Shabbos 92 מתעסק and unintentional melacha revisited

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This Daf is packed with examples of some of the most important principles of Melocho on Shabbos, mainly based on the idea that in order to be biblically forbidden and punishable, an act has to be considered מלאכת מחשבת (a significant, important, or calculated act of work.)

Among them, are the idea that a melacha done in a significantly unusual way (שנוי) is exempt from punishment, as is the rule of two people performing a melacha that could be done by one person ( more on that tomorrow , Hashem willing .)

We have discussed before the concept of מתעסק, where someone who does not have full intention to perform the forbidden act might be exempt .

This, unlike many of the exemptions of מלאכת מחשבת, is derived ( כריתות יט.) from a specific מעוט ( exclusion) in the verse that obligates one to bring a קרבן חטאת for performing a serious transgression unknowingly – “וחטא בה פרט למתעסק” . ( interestingly enough, so is שנים שעשו, right here on the daf)

Yet , despite having its own source, the Gemara in numerous places also states that המסעסק בשבת פטור מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה המתעסק בחלבים ועריות חיב שכן נהנה – one who performs a melacha on shabbos without intention is exempt, as the Torah only forbade calculated melacha, but if one eats forbidden fats or sleeps with someone forbidden to him unintentionally, he is liable , as he has derived pleasure from it .

This seems to imply that מתעסק is yet another exemption of מלאכת מחשבת , and not an independent exemption based on its own source .

One can ask further that if the only reason מסעסק is liable by forbidden fats and עריות is because of the pleasure he gets ( a subject for analysis in its own right), then it should apply in ALL areas of halacha where pleasure is not a factor, not only on shabbos , so what is the relevance to מלאכת מחשבת , which is only an exemption on shabbos? ( see Rashi there who asks the question and takes a different approach to what I suggest below, which is more constant perhaps with other Rishonim here , for reasons outside the scope of this post, but that need to be fully studied to get an understanding of this concept.)

It stands to reason that there probably two different kinds of מתעסק or intentional melacha , one category that is exempt in all areas of halacha other than where הנאה ( pleasure) is involved , and one that is only exempt on shabbos .

For example , the classical case of מתעסק where one intends to pick up something detached from the ground and landed up picking up something connected to the ground ( see earlier post on perek 7) , is similar to intending to eating permitted fat and landing up eating forbidden fat, which would be exempt if not for the fact that he derived benefit.

It follows that there is no need for the concept of מלאכת מחשבת to exempt this, as it is covered under the blanket exemption learnt from its own source, which applies in theory to all areas of halacha.

But there is another kind of מתעסק , which we see in the main sugya in כריתות, as well as on our daf today !

This involves a case where one intends to do something that is forbidden, but lands up performing the same forbidden action on a different חפצא ( object ) than intended , or in a different manner (צורה) than intended .

One example subject to debate in the sugya in כריתות is when one intends to light or extinguish a certain candle and lands up lighting or extinguishing a different one .

In other areas of halocho, if one would intend to , for example, bow down to one idol. , and landed up bowing down to another , it is very possible that one would still be liable, seeing as one intended to do the same forbidden action, and there is no exclusion from וחטא בה .

However, on shabbos, the exemption of מלאכת מחשבת is so strong, that it requires a complete fulfillment of נתקים מחשבתו, (his intentions were fully fulfilled .)

Any deviation from this could be a reason for exemption, due to this broader form of מתעסק.

A far -reaching application on this rule is found in a Mishna on our daf!

If one intends to carry something in front of him, and lands up carrying it behind him, even though there is no lack of intent ( מתעסק) in the מעשה ( action), or even in the חפצא ( object of the action), but merely in the צורה ( manner or form of the action), one is exempt!

Rashi explains that this is a form of לא נתקיימה מחשבתו ( his intentions were not fully fulfilled ) which in turn is a form of מתעסק!

[ These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha ]

Shabbos 91 and Parshas Behaaloscha Racism, Self-Defense, and Prison Reform

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Today’s daf contains an unusually high amount of different Talmudic principles, all of which can be the subject of post after post on their own.

Among them we see again the concept of אחשביה, the idea that something (or quantity) generally not appreciated as significant by a society in general and thus not subject to the penalty for transferring on shabbos, can become significant when someone sets it aside for a useful purpose.

Besides, for being a recurring theme in our masechta regarding shabbos, we have also seen this in a recent post regarding inedible chametz on Pesach, which can become forbidden when someone chooses to eat it.

We also see the principle of בטל דעתו אצל בני אדם, ( a person’s view is nullified by the view of others), which in our case, shows that the converse DOES NOT apply- even if someone does not regard something as significant, if the majority of people do regard it as such, it is also considered significant.

And towards the end of the daf, we encounter a famous legal rule of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה (a person who does one action subject to multiple punishments, is only subject to the greater of the two.)

It is very tempting with our high, often justified, but often exaggerated, regard for the modern, western justice system, to chas veshalom view the Torah approach to justice as archaic, and even cruel chalila.

While there are certainly many aspects of it, that at least on the face of it, do create philosophical and ethical challenges for us , there are So many concepts, that even on the simple face of it, should be so easy for modern society to learn from.

Punishment is supposed to be constructive, fit the crime, and not over burden society.

On the one hand, self-defense, and defense of one’s property, is a legitimate reaction, and one of the main sugyas of the idea of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה, is the sugya in Sanhedrin (72a), where one is permitted to kill a robber breaking into one’s house, when the assumption is that the thief is coming to kill.

This is so much so, that the thief is exempt from monetary claims caused by his damage during the crime, seeing as he was subject at the time to a possible death penalty!

