Shabbos 70 and Parashas Behar Killing financially and emotionally 

Shabbos 70 and Parashas Behar

Killing financially and emotionally

Our Mishna taught us that if a person remembers it is shabbos but forgot that various melachos(categories of work)  are forbidden on shabbos, and did them all, he is liable to bring a separate korban for each of them.

On our daf, the Gemara brings various sources for this ruling.

One of the sources brought is the passuk מחלליה מות יומת (one who desecrated it shall surely die.)

As we already know from another verse that one who intentionally breaks shabbos ( with warning and witnesses in the time of Sanhedrin) is   חייב מיתה (liable to capital punishment,) the Gemora deduces that this must be referring to shogeig (an unknowing transgression) , and that the doubling of the word מות in מות יומת mean that one can get many “deaths”  if one transgresses multiple categories of work.

The Gemora then says an amazing thing:

As there is clearly no death penalty for shogeig, this must refer to him being “killed with money”- in other words, financially hurt by the cost of the many sacrifices he needs to bring.

The frightening message of this Gemara is that it is possible to “kill” someone by hurting him financially- destroying a person’s financial position in a certain sense is like killing him.

We see a similar concept in the Midrash (Pirkei d Rabbi Eliezer 40, brought in Rashi Shmos 4/19), where one who has lost his financial assets is considered as one who has died.

We also   could possibly  see this idea in the well-known law that if a wealthy person loses his money, there is a mitzva of charity ( within ones means obviously and the 20% max) to maintain him at the standards he is used to!

Although this is clearly not a total equivalence- on the contrary, we “kill” him with money , and not with capital punishment, there is no heter to hurt or kill someone who has lost his money as if he was dead, and he can certainly count in a minyan etc.,-  the message is loud and clear: There is an element of murder in causing financial loss, and even more so total financial ruin.

In this week’s parsha, we learn about the prohibition of אונאה- overcharging or underpaying someone for land or other things ( this only applies if the victim is not aware that the agreed price is significantly above or below the market price.)

It also prohibits אונאת דברים – cheating or hurting someone with words.

This includes causing emotional harm to someone by insulting him, reminding him of bad elements of his past, etc, as well as giving him bad financial advice (literally cheating him with words.)

At the worst level, emotional harm is also considered a form of murder, as per the well-known rule that one who publicly shames his friends is considered as if he has killed him (Bava Metzia 58b.)

We see how careful we need to be to avoid causing people financial or emotional harm, and that one who does so, could be considered in a certain way as belonging to the worst category of people- those who spill the blood of man .

Shabbos 68 “Tinok Shenishba” -Does a newly religious person need to repent for earlier transgressions?

On today’s daf, we are introduced to some basic concepts regarding the forbidden categories of work on shabbos.

One rule is that a person who unknowingly describes shabbos is liable to bring a special sacrifice to atone for this unwilling transgression. This type of transgression is called shogeig (שוגג), as opposed to a knowing and intentional transgression which is called meizid  ( מזיד) .

Since the destruction of the second temple where sacrifices are no longer offered, it follows that one is still required to  repent and pray for forgiveness for such aveirot , as prayer comes in place of sacrifices (ונשלמה פרים שפתינו)

However, not every type of unwilling transgression is defined as “shogeig” and requires a sacrifice.

To be defined as “shogeig” regarding the laws of shabbos, a person has to have intended to do the actual forbidden action but simply

  1. Have forgotten that work is forbidden on shabbos
  2. Have forgotten it was shabbos
  3. Have forgotten that the specific category of work is forbidden on shabbos .

If one did a  forbidden melacha ( work category)  completely unintentionally , not though an act of forgetfulness, like if he was forced to do so by someone else or did it by accident, it is called ones (אונס), a transgression performed under duress, and one is exempt from the Korban.

In such circumstances, we generally tend to view such actions as not tied to him at all and the action is not considered a sin at all- thus repentance might not be needed at all ( I say might as there are different categories of אונס and מתעסק and some opinions hold that some of them might still be considered a מעשה עבירה even if one is exempt from a sacrifice .)

