
Rashi gives both a general rule and an example of this melacha.
He gives the example of the hammer blow given to a stone by those who hew stones, after it has been cut out of the rock but not completely detached .
The stone is then hit with a hammer which causes it to detach and fall from the rock surface.
This is the final stage in the act of hewing a stone, and Rashi then tells us the general rule that the final stage of any melacha makes up the melacha of מכה בפטיש . He told us this rule back on daf 73a as well.
In truth though, numerous difficulties can be raised with both the rule and the example.
Firstly, as Tosfos points out, a forbidden category of melacha needs to involve an action performed in the work of the mishkan, and no quarry work was involved in that at all ( there were no stones in the mishkan, and constructing an altar from hewn stone was actually forbidden- note also how the Aron, Menorah, and Shulchan were all made of one single piece of beaten gold, and NOT of anything that had been cut into parts and then joined together !)
Secondly, if מכה בפטיש is the final stage of any מלאכה, surely it is already included in that מלאכה itself , and why should it get its own category? Does that mean that any melacha done from start to finish would incur two punishments , one for that particularly מלאכה , and one for completing it ? If so, one would expect that to be discussed .
However, this definition of מכה בפטיש does not originate with Rashi, but actually goes back to the Talmud itself (Shabbos 75b) where Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira both tell us that anything that involves completing a מלאכה is מכה בפטיש.
Tosfos appropriately does not disagree with the rule cited by Rashi, but chooses rather an example that did take place in the work of the mishkan , namely the final hammer blow given to strenghen the vessels of the mishkan once they were ready .
Does this melacha perhaps apply to the final act in a creative process even if that process does not involve a forbidden melacha ?
If so , where do we see such an example – after all, if it is a creative act of work that wasn’t in the mishkan, it will usually be included in the toladot of that melacha .
The key might lie in a Yerushalmi often quoted by our teacher, haGaon haRav Osher Weiss שליט”א ( various teshuvos on electricity in מנחת אשר חלק 1 וחלק 3 for example )
The Yerushalmi (Shabbos perek 7/ halocha 2) accounts that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish spent 3 and a half years studying the matter of 39 melachos.
They found 39 Tolados ( derivatives) of each melacha.
Whatever melacha they were able to fit into one of those, they included in one of those .
Those that they could not include in one of those were included in מכה בפטיש .
It seems clear from this Yerushalmi that there exists NO melacha that is not forbidden on shabbos.
Every possible melacha, however it is defined, either falls under one of the 39 categories, their derivatives , or the מלאכה of מכה בפטיש.
Rav Weiss himself suggests the relatively radical idea that for this reason, any activation of an electric circuit fits under the prohibition of מכה בפטיש .
Although the Bavli gave a different definition, namely גמר מלאכה, and the rule is that one does not follow the Yerushalmi when it contradicts the Bavli, he contends that it is possible that the Bavli did not mean to exclude these “left out” melachot from מכה בפטיש but simply to also include the completion of any melacha .
However, as he himself is fully aware, many poskim before him rejected this possibility, and were most likely fully aware of this Yerushalmi.
Far from me with my barely existent understanding of the subject to argue, but those who do not follow this view regarding electricity have all these Poskim to rely on ( of course, electricity remains forbidden for numerous possible other reasons given, but there could be many נ”מ)
Perhaps what the Yerushalmi really means is that COMPLETING any melacha, even one that doesn’t fit into the forbidden categories, is still forbidden because of מכה בפטיש .
However it follows from this classification that unlike other melachot, some of which one could transgress just by doing some or most thereof ( even if one is sometimes exempt due to “בעשותה” ) , one would have to actually complete the goal of these “left out” melachot in order to transgress.
If one learns this way, there is no disagreement between the bavli and the Yerushalmi at all- מכה בפטיש indeed includes all “left all” melachos , but only the completion of them.
In fact, it is also stated in the same halacha on the Yerushalmi that גמר מלאכה is מכה בפטיש,
Admittedly, this might not be the simplest reading of the Yerushalmi, but it allows for a simpler reading of the Bavli and also avoids the need to say that the Bavli and Yerushalmi have such a basic difference in understanding the melacha, one that the Rishonim do not seem to mention at all ( though see the Rambam , for example in Pirush haMishnayos to perek 7 which Rav Osher suggests as a support for his words .)
Of course , we would now have to test all the examples given in the gemara of this melacha, as well as those on our daf that Rav and Shmuel argue about, before we can really see if this thesis can stand its ground .
We would also need to define exactly what מלאכה is , and what kind of גמר מלאכה is meant by the Gemara- is it the completion of any melacha, just the completion of a כלי, or just the completion of a מלאכה not already included in the 39.
Lots of work to do, but its late …
Shabbos 100 Relative versus objective movement
Shabbos 100 Relative versus objective movement
On this daf, we have a number of interesting discussions that touch on physics and make an impact on the laws of shabbos.
One of the recurring themes in this Masechta is that in order to transgress the biblical prohibitions of transferring an item from one domain to another, one has to both lift it up from one domain and put it down at rest in the other.
If the item never comes to rest in the forbidden domain, one will generally only have transgressed a rabbinical prohibition at a maximum. (One exception is the rule of קלוטה כמי שהונחה דמי according to some opinions in the Gemara.)
We are told that if one draws water from one domain and puts it down in another on top of water (such as in a river or pond) , even though the water actually mixes and flows with the other water and never “rests”, its is considered to have rested, as this is the way of water.