Yet, the rule is also very clear that this (as well as the general rule of a pursuer) is an absolutely last resort- If there is any way to save oneself by wounding the attacker, one is required to do so, and if one fails to, one is guilty of murder )Sanhedrin 74a.)

In a world where so many people are treated as second class citizens, the rule of אחשביה could teach us on an ideological level, that we are able to elevate these people and restore their dignity simply by starting with ourselves and being the one’s to appreciate them.

At the same time, we can never be guilty of being the ones to treat people with less dignity than the norms of the society in which we live.

In our parsha, Miriam is guilty of gossip against her brother, Moshe Rabbeinu, the greatest prophet of all time.

The passuk tells us that this gossip, had something to do with the Cushite (Ethiopian black) wife that Moshe had taken.

There are many varied explanations in Chazal and the Rishonim as to the precise nature of the gossip (some of which might have more appeal than others to our personal views on racial matters) , and of course, there are multiple facets to everything in Torah.

However, we have one iron-clad rule that Chazal themselves taught us (earlier in our masechta) : אין המקרא יוצא פשוטו (a verse does not depart from its simple meaning.)

This golden rule is usually taken to mean that the various midrashim, even those that seem to contradict the simple reading of the passuk, come to supplement and add additional messages to the simple meaning of the text, NOT to replace it, and although there is much to discuss about this idea in its own right, I will take it as a given for the purposes of this post at least. (for further reading, see the various explanations in Rashi, Ibn Ezra, the Targumim, and in particular, the Sifsei Chachomim on the two explanations in Rashi, on this episode.)

Although it is always hard to understand how great people can do terrible things, whatever the precise nature of this gossip was, the terrible punishment makes it clear that it was indeed a terrible mistake.

I would like to suggest what to me, at least in the context of our time (and the timeless Torah speaks to ALL of us, in ALL times), is the most obvious simple meaning of the text.

In the biblical society, like in today’s so called liberal western world, the illness of racism was a scourge, that even otherwise great, and good people, were affected by.

Moshe Rabbeinu’s marriage to a black woman, was frowned on so much in that society, that even his own great and righteous sister couldn’t handle it.

And what happened- she become ill with an affliction which makes the skin go snow-white!

In Judaism, diversity in creation is actually celebrated, and even has its own bracha, משנה הבריות, (one who diversifies his creations), one that is actually made on rare animals like elephants (depending on time and place), as well as unbelievably, black people, who were very rarely seen in Talmudic Israel and Babylon (Brachos 58b.)

Perhaps the simple lesson from Miriam is that if one doesn’t appreciate that “black is beautiful”, one can land up as a leprous outcast, as white as white can be!

Shabbat Shalom ,and may we see the end of the terrible scourge of racism and the appreciation of every person created in the Image of Hashem.

Shabbos 90 General knowledge

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I was never great at the school general knowledge quiz.

That was not due to a lack of love for trivia, but more because I am one who tends to obsess over subjects that interest me and pretty much disengage from those that do not.

In a general knowledge quiz, knowledge of sports and modern music trends ( which really did not interest me much) is as important as knowledge of geography and religion ( which did )

As I grew older, my interests broadened, and I even managed to appreciate  poetry at least enough to get through matriculation in South Africa .

I still have a particularly hard time with many technical sugyas- for example, as much as I try ( which admittedly is not enough), I have not succeeded in understanding the weaving process enough to begin to understand the melachos that are based on this most ancient of skills. 

One of the incredible things that constantly strikes me about Chazal, is how they were required to have the most broad general knowledge of pretty much everything that was known at the time, in order to learn, teach, and interpret Torah correctly. 

The Amora Rav relates (Sanhedrin 5b) that he spent 3 years of his youth on a cattle farm, learning how to distinguish between different types of blemishes. 

We saw earlier in the masechta how important knowledge of Astronomy is for our calendar and thus all mitzvos that relate to specific dates .

Mathematical knowledge was an essential requirement for the many measurements that make up so much of halacha .

And an understanding of politics , culture ,and current affairs was a given for the complex interactions required with our various hosts , colonizers, and oppressors, not to mention the laws of derech eretz which were clearly impacted by and adapted to, the culture of the times .

Although there are countless examples, let us not forget that the members of the supreme Sanhedrin had to know 70 different languages – is there anyone alive today who can claim that feat?

On this daf, the Amoraim work hard to try and understand the meaning of various items mentioned in the Mishna, things which were clearly well known during the Mishna period, but were clearly  not  well known in the  Sassanian Babylonia of the Talmud Bavli. 

They appear to have successfully done enough research to identify all of these, for example בורית is identified as a type of  אהלא, after some give and take , and אשלג is identified as שונאנה, only after consulting with a regular overseas traveler-it seems us frequent travelers can come in pretty handy too!

Of course, just because the Amoraim were able to identify these things, doesn’t mean we are able to- if you feel a little frustrated and perhaps disillusioned by the ancient vocabulary required to understand sugyas like this, be slightly comforted by the fact that even the father of the mefarshim (commentators), Rashi himself ,admitted, in his usual honest way, that he did not  know what שלוף דוץ was!

The identity of the חלזון,  required for making the tcheiles  (arguably blueish dye used for tzitzis and certain items in the mishkan) has evaded our greatest authorities for centuries, generating much debate, but absolutely no consensus. 

As we quoted in that earlier article, our greatest leaders from the Rambam to the Vilna Gaon taught us how an understanding of all forms of wisdom is essential for a proper understanding of the Torah- we can only look up in awe to the great bearers of our Masora ( tradition) who were able to familiarize themselves with a treasury of general knowledge anyone today could barely dream of, together with mastery of the entire Torah itself.