One fascinating debate on this daf is the status of a “tinok  shenishba”- someone who was captured by non-Jewish captors as a child and was raised as a non-Jew, without being aware of his obligations as a Jew and without the belief required to carry them out. (Another fascinating case with the same law is the גר שנתגיר בין הנכרים which could make an interesting post in and of itself …)

Are his actions  considered to be “shogeig” ie intentional but unknowing , and liable to the relevant sacrifices when he becomes aware of his Jewishness and embraces it, or are they considered to be more like “ones”, done under duress, and thus exempt completely from a sacrifice, and probably the equivalent prayer and repentance in the absence of one?

The leading Amoraim (sages of the Gemara )  of Bavel ( Babylon) , Rav and Shmuel, are of the opinion that such a person has the status of a “shogeig” and needs to bring a korban when he becomes Jewish observant, and the leading Amoraim of Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, hold that he has the law of an “ones” and is  exempt ( there is a debate between Rashi and Tosfos as to the precise reason or source for this exemption, which might have some practical ramifications, but I will leave this for further discussion)

It can be argued that a person who was brought up Jewish but unobservant is similar to the “tinok shenishba” of our daf, in that he too grew up without awareness of his religious obligations or at least without the necessary belief system to appreciate their importance, and is thus subject to the same dispute.

As the law usually follows Rabbi Yochanan (and so rules the Rambam, Mamrim 3/3), it would follow that they would then likely be exempt from the sacrifice and from the equivalent prayer and repentance required in its place.

We find precedent for extending the rule of the captive child to such a person in the Rambam’s ruling regarding heretics (Mamrim 3/3.)

Whereas the original heretic who gives up on Jewish belief is treated in halacha appropriately, the Rambam says that their children and descendants, who know no better, are to be treated as the captive child, and thus not held responsible for their unknowing transgressions  prior to their religious arousal.

He applies this rule specifically to the karaim (karaites), a powerful sect in his time who accepted only the written Torah but denied the oral Torah .

The equivalent of the karaim’s descendants today would probably be the descendants of the original reform or secularist Jews , who due to their lack of religious upbringing, know no better , and thus according to Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and the Rambam and other poskim after them, might  not be liable to a korban nor the equivalent tefilla and repentance in our day and age, for their transgressions up until the time that they chose to become observant.

My father שליט”א always likes to point out, on this basis , that the term  “Baalei Teshuva” (penitents) , commonly applied to newly religious people, is actually inaccurate, and should be reserved for people who intentionally sinned or left the path of Torah, and then returned.

Rather, people who grew up irreligious and became religious later   are really in the category of “Tinok Shenishba.”

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 67 Pesukim as charms revisited 

A few daf ago, we discussed the idea of amulets and the apparent protective powers attributed to them by Chazal.

We noted that this seems to contradict the general mitzva of תמים תהיה עם אלוקיך, a commandment to pray and seek salvation only directly through Hashem himself, and not by means of magic or other supernatural means.

We also noted that it seems to go against the serious prohibition of saying pesukim to heal a wound or other ailment , as mentioned in the last perek of Sanhedrin.

In a related sugya in Shvuos 15b, we are told that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi used to say certain pesukim before going to bed at night (apparently to protect him.)  The Gemara asks how he could do this, seeing that one is not allowed to use words of Torah to heal, and answers that although healing is forbidden, using them as preemptive protection is permitted.

This could explain why using amulets with pesukim in them is permitted for protection, if there is reason to believe that they work.

The Rambam  also allows this, despite his belief that there is no power in such things,  possibly as he sees psychological benefit for those who do believe in them, or because he believes the requirement that it be an amulet that has proven itself 3 times reduces the group of amulets that may be worn to a null set.

On this daf, we are told, amongst other seemingly bizarre incantations, that Rabbi Yochanan advise someone with a severe type of fever to follow the following procedure:

  1. Take a blade made entirely of iron and find a thorn bush.
  2. Mark the thorn bush by tying a strand of hair around it.
  3. On the first day, cut a notch in the bush with the blade and say the verse “and an angel of Hashem appeared to him” (the verse  in Shmos 3 describing Hashem’s first revelation to Moshe in the burning Bush)
  4. On the second day, cut another notch, and say the passuk ” and Moshe said, I shall turn aside and see.” (all these pesukim are in the same episode)
  5. On the third day, cut another notch, and say the passuk “and Hashem saw that he had turned around to look “

Rav Acha then suggested to Rav Ash (generations later) that he should say on the last day the passuk “and he said, do not approach”, indicating that the fever should leave him alone.