Rashi adds that if one were to pickup or splash water from a body of water, it would similarly be considered uprooting it, even though it was never really at rest.
Water by its nature is constantly moving (unless absorbed by a solid) and that is halachically considered its natural state of rest!
In contrast, if one picks up a solid item such as a nut from one domain and puts it down in another domain on top of water, so that it flows on the surface of the water, and never rests, one is exempt from the biblical prohibition, as the solid never comes to its natural state of rest, which is a state of stillness.
Rava then asks an interesting related question:
What would happen if our famous nut is picked up from one domain and placed inside a container floating down a stream of water in another domain?
The item is at rest in the vessel, but the basket is moving with the water.
Is this considered to be an act of הנחה (putting to rest) the nut, seeing as it is stationary relative to the container it is in, or is it considered not to be at rest, seeing as it is inside a moving container?
By Rashi’s extension, we could then also ask whether lifting up the item is considered an act of uprooting, seeing as the item is in its natural state of stillness within the vessel, or whether it considered as if it always was moving, seeing as it was inside a moving vessel!
The Gemara leaves this question unresolved.
What exactly is the uncertainly of the Gemora?
It seems clear that the doubt concerns whether an item’s halachik state of rest or movement is defined in absolute terms, or relative to the surface it is dependent on for support.
On the one hand, it seems that this status must be relative- after all, all items and beings at “rest” on the surface of the Earth, are essentially only at rest relative to the Earth- in more “objective” terms, they are all moving at an incredible speed around the Earth’s axis as well as around the sun!
Yet halacha considers such items or people to be fully at rest.
However, if one takes a closer look, there is another possible reason why this is so.
Perhaps in general, halacha defines “at rest” as objectively “at rest”, unless the items’ natural state is to be in constant movement, like water.
Seeing as the natural state of anything on the surface of this planet is to be moving with the planet, that too is considered its natural state of rest.
However, it is not the natural state of a nut to be inside a vessel floating down the river- perhaps in such a case, we go by an item’s objective state, and thus do not consider it to be still but rather moving!
To formulate this in more formal Brisker format:
Is the reason why an item at rest on the surface of the Earth is halachically considered to be “at rest” because
i. Halacha goes by relative state, not objective state, and relative to the Earth, it is indeed at rest, just like a nut inside a container floating down a river is at rest relative to container it is in.
ii. Halacha usually goes by objective state, but just like water’s natural state of rest is a state of movement, so to any terrestrial item’s natural state of rest is one of moving with the sun.
The Nafka Minah (practical difference) would be that now infamous nut inside the container:
If option 1 is correct, then the nut will indeed be considered to be at rest, even though the container it is in is moving.
If, on the other hand, option 2 is correct, the nut will be considered to be moving and NOT at rest, unlike a terrestrial item that moves with the earth.
The next question of the Gemara is about two liquids with different densities on top of one another, such as oil and wine.
Is this considered like a solid on top of a liquid, or a liquid on top of a liquid.
There is no time left for this fascinating issue today, but it raises a very interesting question:
What happens when water of one density is transferred to a body of water of different density in a different domain?
Sound Impossible? Then you obviously haven’t been to the “Meeting of the waters” in Brazil!
But I leave that for further discussion- hint: color….
One other curveball- I have assumed in this analysis that Chazal were aware/believed that the Earth revolves around its orbit and/or around the sun. Is this a fair assumption, or way off track?
Shabbos 99 Defining the public domain, and the great Eruv controversy
Shabbos 99 Defining the public domain, and the great Eruv controversy
In the first chapter (Shabbos 6a), we were introduced to the 4 רשויות (domains) of Shabbos, roughly as follows:
- רשות היחד
(private domain)- an area at least 4 טפחים (hand-breadths) wide that is either raised at least 10אמות (arm-lengths) above the ground, surrounded by partitions of that height, or sunken into the ground at that depth. - רשות הרבים
- large and busy thoroughfares and markets, and מבואות (quieter side streets) that open to them
- כרמלית
( some examples given there are the sea, open valleys and a כרמלית proper, but this is generally understood to mean a place that is too open to be a private domain and too quite to be a public domain. - מקום פטור
an exempt area.
We are also told that transferring an item from a private domain to a public domain, vice-versa, or 4 Amos within a public domain is a biblical offense.
On the other hand, transferring an item from either a private or public domain to a Carmelis or vice-versa, or transferring an item 4 Amos within a Carmelis, is only a rabbinical prohibition.
Although obviously we treat rabbinical prohibitions very seriously, we have mentioned numerous times that there are still certain leniencies with them that do not apply to biblical prohibitions, one of them being the idea of a שבות דשבות , an action that is only rabbinically prohibited for two separate reasons.
Such things, are permitted for the sake of Mitzva, great need, or to prevent suffering, at least when done by a non-Jew, and according to some opinions, even when done by a Jew (see earlier posts on שבות דשבות)
An example could be asking a non-Jew to carry or transfer something in, into or from a Carmelis, or according to the more lenient views, by a Jew in an unusual way in or into a Carmelis.
Pulling a pram with a child that is able to walk on his own inside a Carmelis could also be such an example, due to the rule of חי נושא את עצמו (a living person carries himself), perhaps to be discussed in another post.
Another important distinction would be in the case of a ספק (doubt) if an action is forbidden or not – the golden rule being that in doubt regarding a biblical rule, we need to err on the side of stringency, but when it comes to a biblical rule, we may be lenient out of doubt.