As my high school Rebbe and shul Rav in my youth , haGaon Rav Eliezer Chrysler שליט”א told one of us at our Barmitzva, in his Gateshead English style  – “you might not be able to be Rav Moshe Feinstein zt’l, but you jolly well can try.”

I guess that being on the future Sanhedrin is not even a dream for most of us, but we better “jolly well try”! 

Shabbos 89 The teenager in halacha

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It is commonly known that the age of majority in Jewish law is 12 for a girl and 13 for a boy, roughly the average age of the onset of puberty.

At this age, the Jewish adolescent becomes obligated to perform all positive commandments, refrain from all negative commandments, is liable to punishment in a court of law, and can participate in much of public Jewish life. 

As such, it is the conception of many, that there is no real period of transition between childhood and adulthood recognized by the Torah, and that the term teenager really has no halachik meaning at all.

However, a closer look at various sources , including today’s daf, shows that this is not true at all.

In fact , there is no direct source for the age 13 being the age of majority in the Chumash itself- this is derived mainly through  the equally authoritative oral law- we see in the text  references to Yishmael having his circumcision at age 13, but given that Yitchak’s  circumcision was at 8 days, this is hardly a clear proof for anything .

In fact, the most common age of adulthood referred to in the Torah is the age of 20, specifically when the teen years end. 

This is the  minimum age for army service, for counting, an important cutoff for ערכים ( evaluations), and the age at which people were sentenced to die in the wilderness after the sin of the spies .

And this is the age, according to numerous statements of Chazal, at which one becomes liable for punishment in the heavenly Court (דיני שמיים.) 

One of the key statements about this is made on today’s daf  (This source was first pointed out to me  quite some years ago in Africa  by our great teacher, haGaon  haHagadol  haRav Asher Weiss שליט”א) 

In the future, Hashem approaches Avraham and tells him that the Jewish people have  sinned.

He replies that they should be destroyed for the sanctification  of Hashem’s name.

Hashem then goes to Yaakov, who gives the same reply .

Finally, he comes to Yitchak who asks Hashem to forgive them based on the following argument:

1. A person only lives 70 years on average 

2. The first 20 years is not subject to punishment (in the hands of heaven)

3. Of the remaining 50 years, half are made up of nighttime ( while one is sleeping )

4. Of the remaining 25, half are spent  davening, eating, and in the bathroom ( without much chance to sin)

5. Of the remaining 12.5 years , Yitchak offers to cover half with his own merit and asks Hashem to cover the rest .

6. If Hashem disagrees, Yitchak offers to cover them all, in the merit of the Akeida (binding of Yitchak)

There are multiple questions one  should ask here, among them:

1. From where do we see that the first 20 years is not subject to punishment, and what exactly does that mean ?

2. Does one really sleep 50% of the time?

3. Does one really spend half one’s awake hours davening, eating, and in the bathroom?

4. Is there really no opportunity to sin during these 3 activities? I can think of plenty personally !

We will focus on the first question for now, bearing in mind the other three, as they might affect how we understand the first as well .

Rashi points out that we learn that the first 20 years are not subject to punishment from the generation of the spies .

After the nation believed the bad report that the spies brought back, they were condemned  to wander in the desert for 40 years and die before entering Israel .

Those under 20 years were exempt from the second part of the punishment  and would live to enter the land .

From this, we see that one isn’t punished by Hashem for one’s sins until the age of 20.

We said this idea in various other places too , among them :

In the beginning of Parshas Chayei Sarah, Rashi brings the Midrash that Sarah was  free of sin at age 100 just like she was at 20.

In Parshas Korach, Rashi quotes Chazal who emphasize the severity of machlokes, in that whereas the heavenly court normally does not punish before the age of 20, due to the severity of the rebellion and machlokes it caused , even children died .

The question that cries out for an answer is as follows ?

How can it be that a 13 year old boy is treated as an adult in almost all regards, even to the point that he can be subject to capital punishment in a court, in the extreme case of the בן סורר ומורה ( wayward son), specifically at that age , but get off scott free for whatever he does, if he does not make it to a human court?

Paraphrasing  the words of the נודע ביהודה, can we really accept that a teenage boy can party as much as he wants, sleep around as much as wants, eat whatever he wants, and get off the hook because he is not yet 20?

If he is mature enough to be liable in court and to be able to sign on legal documents, how can he just get off free in the hands of heaven , and not get kareis or מיתה בידי שמים for the worst of sins, or at least the יסורים ( suffering) required to atone for them ?

And if he does not, what motivation is there to hold him back from sin, at a time of life when sin literally crouches at the door?

Clearly this cannot be quite as straightforward as it seems .

Various approaches can be taken, and  some have been suggested by various Achronim ( later authorities.)

1. Perhaps this is simply a concept exaggerated  by Yitchak in order to speak in our favour. 

Just like we clearly don’t sleep for half the 24 period, nor daven, eat, and go to the facilities for half our waking hours, not completely abstain from sin during that time, perhaps the idea is that the first 20 years are more prone to mercy and sometimes Hashem refrains from punishing during that period .

2. Perhaps the punishment is delayed until 20, but after that, one is punished for  his earlier sins too.

3. Perhaps there is no punishment during one’s lifetime for sins done before age 20, but one is still punished after death in Olam Habah ( the world to come )

4. Perhaps   one is  not punished severely during this time, to the point of death or kareis, but one still gets some form of punishment  

5. Perhaps one is not punished during this time at all, but one still does not get the great reward one gets for refraining from a sin one is tempted to do, 

6. Perhaps  one’s soul is still damaged by the aveira and requires repair through atonement  

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Shabbos 88 Choice and coercion in religious life 

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On today’s daf, we are faced with 2 very different approaches to how the Torah was giving, so much so that it seems bizarre that the Gemora brings them one after another without noting any contradiction.