It then continues to describe what should happen when the fever leaves him (which is apparently achieved by the previous steps.)

Without going into the issue of symbolism in these kind of sugyos ( the continuation of the sugya does indeed indicate that the symbolism is used to teach a vital lesson in humility)  , it is clear that this seems to contradict what we have learn that it is certainly forbidden to use pesukim as cures.

There are several approaches to resolving this in the Rishonim, among them

  1. Tosfos and the Rosh take the approach that if a danger to like is involved, like a severe fever, even healing is allowed , as all sins other than 3 are permitted to save a life .

This answer is difficult in that it assumes that such an action indeed can save a life, otherwise what is  the heter of pikuach nefesh? No one would suggest that its permitted to break shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh to make a treatment that is known not to work!

While it is possible that these Rishonim indeed take the approach that such things do work, but are simply forbidden, this would not work for the Rambam’s approach!

  1. The Meiri, who generally takes a similar “rationalist” approach to the Rambam , takes the view that the prohibition does not apply when other actions are taken for the cure and the pesukim just accompany them, perhaps because he sees them as simply a form of prayer in such a context, something the Rambam indeed says regarding using pesukim for protection, but notably not regarding saving life .
  2. It could be   possible, that as seems to be the way of the Rambam, he simply does not regard this sugya as authoritative given that it contradicts the axiomatic  sugyos on the subject, and simply chooses to leave it out of the halacha . This takes us into a long and controversial subject, which is out of the scope of this post.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

Shabbos 66 Adopted parents 

On this Daf, we learn several things that the leading Amora, Abaya, was told by his mother.

The truth is, however, that according to the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b,) Abaya never got to know his biological mother , as she passed away tragically during his birth.

To add to his suffering, his father had  also passed away before he was born, so he never met him either – he was orphaned of both parents from birth .

As such, the Gemora there explains that when he refers to things he heard from his mother, he is referring to his foster mother.

His foster mother was no ordinary lady, but the wife of his teacher and leading Amora, Rabbah bar Nachmani himself , who had adopted the child who would eventually become one of his two star students ( see Rashi in Gittin 34b “והלכתא” )

The fact that he referred to her as his mother, seems to indicate that at least in certain respects , he considered a foster  mother to be like a biological mother , and thus the laws of honoring parents that prohibit mentioning one’s parent by name would apply to her too, at least in spirit, if not in actual law.

Whether this is because he held that actual halachik status is given to a foster parent, or whether he simply did it out of courtesy, is not plainly evident.

There are multiple practical ramifications of this question, that could affect, for example

  1. Whether the mitzva of having children is fulfilled through adoption,
  2. Whether the mitzva of honoring parents applies to foster  parents,
  3. Whether one gets the death penalty for hitting a foster parent.
  4. Whether the laws of inheritance apply to foster  children.
  5. Whether one may marry the daughter or son of a foster parent.
  6. Whether there is a prohibition of yichud with an adopted child.
  7. May one be called to the Torah using his foster father’s name, and could it be used in a marriage document,

In looking for further evidence that an adopted child is treated as a biological child, at least in certain respects, we encounter an almost explicit Gemara in Sanhedrin 19b.

The Gemara points out that the 5 sons of Shaul’s daughter, Meirav,  are referred to in Shmuel  2/21 as the daughters of Michal, his other daughter .

It explains that even though Meirav gave birth to them, Michal raised them, and they were thus referred to as HER sons.

The Gemara derives from this, and a few other examples from Tanakh, that if one raises an orphan in his home, the Torah considers it as if he gave birth to him!

Together with the example of Abaya on our daf, this seems to be very strong proof that at least as far as naming is concerned, a foster parent or child is, or at least can be, treated like a biological one.

Of course,  there is much more work to do before conclusions can be reached either way- in practice, as with most complex issues,  each one of these questions must be researched separately and discussed with a serious Talmid-Chacham holding in all relevant sugyos – as a spoiler,  it seems that for most issues of halachic status, the consensus of poskim is not to treat adopted children as biological children, and the “as if”  כאלו comparison in Sanhedrin , like many like it, is not meant to be taken precisely in the halachic sense.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha.