Perhaps the most important distinction between a רשות הרבים and a כרמלית is in the laws of Eruvin, which largely rely on the fact that the Eruv is made in an area in which it is only rabbinically forbidden to carry, such as a Carmelis, and not a רשות הרבים, where making an Eruv is far more problematic.
As such, accurately being able to tell the difference between a רשות הרבים and a כרמלית is essential and makes a major impact on daily shabbos life.
As usual, the main factors we consider in this distinction, are the properties of the דגלי מדבר (the biblical encampment of Israel), which are the basis for the מלאכה of הוצאה being performed in the work of the Mishkan, and thus qualifying as a forbidden category of work.
3 of the most commonly accepted distinctions between the two, are as follows:
- A רשות הרבים needs to be at least 16 Amos wide, like the space in which the wagons passed (5 for each wagon, 5 for the space between them plus one extra for the Levi, as per our daf!)
- A רשות הרבים must be open, not even covered at the top by a roof, as per the camp of Israel.
- A רשות הרבים needs to have at least 600,000 people, like the population in the camp of Israel.
The first condition, namely the minimum width, is universally accepted, and based on an explicit statement on our daf, as well as in a Mishna (Bava Basra 99b), which according to Rashi, has its source in the reasoning mentioned on our daf.
The second condition has actually been the matter of debate on the previous daf, but seems to be the consensus of the poskim.
In contrast, the third condition has been and remains the subject of MUCH controversy.
On the one hand, there is NO specific source for this requirement in the Gemara.
It is only in some of the (mainly) Ashkenazi Rishonim (early commentators) that we see this requirement.
Although this could be a logical extension of the comparison to the biblical encampment, as mentioned above, as Rashi explicitly says (Rashi, Eruvin 6a) , it actually seems to be contradicted by our daf, which tells us that the ground underneath the wagons was considered a רשות הרבים – it is kind of hard to imagine 600000 people fitting into that space!
It is also a rather difficult suggestion, given that there were only 600000 men in the biblical camp, but far more people when women and children are included- as such, if we going for this rule, lets go even further and make the minimum number far higher! (see Tosfos Eruvin 6a who brings and resolves these difficulties.)
As such, the (mainly) Sephardi Rishonim, such as the Rambam (Shabbos 14/1), Ramban, and others (see Beit Yosef 345 for a list) , do not mention this requirement at all, and it remains a major debate to this day (see Shulchan Aruch 345/7 who brings both opinions, the more lenient one only as a יש אומרים (secondary opinion.)
In practice, mainstream Ashkenazi practice is to treat cities, or even neighborhoods within cities, that do not have at least 600000 people , as a כרמלית , and to allow regular simple Eruvin in such places (see for example Taz O.C. 345/6) , though there are certainly some Ashkenazim who, like many of their Sephardi brethren, are stringent.
For more, see for example Aruch haShulchan 345/14 for a lengthy treatment on this controversy in the Ashkenazi world, and compare Birkei Yosef with Yalkut Yosef on the same siman regarding what normative Sephardi practice should be.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters
Shabbos 98 Miracles and technical matters
את חטאי אני מזכיר היום
I have admitted before that technical matters are not my strong point, and like many others, I usually tend to glide over the more technical sections of the Tanach and Talmud, without really understanding what is going on.
Hence, when it comes to Parshas Teruma, and other similarly styled parshiyos , I have a particularly hard time getting though the required weekly שניים במקרא ואחד תרגום (reading the weekly portion twice in Hebrew and once in the Aramaic translation/commentary of Onkelus.)
The depth of the technical descriptions of the makeup and precise dimensions of the Mishkan and its vessels simply are not recognized easily by me, and even when they are , the required level of focus and mental visualization usually proves too much for me- I thus usually land up making do with a quick leining- style reading and move on to the more conceptual or contemporary topics that seem to match my talent set better.
However, one takes oneself with wherever one goes, and such human weaknesses always come back to haunt us, not only each year, but also whenever we get to parts of the Talmud that analyze these matters, which given the nature of the Shas, can pop up in the most unexpected places.
Seeing as so much of the laws of Shabbos are derived from the work of the Mishkan, it is inevitable that at some point, they will lead back to the technical descriptions in the relevant verses of the same.
Our daf is one of those moments, and a discussion of whether a public domain covered by a roof is similar enough to the public domains in the biblical camp of Israel to be considered as such regarding the law of passing and carrying, takes us to a discussion of the wagons that were used to transport the components of the Mishkan, in particular its beams, and status of the enclosed space between them.
This in turn takes us to a discussion of the properties of the beams themselves and the bars that reinforce them, which brings us to a rather cryptic passuk that describes the central bar.
Each beam was 10 Amos (handbreadths) tall, 1.5 Amos wide, and 1 Amah thick (at least at the base.)
20 beams thus made up the 30 Amos length of the Mishkan on both the North and South side.
Another 6 beams made up the 10 Amos width, with 2 other beams on either side to fill the gaps.
Various bars were placed along the length of the planks, with one central bar in the middle.
The passuk tells us (Shmos 26/28) “והבריח התכון בתוך הקרשים מבריח מן הקצה אל הקצה” (and the main bar in the midst of the beams should run from one end to another.)
The simple meaning of this verse seems to imply that the wooden bar ran all the way from the south-eastern corner of the Mishkan, to the north-eastern corner, making a perfect right-angled turn twice along the way, a somewhat challenging if not impossible task for any carpenter, as Rashi on our daf points out.