On the one hand , the Gemara learns from the passuk ויתישבו בתחתית ההר (” and they settled down at the bottom of ( or underneath) the mountain”- Shmot 19/17)  that Hashem  raised the mountain over us and threatened that if we do not except the Torah, we would be buried under it .

Although it is certainly within normative use to translate the word בתחתית as “at the foot of” , and not “under” , and this is probably the simple פשט , we can  explains that this derasha is based on the contrast between this word and another word used  in an earlier passuk  (Shmos 19/2) to describe their position, namely נגד (by or opposite) the mountain .

It seems clear from this that the Torah was forced on us, to the point that the Amora, Rav Acha bar Yaakov, makes the rather harsh point that this is in fact מודעא רבה לאורייתא , a strong argument for those who do not follow the Torah, seeing as it was given by force .

Straight after this , the Gemara brings statements of Chazal who understand the phrase “נעשה ונשמע” said by the people to imply that we accepted the Torah unconditionally and willingly , committing to keeping it even before we heard what was in it .

We could argue that this has nothing to do with accepting the Torah voluntarily, but rather the unconditional way in which we accepted that which was forced on us .

This could be  similar to if , chalila, a robber or powerful ruler (lehavdil) holds a gun to someone’s head –   one first immediately puts one’s hands up and says “Take anything you want, I will do whatever you say”, before actually hearing what he wants of one .

However, from the description of the 2 crowns that were given as a reward for this, and the story of the Sadducee who bothered Rava and mocked the way we accepted the Torah without first hearing whether we could handle it or not , it seems clear that the common explanation, namely that we indeed did indeed  accept the Torah voluntarily and unconditionally, is the correct one .

It is possible to suggest that these two forms of acceptance both took place, perhaps one after another .

Perhaps we first accepted the Torah voluntarily , but after hearing what was in it, or even before , started to have second thoughts? At which point we were told that it was now already binding on us and we have no choice but to accept it. 

This would be like making a voluntary vow , which once made is now compulsory, or entering a voluntary contract, which once signed , is now binding . See Tosfos on the daf who discussed this issue.

It could also be compared to a convert who voluntarily takes on Judaism, but who is now halachically Jewish, bound by the commandments, and unable to go back .

Alternatively, perhaps we were first coerced into accepting the Torah, and then later became excited about it and accepted it voluntarily. 

This would be similar to a child who is forced to go to school by his parent but then becomes excited about it and goes voluntarily.

Although interesting, the first explanation certainly fits the order of the pessukim better!

Nevertheless, we still need to explain why both these stages were necessary ?

If Hashem knew we would or did accept the Torah voluntarily, why did he force us to do so, particularly given the high risk that we would resent it and abandon it, as pointed out by Rav Acha bar Yaakov ? 

Rav Avraham Rivlin שליט”א , our mashgiach in Kerem b Yavneh, always makes an analogy to the different types of love we bless a bride and groom with ( it should be noted that on the next daf, the giving of the Torah is indeed compared to a wedding!)

Two of these are אהבה ( love) , and אחוה( brotherhood) 

Love is something personal, voluntary. 

A person chooses whom he wishes to love and be friends with. 

Brotherhood is something one has no say in at all- your brother is your brother whether you like it or not .

Love is something that can be temporary, unfortunately – even best friends often split up.

Brotherhood, in contrast is forever – one cannot “divorce one’s brother .”

We bless the bride and groom that their relationship  should experience the passion that comes with choosing who to love, but the stability and permanence of brotherhood .

Similarly, explains Rav Rivlin: It was essential for our love and passion for   Torah, that it be something we accept voluntarily .

Yet easy come, easy go, and something  we choose to love can often become less loved when the initial passion wears out.

As such, it was equally essential that our relationship with Torah also  contains “brotherhood”- an eternal and unbreakable bond, that weathers the highs and the lows and can never be broken.

This approach is fascinating, but could perhaps be questioned based on Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s point that, on the contrary, the fact that we accepted the Torah by coercion was actually an excuse to abandon it, not a reason to keep it forever !

Although this can perhaps be answered , there is another possibility I would like to suggest, which might also  bare some relation to Rav Rivlin’s approach.

There is a well-known, though counter intuitive Talmudic principle , that גדול המצווה ועושה ממי שאינו מצווה ועושה.” – one who performs a commandment he is obligated to perform is greater (gets greater reward) than one who performs a commandment voluntarily. ( see for example Avodah Zarah 3a, Kiddushim 31a )

This could be because someone who is forced to do something, has a natural temptation  to rebel and has to resist this urge to do so ( see Tosfos A.Z. 3a who takes this approach. ) 

This is in stark contrast to the passion with which  one fulfills a good deed which one has  chooses to do on his own .

As such, a child who becomes an adult celebrates the fact that until now, he only fulfilled commandments voluntarily, but know he will be fulfilling them because he is obligated to do so, and getting the increased merit for doing so.

Perhaps it is specifically for that reason, that once we had already accepted the Torah voluntarily, Hashem now forced the Torah on us.

Rav Acha’s point now supports this decision fully – precisely because we would now have an “excuse ” to rebel against what we had now been forced into , we have the potential to resist this urge and reach a far higher level and the accompanying merit. 

As such, this “coercion” now becomes one of the greatest kindness and opportunities that Hashem bestowed about us, perhaps even as a reward for our initial voluntary and unconditional acceptance! 

רצה ה.ק.ב.ה. לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצוות

(מכות פרק ג פסוק טז)

Shabbos 87 Personal autonomy versus blind obedience 

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There is a general tendency to see Torah as a top down system , where instructions are given from the top , and followed blindly from the bottom.

Hashem instructs prophets, who in turn instructs people, and today, the place of the prophet is taken in part by the Chachamim.