 

Shabbos 65 Lesbianism in halacha 

In this Daf, we are told that the Amora Shmuel’s father, also a great authority, would not allow his unmarried daughters to sleep together on the same bed.

The Gemara discusses what his concern was.

First , it suggests that he  supports the  view  of Rav Huna that women who have sexual contact with each other ( נשים המסוללות זו בזו ) are not permitted to marry a kohain   (in fact specifically a kohain gadol according to Rashi.)

It could thus be that he was worried that if they sleep in the same bed, they might come to sexual contact, which would cut out their chances of marrying one if they so desired.

It should be noted that even if they were not permitted to marry a kohain or a kohain gadol, that would not necessarily mean they did something wrong – a kohain gadol can only marry a virgin, which excludes a widow who certainly has done nothing wrong, and a kohain cannot marry a divorcee, who has also done nothing wrong  .

The Gemara rejects this suggestion and asserts that he does not necessarily agree with this, and he would permit a woman who had slept with another woman to marry even a Kohain Gadol.

The Gemara explains that he simply did not want them to become used to close bodily contact with other people in case they started doing the same with boys while they were unmarried still.

It seems to  follow that  at least according to THIS sugya, there is no actual Torah prohibition for women to sleep with each other , as if there was, that should have been enough reason for Shmuel’s father to stop his daughters sleeping on the same bed fully clothed.

This fits in well with the fact that there is no specific verse in the Torah prohibiting sexual activity between females, unlike the verses which seem to clearly forbid any such activity between two men.

However, just like we do not make halachic ruling from verses alone, we also do not make halachic rulings from one Gemara in isolation.

To get a bigger picture of this issue, it is necessary to study in depth all other sugyos that relate to this issue and study the rulings of the early poskim on the subject, at a minimum.

A look at the parallel sugya (Yevamos 76a)  and the Rambam (Issurei Biah 21/8), shows that this issue is not so simple, but that’s perhaps for another time – this is a daf post after all, not a teshuva or halakhic ruling.

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha .

Shabbos 64 Positive beauty  

 Modesty is an extremely important value in Torah life, both for men and for women, and although “tzenius” has many aspects, a very strong focus has been placed particularly in recent decades, on the modesty of woman’s dress.

This extra emphasis of an existing value can be explained by the changes in general society and super liberalization of dress standards, whereby extremely revealing and suggestive clothing has become the norm.

However, this has reached ridiculous extremes in some religious circles, where the very presence of women, either in person, or even in advertising, has become at best frowned upon, and at worst, been forcibly prevented.

In such circles, women and girls are often encouraged to dress as unattractively as possible, and stay out of the way, while their male counterparts face no such restrictions. 

There is no doubt in my mind that asides for the innate unfairness of treating women simply as if they are dangerous “eye candy” for hungry men and boys, such extreme treatment backfires, and causes the exact opposite of what is desired- men become over sensitized, often resulting in unhealthy, even abusive behavior, and woman become more and more sidelined, sometimes to the point that even  their relationship with their husbands is severely impacted .

On our Daf, we are told about more items which people are not allowed to wear on shabbos in a public domain, lest one take them off.

One example is a wig (sheitel or פאה נכרית) worn by women to look attractive.

The leading Amora, Rav ,tells us that although most things that are forbidden to wear in a public domain, may also not be worn in a shared courtyard which has no eiruv ( see Tosfos who holds that we are indeed discussing a courtyard without an eruv) there are a couple of exceptions.

One exception he mentions is the sheitel, which is allowed in a shared courtyard, while still forbidden in a true public domain for the above reason.

The reason for the leniency is that we do not want a woman to look less attractive to her husband, even in front of other people in a courtyard, so she doesn’t repulse him in general.

This despite the fact that there are other people in a shared courtyard, and certainly in a Karmelit, which according to Tosfos is also permitted .

It can also be noted that if it were not for the concern of a biblical desecration of shabbos laws, “chillul shabbos deorayso” in a true public domain, it would be permitted in the most crowded places too.

While the need for married women to be attractive  for their husbands might not go down so well in today’s liberal world, this is a totally different discussion for another occasion. 