So much so, that a Beraisa teaches that the middle bar of the Mishkan was put and held in place miraculously!
Tosfos, however, quotes the ר”י (Rabbeinu Yitchak, one of the leading Tosafists, who brings another Midrash that holds there was no miracle here at all.
It explains simply that the 2 lower and 2 upper rows of beams each contained 5 separate beams- One went from the south-east corner half -way down the southern wall of the Mishkan, another from there till the south-west corner. Another then covered the western wall, and the other two similarly covered the northern wall.
The main “beam”, in contrast, consisting of only 3 separate beams, one for each of the 3 walls, and when the passuk says that it went from one end to the other, it means from one end of each wall to the other end of the same wall, not along the entirety of the 3 walls!
Whereas this is far from the simple meaning of the verse, and requires one to interpret “the main beam” as the 3 “main beams of each wall”, as well as the “5 beams” of each side as the “5 sets of beams of the southern and northern side and one set of beams of the western side”, it allows us to explain this completely naturally without resorting to a miracle.
This seems to illustrate that the debate over how common miracles are and whether to try and interpret seemingly miraculous descriptions in the sacred texts in a natural way where possible, commonly largely ascribed to the Rambam and the Ramban (for another post) , is in fact a much older debate, amongst the sages themselves!
Another example of this can be found in the story of Rav Huna and his wine cellar (Brachos 5b)
The Gemara tells how a financial tragedy befell Rav Huna (who seems to have been either a wine merchant or a very serious collector), where 400 barrels of wine went rancid (turned to vinegar.)
On visiting him to, two other Amoraim respectfully advised him to investigate his financial affairs to see if he had done something to deserve this huge loss.
After some debate, he admits to something seemingly rather minor (and perhaps not even strictly forbidden-another post some time bli neder) and commits to making it right.
One opinion then tells us that that a miracle took place and the vinegar turned back into wine!
Another narrative is then suggested that it did not really turn back into wine, the price of vinegar simply went up and matched the price of wine!
While the later case shows a debate as to whether the reward he received was through a supernatural miracle, or an unlikely natural event that took place at the precise time it was needed, also a form of miracle, albeit a natural one, we again see two different views regarding whether to interpret events as supernatural miracles, or to explain them in a natural way where possible!
When one studies the original Talmudic sources in depth and breadth, rather than just reading summaries of far-reaching debates and controversies amongst the Rishonim and even contemporary authorities , one often sees how the debate can be traced back much further than one originally thought.
The later Amoraim after do that with a dispute amongst earlier Amoraim, with the claim of כתנאי (claiming that this argument is actually based on an earlier debate amongst the Mishnaic sages)
Is there any reason why we should not attempt to do the same with the disputes amongst the Rishonim?!
Shabbos 97 False Accusations and justifiable censorship
On this daf, we continue dealing with a fascinating מחלוקת (disagreement) between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira, regarding the identity of the מקושש (the person found guilty of gathering wood on Shabbos.)
Every cheider kid will tell you that there is no question here- it was obviously צלפחד, the man whose daughters were later granted his estate.
However, nowhere in the text of the Torah is his identity mentioned, and it is Rabbi Akiva, who derives it from a גזירה שוה (an orally transmitted tradition hinted at by use of similar language in the text.)
This identification of the מקושש as צלפחד seemed so radical to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira, that he rebuked Rabbi Akiva with the argument that if he was wrong, he was guilty of false accusations, and even if he was right, he was guilty of revealing information that the Torah had chosen not to reveal!
The Gemara questions how Rabbi Yehuda could take issue with Rabbi Akiva, given that a גזירה שוה is a legitimate form of interpreting the Torah, and in fact, anything derived from one is considered as if it was actually written in the Torah explicitly!
The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yehuda ben Baseira had not received that גזירה שוה in his oral tradition from his Rabbi.
The nature of דרשות in general, and a גזירה שוה in particular, could make an essential study in its own right, perhaps in a later post, but for today, I wish to focus on the 2 things that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira accused (irony noted) Rabbi Akiva of doing, i.e.
i. Possibly falsely accusing צלפחד of something he never did
ii. Possibly revealing the identity of the מקושש when the Torah had chosen to cover it up.
The Gemara proceeds to record a similar debate, where Rabbi Akiva claims that Aharon was punished the same as Miriam for speaking lashon haRah about Moshe, and became a מצורע (lepor) too.
Once again, Rabbi Yehuda rebukes him for either spreading falsehood about the righteous Aharon or revealing the fact that he was equally implicated and punished, when for some reason the Torah had chosen to cover it up.
The Gemara later on brings Reish Lakish who claims that Moshe Rabbeinu himself was afflicted with צרעת on his hand because he had falsely suspected the Jewish people of not being open to listening to his message- He learns from this a general rule that anyone who falsely suspects an innocent person will suffer physical afflictions on his body.
The Navi Yeshayahu too, appears to have fallen prey to this sin during his initiation as a Navi (Yeshayahu 6/5), when he accuses the nation of being a nation with impure lips- We see there as well that the angel strikes him on his mouth as a punishment.
Those who have learnt Brachos might also recall the famous story with Chana and Eli (Brachos 31b) where he accused her falsely of being drunk, and she responded that he needed to bless her in compensation.
There too, we see reference to the biblical case of a Sotah, who if falsely accused by her husband of adultery, is blessed with having children (Bamidbar 5/12.)
It is important to note that Rabbi Akiva does not in any way minimize the severity of false accusations, or revealing what the Torah covered up- he simply has a received oral tradition that his facts were correct, and thus also believed the Torah had never covered them up.