In truth, it is somewhat more complex than that, and there is actually a system of multiple power centers, with a king ( or Nasi), Sanhedrin( supreme Court and legislature ) ,and prophets and Torah sages, each working separately and in tandem .

Notwithstanding the above, the system still seems very vertical, and little room or tolerance is given for individual dissent . 

In contrast, going against the word of the King (מורד במלכות) , the Sanhedrin ( in its most severe form , זקן ממרא ),  the Navi (עובר על דברי נביא ), or sages (העובר  על דברי חכמים) are all severe transgressions which could sometimes even be capital.

Even the wisest of all men , Shlomo haMelech , was heavily criticized for deciding that Torah warnings and prohibitions against having too many wives, horses, or too much silver and gold did not apply to him, and his subsequent sinful actions that and landed up causing a split in his kingdom . (See Sanhedrin 21b) 

The Torah stresses so many times how Moshe, Aaron, and Betzalel   fulfilled every introduction of Hashem precisely as he commanded .(See for example Shmos 39)

Yet, on today’s daf, we see  what appears to be a completely different approach.

The Gemara tells us how there are 3 decisions that Moshe Rabbeinu made on his own that Hashem agreed to, at a later stage .

These were 

1. Adding a day of seperation before the giving of the Torah, effectively making the date the actual giving took place 1 day later on 7 Sivan.

2. Separating from his wife for the long term now that he had achieved a higher level of prophecy ( a discussion in its own right , maybe for another post )

3. Breaking the tablets.

All  these 3 were rather serious decisions, with extreme ramifications .

The first, bypassed the day Hashem had set aside for the giving of the Torah, delaying it by a full day, the second caused great distress to his wife,  possibly bypassed the מצוה רבה of פרו ורבו ( the great mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying ) , and led to the later debacle with Miriam and Aharon, and the third, literally destroyed the Torah that has just been given , the ultimate holy of holies. 

We see a similar concept , though perhaps not quite as extreme, regarding Ruth and Shmuel.

The Gemara (Shabbos 113b) quotes the passuk תן לחכם ויחכם עוד (give to the wise man that he should become wiser )  (Mishlei 9/9)   and applied it too great people who used their own discretion to modify instructions given to them by their superiors.

Shmuel was told by his mentor , the prophet Elie, that when he heard the voice he had been hearing again, he should reply to the voice addressing him as Hashem  ( Elie knew that it was Hashem who had revealed himself to Shmuel and given him his first experience of prophesy.)

Concerned that it might be someone else calling, Shmuel replied without referring to the voice as that of Hashem.

Ruth was told by Naomi to prepare herself and make herself beautiful before going to the tent of Boaz.  

Yet, she changed the order , and first went to the tent , preparing herself there, in order that passers-by would not think that she was a prostitute. 

Although elsewhere, Shmuel is seriously criticized for even ruling on a halacha in front of his Rebbe (Brachos 31b ), here this is viewed as using the discretion given to him by Hashem to be even wiser , and be flexible with his Rebbe, the Navi’s instructions , apparently a compliment.

The same, though perhaps less risky , applies to Ruth’s second guessing of Naomi .

The cases on our daf, might be more easy to explain , given the special level of prophecy that Moshe head, but also appear even more severe , seeing as he seemingly  risked going against the will of Hashem himself, and in such serious ways!

When is such license permitted and even encouraged, and when is it forbidden , and sometimes severely punished ?

Stay tuned for part 2, when we reach Daf 113, Hashem willing. 

Shabbos 86 “Pesachdik” Deodorant

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Does one need to ensure that deodorants and perfumes used over Pesach do not contain chametz, typically wheat-based alcohol?

In general, the rule is that any chametz that is no longer fit for a dog to drink is no longer subject to the biblical prohibitions  of eating, owning , or benefitting from Chametz on Pesach  ( see Pesachim 45b and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 442/2) , though one who is crazy enough to actually eat it might still have transgressed a  rabbinical prohibition (see machlokes there )

As no dog in its right mind would drink deodorant or perfume, it thus seems obvious that there is no concern with such things over Pesach. 

Some, however,  have suggested that as the alcohol in the deodorant could technically be separated by chemical means , it is  thus theoretically still edible, but as pretty much anything  can be separated chemically with the correct process and halocho is generally based on the current status of an item, not a hypothetical status after a major chemical process , this seems to be somewhat of a stretch.

However , there is another concept that needs to be addressed , and that is the principle  of סיכה כשתיה ( anointing is the equivalent of drinking  .)

This principle is derived in a Mishna on our daf from a passuk,  and is applied to Yom Kippur  in particular, to the point that anointing oneself on Yom-Kippur is forbidden just like drinking is .

This comparison  is only partial though, and the severe punishment of kareit (excision ) that applies to one who eats knowingly and intentional on Yom Kippur certainly does not apply to one who anoints oneself – at most , it involves a regular biblical prohibition , at least , a rabbinical one based on a verse ( אסמכתא ) 

The question is whether this principle is unique to Yom Kippur, as implied by the Mishna’s precise wording , or applicable in other areas of halocho too, with the Mishna using Yom Kippur just as the main example of such application , for whatever reason .

If this principle  does indeed apply to Chametz on Pesach too, it would seem that anointing oneself with Chametz might be equivalent to drinking it, and thus forbidden .

However, even if this is true, one would have to investigate further whether this could create a biblical or even rabbinic prohibition on using deodorant or perfume containing chametz on Pesach.

This is because the biblical  prohibitions on Pesach only apply to chametz that is still fit for a dog to eat .

Even if anointing oneself with chametz that is fit for a dog to eat is forbidden like drinking is on Pesach , and not just as part of the prohibition of benefitting from chametz, seeing as the perfume is not fit for a dog to DRINK , there might  still be no prohibition to ANNOINT with it, at least biblically .