What seems clear from this daf , however .is that there is absolutely no problem with married women looking good in public, in person , and certainly not in advertisements , so long as the basic  laws of modesty are kept, and this applies even more so to unmarried women of marriageable age who are supposed to be attractive to potential partners (see Kiddushin 30b)

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha .

Shabbos 63 Dangerous dogs 

Shabbos 63 Dangerous dogs

On this daf, Rabbi Aba brings the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, a leading first generation Amora, that one who keeps an “evil” dog in his house keeps kindness away from his house.

Rashi explains that because of the dangerous dog, poor people will be afraid to approach and ask for money.

The Gemara in Bava Batra( 7b) makes a similar point regarding a בית שער  (courtyard gate), saying that having a locked gate to one’s courtyard is also problematic for the same reason .

 

In Bava Kama( 46a) , the Gemora also states that one who keeps a dangerous dog in one’s house transgresses the prohibition of לא תשים דמים בביתך ( do not place blood in your house ), a prohibition against having perilous items or unguarded patios etc.

There is  much discussion as to what is considered an “evil”  dog, but both here and in the sugya in Bava Kama, a strong emphasis is placed on the danger scary dogs poise to pregnant women, who might be so terrified by it that they miscarry, chalila.

I was learning this Gemara with my 8 year old son, Noam, last night , and he reminded me about how when Julie was pregnant with him (and no, he didn’t know what was happening when he was in her womb..), the gate of our property fell ont her ,and although she was uninjured Boruch Hashem , she went to the hospital just to be sure that  the fright had not endangered the pregnancy.

It turned out that  he was indeed in distress, to the point that she almost had to have an emergency caesarean, many weeks too early .

I was far away in the Kruger park area at the time with a group of clients, it was night ,and there was no way to get back home , other than a 7 hour drive over treacherous mountain passes in the dark, something we decided was a bad idea, and my ability to be there added to the stress .

Boruch Hashem, he calmed down and all was fine- yet this personal experience made me extra sensitive to this issue , and in the daf today , a tragic story is told which didn’t end so well.

A pregnant woman went to a neighbor, as was the norm at the time for those who couldn’t afford their own oven , to use his oven to bake bread.

He had a dangerous dog, that barked so loudly at her that she miscarried.  Unaware of what happened, but seeing she was afraid, the man tried to calm her down, saying that the dog was harmless and  had its most dangerous teeth removed and claws cut.

Suffice to say, the woman told him she wanted nothing from him and it was already too late.

Chazal have various things to say about dogs, some very positive, some rather negative , and obviously things depend a lot on the type and nature of the dog, how  it is constrained, and other circumstances- when needed for security reasons , that is also a factor.

One thing, however, is clear to me from experience, and that is that in many places, people are simply unaware or totally ambivalent about the level of fear and stress that visitors get from their more aggressive 4 legged friends , and often get extremely defensive about it.

I remember as a child growing up in crime infested Johannesburg the terror I experienced every time I walked passed a house with a Rottweiler as it attacked the gate and made out as if it was about to charge me- on some occasions, large dogs actually jumped over those towering Joburg walls and though most were more bark than bite , I was more terrified of them than of the criminals .

 

And I was a kid who absolutely loved dogs and had 3 of my own!

A Jewish home is supposed to be an open home, where visitors, particularly the poor , feel welcome and at ease , and anything that causes it to be the opposite, other than valid security concerns, needs to be very carefully considered .

Shabbos 62 Important women versus the “cows of Bashan”

In a recent post, we discussed the ancient Talmudic  concept , extremely “progressive” in its time,  of an  “important woman” or אשה חשובה, one who due to her profession, wealth, or religious stature is not subservient to her husband and has obtained a status of equality, if not similarity , to the men of society .

We also noted how poskim in the past millennia, long before the modern drive for feminism, have noted that the woman of our society ALL have this status .

This is no way contradicts the biblical prohibition of cross-dressing between males and females (I am not addressing the issue here of transgender people, who are very likely a completely different category,) also sometimes extended to symbolizing the importance of unique roles assigned to each gender, and many halakhoth based on the “equal but different” mantra are still in force – women are allowed and expected to be women, and men are allowed and expected to be men.