While anyone who has ever been falsely accused of anything can testify to what a crushing experience it is, It is also important to note that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira rebuked Rabbi Akiva for this in two cases where the relevant person was already dead and would not suffer the results of the accusation, at least as we livings humans do (what the dead do or don’t feel is another subject- you might recall the discussion on this in מי שמתו)
It seems that this would thus apply even more so to falsely accusing someone who is still alive (though one could also argue to the contrary, the living are able to defend their own reputation, but the dead cannot.)
Yet surely there is also a time when one needs to take the risk of falsely accusing someone?
The case of a Sotah is a clear example of this- the accusation is allowed, and the woman subjected to a very unpleasant procedure, and if it is false, she is compensated.
If there is compelling evidence that someone is a dishonest in business, even if it cannot yet be proven in court, is it not necessary to take the risk of publicizing this in order to protect others, and later compensate him if the proof is found wanting?
If there is compelling evidence that someone is a child molestor, is it not necessary to first warn people to keep their children away from, and later compensate him if the evidence is found to be lacking?
As to the second rebuke of Rabbi ben Beteira, is he really discouraging freedom of reporting? Does he really suggest that terrible travesties should not be publicized by those who know about him, because the authorities that be have decided to cover them up?
This question is extremely complex and lies at the heart of the way Jewish leaders need to deal with such things. It is certainly not solvable in the few lines that make up this essay, and requires, amongst much else, a thorough analysis of the idea of חושש מבעי (although one may not believe lashon haRah, one may sometimes take it into account in order to prevent harm- see Niddah 61a and Chafetz Chaim/Lashon haRah 6.)
However, it seems clear that one must very carefully weigh the damage done to the victim of possible false accusations against the damage that could be done to innocent people if the charges are true.
Sages like Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira knew how to make these calls. In the case of the Sotah, we had the miraculous bitter waters to make the call for us- for us, it is much harder.
Similarly, there are times that it is constructive to publicize the confirmed sins of people, particularly great people, for the public good- Yet there are also times that such revelations are not constructive.
The Torah is certainly the supreme authority over such decisions and can hardly be accused of covering up the sins of great people, as any biblical student can attest.
During the times that the Torah does choose not to publicize something, it is not for us to reveal it, and we must assume that doing so is not sufficiently constructive to justify it.
This fits in well with the fact that lashon haRah is forbidden even if it true unless there is justifiable benefit to spreading it.
Our great prophets and sages struggled with these choices and sometimes even they failed.
How much more so must those of us responsible for such decisions in our time, relate to them with great trepidation and after coming to a rational halacha based decision, daven hard שלא תבוא תקלה על ידי (that no damage should be caused by my decision.)
Shabbos 96 הוצאה – the inferior מלאכה that rules the roost.
If you would ask any semicha student which of the מלאכות ( forbidden categories of shabbos work) are the most complex, my bet would be that it would be a tough choice between בשול ( cooking ) and הוצאה (transferring.)
If that student had extended his usual semicha studies to include ערובין , it would become a no brainer- הוצאה would definitely scoop the prize .
This is the only one of the מלאכות that takes up virtually an entire masechta ( Eruvin) , as well as at least 4 full chapters of Shabbos.
It is also one of the only 2 מלאכות ( I stand to be corrected ) that gets it own source:
- the מלאכה of הבערה ( lighting a fire) is specifically mentioned (Shmos 35/3) – לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת ( You may not kindle a fire in any of your dwelling places on the Sabbath day .)
Chazal debate why it is singled out and their are 2 major approaches to this (הבערה ללאו יצאת או הבערה לחלק יצאת) , but thats not for this post. - Our Gemara asks where the source is that הוצאה is forbidden on shabbos, and brings a passuk ויעבירו קול במחנה (Shmos 36/6) , an instruction to stop bringing ( transferring) things for the Mishkan.
Given that we are already aware from various sugyos that we have studied that the source for all the מלאכות is the verse “You shall not do any מלאכה ” and the proximity of the verse that discusses Shabbos to the one that discusses the משכן (sanctuary) , teaches us that the מלאכות referred to in the prohibition are those that were done in the work of the משכן.
In our very Mishna, this same idea is applied to the מלאכה of הוצאה to explain why passing something from one private domain to another through a public domain is forbidden yet throwing is not, according to Chachamim ( Rabbi Akiva of course disagrees and forbids throwing as well- welcome to הזורק! )
In chapter 4 of our Masechta (Shabbos 49b) , it also specifically mentioned that both הוצאה ( literally taking out ) and its תולדה ( derivative ) הכנסה ( bringing in ) , are derived from what was done in the Mishkan.
As such, the question screaming out at us is why do we need a separate passuk to teach us the prohibition of הוצאה and its תולדות of הכנסה, זריקה, etc , when it was already one of the 39 מלאכות done in the Mishkan and is indeed derived from there too!
Tosfos on the first daf of the Masechta ( Shabbos 2a ” פשט” ) , deals with this question at length, and focuses on the idea that הוצאה is a מלאכה גרועה ( inferior מלאכה ).
This seems to be because unlike most מלאכות where an actual physical change ( usually an improvement) is made in the object the מלאכה is applied to, transferring an item from one domain to another does not have any physical affect at all- it remains the same item as it was before.
Tosfos points out that it is so questionable whether this should even qualify as a מלאכה that transferring from one adjoining private domain to another is completely permitted on a biblical level while transferring from a private domain to a public domain is forbidden, despite their similarity in terms of the action done!