Even if it is still forbidden rabbinically to drink such unfit chametz, it doesn’t necessarily follow that Chazal extended their ruling to the already novel principle of סיכה כשתיה .

One would have to investigate whether

–  סיכה כשתיה merely means that  anointing is the same as drinking regarding the actual prohibition itself   ,

 OR

 -whether it is a broad enough comparison to mean that if it is FIT for anointing , it is ALSO  as if it is fit for drinking .

Only if the latter is true , would we say that seeing as perfume and deodorant is fit for anointing, it is considered as if it was fit for drinking, and thus anointing with it is forbidden.

One could also argue that deodorant is not used for classic anointing at all, which is to provide  a good fragrance, soften the skin,  or other pleasure, but simply to remove bad odor, which MIGHT be  permitted even on Yom Kippur. This depends on the scope  of the prohibition on Yom Kippur, which is in turn derived from the requirement to afflict oneself.

The latter argument is not straight forward, as most modern deodorants are dual purpose and many people indeed choose them based on their preferred fragrance,  using them even  when they are not particularly sweaty or smelly.  As such, it seems to me that such deodorants may indeed be viewed halachically as perfumes, though I have not come to any conclusion on the matter.

There is much to discuss about the first חקירה   we made regarding whether the rule of סיחה     כשתיה   applies only on Yom Kippur or in all areas of halacha.

Suffice to say is that given that this is a Chiddush, and the Mishna specifically mentions Yom Kippur alone, the burden of proof should be with one who wishes to claim that Yom Kippur is merely an example of the application of a general rule.

Examining the source for the rule, one comes to  the Passuk in Tehillim  109 , where David haMelech describes the curse that befalls those who forget Hashem and oppress the poor-וַיִּלְבַּ֥שׁ קְלָלָ֗ה כְּמַ֫דּ֥וֹ וַתָּבֹ֣א כַמַּ֣יִם בְּקִרְבּ֑וֹ וְ֝כַשֶּׁ֗מֶן בְּעַצְמוֹתָֽיו: 

(and the curse will come like his garment, and it will come like water inside him and like oil in his bones”)

In the passuk, oil which soaks into one’s bones through annointing , is compared to water in one’s insides (stomach) which is absorbed through drinking, hence the basis (though admittedly by the Mishna itself only a “zecher ladavar”) for the rule.

As the context is that of suffering, and the Mitzva of Yom Kippur is also that of self-affliction, it seems clear that the comparison is being made specifically in the context of affliction, not other things.

However, the room is still open to argue that if refraining from annointing with oil and the like  is considered a  requirement of  affliction like refraining from drinking water is, then the benefit obtained on Pesach from annointing with chametz , is also equivalent to the benefit obtained from drinking chametz.

If so, even if we do not expand the rule to include also  אסורי אכילה  (things that one is forbidden to eat or drink), perhaps we would at least extend it to אסורי הנאה , like Pesach.

Although  the prohibition of benefitting only applies to edible chametz, perhaps chametz which is fit for annointing  is also considered edible regarding the definition of benefit?

In practise, it seems that there are a lot of Chiddushim (novel ideas) required to forbid using deoderant or even perfume containing chametz alcohol on Pesach, and that it is probably fine.

I wrote this as a lomdishe analysis based mainly on this daf, without taking an encyclopedic view to the concept as is required to come to a full conclusion, but a quick look at parallel sugyos and the relevant Rishonim reveals that there is indeed some disagreement as to the scope of this rule .

I  was happy to see that although the Chofetz Chaim in Biur Halocho (326/10) tends towards stringency even in regular אסורי אכילה like חלב  (forbidden fats), most contemporary poskim including Rav Moshe Feinstein zt’l  (O.C 3/62) and Rav Asher Weiss  יבדל לחיים  ( I have seen quoted from his Hagada siman 24 but have not got hold of one yet) seem to  hold that there is no problem with annointing  with inedible chometz materials , each citing various distinctions that I made in this analysis!)

( These daf posts are aimed to raise points for discussion and analysis based on a chosen idea on the given daf . They are written quickly, without sufficient time to be checked thoroughly  by myself or senior Talmidei Chachomim, and not meant for psak halocho- please message me privately if you require practical guidance in the relevant area and if I cannot help you myself, I shall  bli neder try direct you or your question to someone who can.

I hope that those who read them will give their input and help me improve on them)

Shabbos 84 “May Hashem save us from your opinion “

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The ways of the Torah are described as “דרכי נועם ” , “the ways of pleasantness” (Mishlei 3/17), and one of the most basic rules for those of us who spread Torah is to speak gently and pleasantly to people, as Hillel was so well known for doing (see Shabbos 31a.) 

We also know very well the price that was paid by Rabbi Akiva’s students for not showing honor to each other (Yevamos 62b.)

We know that “תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם “, “Torah Scholars increase peace in the world,” (Brachos 64a) and our saintly Rosh Yeshiva, Rav Azriel Chayim Goldfein zt’l was well known for quipping the obvious corollary , that ” if he doesn’t increase peace, he is NOT a Talmid Chacham.” 

Furthermore, we are told ( Eruvin 13b) that one of the reasons we follow Beis Hillel over Beis Shamai is because they would quote their words together with the words of Beis Shamai, and even quote Beit Shamai first !

The correct approach to other views according to that sugya,  is one of “אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים ” ( Both these and those are the words of the living G-d), and this respect for other views is an intrinsic part of our approach to learning Torah .

Nevertheless, more than just occasionally, we are faced with what appears to be extremely harsh language by one scholar to the other .