Little girls should not be pushed to play with fire engine toys and little boys should not be pushed to play with dolls- gender is part of nature and biology and the Torah expects us to recognize and honor that, while still leaving the door open for certain exceptions based on the individual , so long as certain boundaries are not crossed.

Yet at the same time, there is a toxic side to femininity, just like there is a toxic side to masculinity.

Whereas the latter is often expressed in unnecessary violence and acts of war (which our sages considered to be “degrading” to the point that a sword is not considered to be a valid form of garment or adornment to be worn on shabbos ), as well as in rape and other physical abuse, the former  is often expressed in overly ostentatious and provocative dress, designed to make women into sexual  objects , as is so common in Hollywood.

The above excesses are not elegant and classy, like the “Jerusalem of Gold” worn by the ” Isha Chashuva”, of the likes of Rabbi Akiva’s wife Rachel, and Yalta, wife of Rav Nachman, but pure hedonistic and overtly sensual  displays of wealth and/or immorality.

These are the “cows of Bashan”  that the prophet Amos ( chapter 6 ) cries about, who anoint themselves with the best oils, sleep on beds of ivory AND oppress the poor, rather than show the acts of kindness these “important women” are known for ( recall How Rabbi Akiva’s wife initially slept in a barn for so many years and waited for her husband to come back from the studying she had pushed him to do )

These are the girls and women of Jerusalem that Amos mentions and Chazal elaborate on, who would intentionally try to seduce young lads to sin, and their equally perverse male counterparts, who would swop wives with each other and walk around the house naked , urinating on the floors as they were too lazy to get dressed to go out to the toilet.

Judaism does not reject beauty- Jewish women  are allowed to look attractive, and supposed to ( see Kiddushin  30b re how a father must make sure his daughter is attractive.), without compromising their modesty, as are men in their own way .

but it certainly rejects “over the top” ostentatious and hedonistic behaviour, which can destroy an otherwise observant Jewish society .

It’s a delicate but essential balance for us to strive for, the difference between building a Torah world, like the wife of Rabbi Akiva merited to do, and destroying the first commonwealth, as Amos’s  “cows of bashan”  played a major part in doing

These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha

Shabbos 61 Amulets for healing and protection


The Mishna tells us that one may not go out on shabbos wearing an amulet that does not come from an expert.
On the other hand, an amulet from an expert may be worn, and is considered a valid garment and not a burden.
The Gemara says that these rules apply to both amulets which have potions in them as well as amulets which contain holy verses from the scriptures.
The Torah, in Parshas Shoftim, prohibits various types of superstitious behavior, amongst them following or practicing omens, charms, calculating special times, magic, etc., and tells us to be “perfect with Hashem”- i.e. believe in and follow Hashem alone and no other supernatural powers or forces.
The Mishna and Gemara in Sanhedrin (perek 7) and describe these prohibitions in great details, and they are taken very seriously by all.
There is also a well-known dispute regarding the efficacy of these practices .
The Rambam and others of his school, appear to deny the existence of any supernatural forces in the world, and consider all these actions to be completely ineffective, in addition to being prohibited, calling them absolute foolishness.
On the other hand, the Ramban, and others mainly of the Kabbalistic school, believed that there are supernatural forces in the world , and that many of these actions can in fact work , but that as Jews, we are prohibited from following them.
The first Mishna in perek Cheilek lists someone who is “לוחש על המכה”, whispers holy verses to heal a wound, as one of those who have no share in the world to come .
The Rambam )Avoda Zara 11/12) , as is his way, explains that turning words of Torah into magical charms is the ultimate disgrace to Torah, in addition to the fact that they do not work.
So how does our daf make allowance for amulets with holy pesukim in them, on the basis that they have been shown to be effective?
Surely everyone would agree that even if they are effective, this is forbidden as per the Mishna in cheilek and the above prohibitions?
And how would the Rambam who believes that such things have no real affect at all, explain and rule on this explicit Mishna and Gemara which allows wearing such an amulet on shabbos?
In addition, amulets with potions in them should also be forbidden, based on the prohibitions of superstitious behavior, and according to Rambam’s approach, of course, also considered useless.
Please share your thoughts, and I shall try give some of mine in the comments section or in a later post, as this theme comes up again a little later in the perek.
These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf . They are not intended as psak halacha .