The question that still bothers Tosfos though, is the converse .
If we already know that הוצאה is forbidden from a separate verse despite it being a מלאכה גרועה , then why does our Mishna and other sugyos have to show that it was done in the Mishkan ?
He answers with the radical idea that had we not been able to show that הוצאה was indeed one of the מלאכות in the Mishkan, we would have learnt from the passuk that explicitly forbids it that ANY melacha like action, (perhaps even a weak one like הוצאה) , is forbidden on shabbos, even if it was NOT done in the Mishkan !
We thus need a separate passuk to teach us that even though it is a מלאכה גרועה, it is still included in the prohibition with its sister melachot that were done in the Mishkan, but we need the fact that it was in fact done in the Mishkan to save the famous rule that only מלאכות done in the Mishkan are in fact forbidden !
It thus comes as a leniency rather than a stringency as we thought .
But what would we have done with the דרשה that derives the forbidden מלאכות from the משכן due to proximity of verses ?
Tosfos suggests that this would have simply been used to teach us something else , perhaps a fascinating statement about how he views the world of דרשות in general , but thats for another time perhaps …
Lets take a minute go consider how far-reaching this suggestion is- The golden rule that we always take for granted about the connection between the Mishkan and Shabbos would have come tumbling down in a moment had Chazal not shown that this “inferior Melacha” was also done on the Mishkan!
There is another, philosophical lesson, I would like to learn from this .
What seems to us like the weakest of Melacho, one that has NO physical impact on the item at all, to the point that it needs its own unique prohibition, has become the Melacha which our Masechta opened up with, that occupies 2 of the longest and most complex chapters of the Masechta, and also gets its own entire Masechta virtually to itself !
Despite the emphasis placed on the laws of לשון הרע ( gossip) and אונאת דברים (offending people ), in practise , we still often tend to harbour the mistaken belief that ” sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never harm me .”
So long as one doesn’t actually physically hurt a person, it is OK to hurt him emotionally, after all emotions cannot be seen or measured !
Yet the message of this מלאכה is precisely the opposite.
If a constructive action that involves no physical improvement to an item can not only be considered מלאכת מחשבת , a significant form of work, but even dominate all the other מלאכות in the time spent studying it , how much more so should we focus on the significance of non physical damage that appears to be less significant, but in fact, can be as damaging , or even more so, than physical actions, , as we know from the innocent lives that have been utterly ruined by lashon harah.
Shabbos 95 Wearing make-up on Shabbos
On the previous daf, our Mishna taught us a list of various things that Rabbi Eliezer considers to be biblically forbidden on Shabbos, and subject to the appropriate punishment, and which the Chachamim only consider to be rabbinically forbidden (שבות)
One of these things is כוחלת, painting her eye-lashes blue.
The Gemara suggests that the reason Rabbi Eliezer considers this a biblically punishable offense is because it is a form of כותב (writing.)
Rashi explains that this is because she uses the paint-stick to circle her eye like one who writes a letter with a pen.
The Gemara rejects this explanation because that is not a normal way to write and concludes at the beginning of our daf that it is because of צובע, the melacha of dyeing/painting.
It then brings a Beraita that says similarly that it is forbidden for a woman to put סרק (red coloring) on her face, because of צובע.
As the halacha usually follows the majority of Chachamim, it seems that we should rule like Chachamim that this is only a rabbinical transgression or שבות.
However, the Rambam (Shabbos 23/12) seems to rule like Rabbi Eliezer, but also like the Gemara’s first suggestion, that it is forbidden as it is like writing!
Whereas one might possibly interpret the Rambam’s wording to mean that it is considered rabbinically like writing ( a look in the Achronim shows that both interpretations are well represented) , it is still bizarre that he rules like a rejected suggestion in the Gemara.
This becomes even stranger when we see that in the previous chapter, (Shabbos 23,22), he ruled that using סרק is forbidden because it is like painting!
The Masores haShas, uncharacteristically comments on the Rambam he points to, and refers us to various Rishonim relevant to this.
Also, Rabbeinu Chananel, one of the earliest of the Rishonim (early commentators) ,actually rules explicitly like Rabbi Eliezer- his reasoning is that seeing as the Rabbis of the Gemara spend time debating his reasoning, it seems like they rule like him, and even though some say that the Halacho follows Chachamim, it makes more sense to rule like Rabbi Eliezer seeing as it is a possible אסור דאורייתא (biblical prohibition.)
Despite the above, both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 303) rule that it is forbidden because of צובע, as per the conclusion of the Gemara, and the consensus of the Achronim (see Beit Yoseif, Mishna Beruru, Aruch haShulchan etc) is that it is only rabbinically prohibited, in accordance with the view of the Chachamim.
It seems clear from the above, that using make-up or lipstick on Shabbos is a rabbinical prohibition, and as such, may clearly not be done, and this is the general consensus amongst poskim.
However, it might be that given certain social or family dynamics, a woman living in a less observant community feels that putting on make-up or lipstick is a great need, and that not doing so causes her great suffering, and perhaps even to be mocked by her less religious friends and relatives.
Even in fully observant communities, many women simply feel very uncomfortable being seen without make-up, and without a solid halachik way, might chas vesholom come to the rely on less permissible ways of putting it on .
It would seem reasonable to suggest that she should then be permitted to put it on with a שנוי ( in an unusual way), at least according to the views (see previous post) that a שבות דשבות is permitted even by a Jew for the sake of a Mitzva.