For some of  very many examples:

 -In Brachos 32a, Rabbi Yannai tells Rabbi Chanina the reader “פוק קרא קראיך לברא” ( get out and read  your reading outside .)- this is a relatively common retort in the shas.

-At the end of שלושה שאכלו (Brachos 51b), Rav Nachman’s scholarly wife, offended at the Amora Ullah’s apparent chauvinism, responds  to his words by saying:

“ממהדורי מילי ומסמרטוטי כרמי  ( empty words come from peddlers and lice come out of old rags .) 

-Though not exactly the same, there is also the view that a Talmid Chacham who does not  “take revenge and bare a grudge like a snake” is not a Talmid chacham ” ( Yoma 23a.)

On our daf, there is a debate between Rabbi Ilai and Rabbi Chanina regarding the rule that a zav only causes impurity  when he sits on something that can be purified in a mikva ( as opposed to earthenware vessels than cannot be purified and certain types of simple wooden vessels like the מפץ  (see Rashi .)

Rabbi Ilai holds that so long as some things made of the same material ( namely wood ) can be purified in a mikva, even things of that material that cannot be purified in a mikva ( like the מפץ), can become impure.

Rabbi Chanina responds to what he seems to view as a ridiculous idea, by saying ” may Hashem save us from that opinion,”   to which Rabbi Ilai retorts in kind , that on the contrary :” may Hashem save us from YOUR opinion. “

Neither Chacham  seems to be satisfied with the usual respectful  give and take of the Talmudic discussion but seems to feel the need to speak extremely harshly and seemingly disrespectful about the other’s view.

It should also be noted that this debate is not  exactly about one of the main principles of belief, which makes this behaviour even more surprising. 

Interesting enough, the Masores hashas  points us to two other places where a similar exchange occurs, between the same two chachomim , both in masechtos commonly learnt in yeshivos –  and we really need to  take a deeper look  and try and find a common thread. (The case in Kesubos involves possibly giving someone a harsher death penalty than deserved, whereas the case in Bava Kama involves possibly making a thief pay back more than he needs to.)

But although these 3 cases must certainly hold clues as to when harsh language is indeed appropriate, it seems clear from them and so many other cases, that there is indeed a time for using such. 

Although counter examples can perhaps be found  the basic concept seems to me to be that in one’s relationship to people outside one’s immediate cozy learning environment , one has to always be extra careful with ones words and how one says things .

 Of course, there are times such as danger to life and public chillul Hashem where it is sometimes necessary to speak harshly in the public eye too, as did the Neviim, Chazal, and Gedolim through all the ages , but one needs serious סיעתא דשמיא to do this successfully and it is essential to show that one is not doing it out of ego or anger, but completely for the sake of heaven – much more to discuss in this regard, perhaps in a later post , Hashem willing .

In contrast, inside the walls of the Beis Midrash, more scope is giving for lively  and sometimes extremely strong “give and take ” so long as the argument is לשם שמיים .

As the Gemara says in Kiddushin (30b),  two Talmidei Chachamim who are fighting with each other over a halacha can temporarily become “enemies ” during the passion of the argument , and this is part of the passionate search for the truth, and is completely legitimate .

Similarly perhaps,  a Rebbe might use harsh language with his student in order to sharpen him and his thought process or stop him being lazy ( see Rambam hilchos Talmud Torah 4/5) – I would add that this is obviously ,provided he is confident that the student will be impacted positively by this and not negatively ( which in my experience is an extremely risky and often counter-productive strategy in our age.)

A Nasi may also be very strong with those under him in to strengthen the authority of the position ( see Kesubos 103b), as Rabban Gamliel did (perhaps going too far ) with Rabbi Yehoshua ( see Brachos 27b and parallel sugyos.) 

HOWEVER , as the Gemara  in Kiddushin continues , they do not leave the study hall without becoming friends again, and this is the true test of whether this harsh talk was in the correct spirit or not .

True debates  for the sake of heaven  might indeed get heated, but they may never get personal.

Shabbos 83-85  Food for thought  over Shavuos 

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I wish I had the time to prepare posts in advance for the coming dapim,  but Yom-Tov prep in the house also has to be done, so will have to try catch up next week.

Meanwhile , some food for thought and Iyun over the chag  from the dapim , with some relevance to shavuos ( as we get very close to the sugyot about Matan Torah!)

1. Items used for Avoda Zara are compared to a Nida regarding certain laws of impurity. 

The implication of the pesukim is that a Niddah is treated as rejected, “צא תאמר לו “

The Zav, Metzora, and Tamei Meis are also  treated seemingly harshly and physically  sent out from at least part of the camp.

Yet these are all people who do not seem to have done anything wrong.

It is true that  biblical צרעת is viewed by chazal as a punishment for lashon harah, but since when do we punish a person ourselves without warning or witnesses?

Being a Niddah is a natural process every woman goes through regularly , so why should she be considered impure for that , let alone be described in what seems to be such a harsh language?

More than this, it is normal for a man to become a Baal Keri even more  regularly , often daily , without necessarily doing anything wrong , so why is he treated as Tamei, to the point that at certain periods in history , he was not even allowed to learn Torah ( see Mishnayos in chapter 3 of brachos and related sugyos)

It seems that the Torah is trying to teach us something so important, that even normal and unavoidable biological processes are somehow used to illustrate it.

Can it perhaps be something to do with the value of life , which Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch famously related to virtually all types of impurity?

2.It is amazing how so many of us who have regular Torah learning programs, whether its daf yomi, amud yomi, shnayim bemikra , nach yomi, or whatever else, can testify to the fact that there is almost always something we can notice that is relevant to the time we are learning a particular piece .

Purity was a requirement for Kabbalas haTorah, and incredible , our dapim  in the days leading up to this shavuos and beyond have taken a major detour from matters of shabbos and focused on matters of purity !

Even more amazingly , our daf ends with some incredible Agadot about learning Torah- how one should never leave the Beis haMidrash, learn till the moment one dies , and “kill himself ” with exertion in order to master it .

May we merit to renew our acceptance of the Torah with the required devotion, motivation, and dedication to fulfill Chazal’s tremendously high bar that they set for us in this regard ! 

Shabbos 82  Health and safety  matters (excuse the pun)

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On this daf, we are told how Rav Huna asked his son Rabbah, why he did not go to learn anymore by Rav Chisda, who was particularly sharp in his learning.

Rabbah replied that Rav Chisda used to always teach them “worldly matters”, and he preferred to focus on only Torah during his studies .

For example, he used to tell them that when one goes to the toilet, one should not sit down too quickly or push too hard, as it could cause injury .

Rabbah’s response was that he was teaching him matters of health (the life of people ) , and that was even more reason to go learn with him!

The most obvious explanation of this is that the Torah commands us to look after one’s health and safety and avoid danger, in the passuk

 ונשמרתם מאוד לנפשותיכם ( be very careful with your lives.) ( Devarim 4/9) 

The Rambam is generally presumed to hold that anything one does that is bad for one’s health or a danger to his life will usually be a transgression of this Mitzva ( See for example  Hilchos Deos chapter 4 and Rotzeach ushmiras hanefesh chapter 14 and 11/4, though he might also have other sources for this- another discussion for a different post, perhaps )

If the Rambam’s definition is correct, than anything which is health or safety related is part of this Mitzva and thus considered Torah, so Rabbah’s claim that he preferred to focus on “Torah” was ill informed, seeing as this very much WAS Torah !

In truth though, even if this particular passuk is not referring to avoiding physical danger, but rather spiritual danger as in its context (see Torah Temima on the passuk for different views on this ), there are plenty sources that avoiding danger is a Torah requirement, and in fact that it is MORE important than avoiding sin (חמירא סכנתא מאיסורא -see Chullin 10a.)

However, if one takes a more careful look, one still needs to explain :

1. What was Rabbah was initially thinking?- did he really not know that looking after oneself is a Torah requirement?

2. Why does Rav Huna say that it was even MORE reason to go? If health and safety is just another Mitzva , then why should it be even more important than learning Brachos  or Shabbos or Yevamos?

This is only one of many statements of Chazal that venture into the realm of health and medicine, to the point that one often finds what seem like clear contradictions between the views they express and those of modern medicine (more on this perhaps in a different post.)

In order to address this problem,  Rabbeinu Avraham son of the Rambam (Maamar al Derashos Chazal)  tells us that such contradictions should not worry us, as Chazal did not get their medical knowledge from any form of Torah  tradition or prophesy, but rather based their advice on the medical knowledge available to them at the time.

The Rambam himself wrote similar things regarding Astronomy (Moreh Nevuchim 3/14.)

Perhaps precisely for this reason, Rabbah was of the view that medical issues should be left to the doctors and Rabbis should focus on teaching Torah only, stating the mitzva to look after oneself , but not going into the practical details, which one should rather learn from the doctors of the time .

Rav Huna, however , knew that if Rabbis don’t take health matters seriously and teach it to their Talmidim, the talmidim won’t take it seriously, and it is therefore their absolute obligation to become as familiar as they can with the medical knowledge of the time, and under the guidance of their medical consultants, drill it into their students .

Alternatively, perhaps Rabbah held that such details, being subject to change as medical knowledge develops,  cannot be part of a timeless Torah ,that never changes .

Rav Huna taught him that although the facts and knowledge one has available to apply to the Mitzva might change , the Mitzva itself is timeless and part of that timelessness is the need to constantly apply new knowledge to how it is carried out.

In fact, Rav Huna might be suggesting that studying  a theoretical mitzva  which does not include practical ways of fulfilling it in each time and environment, is an inferior form of Torah study itself .

As such, he tells his son, destined to become a leading Amora in his own right , that on the contrary, the fact that Rav Chisda doesn’t just teach the mitzva out of context, but emphasizes the  contemporary wisdom required to carry it out in each place and time, is EVEN more of a reason to learn by him, as such Torah is actually superior – it is not enough to learn about the Mitzva of being healthy- one has to study health itself in order to be able to fulfill the mitzvah properly , and that is not a secondary level of Torah, or a mere הכשר מצוה , but Torah itself !

This also explains the Mitzva of learning astronomy which we discussed in a previous post re כי היא חכמתכם ובינתכם , and is summed up incredibly by the famous statement of the Vilna Gaon  that “all categories of (secular) wisdom are required for our holy Torah and are incorporated with it” (See  “הגרא” מאת דב אליאך   chapter 19 for references and detailed discussion)

And while it could be argued that this is only necessary later in life once one has completed a basic understanding of Torah , perhaps also the initial feeling of Rabbah bar Rav Huna, it seems that Rav Huna was teaching him that, on the contrary, one has to study these wisdoms in one’s youth, at least as they come up, in order for one’s learning to be of a more superior quality!

P.s. one could go a simpler route and argue that Rav Huna was simply teaching his son that looking after one’s health is NOT just another Mitzva, but more important than other Mitzvos, given the precedent of וחי בהם and pikuach nefesh,  but one would then have to explain how Rabbah bar Rav Huna was not aware of such a simple principle such as “danger is more severe than prohibition .”

In light of recent events where we have seen plenty people who learn regularly but seem to be unaware of this rule, at least on a practical level, that might seem less far-fetched  than our initial feeling, but I would still rather not attribute such a view to any one of the Amoraim, even in their earlier years of study !