As this would be rabbinic for two separate reasons:
- Coloring the skin is not considered real צובע, but just a שבות
- Any melacha with a shinui is only derabonen (rabbinically forbidden)
This would be even less problematic if she uses short-term make-up that doesn’t last long, as it could also be considered דבר שאין מתקים (a melacha whose affect doesn’t last), and might never even have been included in the גזירה to start out with.
It would go we thought saying that it would have to be a texture that doesn’t involve the prohibition of ממרח (smearing ), which semi solid creams and lipsticks usually do ( here too though , if it isn’t thick enough to be ממרח דאורייתא, the שבות דשבות rule with a שנוי might also help!)
While I find my reasoning appealing, I have not found any major poseik who has made this suggestion, and in any case, these posts are not meant as halachik rulings, so anyone with a learning background who finds my suggestion convincing, should discuss it with an expert poseik.
In practise, with the development of various types of shabbos friendly makeup, and the increased sensitivity to halacha in many communities, this is probably less of an issue than it once was .
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 94 שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל – a double derabonen by a Yisroel
Shabbos 94 שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל – a double derabonen by a Yisroel
One of the most powerful leniencies on Shabbos, is the rule of a שבות דשבות, an action which is only rabbinically prohibited for 2 different reasons.
The most common application of this applies to work done by a non-Jew on Shabbos for a Jew.
In general, it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to perform a forbidden task for a Jew on Shabbos. According to most opinions, this is a rabbinical prohibition, which I hope to discuss in a later post.
However, one is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform something that is only rabbinically prohibited, for example to move something that is Muktza, or perform a forbidden melacha in an unusual way, so long as there is a great need for this, to prevent suffering, or for the sake of a Mitzva. (This too, is not straight-forward, and I hope to devote a future post to it.)
Although subject to debate in the Rishonim, this is the generally accepted halacha, and is because this is only rabbinically forbidden, for 2 different reasons:
- אמירה לעכום (asking a non-Jew to perform forbidden work) is only rabbinically forbidden
- The actual act being requested, is also only rabbinically forbidden.
The generally accepted source for this, is a sugya in Eruvin 67 , which allows one to ask a non-Jew to bring hot water for a bris milah through a shared courtyard where an eruv has not been made. (See Rif and Ran Shabbos 56 for a long analysis and debate on this.)
The question is, however, whether this is limited to a rabbinical prohibition performed by a non-Jew, or whether a Jew would also be allowed in case of great need, to perform an action that is a שבות דשבות, for example moving Muktza in an unusual way, or two people turning on a light in an unusual way.
In order to answer this question, one would either need to prove that whatever Chazal’s reason for this leniency is equally applicable to a שבות דשבות performed by a Jew, or find a specific case in the Gemara where a שבות דשבות by a Jew is permitted.
On the other hand, should we find a case where a שבות דשבות by a Jew is not permitted, even for the sake of a Mitzva, great need, or suffering, one would be forced to either prove that this is an exception or a non-authoritative view, or conclude that שבות דשבות is not permitted for a Jew.
I have been trying for many years to find a concrete example of what might be an example of שבות דשבות by a Jew that is permitted, within the Gemara.
Today’s daf got me extremely excited, at least for a minute!
We are told that there was a corpse in the town of Darukra, that Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak permitted to be moved to a Carmelis (an open area that is not closed enough to be a private domain and not busy enough to be a public domain.)
This action seems to be a clear example of what we are looking for, a שבות דשבות done by a Jew!
- It is mentioned just after we have analyzed the view of Rabbi Shimon that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (A Melacha where the usual result is not needed- another post to look forward to!) is only rabbinically forbidden. As the corpse is not needed, but merely needs to be removed, this would be one reason that this is only rabbinically forbidden.
- It was taken to a כרמלית, which is also only Rabbinically prohibited!
It seems that we have our case!
The trick, however, comes in how we learn the continuation of the sugya!
Rabbi Yochanan, brother of Mar son of Ravina, challenges Rav Nachman bar Yitchak on his leniency.
He says that even if one holds like Rabbi Simon that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is only rabbinically prohibited (פטור אבל אסור), that does not make it permitted!
It seems clear that the challenger does not see a difference between one שבות or a שבות דשבות if it is done by a Jew, or the question would not be relevant- it would be true that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is at least rabbinically forbidden, but Rav Nachman bar Yitchak only permitted it to be moved to a כרמלית, which is also only דרבנן, and thus permitted as a שבות דשבות.
At this stage, one might still argue that Rav Nachman bar Yitchak himself does differentiate and permits a שבות דשבות even by a Jew.
However, if that were the case, one would expect him to reply accordingly.
Instead, he replies that even his challenger would permit this case, and even if he held like Rabbi Yehuda that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופא is biblically forbidden (i.e. Only one שבות is involved.)
This is because of the rule that כבוד הבריות (human dignity) over-rides any rabbinical prohibition, and seeing as this was only to a כרמלית , which is only rabbinically prohibited, it was permitted.
It seems from his reply that the reason he permitted this was NOT because of a general rule that שבות דשבות is permitted for any mitzva, or great need, but because of the התיר of כבוד הבריות that applies to any שבות, even if it isn’t a שבות דשבות.
Before I give up and acknowledge that this sugya is thus not a proof that שבות דשבות על ידי ישראל is permitted, but rather could be a proof that it is not, I make one final argument:
Perhaps, Rav Nachman’s reply is not meant to deny the permissibility of שבות דשבות על-ידי ישראל , which likely is his initial motivation for his decision.
Maybe, he is merely bringing the less controversial התיר of כבוד הבריות to answer his challenger and to show that even his challenger, and even Rabbi Yehuda himself, would also have no reason to oppose his reason!
Much more to discuss, but that’s it for tonight….
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.
Shabbos 93 שנים שעשו A melacha performed by 2 people
Shabbos 93 שנים שעשו A melacha performed by 2 people
As mentioned yesterday, I would like to focus today on an extremely practical leniency in the laws of Shabbos- the exemption of a melacha done by 2 people.
This rules takes us all the way back to the beginning of the Masechta, where we learnt that in order to be forbidden biblically and liable to a korban (or מיתה or כרת if done knowingly) for transferring something on Shabbos from one domain to another, one has to both uproot the object from the one domain and put it down in the other.
Someone who does only one of these actions, has performed a rabbinical prohibition, not a biblical one, and is exempt from the biblically prescribed punishment.
A question that might have still been left open during the many daf that discussed this rule, is what the source is for this exemption!
One possibility is that it is simply another manifestation of the general rule that a biblically prohibited Melacha must be considered מלאכת מחשבת, an important, calculated, and significant act of work.
One could argue that if one only performed part of the action, leaving the rest for someone else to complete, one’s action is simply not מלאכת מחשבת.
On our daf, we face a different, though possibly related, exemption.
Here, two people perform a Melacha together, such as writing with the same quilt, or carrying the same item from one domain to another.
In this case, we are faced with 3 opinions:
-Rabbi Meir is of the view that one is liable
-Rabbi Yehuda is of the view that so long as neither of them could have managed the action on their own, they are exempt. Otherwise, they are liable.
– Rabbi Shimon is of the view that even if each of them could have managed the action on their own, they are still exempt.
The Gemara derives these 3 views from the passuk in Vayikra which is the basis for the requirement to bring a sin offering:
ואם נפש אחת תחטא בשגגה מעם הארץ בעשתה.
“and if one soul sins unknowingly from amongst the people, by doing it.”
According to Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, there 3 מעוטים (exclusions) here:
נפש (a person in the singular)
אחת (one)
בעשותה performing it, ie ALL of the transgression)
Rabbi Yehuda uses one of these to exclude the case when each of them do part of the Melacha, ie either עקירה (uprooting) or הנחה (putting down), as in the first Mishna of the Masechta.
He then uses another one to exclude a case when two people perform the entire act together, when they could have done it on their own, ie our case, when two people carried a fig outside.
The third exclusion is used by him for a different matter.
Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yehuda regarding the first two exclusions and uses the third as well to exclude a case when both of them could NOT have done the action on their own.
Rabbi Meir holds that the first 2 exclusions, i.e. נפש אחת , count as 1, not 2, and only excludes the case of 2 people doing different parts of the melacha- he uses the other exclusion (בעשותה) for the same different matter Rabbi Yehuda derived from it.
It follows that both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda agree that in a case where two people perform the entire melacha together, and they could have each done it on their own, they are exempt.
The Halacha follows this majority view (see Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch on this subject), and both cases of שנים שעשו, the case where different parts of the melacha are performed by 2 different people, and our case, where an entire melacha that could have been performed by one person is done by two people together, are exempt from the biblical punishment and are only rabbinically forbidden.
It also follows from our daf that both leniencies are learnt from their own unique words in the above mentioned passuk, and not just from the requirement for מלאכת מחשבת.
Why is it important at the end of the day whether this is derived from its own passuk, or from מלאכת מחשבת?
I would like to suggest two possible practical ramifications (נ”מ):
What happens if two people perform together another forbidden action, NOT related to shabbos, that they could have both done individually?
For example, if two people together made an idol.
If the exemption was only from מלאכת מחשבת, it would only apply to shabbos, and these two would definitely be liable.
However, if the exemption is due to the independent passuk regarding the laws of sacrifices, it has no specific relation to shabbos, and should in theory also apply to other prohibitions.
Yet despite this, I am yet to see an example of the Gemara applying this exemption to prohibitions other than shabbos.
Another Nafka Minah could be regarding the leniency of שבות דשבות (an action that is only rabbinical in nature for two different reasons.)
The rule is usually, regarding shabbos at least, that such an action is permitted in case of suffering, great need, or for the sake of a Mitzva (though whether this applies to an action performed by a Jew, or only to one performed by a non-Jew is in fact subject to debate.)
If this leniency indeed applies to actions performed by a Jew as well, what happens if two people perform one action that each of them could have done on their own, in an unusual manner (שנוי)?
This action is only rabbinically prohibited for 2 reasons- it is unusual, AND 2 people have performed it instead of one.
However, if the leniency of שנים שעשו, is also, like שנוי, derived from the requirement of מלאכת מחשבת , one could argue that this is not really a שבות דשבות , but all part of the same one exemption, namely מלאכת מחשבת!
(I did put this possibility to haGaon Moreinu haRav Osher Weiss Shelita, and his gut feel was that it would still be called a שבות דשבות, but there is certainly what to explore here.)
If, on the other hand, as we have proven, the leniency of שנים שעשו comes from a completely different context than that of שנוי and other Mishkan\Meleches Machsheves related leniencies, our case would clearly be an example of a שבות דשבות , and according to those who permit this even when done by a Jew for the sake of Mitzva, great need, or to avoid suffering, this should certainly be permitted!
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